




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INTERNATIONAL LAW

AS INTERPRETED DURING

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

PRESS NOTICES OF THE FIRST EDITION.

THE TIMES (*Literary Supplement*).—"Every chapter testifies to conscientious, painstaking labour. The authors do not shirk difficult questions. They do not hide imperfect knowledge under generalities. Their statements are well "documented." It is a critical, well-considered history of the war from the point of view of the lawyer. Students will be grateful for the collection of facts and documents in the appendix. . . . They have reviewed, in a book certain to be often consulted, most of the chief questions of international law which have arisen during the war in a spirit of fairness and with conspicuous ability. . . . It is a piece of well-knit, solid work. It embodies research and care."

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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE JOURNAL.—"The authors of the above work have performed a service of the utmost value in presenting a reasoned examination, not only of the points of novelty and far-reaching principle that arose during the recent war, but also of those questions which are of special interest to commerce and the shipping industry. The various questions that attained such prominence during the war, such as contraband of war, laying mines in mid-ocean, the use of wireless telegraphy in war, the destruction of neutral vessels, the right of search, and the reception of belligerent cruisers in neutral waters, are all dealt with in a particularly thorough and lucid manner. . . . To the ship-owner and merchant, as well as to the student, the work under notice will be of the utmost interest and value."

THE STANDARD.—"A fine example of careful and intelligent work."

INTERNATIONAL LAW

AS INTERPRETED DURING
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

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RIGHT OF ASYLUM," ETC.

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1907

DEDICATION.

Dear Sir Robert Finlay,

We did not venture to dedicate to you the first edition of a work which not even your name might have redeemed from failure. Two facts encouraged us to ask your leave to address the second edition to yourself: we were influenced first by the unexpected success which the first edition achieved, and secondly by the spontaneous kindness with which you assured us of your substantial concurrence in the conclusions contained herein.

This was indeed "laudari a laudato viro," for it had been your official duty to advise the late Government in most of the difficult matters of controversy which are treated in the following pages.

We have followed at a long interval in your footsteps, and we greatly value the appreciation which you have been good enough to express of our work.

*F. E. S.
N. W. S.*

*"To Sir Robert Finlay, K.C.
Formerly his Majesty's Attorney-General."*

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
P R E F A C E.

THE kindness with which the public received the first edition of this work has rendered a second edition necessary within a period which, having regard to the nature of the book, must be pronounced short. We were at first in hopes that this circumstance would have enabled us to recast the whole work, in order to attenuate, so far as might be, the journalistic element which was inevitably conspicuous in a book which appeared almost the day peace was signed. It was, however, found that this object could not be attained without rewriting and rearranging the work—a task which for many reasons it was not possible for us to undertake. We have therefore contented ourselves with large omissions when the matter contained in the first edition seemed merely of temporary interest, with some not unimportant additions, and with very many corrections, which the suggestiveness of critics, or our own observations, have enabled us to make.

We are not without hope that in its present shape the work will be found useful for reference by those who undertake the responsible duty involved in the scientific consideration of International Law as a growing body of doctrine.

F. E. SMITH.

N. W. SIBLEY.



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
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INTERNATIONAL LAW

AS INTERPRETED

DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE points on which international law differs from law proper are almost as familiar as the points of resemblance. It possesses in a high degree many of the attributes which spring most readily to the mind which dwells upon the conception of law. It is deficient, however, in the one element which is of greatest practical importance. Nor is the deficiency discoverable merely by the nicely trained analysis of a disciple of Austin. A very ordinary type of mind, quite unfamiliar with the technical meaning of the missing "sanction," is able to appreciate the distinction with remarkable clearness. A British shipowner with a commercial quarrel upon his hands is comfortably familiar with its development from the issue of his writ until the delivery of judgment in the Commercial Court. The same man is conscious of unplumbed depths, of disagreeable and, worse still, of incalculable possibilities when he learns that his vessel must abide the issue of a tribunal in session at Vladivostock or Tokio to administer law, the very rules of which are often, before the event, unknown to his professional adviser. Such a man must often have reflected with bitterness, when offered the stone of diplomatic remonstrance, upon the irony latent in the term law of nations. The merchant who continues his trade

in provisions to a Japanese port which is hundreds of miles remote from the seat of belligerent operations, is advised in England that his traffic is innocent. When confronted with the arrest and, if he be unusually unfortunate, the destruction of his vessel, he is likely to realize the defect of a so-called law unillumined by the penetrating Roman maxim, *nemo potest iudex esse in re sua*.

It is, moreover, highly important to observe that the branch of international law which has engaged the attention of prize courts is the very part of the system which exhibits the most numerous points of analogy to law proper. If it fails here there is little hope for the more important residue, which is concerned not with the claim of foreign traders, but with high matters of national policy. In civilized countries prize courts invariably profess, and commonly attain to, a high standard of adherence to established principles. The abstract view was very clearly stated by Lord Stowell,¹ whose practice was inflexibly consistent with his theory.

"In forming this judgment I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me, namely, to consider myself as stationed here not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out without distinction to independent states, some happening to be neutral and some to be belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm—assert no pretension of the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to ignore no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character. If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and

¹ *The Maria*, 1 C. Rob. at p. 349.

which I mean should be considered, as the universal law upon the question."

It might be thought that a code of rules honestly administered upon these principles would be fairly entitled to the term of law. Yet even here, in the least assailable side of international law, a fundamental qualification is required. To justify the conception of law not only must the judge be honest and the principle judicial, but the system administered must be stable, consistent with precedent, and, above all, unsusceptible of variation at the hands of the litigant, *i.e.* *ex hypothesi* the belligerent Power of whose jurisdiction the tribunal is the creation. If the judge be disposed and constitutionally authorized to decide matters coming before his prize court with complete indifference to the transient claims of the belligerent's policy, we have a fairly close approximation to law with its twin connotations of regularity and coerciveness. To take a simple illustration. If a Russian judge decides the fate of an English prize by reference to the well-established principles out of which the rule of international law has been gradually shaped, he exercises functions comparable to those discharged by any other judge of law. If, however, he professes himself, or is in fact unable, to challenge the legality of a manifesto promulgated *ad hoc* by his Government, *e.g.* a list of contraband articles, he ceases to administer law, and becomes the creature of a system which is the very negation of law.

The matter becomes still clearer when examined from the point of view of disputes, not between belligerent nation and neutral individual, but between nation and nation. It is, of course, true that here, as elsewhere, there exists a mass of quasi-authority to which deference is at least ostensibly paid, but no one who has been professionally familiar with litigation will be deceived either by this circumstance or by the legal dress in which diplomatic disputes are commonly conducted. Even if the assumption be made that the rules of international law are as well ascertained as those of a scientifically codified modern system (an assumption which is notoriously inconsistent with the facts), the so-called

“adjective” portion, or that branch which is concerned with the enforcement of remedies, remains entirely deficient in the first postulates of every civilized system of jurisprudence. In other words, even an agreed code of rules is useless unless reinforced by an indifferent tribunal for the purpose of finding the facts. Every practising barrister knows how seldom he meets with a case in which the issues are purely legal, and how necessary it is for the tribunal to find certain facts before the legal issues involved can be usefully discussed. A simple illustration makes the distinction clear. A and B are litigants in an English Court. Their counsel are in substantial agreement as to the law applicable to their dispute, but A’s witnesses give one version of the facts and B’s another. The judge hears the evidence, finds the facts one way or the other, and has little difficulty in determining the considerations of law which govern the facts as found. Substitute Russia and Japan for A and B, and consider the course of events. The diplomatic correspondence is long and sterile because each disputant continually repeats his own version of the facts, and dilates upon the law appropriate to these facts. Progress is impossible simply because there is no method of dealing with these preliminary issues. The clearest code in the world is of no use to litigants who are in controversy as to the facts, and are equally entitled to insist upon their own version. These considerations are so familiar that we are in some danger of missing their significance. In fact, they suggest the conclusion that convenience has placed international law upon a pedestal which it has little claim to occupy. Suppose, for instance, a universal admission by all competent international authorities that Russia was right and Japan wrong in the controversies which preceded the late war. Conceive that all the jurists, from Grotius downwards, agree with the consistent stream of international practice to vindicate the pretensions of Russia. Yet, so far as international law is concerned, Japan is entitled to put her quarrel to the hazard of the sword. To parody the title of a valued convenience in the jurisprudence of Rome, there is *legitimatio per subsequens bellum*. And if Japan were to succeed

in a war with such an origin, her victorious armies might march in conquest to Moscow without violating any rule of international law.

To summarize the above views: international law consists of rules to regulate relations which have a legal rather than a moral character; its treaties and controversies have assumed a legal guise, encouraged by a general willingness to increase their apparent obligatoriness. But it none the less remains broadly true that it is deficient in that coercive side of the term law which is above all others essential and characteristic. All civilized nations agree that they are bound by its principles, and in the majority of cases find it convenient to observe them. On the other hand, they are not infrequently broken, and breaches may be consecrated by adding successful violence to the original offence. In reality the sources of its strength are three: (i) A regard which in a moral community often flickers but seldom entirely dies, for national reputation is affected by international public opinion; (ii) an unwillingness to incur the risk of war for any but a paramount national interest; (iii) the realization by each nation that the convenience of settled rules is cheaply purchased on the whole by the habit of individual compliance.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan was naturally of interest to all who follow the development of public law. It was scarcely conceivable that a prolonged and arduous campaign, both by sea and land, should be fought out without testing and modifying many rules which have been repeated in the text-books. The personality of the opposed nations rather widened than otherwise the possibilities of the struggle. On the one side was Russia, the convener of the Hague Conference, the builder, in a figurative way, of the nineteenth-century Temple of Peace. For her, indeed, the latter *rôle* was a novel one. Historically, her efforts in the direction of consolidating and adhering to the law of nations have been neither conspicuous nor successful. It is not yet forgotten how, in 1870, when the hands of Europe were tied by the Franco-Prussian War, Russia, without the slightest ground of excuse, repudiated the solemn treaty of 1856, and indirectly

struck a blow at the whole treaty law of nations. In later years her Far-Eastern policy has furnished a sinister commentary upon the Hague proposals. International law is not indeed concerned—at least not until invoked by China—with the repeated breaches of faith which marked the acquisition and growth of Russian influence in Manchuria; public, like municipal, law hands over to the censure of the moralist the man who merely says the thing which is not. Open conquest in these regions would have been legal, as we have seen above, but it would have been impolitic and difficult; the world was therefore treated to the idle fiction of leases, and a new refinement was added to the conceptions of international law.

The record of Japan in international matters was of a very different character, but here again there were in existence many factors making for uncertainty. The civilization of the West, widely diffused as it was known to be in Japan, was nevertheless a plant of recent introduction, and there were some who doubted whether it would be proof against the savagery excited by warfare even among the most cultivated nations of the world. Others—and amongst their number were many who know Japan best—pointed to an escutcheon kept with one single exception stainless during the trying struggle with China, and predicted that the nation which had preserved its dignity in the face of her humiliation at Port Arthur, which had never forgotten the language of courtesy and patience in the exasperating negotiations with St. Petersburg, would observe with scrupulous correctness the rules of international law as understood by the experts at Tokio.

The struggle extended over a period sufficiently long to justify an examination of its bearings upon the doctrines of international law. Many points of novelty have arisen and, what is more important, one or two questions of far-reaching principle. The former are dealt with at length in the following pages, but it is perhaps convenient to indicate the latter in this place. Under this head it may be confidently stated that the real significance of this war from the point of view of public law lies in the indifference with which

Russia has treated the rights of neutrals, as those rights have been hitherto understood. The undiscriminating comprehensiveness of her list of contraband articles, her repudiation of the distinction between conditional and unconditional contraband, her claim to destroy neutral vessels upon provocation so extremely slight, and, finally, her bold contention as to the status of the volunteer cruisers, suggested decisively that the Russia of 1904 is still in essentials the Russia of 1870. The force of these reflections was increased rather than lessened by the fact that the statesmen responsible for those usurpations upon neutral rights were, at least for the moment, the spokesmen of a defeated power. Had Russia been in the flush of conquest and in possession of the sympathy of France and Germany, it may well be doubted whether any concession would have rewarded the efforts of British diplomacy. And yet many of the pretensions advanced from St. Petersburg were in conflict, as will be seen hereafter, with the whole weight of authoritative opinion from Grotius down to Lord Stowell.

It may indeed be asked whether the reference to authority, which is so frequent in the pages that follow, is of practical importance in the present condition of diplomatic controversy. Did the cogency of Grotius disappear at the time when Homer lost his vogue in the House of Commons? The answer is, perhaps, that after a period of reaction against excessive over-valuation the opinions of jurists are now considered with a stricter sense of proportion. Their views are valuable in proportion to the personal weight of the writer, and still more to unanimity among authorities belonging to different nations, and presumably under the influence of different preconceptions. It is, indeed, hardly conceivable that men of action—men of the Bismarck type—will be deterred from a course which promises advantage by the admonitions of Grotius and his successors. They are more likely in Bismarck's methods to employ a diligent student to discover in the vast literature of the subject a more favourable opinion. Even so moderate a statesman as Lord Salisbury pronounced that international law depended generally on the prejudices of the writers of text-books. It may be assumed that when authority is nicely

balanced, so that a plausible argument is possible on either side, the man of affairs will not embarrass himself by weighing too scrupulously opinion and counter-opinion. He will choose his course at the moment, and collect the authorities at his leisure. It is, however, in one way almost as important as it ever was to note both the current of national practice and of expert opinion in questions of public law, because public opinion is strongly influenced in all civilized countries by the views of those who profess a special familiarity with its problems. The practical importance to-day of citations from the old jurists lies in the respect still paid to them in the pages of the better known text writers, in diplomatic correspondence, and so ultimately in that international public opinion which is, after all, the strongest bulwark of international law. For these reasons it has been thought useful and, at least, historically interesting to examine in the following pages the various points which have arisen in the light of similar controversies which have preceded them, and the discussions provoked by such controversies. It is apparent that the most important of the questions under consideration have concerned Russia on the one hand, and a neutral nation on the other. Japan has only once been brought into direct collision with public opinion, and even on that occasion the voice of authority was almost equally divided. The considerations involved in what is commonly known as the cutting-out incident are discussed in detail elsewhere. It may be fully conceded that the curiously artificial situation created by the partial neutralization of China by the belligerents lent strong support to the contentions put forward in the official Japanese apologia, but it is none the less permissible to regret that Japan should even for a moment have stood in the debatable land of international subtleties. Throughout the war her attitude has been one of intelligent correctness, "giving nothing away" in the current phrase, but taking no liberties with accepted international practice. Few subjects in the astonishing curriculum of Japanese education have proved more attractive than the study of law. The law students in the University of Tokio are far more numerous

than those of any other faculty, and it is stated that public law and international law are the favourite subjects of research. From the moment that Japan successfully asserted her claim to enter the concert of civilized nations she set aside some of the finest minds in the country to become the vigilant guardians of her international legality. She left as little as possible to the international law of the quarterdeck, and it is reported that jurists were attached to the staffs of her marshals to instruct and advise them in the subject of their particular study. Thus, in the Chinese War, Professors Takahashi and Uriga were appointed respectively to advise the navy and army,¹ and in their accounts of the questions which arose for discussion made a permanent addition to the literature of the subject. It is, perhaps, not fanciful to trace in the masterly documents which have from time to time been put forward by the Imperial Government, the skill and experience of specialists who have given their lives to a particular study, and who enjoy in Japan a practical influence which is hardly conceded elsewhere. The conjecture may, perhaps, be put forward that had the relations of Russia with neutrals been determined by men with the learning and experience of Professor Martens instead of by a council commonly supposed to contain an excessive proportion of grand dukes, the controversies provoked by the war would have been at once less frequent and less bitter.

¹ *Times*, Oct. 6, 1904.

PART I.

THE NORMAL RELATIONS OF RUSSIA, JAPAN,
CHINA, AND TURKEY.

CHAPTER I.

BELLIGERENT OPERATIONS IN NEUTRAL TERRITORY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

SUCH facts arising out of the events of the war as illustrate the Normal relations of Russia, China, and Korea.
principle that neutral territory must not form the basis of belligerent operations, may be conveniently divided into those which relate to Manchuria, Korea, and China respectively. The facts relating to Manchuria and Korea are somewhat complex, and from the first have been recognized as presenting problems of great difficulty in the light of international law.

It will be convenient to examine first by what right the Russians have rendered Manchuria, as Belgium was in the ^{sia in Man-} _{churia.} Great War, the battlefield of nations other than the territorial sovereign.

At the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5, by Japan acquires Port Arthur by Treaty of Shimonoseki. Russia, Germany, and France interposed, and objected to Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany. The victors had, therefore, to be content with the acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, and an additional indemnity of thirty million taels.¹ When Russia ultimately acquired the Liao-tung peninsula in 1898, Mr. Balfour reminded the House of Commons that the Russian objection to a Japanese Port Arthur was that it would have been a constant menace to the capital of China, dominating, as

¹ "Annual Register," 1895, p. 343.

it did, the maritime approaches to Pekin. Subsequent events cast a significant light upon Russia's action in 1895. Sir W. Harcourt observed of intervention that "its essence is illegality, and its justification is its success." An intervention, like that of Russia in 1895, can hardly be called successful when, within a single decade, it has the effect of committing the State which intervenes to a mortal struggle with one of the parties whose action gave rise to the intervention. It is difficult not to regard her action in 1895 as not merely the overbearing, but even the exclusive, cause of the great war of 1904. Though the intervention of 1895 succeeded in its immediate object, it perhaps illustrates, as conspicuously as any in history, that other aphorism of Sir W. Harcourt's, "Of all things at once the most illegal and the most unjustifiable is an unsuccessful intervention."

Alleged secret
treaty between
Russia and
China.

But Russia did not rest content with the advantage she had gained over Japan in 1895. Ever active and vigilant, her diplomacy reaped important fruits in the course of the following year. The rumours of a Russo-Chinese treaty were revived in March, 1896, and in December what claimed to be the text of the treaty was published. In St. Petersburg nothing was known of it. In fact there is little doubt that a secret treaty arrangement had been concluded between Russia and China. The text of this agreement or treaty as published was, it is alleged, only that of the draft proposed by Count Cassini, Russian Minister at Pekin, for the approval of the Chinese Government, and was materially modified before definitive adoption. By this so-called treaty China allowed Russia to extend the Siberian railway across Manchuria, from Vladivostock to Hunch-un, and thence to the capital of the Kirin province, also from a city in Siberia to Aigun, to the provincial capital of Tsitshur, to Petunê in the province of Kirin and thence to the capital of Kirin. The entire control of the railways was to be in Russia's hands for thirty-six years, at the end of which time China was at liberty to redeem them. Russia was to be allowed to build another railway from Mukden to the Siberian trunk line if China failed to build it. She was further empowered to place soldiers at

important stations to protect railway property. China was permitted to engage Russian officers to reform her army organization. An additional clause provided Russia with a seaport. China further undertook to lease to Russia the port of Kioo-chau, in the province of Shantung. These rumours were substantially confirmed shortly afterwards by the issue of an imperial ordinance giving the Czar's sanction to the articles of association of the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, which undertook to construct a railway on Chinese territory in connection with the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway. The company was to have a capital of five million roubles, and the line was to be completed in six years. Even at that date, in 1896, the *National Zeitung* argued that the treaty could only be the fragment of a wider agreement procuring for Russia the ultimate possession of Port Arthur. But in this country later events showed that there was a complete indisposition to realize the sedulousness with which Russia was toiling towards her objective. Her action in Korea, as will be seen, only formed a part of the same consistent plan. It now remains to describe the final steps Russian acquisition of Port Arthur.
by which she acquired possession of Port Arthur. Early in 1898 her diplomacy was extraordinarily aggressive. Sir Nicholas O'Connor, our ambassador at St. Petersburg, informed Lord Salisbury, in a dispatch of January 19, that the endeavour of Great Britain to make Taliewan a treaty port, was regarded as so unfriendly an act in Russia as to set afloat rumours of war. On January 27 the Russian ambassador communicated to her Majesty's Government the assurance that any port acquired by Russia on the coasts of the North Pacific would be open to the ships and commerce of all the world, like any other port of the Chinese littoral. By the treaty of Tientsin, Art. 52, foreign countries were authorized to send ships of war to all ports within the dominions of China. About March 10, 1898, the British squadron sailed to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li and visited Port Arthur. The Russian Government protested, and Lord Salisbury, instead of reinforcing the squadron, instructed the British admiral, in more or less direct terms, to quit the port

without delay. This complaisance elicited censure from two such opposed leaders of public opinion in the House of Commons as Sir W. Harcourt and Lord Charles Beresford. The former observed that if we wished to come to an understanding with Russia, the worst thing we could do was to remove the ships, or to allow them to be removed. Nor was Lord Charles Beresford less emphatic in his censure of the withdrawal. On March 16 Count Muravieff authorized Sir Nicholas O'Connor to notify her Majesty's Government that in the event of the Chinese Government consenting to lease Taliewan and Port Arthur to the Russian Government, both ports would be open to foreign trade like other ports in China —a concession *lucus a non lucendo*. About this date Sir Claude Macdonald informed Lord Salisbury that the reason why Russia insisted upon a lease of the Liao-tung peninsula from China was that she desired the means of protecting Manchuria from foreign Powers. The Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Pekin declined to say what Powers were suggested by this apprehension; but it was no secret, as Sir Nicholas O'Connor informed Lord Salisbury, that England and Japan were aimed at. He added that even the Chinese Government recognized the absurdity of the pretext. But the Yamén were aware that they must yield to Russia unless they received help, and therefore earnestly begged that Lord Salisbury would assist them by giving an assurance to the Russian Government that the British Government entertained no designs on Manchuria. The assurance requested by the Yamén was given. It was a fruitless, if a graceful, concession, and had so little effect in abating Russia's insistence, that on March 24 Sir Claude Macdonald telegraphed from Pekin that China was forced to give way to Russia against her will, the latter Power having threatened to take hostile measures unless a lease of both ports were granted before March 27.

In fact the English Government showed neither presence of mind nor resolution. On March 29 it was admitted that a treaty had been signed on March 27 between Russia and China, by which the usufruct of Port Arthur and Taliewan was granted to Russia. During the whole of the crisis, January–March,

1898, the *Times* supplied information of great precision and timeliness to the public; and ministers who consistently denied it were uniformly compelled, after a short interval, to accept it in substance.

It cannot, however, be said that Lord Salisbury failed to realize the seriousness of the position created by the aggrandisement of Russia when the treaty became known. The Prime Minister telegraphed to Sir Claude Macdonald that the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li was materially altered by the surrender of Port Arthur by the Yamén to Russia, and that the British fleet was on its way from Hong-Kong to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. In answer to Russia's action a lease of Wei-hai-Wei was extorted from China on April 4. Opinions, however, differed as to the value of the concession made by China to this country. The terms of the agreement with the Chinese Government effected by Russia on March 27, 1898, were that Russia was to have possession of Port Arthur and Taliewan (with territories that were neither defined at the time nor subsequently), and their adjacent waters for a term of twenty-five years, which might be extended by agreement. Within the territories and waters leased Russia obtained sole military and naval control, and was at liberty to build forts and barracks as she desired. Port Arthur was closed to all vessels except Russian and Chinese men-of-war¹; part of Taliewan harbour was reserved exclusively for Russian and Chinese men-of-war, but the remainder was freely open to merchant vessels of all countries.

To the north a neutral zone was to be defined where Chinese troops should not be quartered except with the consent of Russia. For such period as Russia might hold Port Arthur, Great Britain was, by agreement with China, to hold Wei-hai-Wei, in the province of Shantung, and this port was occupied by British troops in June, 1898. For defensive purposes Great Britain, in addition, obtained a ninety-nine years' lease of territory on the mainland opposite the island of Hong-Kong. To compensate for the advantage given to the Russians,

¹ The stipulation that Port Arthur shall be closed to all but Russian and Chinese men-of-war seems contrary to the Treaty of Tientsin, Art. 52.

Terms of Russian tenure of
Port Arthur.

Further Chinese con-
cessions.

British, and Germans (who acquired Kiao-Chau, December-January, 1897-8), the Chinese Government granted to the French in April, 1898, a lease of the Bay of Kwang Chau Wan, on the east coast of the Tien-Chau peninsula, opposite Fort Hainan.

Applicability of term "usufruct." These anomalous and unforeseen grants by China were needlessly complicated by the introduction of terms derived from Roman law. Whatever the precise nature of the territorial rights with which China parted in 1898, they were clearly rights derived from treaty. But the treaty part of the law of nations is precisely that part which is generally considered not to be derived from the Roman law. Consequently, the concessions of China in 1898 are hardly elucidated by

Professor T. E. being described as usufructs. Professor T. E. Holland observed Holland.

on this point, "I can recall no other use of the term usufruct in international discussion than the somewhat rhetorical statement that an invader should consider himself as an usufructuary of the resources of the country which he is invading; which is no more than to say that he should use it *en bon père de famille*."¹ But it is necessary to recollect that both Grotius,² and Vattel,³ adopt the view that sovereignty merely confers the usufruct of dominions. Grotius considers that most kings, both elected and hereditary, hold their authority *jure usufructuario*, as tenant for life. He admits that kings may hold their authority *pleno jure*, but this is not the usual case. Even writers like Wolf, who consider that monarchy may be patriarchal, admit also that the monarch may merely have the usufruct of his dominions. But Vattel, who is very explicit on the subject, considers that a state cannot be a patrimony, since the end of patrimony is the advantage of the possessor, whereas the prince is established only for the advantage of the State.⁴ The fact that Vattel insists that in every case the monarch has only the usufructus of his dominions, renders

¹ *Times*, April 1, 1898. The reference is to Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," Bk. I. c. iv. s. 20.

² "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," lib. i. c. iii. ss. 11, 12.

³ "Droit des Gens," c. i. ss. 61, 68; *ibid.*, I. iv. c. ii. s. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. i. c. v. s. 61, referring to Grotius, "History of the Disturbances in the Netherlands," Bk. II.

it rather inconsistent that the occurrence of the term should be regarded as a solecism in international discussion.¹

The frequent leases and concessions of territory in modern times cannot be defended by an appeal to the authoritative writers on International Law. Grotius considers that a king is not to be presumed to have the right of alienation if he owes his sovereignty to the will of the people. If, however, a king had authority over a people *proprio jure* he could alienate his kingdom.² Vattel considers every true sovereignty, in its nature, inalienable.³ Vattel's view is certainly supported by the fact that in modern times leases of territory in time of peace, are, almost without exception, exacted from weak States by powerful neighbours.

The Boxer rising of 1900 afforded an opportunity for Russia to pour troops into Manchuria. In September, 1903, she undertook to restore Niu-Chang and evacuate Mukden on October 8. Her failure to fulfil these two promises was the proximate cause of the war. On December 28, 1903, in spite of the promises referred to, the Russian Minister at Pekin informed the Chinese Foreign Office that no further steps could be taken towards the evacuation of Manchuria.

Before the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea was undoubtedly under the suzerainty of China, though in 1875 the Japanese

Suzerainty of
China over
Korea previous
to 1895.

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. ii. s. 13. The terminology of territorial concessions has not always been the same in the most conspicuous modern instances, even when the occasion and manner of the grant has been in *pari materia*. When Turkey ceded Cyprus to Great Britain in 1878 by the famous "conditional treaty," neither the term "usufruct" or the term "lease" was used, contrary to the suggestion made in a review of the first edition of this book in the *Athenaeum*, September 9, 1905, p. 329. By Article II. of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty the Sultan consented "to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England" ("Ann. Reg." 1878; State Papers and Documents, 251). Neither the term "usufruct" nor the term "lease" appears to have been used in respect of British territory in Baluchistán ("Statesman's Year Book," 1905, p. 174). On the other hand, the term "lease" seems to have been used in the case of territorial concessions in West Africa, as regards the Lado enclave. Great Britain has sovereign rights within the enclave, of which the Nile forms the eastern boundary, but has leased certain islets in the river to the Congo Free State ("Statesman's Year Book," 1905, p. 551). In 1894, a lease granted to Great Britain of a strip of territory along the German frontier on the Congo was declared void ("Ann. Reg." 1894, p. 376).

² Lib. i. c. iii. s. 12.

³ "Droit des Gens," I. i. c. v. s. 69.

obtained certain concessions which were of a commercial and not a political character. Since 1636 Korea has not been at war with either Japan or China, and has maintained an attitude of absolute isolation. Japan denied the suzerainty of China over Korea, and this issue was one of the ostensible causes

Treaties recognizing independence of Korea since 1895.

of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894. The independence and integrity of Korea as a fully independent empire have been recognized by all the Powers since that event. This independence was acknowledged not only by the first article of the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, but also by an agreement specially concluded for this purpose between Japan and Great Britain on January 30, 1902, as well as by a Russian declaration of March, 1902.¹ The history of Korea since the Treaty of Shimonoseki resembles that of the Balkan States since the Treaty of Berlin. There have been repeated revolutions and disturbances, though the King, who in 1897 proclaimed himself Emperor, has remained on the throne. Immediately after the war between China and Japan, Russian aggrandizement began in Korea. Early in 1896, at a season of complete tranquillity, a force of Russian marines with a field gun landed at Chemulpho. The King, by a preconcerted arrangement, proclaimed his ministers guilty of treason, and fled to the Russian Legation. He remained there on the pretext that he feared the Japanese. Russia placed him under protection, and lent seven million roubles to develop the resources of Korea. In return for this she was to hold the two northern provinces of Korea as a guarantee for the debt. Japan was admitted (according to the statement in the Annual Register) to a share in this arrangement. A kind of dual control or joint protectorate was established, under the terms of which both Russia and Japan were to keep 250 soldiers at Seoul. But Japan's share in the control was little more than nominal. From 1896-8 a Russian colonel acted as instructor to the military forces of Korea, who were armed with Berdan rifles. On the other hand, after the Boxer rising, Japan succeeded in defeating a Russian design to acquire Masampho, the finest harbour in

¹ Cf. the answer of Earl Percy to Mr. Norman in the House of Commons, June 15, 1904.

Korea. The cruel execution of two Korean officials, formerly Cabinet Ministers, aroused great resentment in Japan in 1900, and from that year until 1905 the war cloud gradually deepened.

In June, 1903, General Kuropatkin, then Russian Minister of War, visited Tokio. His reception, and the friendly tone of the Russian Press at the time, gave some promise of a satisfactory settlement of the Russo-Japanese question in Manchuria. But Russia's continued occupation of Yongampho in Korea undeceived those who held this hope, and excited intense irritation in Japan. At a conference held in October, 1903, between the Japanese Ministers and the Elder Statesmen (Genro), Marquis Ito was said to have proposed that Japan should limit her demands to a pledge from Russia to respect and maintain Chinese and Korean integrity and independence. He further proposed to recognize Japan's "special interests" in Korea, and Russia's in Manchuria, with "equality of opportunity" for the commerce of both in Manchuria and Korea.

At this date it was generally recognized that six Japanese statesmen of the first rank were working for peace—Counts Okuma, Itagaki, Inouye, and Matsukata, and the Marquises Ito and Yamagata. The Emperor at the Japanese Diet (December 10, 1903) delivered a speech in which he referred to the prudence and circumspection shown by his Ministers in the negotiations for securing Japan's rights and interests.

A dramatic *dénouement* to this pacific declaration occurred when the House of Representatives on the same day adopted, without a division, a reply imputing to the Ministry a temporizing policy at home and neglect of its interests abroad. The House then dissolved. The Russian reply to Japan's demands was shortly afterwards received, but was considered unsatisfactory. After consultation between the Ministry and the Elder Statesmen (Genro) Russia was asked, on December 21, to reconsider her position. Rumours of her designs on Masampho were repeated about this date, and fomented the rising resentment in Japan. Finally, the Emperor of Korea, foreseeing the danger of a possible conflict

between Russia and Japan, addressed, in the early part of January, 1904, a Note to all the Powers, declaring his determination to preserve the strictest neutrality. In fact, however, this declaration was favourable to Russia, and it was referred to in terms of praise by Count Lamsdorff in his protest against the commencement of hostilities by the Japanese.¹ The declaration of the Emperor of Korea has been subsequently described as a declaration of neutrality, although made at least a month before the outbreak of hostilities. According to the common view, a declaration of neutrality can only be made after two other Powers have declared war or engaged in hostilities. Against this may be set the view of some European publicists, such as Galiani and Azuni, that a state of neutrality is a continuation of a former state, and not the creation of a new state of things. If the state of neutrality is regarded as a continuation of a former state of things, there is nothing in principle to prevent the issue of a declaration of neutrality before the commencement of hostilities. It is proposed to review, in the succeeding chapter, the declaration of war by Japan, which followed shortly after the events which have been described. The sequence of events in Korea after the battle of Chemulpho, February 8, 1904, is so confused and chaotic that it is extremely difficult to reconcile it with any ordinary construction of the principles of either belligerency or neutrality.

At the commencement of 1904 it seems, however, fairly clear that Russia stood *de facto* at a certain advantage in Korea. The chief political figure in the country, Yi Yong Ik, who possessed practically dictatorial powers, was very friendly to her pretensions. Further, at this date she had obtained a large number of valuable concessions from the Korean Government. On the evening of the battle of Chemulpho, the Japanese Minister in an interview with the Emperor of Korea, declared that Japan would henceforward govern Korea, threatening that Japanese troops would occupy the Emperor's palace in case of resistance. The Japanese Legation in Korea made no previous declaration either to the

Japanese
action in
Korea, Feb.,
1904.

¹ *Times*, February 24, 1904.

Korea Government or to the foreign representatives of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia or of the opening of hostilities.¹ The Russian Minister to Korea was dismissed, Yi Yong Ik was stripped of his office and banished to Japan, and changes were effected in the Korean Cabinet which brought into power the partisans of Japan. Four battalions of Japanese infantry were landed. A protocol between the Imperial Governments of Japan and Korea was concluded at or about the same date, February 8.²

On the conclusion of this agreement the position of Korea

¹ *Times*, February 23, 1904.

² M. Gonsuké Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and Major-General Yi Chi Yong, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, being respectively duly empowered for the purpose, have agreed upon the following articles:—

Article I.—For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea, and firmly establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvement in administration.

Article II.—The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of firm friendship, ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial Household of Korea.

Article III.—The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

Article IV.—In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggressions of a third Power or internal disturbances, the Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as circumstances require, and in such case the Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facility to promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government. The Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the above-mentioned object, occupy, when the circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategic points of view.

Article V.—The Governments of the two countries shall not in future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present protocol.

Article VI.—Details in connection with the present protocol shall always be arranged as the circumstances may require between the representative of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Korea. (Cf. *Times*, February 29, 1904.)

An arrangement similar to that alluded to in Article VI. of the above protocol of February, 1904, was signed at Seoul on August 22 between the representatives of Japan and Korea. The fact that so long an interval occurred before effect was given to Article I. of the protocol of February, must be attributed to the difficulty Japan encountered in overcoming Russian influence in the Korean Cabinet, as throughout August there are found in the columns of the *Times* allusion to the fact that the Japanese Minister at Korea was urging on the Emperor to dismiss his Cabinet and replace them by advisers well disposed to Japan. The text of the agreement of August 22 was as follows:—

Korea, whether belligerent or neutral.

According to the view of international law taken by Dr. Lushington in the case of the Ionian ships (2 Spinks, 212), a protecting State has the right to make peace or war for the protected State, but must clearly express an intention to place the protected State in a state of war. *Ex necessitate rei*, the protected State does not become a belligerent from the sovereign State being at war. Before the outbreak of the South African War, Mr. Schreiner, then Prime Minister of Cape Colony, announced that if hostilities ensued between Great Britain and the South African Republic Cape Colony would remain neutral. This declaration incurred strong animadversion at the time,¹ and is quite incapable of defence by reference to the rule laid down by Dr. Lushington, inasmuch as Cape Colony is not a protectorate, but a self-governing dependency of Great Britain.

It will be seen from the below given conventions between Korea and Japan, that Korea has become, at least for the moment, a protected State. Japan seems, by virtue of these conventions, to stand in the same relation substantially to Korea that Great Britain occupies with respect to Egypt. The analogy is rather one of substance than of form, because we do not nominally exercise suzerainty over Egypt, whose suzerain Power is, on the other hand, Turkey, a third Power. It seems very difficult either to understand or to defend the conventions concluded by Japan with Korea in this year, except upon the ground of military exigency, going to the root of national existence. A State fighting for its independence—and nothing less than the independence of Japan is at stake in the Russo-Japanese War

(1) The Korean Government shall engage as financial adviser to Korean Government a Japanese subject recommended by the Japanese Government, and all matters concerning finance shall be dealt with after his counsel has been taken.

(2) The Korean Government shall engage as a diplomatic adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs a foreigner recommended by the Japanese Government, and all important matters concerning foreign relations shall be dealt with after his counsel has been taken.

(3) The Korean Government shall consult the Japanese Government before concluding treaties or conventions with foreign Powers and in dealing with other imperial diplomatic affairs, such as the granting of concessions to or contracts with foreigners.

¹ *Law Times*, Sept. 9, 1899.

—may cite authority as high as Vattel to justify acts not otherwise permissible. The attitude of the Korean Government at this time was not friendly to Japan. But the protocols under discussion seem not only to infringe the Treaty of Shimonoseki, but also the Anglo-Japanese alliance created under treaty nearly two years before. While the provision of the protocol of February, 1904, relating to the occupation of strategic points in Korea by Japanese troops, under certain contingencies, may perhaps not be considered to infringe the territorial integrity of Korea, it cannot be said that the convention does not affect its status as an independent Power. It is quite true that by Art. 3 Japan guarantees the independence of Korea; and the limitation on the treaty-making Power is mutual to both States, and only operates as regards engagements contrary to the tenor of the protocol. The later convention, after providing for the appointment of financial and political advisers, limits the treaty-making power of Korea by a general restraint. Therefore, Korea appears to be in the same position as the South African Republic under the London Convention. The mere appointment of advisers does not of itself involve a protectorate, and it can hardly be supposed that the Japanese Government intended permanently to reduce Korea to the position of a mi-Souverain State by the protocols of February, 1904, and August 22. But it is difficult to exclude the generally prevalent impression that by this arrangement Korea has virtually become mi-Souverain. If this view is accepted, the protocol of February, 1904, constitutes an undoubted infraction both of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895, and of the Anglo-Japanese convention. Further, it is calculated to imperil the relations of Japan with France, since the latter Power, by the Franco-Russian agreement that ensued on the Anglo-Japanese agreement, equally guaranteed the independence of Korea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the answering Franco-Russian declaration, though only temporary engagements, do not expire till 1907.

Count Lamsdorff, after the agreement between Japan and Korea, in a protest addressed to the Powers, declared that

Russia did not consider herself to be at war with Korea. At that date, and even long after February, 1904, Korea had a representative at St. Petersburg. Therefore, if Korea declared war by entering into the agreement with Japan, the only historical parallel for her action in commencing belligerent operations without withdrawing her ambassador is that afforded by Russia herself, who, in 1808, invaded Finland before the ambassadors had been withdrawn on either side.

It is, of course, quite impossible to deny that Korea is *de facto* belligerent at the present time, her troops having actually engaged in belligerent operations with bodies of Russian troops.

The terms of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of February, 1902, to which great attention has naturally been devoted during the course of hostilities, are as follow. The two Governments, "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Far East, and being specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the empires of China and Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," agreed as follows:—

Terms of
Anglo-Japan-
ese Agree-
ment, Feb. 12,
1902.

"I. The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be advantageous for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and properties of its subjects.

"II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in defence of their respective interests, as above described, should become involved

in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

“III. If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

“IV. The High Contracting Powers agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

“V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.”

VI. This article provides that the agreement shall come into effect at once, and remain in force five years, and if not denounced at the end of the fourth year, till a year after being denounced by either party. “But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall *ipso facto* continue until peace is concluded.”

It is by no means uninstructive to recall some ministerial interpretations of the Anglo-Japanese convention. Lord Lansdowne observed that Japan could well hold her own in combat with a single Power, but that if she were attacked by more than one she would be in imminent peril; and against a coalition of Powers we meant to protect her. The territorial integrity of China included Manchuria. The failure of Russia to keep her repeated promises to evacuate Manchuria has, therefore, on this view, brought about one of the conditions which demands the intervention of this country under the convention. Further, since the convention expressly lays it down that Great Britain is interested, even more than Japan, in maintaining the territorial integrity of China, it should logically seem that it was this country, and not Japan, on which the obligation was incumbent of insisting upon the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia according to the express terms of the convention.

Explanation of
Anglo-Japan-
ese Agreement
by Lord Lans-
downe.

By Lord Cranborne.

Lord Cranborne, shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese convention, observed that it was not framed in an aggressive spirit. The principle of the open door and of the territorial integrity of China had been laid down in several public documents, and was accepted by almost all the Powers. These two principles, and the recognition of Japan's special interests in Korea, which were admitted by Russia in 1898, were the three main foundations of the agreement. It was only when either party to the alliance was the subject of aggression from two Powers in combination that the obligation on the other to fight would come into effect. Whether or not such aggression had been suffered would be a question for the ally so called upon.¹

The Anglo-Japanese agreement elicited an official declaration from Russia and France welcoming the principles affirmed by the treaty, but reserving to themselves the consideration of the means of protecting their interests in certain eventualities. This declaration was regarded in Russia as specially important, because it showed that the Franco-Russian alliance bound the two Powers to act in the Far East as well as in Europe. It is impossible not to comment on the fact that while the Franco-Russian declaration of March, 1902, professed "to welcome" the principles of the territorial integrity and independence of China and Korea, Russia was at the time occupying Manchuria, and more than a year afterwards found herself unable to assign a date for evacuation. The most interesting feature of the Franco-Russian declaration of March, 1902, is that it suggested an obligation on France, in certain ill-defined contingencies, to act jointly with Russia in the Far East. However, this is all that can be said. To the extent to which the Franco-Russian declaration has been made public, it does not appear that France contemplated that Russia might be made the object of a coalition of Powers, such as that which, in 1895, prevented Japan from acquiring Port Arthur. But it is not easy to see what is the rationale of the Franco-Russian declaration, unless it is merely a counter declaration to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Franco-Russian declaration, March, 1902.

¹ "Annual Register," February, 1902, p. 60.

CHAPTER II.

RUSSIA AND THE PASSAGE OF THE BOSPHORUS—THE RAID OF THE VOLUNTEER CRUISERS, "PETERSBURG" AND "SMO- LENSK," IN THE RED SEA.

THE right of innocent navigation in appropriated basins which History of the
is recognized to-day was not conceded by Turkey when the question.
Black Sea was a Turkish lake. Peter the Great was able
for a time to acquire a footing on the Black Sea, and set his
heart on putting Russia in regard to the Dardanelles in the
same position as she occupied in the Sound. But his suc-
cessors were defeated in this object by the wars which took
place in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The
Black Sea only ceased to be a Turkish lake in consequence of Treaty of
the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774. While restoring Kutchuk-Kai-
to Turkey much of the territory of which her arms had put
her in possession, Russia retained Kinburn, Yenikale, Kertch,
and Azoff, with the adjacent territory. By Article XI. of the
Treaty of Kainardji, Russian merchant vessels were given a
free passage through the Bosphorus, and the aim of Peter the
Great's policy seemed realized.¹ But after the Treaty of
Kainardji, Russia and Turkey treated the Black Sea as a
mare clausum, which was closed to the commerce of all other
countries. By the seventh article of the Treaty of Adrianople, Treaty of
1829, the right of innocent navigation was conceded in the Adrianople,
Black Sea, not only to Russian merchant vessels, but also to
those of other European States in amity with Turkey.² At
the Treaty of Adrianople, therefore, the situation, as far as the

¹ Cf. Article on the Malacca Incident in the *Times* July 25, 1904.

² Martens, "Nouveau Recueil," t. viii. p. 143.

Black Sea and Dardanelles were concerned, was, in the view of modern international law, purely a normal one. They became territorial waters, in which the right of innocent navigation could be exercised, while access was prohibited to the public armed vessels of other States. For obvious reasons Turkey had always strenuously opposed the entry of foreign vessels of war into the Straits. From ancient times she refused such permission, and asserted her rights to exclude them. But when Mehemet Ali's revolt against the Sultan menaced the safety of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Turkey concluded in 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, by which the former engaged to send its fleet and army to the aid of the latter, the fleet being free to pass the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By a separate and secret article the Porte promised not to allow the entrance of the vessels of war of other nations under any pretext whatever. This arrangement was not long maintained in the face of the opposition of Europe; and England and France protested against the Secret Article as soon as it became known to them. By the treaty concluded at London on July 13, 1841, between the five great European Powers and the Ottoman Porte, the principle of closing the Straits was for the first time declared in a formal instrument. By the first article of this treaty the Sultan declared his firm resolution to maintain in future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; that so long as the Porte should be at peace, he would admit no foreign vessel of war into the said Straits. The five Powers, on their part, engaged to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

Treaty of
Unkiar Ske-
lessi, 1833.

Treaty of
London, 1841.

By the second article it was provided that, in declaring the inviolability of this ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan reserved the faculty of granting, as heretofore, firmans allowing the passage to light armed vessels employed, according to usage, in the service of the diplomatic legations of friendly Powers.

By the third article the Sultan also reserved the faculty of notifying this treaty to all the Powers in amity with the Sublime Porte, and of inviting them to accede to it.

Article X. of the General Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris, General Treaty of March 30, 1856, referred to "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" as to the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles. And by a convention annexed to this General Treaty, between her Majesty the Queen of England, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Sardinia on the one part, and the Sultan on the other part, respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, it was firmly resolved to "maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire, and in virtue of which it has, at all times, been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace, His Majesty will admit no foreign ships of war into the said Straits."

"And their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Sardinia, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared." By Article II. it was provided, "The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, the right to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed, as is usual, in the service of the Missions of Foreign Powers." By Article III. it was provided, "The same exception applies to the light vessels under flag of war, which each of the Contracting Powers is authorized to station at the mouth of the Danube, in order to secure the execution of the regulations relative to the liberty of that river, and the number of which is not to exceed two for each Power."

Next by treaty between Great Britain, Austria, and France, guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, April 15, 1856, it was provided (Article II.), "Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty (*i.e.* ^{Treaty guaranteeing independence and integrity of Ottoman Empire, 1856.} the treaty of March 30, 1856) will be considered by the Powers signing the present treaty as a *casus belli*. They will

come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which will have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their military or naval forces."

London Convention, 1871. Article II. of the London Convention of 1871 provided that "the principle of the closing of the Straits, such as it has been established, is maintained," but that power should be given to the Sultan "to open the Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, 1856." By the London Convention of 1871 both Russia and Turkey acquired the power of building military or maritime arsenals on the coasts of the Black Sea, and became entitled to maintain a fleet on its waters, thus abrogating the neutralizing clauses of the Black Sea Convention, 1856.

Halleck on. General Halleck suggests that the right of Turkey to exclude foreign ships of war from entering or passing either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus "was considerably modified by the Treaty of London, 1871."¹ The discussion which Mr. W. E. Hall devotes to the subject confirms the common view that the Treaty of London, 1871, is to be explained on purely political considerations. From the point of view of international law, the action of Russia in tearing up the Black Sea Convention has never been seriously justified. Lord Granville, at the time, did not attempt to refute or even notice the grounds on which Russia sought to justify her action in 1871; and Mr. W. E. Hall considers that the only plausible pretext was the passage of the public vessels of other States. At the most, there was a nominal breach of the treaty by other Powers, as they merely dispatched isolated vessels, at long intervals, through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea. The fact that Russia succeeded in her object as far as the Black Sea Convention is concerned, no doubt gave rise to Halleck's opinion that the Treaty of London, 1871, has modified the Straits Convention, 1856. But Russian diplomacy absurdly exaggerated the facts, describing the

¹ Halleck's "International Law," vol. I, p. 170.

passage of eight vessels in fifteen years as the passage of "whole squadrons." As regards the last phase of the question, Wheaton opportunely reminds us, "The Treaty of Berlin contains no express mention of the Dardanelles, but in the Eighteenth Protocol, Lord Salisbury declared on behalf of England 'that the obligations of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determination in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties.'" The plenipotentiaries of Russia declared, in reply, that "without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of 'Lord Salisbury's proposition,' in their opinion the principle of the closing of the Straits is an European principle," and that existing stipulations are binding on the part of all the Powers, "not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions."¹ The intention of the British declaration was, apparently, to reserve liberty to British ships of war to enter the Straits with the consent of the Porte."²

It is very necessary, in view of the despatch by Russia of her auxiliary cruisers through the Bosphorus in July, 1904, to remember that at the Treaty of Berlin, the last occasion on which the principle of the closing of the Straits received international consideration, the Russian plenipotentiaries declared that it was an "European principle," binding all the Powers signatory to the transactions of 1856 and 1871. There is nothing to show that the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Treaty of Berlin considered that the Treaty of London, 1871, had considerably, or in fact at all, modified the Straits Convention, 1856. It seems no less certain that the intention of the British declaration at the Treaty of Berlin was to reserve an even less restricted liberty for British ships of war to enter the Straits than that suggested by the learned editors of Wheaton's "International Law."

It must be remembered that in February, 1878, Admiral Hornby, with a fleet of ten ironclads, passed through the

Treaty of
Berlin, 1878;
18th protocol.

¹ Holland, "European Concert," p. 226.

² Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1904, p. 286.

Admiral Hornby's passage of the Dardanelles, Feb., 1878.

Dardanelles in the face of a formal protest by Turkey, and that he even desisted at first on account of the protest. Afterwards, on receiving further instructions, he effected the passage without a shot being fired. In the House of Lords the Earl of Derby justified this action on the ground that at the time Turkey could hardly be considered a free agent, and that therefore the British Government took responsibility on themselves.¹ At the time, the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas lay outside Constantinople, into which it had the power, in a military sense, of entry at will. The fact that the Porte forwarded its protest against the passage of the Dardanelles to the plenipotentiaries at the Russian headquarters, throws considerable light on the real position. The view taken by the British Government was that the Turkish protest against the passage of Admiral Hornby's squadron did not proceed from "the independent determination of the Sultan," and that therefore it could be disregarded. The British declaration at the Treaty of Berlin can only be construed in the light of preceding facts. So far from merely reserving liberty to British ships of war to enter the Straits with the consent of the Porte, it apparently reserved the more extended, though still conditional, right of entering with or without the consent of the Porte, when the consent, in the latter case, was withheld under circumstances which were beyond the control of the Porte. It is worth noticing that Austria, France, and Italy applied to the Porte for firmans for the passage of war vessels about the same time that Admiral Hornby passed the Dardanelles. In the House of Lords the Earl of Derby does not seem to have stated that the Porte had either granted or refused these firmans, but he evidently considered it improbable that the Powers in question would necessarily avail themselves, if they had received permission, of the firmans. A little earlier in the year Lord Beaconsfield stated that "the intention of sending the fleet in that direction was that it should defend the lives and properties of British subjects in Constantinople, and take care of British interests in the Straits."² On the whole it must be

¹ *Times*, February 15, 1878.

² *Ibid.*, January 26, 1878.

conceded that the technical contention that Turkey at the time was not in a position to give consent, is somewhat deficient as a legal justification. But even if it be admitted that the passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Hornby's squadron in the face of the formal protest of Turkey was a breach of treaty, there is much to be said for the view that the subsequent declaration of the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Treaty of Berlin constituted a waiver of the breach as far as Russia is concerned.

The closing of the Straits by treaty remains a principle of far-reaching importance, and the question became critical in view of the passage of the Bosphorus by the Russian volunteer cruisers in July, for this disregard (if such it be) of treaty obligations enabled Russia to call another fleet into existence.

Perhaps the restraint imposed on Russia is of a higher character than even a treaty stipulation, being based upon an ultimate postulate of international law, the territoriality of sovereignty. The precedent of 1870-1, when two powerful belligerents like France and Germany respected the neutrality of a weak State like Belgium, though military exigency and, in the case of France, even self-preservation might have been invoked to justify its infraction, shows that the most powerful belligerents have learned to respect the territory of a weak neutral.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the Ottoman Porte exercises territorial jurisdiction over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, as those Straits are less than six miles wide in most parts, and Turkey enjoys sovereignty over the littorals on either side.¹

¹ The following interesting account of the Dardanelles in 1745 is met in "A Collection of Voyages and Travels compiled from the Curious and Valuable Library of the Earl of Oxford": "Some thirty-one miles below Gallipoli is the straightest passage of the Hellespont, a place formerly famous for Xerxes' bridge, but much more glorious in the loves of Hero and Leander. These castles, called the Dardanelles, command the passage, and are the security of Constantinople on that side: that upon Europe, anciently Sestos, is made with two towers, one within the other; the inmost highest, by means of the rising ground upon which they stand, each bearing the form of three semi-circles with the outward triangular: the other upon the Asian side is far stronger, standing on the mariseth level, it is of form square with four round turrets, at each corner one: in the middle before stands one high square tower commanding over all. This formerly was named Abydos, not that the thing remained the same, but often re-edified in the same place." (*Ibid., supra*

The closing of the Straits an inference from principle apart from treaty. On this view "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," declared by the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1878, seems no more than an enunciation of that first principle of international law, the territoriality of sovereignty. Since the Porte exercises exclusive territorial jurisdiction over the Straits, it would appear that a passage of the Straits by the commissioned vessels of a belligerent State, when the Porte is at peace, would constitute an inruption into neutral territory comparable to that made by the army of General Clinchant into Switzerland in 1871, and the same consequences ought in strictness to follow, that is, the disarmament of such a belligerent force, and internment. Mr. W. E. Hall observes that it is somewhat more than doubtful whether any instances of a right of military passage have survived the simplification of the map of Central Europe effected by the formation of the German Empire, though he concedes that Germany has still a right of military passage over the Canton Schaffhausen, leading from the interior of Germany to the Rhine.¹ The use of this continued passage in time of war, Mr. W. E. Hall admits, might possibly become a subject of dispute. It is clear that a permission by Turkey for Russian ships to pass the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would be a concession of a similarly controversial character. The same writer instances the solid nature of the advantage Russia would gain if, being at war with France, she were allowed to march her troops across Germany.² But the advantage that Russia would gain by being allowed by the Porte to dispatch a fleet

vol. i. p. 521.) The following account is given of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in Stanford's "Compendium of Geography, Europe," vol. i., "The Countries of the Mainland" (c. iii.), "The Balkan Peninsula" (p. 181): "The Bosphorus is a gap due to a primary convulsion of nature; subsequently enlarged by the erosive action of the sea currents. At its widest part it is three miles across, and its narrowest under half a mile. The Dardanelles or Hellespont is precisely similar to the Bosphorus in the manner of its origin as well as in its typical characteristics. It is, however, longer (forty miles) and wider (three-quarters to four miles and a half), and its shores are not so high. The Sea of Marmora is 110 miles long, forty-three wide. It seems clear that it possesses a better title to be called an appropriated sea than the Zuider Zee, the entrances to which, though narrow, are two miles and a half and six miles wide, and therefore wider than either those of the Dardanelles or Bosphorus, the western and eastern mouths of the Sea of Marmora." (Cf. Stanford's "Compendium of Geography," by Geo. Chisholm, "Europe," vol. ii.; "The North-West," pp. 35, 36, for reference to the Zuyder Zee.)

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pp. 160, 601.

² *Ibid.*, p. 605.

through the Bosphorus is an advantage of no less solid a character. The late Emperor Frederick once observed that "in war it is the moment which decides," and the time which Russia would gain by being allowed to dispatch a fleet through the Bosphorus instead of round from the Baltic might easily be decisive of a campaign. It is clear that no future possible enemy of Russia can contemplate with indifference a permission granted by the Porte to that Power to dispatch a fleet through the Bosphorus. There does not seem any difference in principle between such a concession and the right of military passage over alien territory of which, as has been seen, it may almost be said there is no modern instance surviving. Nor is there room for controversy as to the rule that "straits which are less than six miles wide are wholly within the territory of the State or States to which their shores belong."¹ Thus Appropriated waters, instances of.
 the whole of the oyster beds in the Bay of Cancale, the entrance of which is seventeen miles wide, were regarded as French. Some writers still contend that the Queen's Chambers belong to England, and a recent decision of the Privy Council has affirmed English jurisdiction over the Bay of Conception in Newfoundland, which penetrates forty miles inland, and is fifteen in mean breadth. The Bay of Conception has clearly less right to be regarded as an appropriated water than the Sea of Marmora, the entrances to which, at either end, narrow to less than a mile. Authors so little favourable to maritime property as Ortolan and De Cussy, class the Zuyder Zee among appropriated waters. Yet the Zuyder Zee is in no sense a landlocked sea like the Sea of Marmora. It is capable of being entered through more than two channels by vessels of light draught, and both the Marsdiep and the Vliestrom, the channels connecting the Zuyder Zee with the North Sea, are wider than the Bosphorus and Dardanelles at their narrowest channels. The United States, Mr. W. E. Hall observes, probably regard as territorial the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, and other inlets of the same kind. As there is no question of interfering with the right of

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 155.

innocent navigation, it is difficult in principle to separate gulfs and straits from one another. It may be remembered that from the fifteenth century all ships using the Sound between Zealand and Sweden, leading from the Cattegat into the Baltic, except such as belonged to the Hanseatic towns, and one or two others in the Baltic, were charged toll for passing through. These Sound duties were abolished on March 14, 1857, by a treaty between Denmark and the principal maritime Powers. A pecuniary compensation of £3,386,260, of which Great Britain paid £1,125,206, was given to Denmark, which bound itself to maintain the lighthouses and superintend the pilotage of the Sound. The Sound, at its narrowest part, between Elsinore and Helsingborg, is only three miles wide. The Great Belt is fifteen miles wide, and the Little Belt seven miles, though it narrows to one mile and three-quarters.¹

The Great Belt, being fifteen miles wide, could not possibly be claimed as territorial water. The claim of Denmark to levy Sound dues, since the difficulties of navigation forced ships to resort to that passage rather than the Belts, seems quite indefensible. If such dues were properly leviable at all they ought to have been divided with Sweden, whereas they were exclusively claimed by Denmark.

But it is curious to note that, at this day, under the San Juan Award of Emperor William I. of Germany, sovereignty is assumed over a channel wider than even the Great Belt.

Both Great Britain and the United States continue to claim as territorial the waters of the Straits of Fuca, separating Vancouver's Island from the mainland. Under the protocol signed at Washington in 1873, for the purpose of marking out the frontier in accordance with the Emperor's arbitral decision, the boundary, after passing the island of San Juan, is carried across a space of water thirty-five miles long by twenty broad, and is then continued for fifty miles down the middle of a strait fifteen miles broad until it touches the Pacific Ocean midway between Bonilla Point on Vancouver's Island and Tatooch Island lighthouse on the American shore,

¹ Stanford's "Compendium Geography, Europe," vol. ii. p. 700.

the waterway being there ten miles and a half in width.¹ If this arbitral decision embodies the true doctrine of appropriated waters in international law, then a portion of the Sea of Marmora falls well within that category. It is somewhat surprising that Mr. W. E. Hall, while he clearly seems to view with approval the claim to a right of property in basins of considerable area if approached by narrow entrances, such as those of the Zuyder Zee, does not review the claims of the Sea of Marmora to be regarded as an appropriated basin of Turkey. He merely notices that the Treaty of Paris contained a promise on the part of Turkey to close the Bosphorus to foreign vessels of war. On the other hand, Mr. Hall evidently considers the claim of Holland to regard the Zuyder Zee as an appropriate basin to be eminently reasonable. It exists independently of treaty, and proceeds upon well-established principles which can be urged with even greater force in the case of the Sea of Marmora. The marked tendency recently observed by Professor T. E. Holland, of extending the limit of marginal seas, in view of the increased range of modern cannon, tends to put the inviolability of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles on an even higher footing, if that were necessary, than it stands at present.²

But assuming the Sea of Marmora to be a territorial water, the treaties closing the Straits have not created any exception, but are merely to be regarded as declaratory of the common law of nations.³ It becomes, on this view, very difficult to concur with the position of M. de Martens, that the closure of the Dardanelles to vessels of war "became a principle of public European law" by the Straits Convention of 1856. It seems, on the other hand, to have pre-existed as an essential inference from a postulate, not of European public law, but of international law itself. In any case, the closing of the Straits was affirmed as a principle of

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pp. 157-8, referring to Parliamentary Papers, North America, No. 10, 1873.

² *Times*, May 25, 1904.

³ Vattel observes that if a sea has no other communication with the ocean than by a channel of which a nation may take possession, it is the property of that nation ("Droit des Gens," l. i. c. xxiii. s. 294).

public European law by treaty before 1856. The first article of the Straits Convention of 1856, as has been seen, is merely a literal transcript of the first article of the Treaty of London, 1841.

The *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* incidents, July, 1904.

It is now proposed to consider the circumstances of the passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the Russian volunteer cruisers, *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*, in July, 1904. This

incident raised two separate and independent issues: (1) Whether the dispatch of these vessels did not involve a breach of the Straits Convention, 1856, and the succeeding treaties closing the Straits. (2) Whether the act of commissioning such vessels did not constitute an infraction of the first Article of the declaration concerning maritime law signed at Paris, 1856, to which Russia was a signatory, "La course est et demeure abolie." For an adequate appreciation of these two points it is convenient to summarize the facts, as related in the *Times*, July–September, 1904.

The *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*, two auxiliary cruisers carrying quick-firers, and capable of steaming eighteen to twenty knots, appear to have commenced a voyage with stores to the Far East, which proved abortive, the early naval successes gained by Japan causing them to return. Apparently during April and May there were persistent rumours that the Black Sea Volunteer Fleet were preparing for cruiser service. It was finally announced in the *Times*, July 6, that the Russian Volunteer Fleet steamers *Petersburg* and *Sevastopol* passed through the Bosphorus from the Black Sea. Their destination was then unknown. The *Sevastopol* was flying the Red Cross flag below the commercial flag; her hull was painted white, and she was therefore presumed to be intended for a hospital ship. The *Petersburg*, which was only flying the commercial flag, was stopped by the firing of blank cartridge at the end of the Bosphorus, no previous warning of her arrival having been given. After a delay of several hours she was allowed to proceed. The next day the *Smolensk* passed through. On July 8 the *Petersburg* was reported at Port Said, having a crew of 240 men. Her destination was stated to be Vladivostock, and her mission that of a collier. Even

the departure of the *Alabama* from the Mersey in 1862 was hardly attended by such a clandestine character as the passage of the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* through the Bosphorus. All three vessels assumed entirely a false character, and it is of course immaterial that the assumed character was different in each case. The essential deceit lies in the assumption of a false status, and not in the use of a flag by a war vessel. In war it is a legitimate ruse to hoist the flag of another nationality than that to which the vessel belongs, provided that the true flag is hoisted before commencement of action. But the use of the commercial flag by the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* was not a legitimate ruse like the use of a foreign flag by a belligerent war vessel. The *Alabama* when cruising in the China Seas flew the French flag, but invariably disclosed her status before going into action.

It was, however, stated in the *Times* that the change of flags in the case of vessels belonging to the Volunteer Fleet was usual since 1884, under an arrangement between the Russian and Turkish Governments known to the Powers. But, by the Russo-Turkish Agreement of 1891, it was stipulated that volunteer cruisers should not carry arms or munitions of war, a stipulation which was directly infringed by the passage of the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*.

The *Malacca* incident directed public attention in England to the status of the cruisers. This vessel was an intermediate steamer, belonging to the Peninsula and Oriental Company, carrying passengers and cargo from London to China and Japan. She carried lyddite in boxes marked with a broad arrow for the British arsenal at Hong-Kong, and left London on June 25 for the Far East, under the command of Captain Street. She sailed from Suez on July 9 for Singapore, where she was timed to arrive July 28. On July 13, however, she was seized by the Russian volunteer cruiser *Petersburg* off Munshejera Island, South Red Sea. The Russians placed a prize crew of some sixty men on board her, and on arrival at Suez, Captain Street, her commander, was forbidden to communicate with the British consul. She reached Port Said on July 21. Her passengers and crew were disembarked, and on

the 25th Captain Street arrived in London. On the 28th the vessel arrived at Algiers, flying the Russian flag, with a prize crew under Captain Schwartz, who apparently stated that the *Malacea* was bound for Libau. On arrival at Algiers the Russian consul had an interview with the British consul on board the *Malacea*, after which the cargo was subjected to a detailed examination. There was, of course, no justification for such an abuse of a neutral port.

The Russian flag, after an interview between the two consuls, was hauled down at sunset, July 28, and on August 6 the *Malacea* left Algiers for Port Said, in resumption of her original voyage.

At the time of the seizure Parliament was in session, and questions were addressed to Earl Percy, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (July 19) and the Prime Minister (July 22). The details were not fully known in this country when General Laurie addressed his question on the subject to Earl Percy, though the *Times* of that date contained a leading article on the seizure of the *Malacea*. But on July 20—practically within twenty-four hours after the matter became known—Sir Charles Hardinge, on behalf of the British Government, addressed to the Russian Government a protest, calling attention to the irregular position of the *Petersburg*, and to the fact that the ammunition seized on board the *Malacea* was the property of His Majesty's Government, was intended for the British-China squadron, and was contained in cases which were clearly marked with the broad arrow. It was added that a very serious situation was involved.¹ On the same day, it was announced that the Russian Government had given orders for the immediate release of the *Malacea*, and subsequently that they undertook that similar incidents should not occur in the future. The cargo of the *Malacea* was to be examined, and a claim for damages entertained.

This incident raised several questions of international law. It is not proposed to discuss here the undoubtedly improper exercise of the belligerent right of visitation and search, the subject admitting of more convenient treatment in a subsequent

¹ *Times*, July 21, 1904.

chapter. The immediately material issue in the *Malacca* case is the status of the Russian volunteer cruisers which passed the Bosphorus.

In a letter addressed by Professor T. E. Holland to the *Times* on the subject, it was pointed out that the facts specially calling for attention in the case of the *Malacca* were: (1) that the capture was effected by a vessel not entitled to exercise belligerent rights; (2) that Great Britain was prepared to claim the incriminated cargo as belonging to the British Government. The writer pointed out further, "Capture by an unqualified cruiser is so sufficient a ground for a claim of restoration and compensation that, except perhaps as facilitating the retreat of Russia from a false position, it would seem, to say the least, superfluous to pray in aid any other reason for the cancellation of an act unlawful *ab initio*." This letter concluded with some interesting facts about the constitution of Russian Prize Courts. Under Rule 54 of the Russian Naval Regulations of 1895, a "Port Prize Court" must, for a decree of confiscation, consist of six members, of whom three must be officials of the Ministries of Marine, Justice, and Foreign Affairs respectively. An Admiral's Prize Court, for the same purpose, need consist of only four members, all of whom are naval officers.¹ The gravity of the situation created by the seizure of the *Malacca* was immediately apparent. Mr. Balfour alluded to it in the House of Commons as "this most serious question," and promised to make a statement on August 12. On July 29, 1904, the Marquis of Lansdowne made the following reference to the subject in the House of Lords: "The later phase of the question (as far as international law is concerned) may, I think, be considered to have commenced with the seizure of the P. & O. steamship *Malacca*. That ship, having on board a miscellaneous cargo of about 4000 tons, of which 23 tons consisted of munitions of war, the property of His Majesty's Government, and destined for the dockyards at Hong-Kong and Singapore, was seized on the 13th of this month in the Red Sea. Her passengers and the crew were landed at Port Said, with the exception of the chief

¹ *Times*, July 26, 1904.

officer and two other persons. The ship was sent homewards flying the Russian flag and in charge of a Russian prize crew. We conceived it to be our duty to make a strong representation to the Russian Government in consequence of this occurrence. Our representation was based mainly upon the character and antecedents of the ship by which the seizure was made. That ship belonged to the Russian Volunteer Fleet. She had lately passed through the Dardanelles, and in our view it would have been impossible for her to pass through these Straits if she had at the time been a ship of war. If it be assumed that she was, at the time of her passage through the Straits, a peaceful vessel, it seemed to us intolerable that within a short space of time she should be transformed into a ship of war and should be found harrying neutral commerce in the Red Sea. We mentioned as a subsidiary point in our protest the fact that the munitions of war on board of her were the property of the Government, and therefore could not be regarded as contraband of war. My lords, the result of our remonstrance was as follows. We received, in the first place, from the Russian Government an assurance that the *Malacea* would be released as soon as orders for her release could be conveyed to her. She had left Port Said before these orders could reach her, and she did not touch port again till she reached Algiers, at which place she arrived yesterday. I am glad to say she was released last night, and, I believe, at this moment flies the British flag. My lords, the second result of our representation was that orders were given by the Russian Government to prevent a recurrence of any similar captures by ships of the Volunteer Fleet; and it was also explained to us, that if any such captures should occur before the orders to prevent them could reach their destination, those captures should be regarded as void and the result of misunderstanding.¹" The subject of the *Malacea* again formed the topic of a discussion in the House of Lords, arising out of a question addressed to Lord Lansdowne by the Marquis of Ripon. It became known that the Turkish Government had allowed other ships of the Russian Fleet to pass through the Dardanelles, after

¹ *Times*, July 29, 1904.

obtaining an official statement that these vessels would fly during their whole voyage the commercial flag, that they would not contain either munitions of war or armament, and that they would not be changed into cruisers.¹ After the exchange of Notes, July 21-23, the Russian Government announced that all seizures effected by the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* in the interval which elapsed between the date of the determination to place the vessels out of commission, and the date of the communication of this determination to the commanders of the two volunteer cruisers, were to be regarded as void. The *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*—now the *Rion* and the *Dnieper*—were in the Suez Canal under Admiral Bostrovsky on January 13, and thus some five months afterwards both vessels were found acting as commissioned vessels under other names. There is some ground for suggesting that this amounted to an infraction of the undertaking given by the Russian Government in July. The *Smolensk*, a powerful auxiliary cruiser of great size and high speed, could not have accompanied Admiral Rohzdestvensky's fleet to Far Eastern Waters, if she had not evaded treaty obligations by her passage of the Bosphorus on July 6. The fact that several months have elapsed since that evasion can hardly legitimate her share in belligerent operations during the war, in view of the fact that she was placed out of commission on July 21 by the Russian Government. Several vessels were, in fact, stopped, but seem to have been subsequently released by either the *Smolensk* or *Petersburg*. On July 27 the P. & O. steamer *Formosa* was seized ninety miles south of Dacdalus Lighthouse by the *Smolensk*. The *Agra* was also stopped by the *Smolensk* and the *Petersburg*. On July 27 the German liner *Holsatia* was seized in the Red Sea. On August 22 it was announced that the *Smolensk* had stopped the British steamer *Comedian*, eighty miles off East London, ten miles from shore off the mouth of Basha River. The sequel was not without a compensating element of humour to English observers. Owing to the high turn of speed possessed by the two Russian volunteer cruisers, and to the fact that they both operated in company and kept

¹ *Times*, August 12, 1904.

the high seas, it became apparent that the Russian Government, not possessing at that date any other fast cruisers in the ocean tracks frequented by the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*, was quite incapable of communicating to the commanders of those vessels their determination to revoke the commissions.

On August 26 it was announced that the Russian Government had requested the British Government to give orders to stop the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*. The vessels intrusted by our Government to deliver these orders were the *Crescent*, cruiser, Captain T. D. W. Napier, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral John Durnford, C.B., D.S.O., the *Pearl* cruiser, Captain E. P. Ashe, the *Odin*, sloop, Commander L. H. D. Pearce, and the *Forte* cruiser, Captain C. H. Dundas. The sequel illustrated the extraordinary difficulty of arresting on the high seas commerce destroyers of a high turn of speed, for it took more than a fortnight to deliver the orders of the Russian Government to the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*. On September 8, the *Forte*, being at Zanzibar, after weighing anchor, saw the masts of two suspicious steamers in Menai Bay, South Island. These vessels proved to be the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*. Captain Dundas delivered to Captain Skalsky of the *Petersburg* the Russian cypher telegram and the formal protest, with the demand of the British Government, calling upon the Russian cruisers to desist from interfering with neutral shipping. The *Petersburg* proved to be armed with seven 5-inch and a few smaller guns. The *Smolensk* was armed with 11 guns of a different calibre. They were followed about by the Hambourg-American liner *Holsatia*, their collier. Had they not been driven in by stress of weather, the commander of the *Petersburg* declared he would not have put into port, and the quest of the *Forte* might have been indefinitely prolonged.

The question, whether a Russian volunteer cruiser is a privateer or not, presents some difficulty. Mr. W. E. Hall, who has treated the question with great care, points out that the use of the commercial flag by vessels of the Volunteer Fleet can hardly be regarded as serious; they are vessels belonging to the imperial navy, and appear to be employed

in time of peace solely in public services, such as the conveyance of convicts to the Russian possessions on the Pacific. The position of the Russian Volunteer Fleet is in this respect to be distinguished from that of the steamers belonging to the great French mail lines, or from that of the liners subsidized by Great Britain, inasmuch as, in the two latter cases, so long as peace lasts, the vessels are employed in genuinely private and commercial purposes. The only difference between the French mail steamers and the liners subsidized by Great Britain is that the latter are not necessarily commanded, in time of peace, by an officer in the Royal Navy, whereas the former are. It cannot, perhaps, be conclusively inferred from Mr. W. E. Hall's examination of the question that the employment by France of her mail steamers in time of war, or the employment of subsidized liners by Great Britain in time of war, would constitute an infraction of the first article of the Declaration of Paris. On the contrary, Mr. Hall apparently holds that when, in time of war, a vessel is brought into close connection with the State, and is actually incorporated in the regular navy of a State, it cannot be considered a privateer. But he places the legitimacy of the status of vessels belonging to the Russian Volunteer Fleet on at least as high a footing as that of the liners which Great Britain and France propose to employ in times of emergency. It must therefore be concluded that he does not consider the former privateers.¹

Professor T. E. Holland considered that the *Petersburg* was "an unqualified cruiser," or a "vessel not entitled to exercise belligerent rights."² This may imply that, in his opinion, the *Petersburg* was a privateer; but, more probably, expresses the view of Lord Lansdowne, that the vessel could not have passed the Straits if at the time she had been a ship of war.

But it remains true that Sir R. Phillimore, writing at a time when privateering had only been temporarily renounced by Great Britain, employs the expression "maritime volunteer" as merely synonymous with "privateer," and considers that

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., part iii. c. vii. p. 527.

² *Times*, July 25, 1904.

such vessels are necessarily provided with letters of marque, and not with commissions.¹ On this view, if the Russian volunteer cruisers are what they call themselves, they must be privateers. And Mr. Hall's observations are not inconsistent with this view, for he insists that the test is the closeness of the connection between the subsidized or volunteer cruiser and the regular navy, or the degree in which the former is subjected to naval discipline. It is impossible to refrain from observing that the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg*, throughout the entire duration of the raid (July 6-September 8, 1904), operated entirely by themselves, and neither received nor rendered any assistance from or to the regular navy of Russia.

If there is any force in these observations, the operations of the *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* involved an infraction, not only of the treaties closing the Straits, but also of the first article of the Declaration of Paris, 1856.

¹ Phillipore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 92, p. 137.

PART II.

THE LAW GOVERNING STATES IN THE
RELATION OF WAR.

CHAPTER III.

DECLARATION OF WAR AND MANIFESTO.

THE subject of declaration of war may be regarded from the point of view both of authority and practice. Among the long line of writers whose treatises constitute one source of the law of nations, Grotius and Emerigon lay it down that, as a matter of right, war ought to commence with a solemn declaration. Bynkershoek¹ and Heineccius² maintain that, although a declaration of war may very properly be made, yet it cannot be required as a matter of right. Grotius thinks war should be declared not so much in order that an enemy may be put on his guard (which is matter rather of magnanimity than of right), but that it may be clear that the war is not undertaken by private persons, but by the will of the whole community, whose right of willing is in this case transferred to the supreme magistrates by the fundamental laws of society.³

Blackstone (1 Comm. c. vii.) observes that in order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the King's authority, and then all parts of both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are bound by it. And wherever in a nation the right resides of beginning there must also reside the right of ending it, or the power of making peace. And the same check of Parliamentary impeachment, the same writer continues, for improper or inglorious conduct, in beginning or conducting or concluding a national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the Ministers of the Crown from a wanton or injurious exercise of the Government prerogative. These observations of Blackstone were, no doubt, accurate

Sir Wm.
Blackstone
from the point
of view of
municipal law.

¹ 2 "J. P.," l. iii. c. ii.

² "El.," II. s. 198.

³ "De Jure Belli et Pacis," l. iii. c. iii.

enough in 1767, when the Commentaries appeared. Only five years previously, in 1762, as Sir Travers Twiss points out, England formally declared war against Spain.

Suggested
reason for a
solemn declar-
ation being
regarded as
obligatory.

The above quoted observations of Grotius, and no less of Blackstone, suggest that the necessity for a solemn declaration of war was justified by the fact that, at least down to the end of the eighteenth century, the practice of foreign enlistment was generally prevalent. In the time of Grotius many Englishmen and Scotchmen fought in the army of Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War. In the reign of George II. Parliament passed measures on the subject of foreign enlistment to discourage the formation of Jacobite armies in France and Spain. It is clear that Grotius was struck by the convenience of a solemn declaration of war at a time when Europe was over-run with large bodies of mercenary troops or *condottieri*, who were not uncommonly engaged in making private war upon one another. Again, in an age when foreign enlistment in times of peace was general, it was no doubt highly convenient for a State to issue a solemn declaration of war in order to recall citizens who might be serving in the armies of other Princes or States, possibly even in those of the enemy. In this connection it is instructive to notice that the altered feeling throughout the Western World on the subject of foreign enlistment roughly coincided in date, at least in this country, with the tendency to commence hostilities without a solemn declaration of war. On the other hand, an obvious explanation of the absence of declaration in English practice during the nineteenth century (the single instance to the contrary occurring in the Crimean War) is the long neutrality which followed the exertions of this country in the Great War.

Solemn declar-
ation of war by
Great Britain,
1854.

It is a somewhat curious circumstance that although there has been an unmistakable tendency for solemn declaration of war to fall into desuetude, England should have issued such a declaration in 1854, the last occasion in which she engaged in a contest in Europe. One recent authority¹ goes so far as to say that the legal effects of war can always be

¹ Dr. T. J. Lawrence.

dated from the first act of hostility, and in fact are so dated, except in the few cases where the struggle is inaugurated by a formal declaration. Fiore¹ is less dogmatic: "It is a question which can be debated whether the commencement of hostilities ought to be established by a formal and solemn declaration of war, or by the publication of a challenge, by a manifesto, or by any other formality. In other ages it was considered necessary to make a solemn and formal challenge to the enemy to legitimize acts of hostility directed against him." Mr. W. E. Hall denies the necessity of issuing a formal declaration of war, while fully recognizing the existence of the dangers likely to arise from unexpected attacks, surprises, and international disloyalty. On the other hand, a foreign publicist, M. Despagnet, insists that a solemn declaration of war constitutes the sole effectual means of averting surprises, to which it may, perhaps, be replied that it is by no means the object or duty of a belligerent to prevent surprises. Mr. Hall's general comment is also sensible, that no forms give security against disloyal conduct.² The same writer points out that there is a great difference between the solemn and formal declaration of war and a manifesto. The practice of issuing a manifesto was commended by Vattel.³ Manifestoes have a "twofold object over and above notice to the enemy, viz. (1) to warn subjects and neutrals of the outbreak of hostilities, and (2) to justify the war in the opinion of foreign Powers."⁴ At the commencement of the present Russo-Japanese War, Japan issued a solemn and formal declaration of war,⁵ while the Tzar addressed a manifesto to "all his faithful subjects."⁶

Distinction
between de-
claration of
war and mani-
festo.

M. Frantz Despagnet has called attention to the real distinction between the ordinary declaration of war and a manifesto. To assert, he insists, that a manifesto is equivalent to a declaration of war is to be satisfied with a fiction, unless it be understood that hostilities are not to commence until it is reasonably certain that authenticated information of the contents of the manifesto has reached the enemy Government. A

¹ "Nouveau Droit International Public," ed. 1886. ² 5th ed., p. 384.

³ "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. iv. art. 62.

⁴ Cf. Walker's "Public International Law," p. 104.

⁵ *Times*, February 12, 1904, p. 3. ⁶ *Ibid.*, February 10, 1904.

formal declaration of war no doubt in old days furnished the most effective notice to the enemy Government, since in the middle ages the solemn declaration was brought by a special messenger, or *héraut d'armes*, to the court of the enemy, and an interval was commonly fixed between the receipt of the declaration and the commencement of hostilities. M. Despagnet considers that the necessity of issuing a solemn and formal declaration of war is an inference from the Congress of Paris, 1856, but the grounds for this view are not, perhaps, very apparent. Mr. Lawrence has given the true reason for the desuetude into which declarations have fallen : "A careful State can hardly be taken by surprise since the ease of communication in modern times renders the concealment of any unusual

The growth of neutral obligation tends to increase desirability of solemn declaration of war.

concentration of troops almost impossible." It is, however, only with a qualification that the necessity for declarations can be pronounced extinct. As between belligerents, though desirable, they are not essential ; as between belligerents and neutrals, they are rightly held a condition precedent of the onerous neutral obligations called into existence by war. Similarly, a declaration of war is a convenient, though not a necessary, method of formally apprizing the citizens of the belligerent of the restrictions imposed upon their trade by the outbreak of war. In Bykershoek's phrase, "Ex natura belli commercia inter hostes cessare non dubitandum." All trade is at once checked, for no contracts are legal, and no recovery of debts can be obtained in the courts of the countries affected.

Writers, like M. Despagnet, who urge the necessity of a solemn declaration of war, are driven to admit that the rule does not apply to either a defensive or a civil war, on which reservation the reflection at once arises that no nation has ever yet on its own admission waged any but a defensive war, so that on this view declarations are likely to be infrequent.

Precedents of solemn declarations of war.

Turning to practice and the history of the topic, in antiquity and throughout the middle ages, the commencement of war was always dated from a solemn and formal declaration. The Greeks and Romans uniformly adopted this practice. Among the latter the Pater Patratus and the Fecial College were especially intrusted with the formal declaration of war.

In the middle ages the declaration was made by letters of defiance dispatched by heralds to the sovereign of the enemy. It was the custom from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries to interpose a delay of three days between the declaration and the attack. This interval was adopted by Frederic Barba-rossa, in his *Landfriede*, or Constitution of the Peace of the Empire, promulgated at Nurembourg in 1187, and also by Charles IV., in the *Golden Bulle* of 1356. It has been observed that the declaration of war in the middle ages bore no small resemblance to the cartel of a knightly encounter, and probably sprang from the belief that it was the part of a true soldier not to attack his opponent without notice. Occasionally the notice was made the occasion of insult, as when Charles V. of France declared war in 1369 against Edward III. by a letter, the bearer of which was a common servant. In 1427 Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, announced by the formal *litteræ diffidationis* that he was prepared as against the Duke of Milan “eum amicis nostris prosilire, ut dum licet valeamus, Altissimo concedente, conspiratis injuris obviare.” Queen Mary declared war by letters of defiance dispatched by heralds against Henry II. of France.¹ In 1657, a Swedish herald brought a declaration of war to the Court of Copenhagen. This appears to be the last instance of declaration of war by the *hérauts d'armes*. In 1671 Charles II. sent a written declaration of war to Holland. But in 1588, Philip of Spain sent the Armada against England without any declaration of war, and Gustavus Adolphus did not issue one when he attacked the German Empire in 1630. From 1700 to 1800, as M. Despagnet points out, nations dispensed more and more with the formalities of a preliminary declaration, and unexpected attacks were even the rule. Thus Frederic the Great in 1740 flung his troops across the borders of Silesia two days before his ambassador arrived at Vienna to demand its surrender. Austria, it is true, observed the old formalities when she invaded Silesia a little latter, but her object was not improbably to excite odium against Prussia by the contrast. The value of the practice is well illustrated by the fact that

¹ Hollinshed's “Chronicles,” vol. iv. p. 87.

declarations of war were frequently issued after the war had gone on for some time, as was the case in 1665, when the English declared war against the Dutch, though all through 1664 the two nations had been fighting in Africa, the West Indies, and along the North American coast. Delay in the issue of the formal declaration often occurred naturally enough when the war broke out in distant dependencies, or when one of the parties commenced as an accessory by giving limited assistance to a friend, and afterward became a principal. In such cases as these the treaty of peace sometimes stipulated that all prizes made before the declaration of war should be returned. In the nineteenth century the American wars with Great Britain in 1812, and with Morocco in 1846, were commenced without notice. In the case of the United States there can be no uncertainty as to the commencement of war, for the constitution provides that no hostilities can commence without the authority of an Act of Congress. This Act is a convenient substitute for formal notification by heralds or otherwise. Piedmont and France waged war against Naples and Mexico respectively in the years 1838 and 1860 without previous declarations. It is, however, a singular circumstance that the great European wars of the last half of the nineteenth century witnessed a return to the old practice. On March 28, 1854, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation, containing a declaration of war against His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. In fact, this declaration of war followed upon the entry of the British fleet into the Black Sea on a warlike errand, and preceded the withdrawal of the ambassadors on either side. In the case of the Ionian ships (1855), 2 Spinks, 212, 215, Dr. Stephen Lushington commented upon the declaration of war, which is also discussed by Phillimore, whose work was published during the war.¹ The notoriety of the declaration makes it strange that Sir Travers Twiss should state² that this country had not issued a solemn declaration of war since 1762. In 1870 Prince Bismarck handed an official notification of war to the French *charge d'affaires* at Berlin, who, in turn, handed a formal

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 94.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

declaration of war by France against Prussia. Declarations of war are, therefore, sometimes bilateral. In a case that arose out of the war between Great Britain and Sweden in 1812, which was a case of war beginning by a unilateral declaration, Lord Stowell observed that it made no difference, so far as setting up a state of war is concerned, whether war is declared merely unilaterally, or not at all. After noticing that in 1812, Sweden had declared war, and that Great Britain had not done so, Lord Stowell observed: "It was not the less a war on that account, for war may exist without a declaration on either side. It is so laid down by the best writers on the law of nations. A declaration of war by one country only is not, as has been represented, a mere challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other. It proves the existence of actual hostilities on one side at least, and puts the other party also into a state of war, though he may, perhaps, think proper to act on the defensive only."¹ Great Britain carried on this war, Lord Stowell subsequently observed, "with forbearance." The island of Hanoe was occupied, and this seems the only belligerent operation conducted. The fact that a declaration of war cannot be regarded, as Lord Stowell observed, as a mere challenge, shows that the term now deviates from its original signification, when it seems clearly to have been a challenge conveyed through the *héraut d'armes*, who also declared peace as well as war, even so late as the eighteenth century. In 1877 a despatch declaring war was handed to the Turkish representative at St. Petersburg. Formal declarations, after commencement of hostilities, were issued by both belligerents in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894, the announcement being bilateral in this case also. Much controversy was excited by Japan's action at the commencement of the recent war. The events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities appear to be, shortly, as follows. On January 16, M. Kurino, the Japanese ambassador, delivered certain proposals regarding the settlement of Korea and Manchuria. These proposals apparently remained under consideration at the Russian Foreign Office

History of
commencement
of hostili-
ties between
Russia and
Japan, Jan.
Feb., 1904.

¹ *The Eliza Ann*, (1813) 1 Dods., Rep. 244, 246.

for some three weeks. On February 6, M. Kurino handed to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs two Notes, the first of which notified the rupture of negotiations on the ground that Russia was evading a reply to the Japanese proposals, the second announced the dissolution of diplomatic relations, and added that the Japanese ambassador, with the staff of the legation, would leave St. Petersburg on the tenth. These Notes were accompanied by a private letter from M. Kurino to Count Lamsdorff, in which the hope was expressed that the rupture of diplomatic relations would be confined to as short a time as possible, a communication which recalls the historic conversation of Napoleon III. with the Austrian ambassador on the eve of the Solferino campaign. Meanwhile, on the 8th of February, two days after the Japanese ambassador had announced that his Government had terminated diplomatic relations with the Court of St. Petersburg, belligerent operations were commenced. According to the evidence at present available, the Russian gun-boat *Korietz* assumed the offensive against Admiral Uriu's squadron, which was escorting some Japanese transports to Chemulpho. The Japanese replied by discharging torpedoes. It appears to be established that the *Korietz* fired the first shot.¹ The next day, Admiral Uriu, having formally called upon the two Russian warships in Chemulpho harbour to surrender, attacked them as they came out of the harbour, and a battle ensued off the Polynesian islands, in the course of which both the Russian vessels were sunk.

Japanese declaration of war.

On February 10 the Emperor of Japan issued a solemn declaration of war, of which the text is as follows:—

“ We, by the Grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects as follows:

“ We hereby declare war against Russia, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against her in obedience to duty and with all their strength, and we also command our competent authorities to make every effort in

¹ *Times*, February 11, 1904, p. 3.

pursuance of their duties and in accordance with their powers to attain the national aim, with all the means within the limits of the law of nations.

"We have always deemed it essential to international relations, and made it our constant aim to promote the pacific progress of our Empire in civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other States, and to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring peace in the extreme East, and assure the future security of our Dominion without injury to the rights and interests of other Powers.

"Our competent authorities have also performed their duties in obedience to our will, so that our relations with all Powers have been steadily growing in cordiality.

"It was thus entirely against our expectation that we have unhappily come to open hostilities against Russia.

"The integrity of Korea is a matter of the gravest concern to this Empire, not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm.

"Nevertheless, Russia, in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China, and of her repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and is bent upon their final annexation.

"And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East, we determined, in those circumstances, to settle the question by negotiation, and to secure thereby a permanent peace.

"With that object in view our competent authorities by our order made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the last six months.

"Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her wanton delays put off the settlement of the serious question, and by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand, while she was on the other extending her naval

and military preparations, sought to accomplish her own selfish designs.

"We cannot in the least admit that Russia had from the first any serious or genuine desire for peace. She has rejected the proposals of our Government. The safety of Korea is in danger. The interests of our Empire are menaced. The guarantees for the future, which we have failed to secure by peaceful negotiations, can now only be obtained by an appeal to arms.

"It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valour of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored, and the glory of our Empire preserved."

The Japanese declaration appeared in the *Times* the day after the Tzar's manifesto, which was in the following terms:—

Manifesto of
the Tzar.

"We proclaim to all our faithful subjects that, in our solicitude for the preservation of that peace so dear to our heart, we have put forth every effort to assure tranquillity in the Far East. To those pacific ends we declared our assent to the revision, proposed by the Japanese Government, of the agreements existing between the two Empires concerning Korean affairs. The negotiations initiated on this subject were, however, not brought to a conclusion, and Japan, not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply and the proposals of our Government, informed us of the rupture of the negotiations, and of diplomatic relations with Russia.

"Without previously notifying that the rupture of such relations implied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government ordered its torpedo-boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in the outer roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving the report of our Viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded Japan's challenge to be replied to by arms.

"While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unspeakable confidence in the help of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous readiness of all our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland together with ourselves, invoke God's blessing on our glorious forces of the army and navy."

On February 19 the Russian Government issued an official *communiqué* in the following terms:—"Eight days have now elapsed since all Russia was shaken with profound indignation against an enemy who suddenly broke off negotiations, and by a treacherous attack endeavoured to obtain an easy success in a war long desired." A further and more detailed accusation appeared in the *Official Messenger* a few days afterwards. This publication declared that, "although the breaking off of diplomatic relations by no means implies the opening of hostilities, the Japanese Government, as early as the night of the 8th inst., and in the course of the 9th and 10th inst., committed a whole series of revolting attacks on Russian war vessels and merchant vessels, attended by a violation of international law. The decree of the Emperor of Japan on the subject of the declaration of war was not issued till the 11th inst."¹

A fortnight afterwards there appeared in the *Times* the answer of the Japanese Government to these charges; the document proceeds to advance grounds in support of the contention that Russia's desire for peace was not sincere. The following reasons were advanced: That Russia (1) had persistently refused to meet the proposals made by Japan in a conciliatory spirit throughout the whole course of the negotiations; (2) had put off the settlement of the question by wanton delays; (3) had sedulously concentrated her naval and military forces in the Far East.

In support of the last point (which is clearly the strongest), the Japanese State protest averred that during the nine months previous to the commencement of hostilities, after having twice promised to evacuate Manchuria, Russia had augmented the tonnage of her squadron in the Far East by 113,000 tons of war ships. In the last six months of 1903 she had increased her force in Manchuria by 40,000 men, and had made preparations for sending out 200,000 more. The fortifications of Port Arthur and Vladivostock were being strengthened day and night. Forts were being built at Huan

¹ *Times*, February 22, 1904. For an example of the formal declaration of war formerly issued by the Sovereign of this country, cf. Trial of Dr. Hensey for High Treason, 29 Howell's State Trials, col. 1350 and note (1753).

Chun, Liao-Yang, and other strategic points. Not only was Russia continually dispatching arms and ammunition to the Far East, but in October, 1903, she forwarded the necessary equipment for a field hospital. All these preparations were intensified at the commencement of 1904. On January 28, 1904, the Viceroy of the Far East, Admiral Alexeieff, ordered the forces on the Yalu to prepare for war. About the same date the Japanese Commercial Agent at Vladivostock was ordered to warn his countrymen to withdraw to Khabarovka. Who, in view of these facts, it was asked, could say that Russia had no warlike intentions, or that she was unprepared for war? Large forces were continually advancing from Liao-Yang to the Yalu; while at Port Arthur all the powerful men-of-war, except one battleship under repair, steamed into the open sea.

Japan was therefore compelled, it was contended, to take measures necessary for her self-defence. The responsibility for the challenge to war must rest with Russia. Finally, allusion was made to the fact that on February 6 the Japanese informed the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he was instructed to break off diplomatic relations and terminate pending negotiations, and that Japan had decided "to take such independent action as she might deem best to defend her position." Great stress was laid upon these last words as naturally including the opening of hostilities. Japan could not be blamed if Russia failed to place the natural and proper interpretation on the expression "independent action." This learned, lengthy, and luminous reply of Japan finally concluded with observing that a solemn declaration of war is not an indispensable requisite to legitimize the commencement of hostilities. Historical consistency prohibited Russia from controverting this position, because there were not only many instances of Russia taking hostile action without declaring war, but in 1808 she invaded Finland even before the rupture of diplomatic relations.¹

¹ *Times*, March 2, p. 5.

Russia has not only thus commenced hostilities without withdrawing her ambassador; but, like Korea in the late war, has actually maintained her ambassador in belligerent territory throughout a war. The Polish War of 1792

From the point of view of international law, it is of some interest to examine the contention of Russia, that the breaking off of diplomatic relations by no means implies the opening of hostilities. It has been noticed that by treaty between France and Brazil, June, 1826, hostilities are dated from the withdrawal of an ambassador. But a treaty may be regarded, as Lord Mansfield and Pitt contended, as creating an exception to the general rule. It seems necessary to distinguish between the withdrawal of an ambassador *simpliciter*, and the withdrawal of an ambassador with the entire staff of a legation. The withdrawal of an ambassador, leaving the interests of his Government in the hands of a *chargé d'affaires*, is a well-known method of indicating that the relations between the two States are strained. But this does not by any means imply that war will come. One may cite the recent instances of Venezuela and Servia. The British ambassador was withdrawn in both cases, and British interests were intrusted to a *chargé d'affaires*.

But on February 6, 1904, M. Kurino announced to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs his withdrawal with the entire staff of the legation. As far as precedents are concerned, they could probably be found to support Japan's action, even assuming the whole gravamen of the Russian charges. Nor could the nations of Europe support Russia's contention with much consistency.

In 1854 the French fleet, in conjunction with the British, entered the Black Sea with orders to compel the Russian squadron to return to Sebastopol before the ambassadors had been withdrawn on either side. The Franco-German War of 1870 serves as a reminder, that even where hostilities are

commenced by M. Bulgakow, Catherine II.'s ambassador at Warsaw, delivering to the King of Poland on May 18 his sovereign's declaration of war. Bulgakow remained at Warsaw throughout the war, which lasted from May 18 to July 23, and was thus enabled to negotiate an armistice in direct communication with the central authorities. In the yet later stages of the final struggle of the Poles for independence, the Russian ambassador, Count Seivier, actually surrounded the Polish Diet at Grodno, November, 1793, with an armed force, compelling it to sign a treaty of allegiance and commerce with Russia, which included new cessions of territory. ("Annual Register," 1792, pt. i. pp. 63, 388; *ibid.*, 1795, p. 23.) It is impossible to believe that any great Power has ever perpetrated such an abuse of diplomatic forms as the above.

preceded by every possible formality, including a bilateral declaration, the actual commencement of hostilities may take the form of a surprise.¹ Nor is it possible to dismiss entirely the current explanation of the presence of the Russian vessels in Chemulpho harbour. A possible explanation is that they were stationed there to deal with the suspected Japanese plan of landing in this harbour. The facts, firstly, that all authorities in this country were unanimous in holding that a formal declaration of war was not necessary to legitimize hostilities, and, secondly, that England has only once, during a century and a half, since 1762, promulgated a declaration of war, account for the indifference with which the Russian charges against Japan was received in England. On the whole, continental opinion concurred. At the close of February an article in the *Neue Freie Presse* opportunely reminded the critics of Japan that Russia invaded Turkey in 1877 on the morrow of the rupture of diplomatic relations without declaration of war.

This precedent was a particularly awkward one for Russian diplomatists, but in fact the current of recent authority was all in one direction. A declaration of war is convenient, but it is by no means necessary. Japan broke no law in striking before the declaration was made, even in the assumption that her vessels, and not those of Russia, struck the first blow. On the other hypothesis, of course, there is not even a case to argue. In the future, as in the past, a nation which, at the close of a critical diplomatic correspondence, sees the diplomatic staff of its opponent leave the capital is by the practice of nations entitled to no further warning, and will be well advised to mobilize its forces.

¹ Halleck's "International Law," vol. i. p. 524.

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHTS OF WAR WITH RESPECT TO THE PERSON OF ENEMIES.

Admiral Alexeieff and the Sakhalin convicts—Treatment of wounded and prisoners
—General Stoessel in Port Arthur.

ON May 19 Admiral Alexeieff, as Viceroy in the Far East, issued a general order calling out Russian convicts as volunteers.¹ Sakhalin is a penal settlement to which the worst criminals from all parts of the Russian Empire are deported. The Russian population of the island consists exclusively of convicts and ex-convicts, their wives and children, and officials and their families. Out of 7,080 convicts transported since January, 1898, no less than 2,836 were murderers, of whom 634 were women. Out of a total of 22,167 convicts and ex-convicts, quite 8,000 have been sent for murder.²

A hundred years ago, it could not be said that a general order like that of Admiral Alexeieff would have been as

¹ The terms of the general order are given in the *Times*, May 24, 1904: "At my request the Emperor has granted to the exiles at Sakhalin who have expressed a desire to enrol themselves in the volunteer corps the following favours and privileges. (a) Each period of two months' active service performed by a convict shall count as a year of penal servitude, to be deducted from his sentence, and those among the convicts who take part in any action against the enemy will be immediately admitted into the class of colonists. Further, colonists who live in the prisons will be transferred to the division of convicts who are allowed to live outside the prisons. (b) Prisoners in the division of Correction and Detention will have remitted a year of their sentence for each four months of service with the army: (c) for colonists who, on the completion of their term, are to be registered as peasants one month's service will count as four months; (d) colonist peasants will have the right to choose a domicile in any province of the Empire apart from the capitals, with the restoration of all their rights except that of owning property."

"The application of these privileges is entrusted to the Governor of Sakhalin, who will have to take into consideration the certificates of good conduct granted by the subordinate heads of convict establishments. All brilliant feats of arms will be reported to me in order that I may reduce the punishment of the convict distinguishing himself, and in exceptional circumstances report them to the Emperor to obtain a full pardon for the author of the achievement."

² Cf. "Uttermost East," by C. H. Hawes.

repellent to the public opinion of the civilized world as it must now be considered. The epigram of Dr. Samuel Johnson, that "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," might have passed for a serious reflection in an age in which criminals were systematically permitted, while undergoing sentence, to pass into the army.¹ The Hessian soldiers employed in America by the Government of Lord North were composed, Goltz wrote (1777) to Frederic, "en grande partie des malfaiteurs détachés de la chaîne." Mr. W. E. H. Lecky observes—

"During the war of American Independence, large numbers of criminals, of all but the worst category, passed at this time into the English army and navy."²

This fact ought to be borne in mind, the historian adds, in estimating the light in which British soldiers were regarded in America during the war of American Independence, and the violence and misconduct of which British soldiers were sometimes guilty. Two or three Acts in favour of insolvent debtors were passed in the eighteenth century, granting them their liberty on condition of enlisting in the army or navy. But that was an age which imprisoned a Goldsmith, a Johnson, and a Collins for debt. Even when full force is given to such facts in the history of this country, they in no way extenuate the course adopted by Admiral Alexeieff. The most abandoned class of criminals did not pass into the English army a hundred and fifty years ago, whereas the convicts of Sakhalin are admittedly composed of the worst convicts in the whole Russian Empire of to-day.

At the time we permitted convicts to be enrolled in the army, it must be remembered that the statute book was constantly adding capital felonies, for offences which would now be considered comparatively venial. The only criminals whose lives were spared by the law were those convicted of misdemeanour and clergyable felony. Nor can it possibly be doubted, in view of the terrible severity of the law of debt,

¹ Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown," vol. ii. pp. 12-15.

² "History of England," vol. iii. c. xiii. p. 540.

that many persons of the highest moral character were consigned to prison. There was little or no conceivable objection, socially or morally, to permitting insolvent debtors to enlist in the army.

Tried, therefore, even by the ethical standard of one hundred and fifty years ago, the course of Admiral Alexeieff in summoning the worst class of criminals to the standards of the Tzar is indefensible. The only precedent which seems at all relevant is sufficient to condemn the policy of Admiral Alexeieff. In 1797 the Directory flung eight hundred convicts on shore at Fishguard Bay, Pembrokeshire, from three or four old frigates, which immediately put to sea. The *fregats* were soon afterwards captured by the militia under Lord Cawdor.

It is noticeable that about the date of Admiral Alexeieff's general order calling for volunteers from the convicts at Sakhalin, complaints as to the treatment of wounded and prisoners by both Russia and Japan showed that the passions of both countries were rising.

It was stated in the *Times* that the Russian Government¹ protested to the Powers signatory to the Hague and Geneva Conventions against the action of the Japanese in firing on a Red Cross train coming from Port Arthur, in which there were two hundred sick and wounded. The Japanese official answer to this charge stated that the train, when approached near Pu-lan-tien by a Japanese detachment, had no special marks as required by the Red Cross regulations. It further stated that Russian soldiers in the train immediately fired upon the Japanese, and that it did not raise the Red Cross flag till it halted. Further, when the Japanese, seeing the Red Cross flag raised, ceased firing, the train escaped. On June 30 it was stated in the *Times* that reports had come in of outrages on Russian wounded, and the military organ at Liao-Yang specified instances of mutilation of which it asserted the Japanese troops to have been guilty. Considering the enormous armies arrayed on either side, and the vast theatre of belligerent operations, it cannot be said that,

Alleged Russian charges against Japan.

¹ *Times*, May 2, 1904.

admitting the accuracy of the Russian relation, it constituted any serious reflection on the great Japanese armies. The instances were relatively small in number, and were attributed by the Japanese to the Chinese marauders.

Gen. Oku's arraignment of Russian conduct in the field.

The Japanese charges on this painful topic seem somewhat more serious. While the Japanese authorities examined carefully the Russian imputations of infringement of the laws of war by Japanese troops, the Russian authorities do not seem to have noticed some very serious and lengthy charges brought against Russian troops for excesses in the field perpetrated by them.

The Japanese War Office published a statement received from General Oku's army arraigning Russian conduct in the field on eleven counts. Of them, two were for abuse of the white flag; one for persistent firing on a field hospital conspicuously flying the Red Cross flag, whereby the Japanese were compelled to remove the hospital amid great danger; two for firing on men of the hospital corps, though they were clearly distinguished by badges; three for stabbing, shooting, and slashing wounded men; two for shockingly mutilating the dead; and one for stealing cattle and horses, and violating women. Besides the above, numerous instances are given in which wounded Russians have fired on Japanese succouring parties. All these charges, preferred with full details, related only to General Oku's army, and were independent of the experiences of General Kuroki's army, which were stated to have been not less shocking.¹

The picture drawn by these charges is sufficiently terrible, and the Russian Government would have done well to inquire into them. In any event it is fair to concede that the outrages charged are sufficiently few in number not to implicate, as a whole, Russian action in the field.

Gen. Kuropatkin on excellence of Japanese hospitals.

It is a relief to turn from this topic to the excellence of the Japanese hospitals, to which General Kuropatkin himself has borne testimony. An officer of the 12th Regiment of Russian *chasseurs*, wounded and taken prisoner at Ka-lien-ta, wrote home from the Japanese field hospital: "Of course,

¹ *Times*, July 18, 1904.

there is no luxury ; but, except that we are prisoners, we are much better off than we should be in our bivouacs."¹ Since General Kuropatkin has himself attested the excellence of the Japanese field hospitals, it may fully be inferred that he has endeavoured to secure reciprocal good treatment for wounded Japanese in Russian hospitals.

The Japanese observed the recommendations of the Hague Convention at least as scrupulously as the Russians. Thus, the Government during the war have kept a bureau for the supply of information respecting prisoners. It was officially stated that at the commencement of July the Japanese had a thousand Russian prisoners in their hands, all of whom were well treated. The Japanese Government complained that the Russians did not keep a bureau whence information might be derived of Japanese soldiers or sailors who had been made prisoners.

The Russian Foreign Office, early in August, informed the Red Cross Society that the Japanese Government had declared its willingness to concede to the steamship *Mongolia*, of the East Chinese Railway Company, the rights enjoyed by military hospital ships in virtue of the provisions formulated by the Hague Peace Conference.²

It is pleasant to notice that, at all events in the latest phase of the war, the Russians have learned to respect the gallantry of the Japanese. Previous to the great battle south of Mukden, October 13-17, where the Russians had more wounded than the French at Sedan, General Kuropatkin, in an informal conversation with a correspondent, spoke in glowing terms of the bravery of the Japanese, saying that they were a brave foe, and that they were most correct in the laws of war.³ It is to be presumed, therefore, that the Russian

¹ *Times*, June 30, 1904.

² Cf. Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, given *in extenso*, Wheaton, ed. 1904, p. 475. It will be there seen that both Russia and Japan were signatories to this convention ; and the above circumstance shows that both countries rely on it in the present war. A revised Convention, of great length and importance, has very recently been signed at Genoa. Prof. T. E. Holland assisted as one of the British plenipotentiaries, June, 1906.

³ *Times*, October 17, 1904.

general has become satisfied that the charges advanced against the Japanese of mutilating wounded men, and of firing on a Red Cross train, are either groundless or relatively insignificant.

It may be worth while here to mention a subject that is allied to those above discussed, and which equally raises a question of the laws of war between belligerents.

Rumoured apprehensions of Gen. Stoessel.

Prince Radziwill, who escaped from Port Arthur, said, on arriving at Chifu, that, in a recent address to the garrison, General Stoessel declared that the present temper of the Japanese made resistance to the last drop of blood a necessity, as if the fortress was entered, the Japanese officers would undoubtedly be unable to restrain their men from massacre.¹

This terrible presage, which may be contrasted with the chivalrous acknowledgment of General Kuropatkin, induces some interesting reflections on history, and, from the point of view of international law, recalls Halleck's statement of the law, that quarter is not given to the garrison in certain junctures, as when besiegers are compelled to deliver an assault and are in overwhelming numbers (ii. 90). Although the reported anticipations of General Stoessel were falsified by the event, the influence of the usage may perhaps be traced in the fact that Port Arthur was surrendered when two important forts were captured, though it might have held out, according to General Stoessel himself, for four or five days longer.

Belligerent usage in besieging towns.

In 1543 the French took Sainct Bony in Piedmont by storm, "et furent tous ceux de dedans tuez, hors mis le capitaine, qui fu perdu, pour avoir este si oultrageux de vouloir tenir une si meschante place devant le canon."² But Vattel³ argues against executing a commandant, and M. Heffter (s. 128) expresses the hope that such an execution will never occur again. Calvo (s. 856) treats it as a still existing opinion that the garrison of a weak place may be massacred for resistance, a conclusion from which it would follow that the garrisons of Arcot, Lucknow, Rorke's Drift, and Mafeking might have

¹ *Times*, September 20, 1904.

² Mess. de Martin du Bellay, liv. ix.

³ Liv. iii. c. viii. s. 143.

been massacred in the event of failure with the approval of the law of nations.

The Duke of Wellington, though he never acted in conformity with it, wrote in 1820: "I believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress stormed have no right to quarter; and the practice, which has prevailed during the last century, of surrendering a fortress when a breach was opened in the body of a place and the counterscarp was blown in, was founded upon this understanding."¹

The great sieges of history with which the Duke of Wellington was connected were those of Seringapatam (1799), Ciudad Rodrigo (1812), Badajoz (1812), and Burgos (1812). At Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz undoubted excesses occurred, the latter place was given over for two whole days and nights to the plunder of the British soldiery before order was restored. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz constitute instances where excesses were perpetrated by the undisciplined violence of the private soldiery. Mr. W. E. Hall contends that the massacre of the garrison and people of Ismail by the Russians in 1790 constitutes the single instance of the massacre of a garrison and people. The difference between the slaughter perpetrated at Ismail in 1790 by the Russians, and the excesses committed at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1812, was that the former were authorized by the commander, while in the latter two cases the officers did all they could to restrain their men. The terrible words in which Suvarof authorized the slaughter at Ismail are as authentic as any that can be recorded in history, so that no posthumous vindication can be given to him, such as Count Tilly, the commander of the besiegers at Magdeburg, has, Sir H. S. Maine observes,² on the whole, succeeded in obtaining.

It is perhaps worth recalling to observe that the slaughter at Ismail, where 30,000 non-combatants perished, exceeds the estimated accepted by Sir H. S. Maine of the holocaust of human life which occurred at Magdeburg.³

¹ "Despatches" 2nd Series, vol. i. p. 93.

² Lecture, "International Law," vii. p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*

Mr. W. E. Hall, writing in 1880, observed that "if one instance (of the massacre of a population such as occurred at Ismail) were now to occur, the present temper of the civilized world would render a second impossible."¹

"Yet," as his editor observes, "since these words were written, an even more hideous massacre than that of Ismail has been perpetrated. On November 21, 1894, the Japanese army stormed Port Arthur, and for five days indulged in the promiscuous slaughter of non-combatants, men, women, and children with every circumstance of barbarity. The only excuse alleged was that officers and soldiers alike were roused to uncontrollable fury by the sight of the mutilated remains of comrades who had fallen into the hands of the Chinese and been tortured to death.² Though an inquiry was ordered by the Japanese military authorities, no satisfactory explanation or reparation was ever tendered, but the scrupulous anxiety shown by Japan on every other occasion throughout the war to conduct its operation in harmony with the laws of humanity has been accepted in condonation of a solitary, though deplorable, lapse into savagery."³

The atrocities after the fall of Port Arthur were witnessed from the top of a steep hill called White Boulders, in Japanese *Hakugokusan*, commanding the whole town, by at least a dozen Europeans, including the military attachés of more than one of the great Powers. The special correspondent of the *Times* observed—

"I saw scores of Chinese hunted out of cover, shot down, and hacked to pieces, and never a man made any attempt to fight. All were in plain clothes, but that means nothing, for the soldiers flying from death got rid of their uniforms how they might. Many went down on their knees, supplicating with heads bent to the ground in *kowtow*, and in that attitude were butchered mercilessly by the conquering army. Those who fled were pursued, and sooner or later done to death. . . . Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were spent by the soldiery in murder and pillage from dawn to dark, in mutilation, in every conceivable kind of nameless atrocity, until the

¹ "International Law," 5th ed., p. 400 and note.

² *Times*, January 8, 1895.

³ Hall's "International Law," *ibid. supra*.

town became a ghastly *Inferno*, to be remembered with a fearsome shudder until one's dying day."¹

The details of this awful scene completely warrant this eloquent and emphatic condemnation. An old man, who, with two boys of ten or twelve years old, rushed into the sea to escape the fury of a licentious soldiery, was followed into the water by a Japanese cavalryman, who hewed them all down. The Japanese alleged in condonation that the townsmen fired on the troops; an allegation which the *Times* correspondent, viewing from a point of vantage the whole scene, was unable to confirm. However, the *Times*, in a leading article, gave credit to the Japanese Government for not suppressing the news. By contrast with the tenuity and obscurity of the news which came to this country of the Blagovestchenk massacre, the Japanese authorities are entitled to some credit for this candour.

But it is a melancholy reflection that the great military empire over which reigned the Emperor Alexander II., so distinguished for his unceasing efforts to abate the severities of war, is a country whose practice exhibits a lamentable defection from the principles he enunciated. The recurrent tradition of Suvarof's savagery at Ismail and Warsaw found a re-echo in the events of the Crimean War, and of Akhal Teke,² and culminated in 1900 in the cold-blooded slaughter by the Russians of the whole Chinese population of Blagovestchenk and district.

By some sinister irony, an interesting account of the town of Blagovestchenk was published in the *Times* at the time the massacre was proceeding, though long before the fact was known in England. Mr. Cooke, the commercial agent for this country in East Siberia, furnished the *Board of Trade Journal* with the following account of Blagovestchenk—

"The town is on the Manchurian branch of the Siberian railway, and is the administrative and commercial centre of the Amur region. It lies at the junction of two wide navigable rivers, the Amur and the Blei, and was founded in 1858,

¹ *Times*, January 8, 1895.

² Sir H. S. Maine's Lecture, "International Law," viii. p. 144.

since when it has grown rapidly from a small military outpost to a large trading town, with a population in 1897 of 32,600. It has some mills and minor factories, but its industrial position is not as yet of much importance, while commercially it is the centre of the cattle trade of Trans-Baikalia and Mongolia, and also of the Amur gold-mining. It has four banks, and its exceptional position must give it increased importance in the future.”¹

Little did the writer of this appreciation realize that the flourishing town he described was destined, at the time his words reached this country, to attain a sombre immortality as the Magdeburg of the passing century. But the most astonishing part of it is that throughout the whole of the winter of 1900, and even six months afterwards, the massacre about to be related was not realized in its full proportion. The only contemporary account, namely, that which appeared in the columns of the *Times*, dealt generally with the ruthless severity of the Russians throughout Manchuria. A correspondent from Niuchang stated that the native population were treated with the utmost severity. Eye-witnesses reported that the indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants had reduced the country in the vicinity of the port to utter desolation.² Excepting this statement, which rather suggests than states explicitly what had happened, it is impossible to gather a contemporary account.

A lady who visited Blagovestchenk a year after the occurrence³ gives a full account of the matter. There was, in the light of after-knowledge, a world of significance in a telegram of a few lines which appeared in the *Times* in July, 1900, briefly announcing that Aigun had been fired by the Trans-Zeya detachment of Cossacks, and that the inhabitants of Sakhalin had retreated two versts in the rear, leaving sentries in their trenches. The telegram laconically added that two or three Cossacks were wounded and one killed. The traveller spoken of above discovered that the Blagovestchenk massacre began when the Chinese at Aigun, some forty versts lower down the river, fired at a passenger steamer, and

¹ *Times*, August 21, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, August 30, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1901.

for nineteen days no steamer arrived at Blagovestchenk coming up the river. She related that Aigun, a city of many thousands, was utterly destroyed, and not one inhabitant left in it. Sakhalin was the Chinese quarter of Blagovestchenk.

The Russian officer at Blagovestchenk, General Gribsky, appears to have exhibited apathy and indecision, and finding some signs of hostility manifested by the Chinese population in Sakhalin, he telegraphed to the Governor of Khabarovka for instructions. The terrible answer returned was, "In war, burn and destroy." With a touch of casuistry, Russian officers argued before Miss Allard that General Gribsky was not responsible for the events which happened, inasmuch as the first two words were omitted in the telegram which reached him from the Governor of Khabarovka. The massacre of Blagovestchenk was described by a Russian officer in the following words:—

"The Cossacks took all the Chinese and forced them into the river on boats that could not carry them, and when the women threw their children on shore and begged that they at least might be saved, the Cossacks caught the babies on their bayonets and cut them in pieces."

According to the Russian account, the entire population of Blagovestchenk, a city of five or six thousand inhabitants was utterly blotted out.¹ But it is clear that the above estimate underestimates the dimensions of the calamity, for shortly before it occurred the British commercial agent stated the population of Blagovestchenk to be 36,000. Further, there were thousands destroyed about the same time at Aigun. It is, therefore, impossible not to conclude, with Hall's editor, that not merely in principle, but even in scale, the horrors of Blagovestchenk are comparable to those of Magdeburg, as related in Defoe's "Memoirs of a Cavalier."

In September, 1901, General Gribsky, who was immediately responsible for the massacre of the Chinese at Blagoveschenk, was appointed governor of the Province of Archangel.

¹ *Times*, July 15, 1901.

Another officer, General Orloff, who protested against his orders to slaughter peaceable inhabitants, was degraded, and subsequently his punishment commuted to "an imperial reprimand." Nothing worse than this massacre of Blagovestchenk has ever been related of the unspeakable Turk, whom Collins long ago bracketed in an eclogue with the Russian—

"The Turk and Tartar like designs pursue,
Fixed to destroy, and steadfast to undo."

"Yet none so cruel as the Tartar foe,
To death inured, and nurst in scene of woe."¹

There can be no doubt that some of the Allied troops were guilty of great excesses in entering Pekin in 1900. The current reports in the columns of the *Times* spoke of appalling destruction having taken place, rendering the aspect of Pekin one of absolute desolation. Miles of houses were said to have been stripped, first by Boxers, then by Chinese soldiers, and then by soldiers of the relief expedition.

These atrocities were attributed by the Japanese to the Russians at the time.

¹ Collins' Persian Eclogues contain a remarkable prediction, uttered more than one hundred years before, of the extinction of Caucasian independence by Russia, an event that took place, it may be remembered, in 1864.

CHAPTER V.

ESPIONAGE AND WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY IN WAR.

VATTTEL defines spies as those who "find means to insinuate themselves among the enemy, in order to discover the state of his affairs, to pry into his designs, and then give intelligence to their employer."¹ As might be expected from a writer described by Chancellor Kent as "very moral and correct,"² Vattel treats the topic of espionage from a critically ethical point of view. All persons who are spies, he observes, are punishable with death, either by shooting or hanging, the reason being "we have scarcely any other means of guarding against the mischief they may do us." In modern times a person who is, so to speak, entitled to be shot is not considered a spy, though he renders analogous services.³ But persons in this category would not fall under Vattel's definition of a spy; though they penetrate the enemy's lines, their object is merely to carry despatches from one commander to another, and not to discover the state of the enemy's affairs. Though Vattel does not distinguish between spies and despatch-bearers, he distinguishes the classes of employment in which a spy may be engaged. He examines the question from the point of view of the State employing the spy, and considers that the employment must be voluntary, and that, except in the case of a very unjust war, it is not permissible, by means of espionage, to seduce the allegiance of a subject, or to tamper with the fidelity of a governor of a fortress.

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. x. s. 179.

² *Seton v. Low*, Johnson's Cases, vol. i. p. 1.

³ Cf. "A Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War," Art. 22; passed at the Conference of Brussels, 1874.

Frederic the Great employed officers as spies.

The Duke of Wellington on spies in Peninsular War.

Case of Osire.

Sir H. S. Maine on spies.

Brussels Conference, 1874; balloonists not considered spies.

Operator by wireless telegraphy.

In these respects Vattel's views were far in advance of his age, as, indeed, he admits when he says that the above practices were not contrary to the external laws of all nations.

In some "Military Instructions" published by Frederic the Great in 1760, he expressly commends the employment of officers as spies. In 1793, when Prussia united with Russia and Austria in issuing a declaration of intention to annex Poland, Frederic William employed Italians as Jacobin emissaries in Poland, for the purpose of invoking the wrath of Catherine II. of Russia against that unhappy country.¹ On the other hand it illustrates, in an age not far removed from that of Vattel, his observation that a man of honour declines service as a spy, that the Duke of Wellington never knew a French officer engage in treacherous correspondence with the English or sell information.² There was, however, one very conspicuous exception, a commissariat officer,

Osire by name, who was what Frederic the Great would have called a double spy.³ Bluntschli observes that the penalty inflicted on a spy is in general out of all proportion with the crime.⁴ Sir H. S. Maine reminds us that "secrecy and disguise are the essential characteristics of a spy in the military sense."⁵ In 1870 Prince Bismarck contended that balloonists were spies, because they might make use of information gained by crossing the German outposts, and were out of control. But it is consistent with the definition of Sir H. S. Maine that at the Brussels Conference, balloonists were pronounced not to be spies.⁶ On the same grounds of absence of secrecy and disguise, Dr. T. J. Lawrence contends that a newspaper correspondent, who transmits information to his employer from a steamer with a wireless telegraphy installation, cannot be a spy.⁷ Mr. W. E. Hall observes that the "Manual of the Institute of International Law" probably states the practice which States

¹ "Annual Register," 1795, c. ii. p. 20.

² "Earl Stanhope's Conversations," p. 94.

³ *Ibid. supra*, pp. 20, 54, 71, etc. ⁴ Ss. 628-32, 639.

⁵ Lectures, "International Law," vol. viii. p. 148.

⁶ Cf. "Project," Art. 22.

⁷ "War and Neutrality in the Far East," pp. 86, 87.

will endeavour to adopt on the subject of espionage.¹ By this manual spies cannot be punished *flagrante delicto*, but only after trial. A spy is not answerable for his anterior acts after he has once made good his escape from the territory occupied by the enemy. In the "Soldier's Pocket Book" Lord Wolseley, whose ethical maxims are compared by Sir H. S. Maine to those of Frederic the Great, appears only to recommend stratagem and artifice which, Vattel observes, "have had a great share in the glory of celebrated commanders"² in the carrying of despatches. But despatch-bearers were expressly declared not to be spies at the Brussels Conference. In 1796 Colonel Graham, afterwards famous at Barrosa and St. Sebastian, penetrated Napoleon's lines successfully with a message from Wurmser to the authorities at Vienna. Previously the French intercepted a messenger carrying a despatch rolled up in a tiny ball of sealing-wax.³ Such services do not amount to espionage.

Espionage is regulated by the laws of war, and of course requires to be carefully distinguished from Secret Service in time of peace, which the revelations of the Dreyfus Case and the Boer War demonstrated to have risen to an extraordinary height.⁴

It seems clear that the Russo-Japanese War has produced, at least, one case of espionage which rivals in its tragic dénouement the case of André or Ney. It is impossible to give any details, but the *Times*, March 21, 1904, published a brief semi-official communiqué from St. Petersburg, stating that a cavalry captain, Irokoff by name, had been executed for having sold secret plans for the organization of the field army to Japan. Later, the *St. Petersburg Journal* announced that a "Capt. Ivkoff," who was immured in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul on the charge of selling

¹ "Manuel de l'Inst. de Droit Int." Art. 21.

² "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. x. s. 178.

³ Cf. Thiers's "Campaigns of Napoleon," with Notes by E. E. Bowen, p. 159.

⁴ Lord Salisbury stated in the House of Lords that he was told on high diplomatic authority that the Transvaal Republic spent in one year £800,000 in Secret Service (*Times*, Jan. 31, 1900). At the Dreyfus trial at Rennes, Col. Picquart gave some interesting disclosures as to the number of persons engaged in espionage, and the large sums they demanded (*Times*, Aug. 19, 1899).

Lord Wolseley
on the carry-
ing of des-
patches.

The case of
Capt. Irokoff,
March 21, 1904.

State documents to Japan, had committed suicide by opening an artery with a tie-clip.¹ The possibility, to say the least, that "Capt. Irokoff" may be "Capt. Ivkoff" recalls an incident in the controversy about the Man in the Iron Mask, where a person suspected of being the *masque du fer* disappears, and no date can with certainty be assigned of his death. This is Count Matthioli, minister of Charles IV. of Mantua, who was imprisoned in 1679 by Louis XIV. for having disclosed to other States the secret treaty under which the fortress of Casalé was ceded to France. It is known that Matthioli was taken to the Îles de St. Marguerite, the State prison near Cannes. In 1694 four State prisoners were conveyed thence to the Bastille; but the one who had been longest confined died on the way. Matthioli, who is frequently mentioned by name in the reports of the Governor of the île St. Marguerite up to 1694, is never mentioned after that date. The Man in the Iron Mask survived till 1703. M. Topin, on this evidence, is still inclined to believe that Count Matthioli is the *masque du fer*. In the genealogical tree of the Matthioli family, the date of this Count Matthioli is left a blank. Mr. Andrew Lang considers, on the other hand, that the Man in the Iron Mask was Eustache d'Auger, all that is known of whom is that he was an obscure spy. The fate of Capt. "Irokoff" or "Ivkoff" must be added to the myriad mysteries of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. If so favourable an observer to Russia as Mr. H. Norman is to be believed, the arcana, not only of the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, but in an even higher degree, those of the fortress of Schlusselberg, are far more impenetrable than those of the Bastille. In this, as may be expected, he is confirmed at all hands by Stepnjak.²

¹ *Times*, July 5, 1904.

² Cf. Mr. H. Norman's "All the Russias," 1902, p. 20, and Stepnjak's "Russia Under the Tzars," vol. i. p. 232, and c. xix. Ibid., for a description of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul: "an immense building, wide and flat, surmounted by a meagre, tapering, attenuated spire, like the end of a gigantic syringe. . . . Every quarter of an hour the prison clock repeats a tedious, irritating air, always the same—a psalm in praise of the Tzar" (Ibid., p. 205).

The well-known case of Major André raised, in an instructive form, the distinction between a noxious person who is entitled to an honourable death at the hands of a belligerent, and a spy in the technical sense. A reference to Vattel shows that the English Government were free from any blame. It may be remembered that André conducted negotiations with Benedict Arnold for the surrender of West Point in 1780. In view of the intestine divisions among the Americans themselves, the case was not an ordinary one of tampering with the fidelity of a governor of a fortress. This Vattel in so many words condemns, except when a war is unjust. But it is doubtless allowable, Vattel observes, to take advantage of intestine divisions among the enemy. Further, on his view the English Government were justified in employing André on the service as it was an exceptional case, and one of the highest importance, in which event Vattel holds the sovereign is entitled to require such service. As Vattel considered a person who is entitled to be shot a spy, it is impossible to cite him as disapproving the manner of Major André's execution. But General Halleck comments on the brutality with which Major André's request to die like a soldier was denied him, and seems to admit that he was not technically a spy, although he was in disguise when taken.¹ Sir R. Phillimore considers that "the manner of André's execution was scarcely justifiable by the sternest laws of war."² As the disguise is admitted even by General Halleck to have been accidental, it is impossible to consider that André was a spy who is liable to a felon's death.

According to the Manual drawn up by the Institute of International Law on the subject (Article 26) a spy is not answerable for his previous acts, after he has succeeded in getting out of the territory occupied by the enemy. André had passed the last American posts when he was apprehended. According to the Manual of International Law, André ought not to have been executed. Mr. W. E. Hall observes that States will in future probably adopt the articles of the Institute of International Law on this subject, and according to them, André ought not to have been

¹ "International Law," vol. i. p. 573.

² Ibid., vol. iii. p. 150.

executed. By Statute 29 & 30 Vict. c. 109, s. 6,¹ spies can be tried by a naval court-martial, and shall suffer death or other punishment. The Army Discipline Act, 1881, part i. s. 4, ss. 3, punishes a member of her Majesty's forces who gives treacherous information to an enemy.

A person who gives intelligence to the governments of foreign Powers with whom the King is at open war, commits high treason by adhering to the King's enemies, under the Statute of Treasons, 1350, Stat. 25 Edw. III. st. 5, c. 3, whether the letter conveying the intelligence arrives at its destination² or is intercepted on its way thither.³ Sending provisions, or selling arms, or treacherously surrendering a fortress to a foreign Power with whom the King is at open war, likewise constitutes respectively an adhering to the King's enemies within the meaning of the Statute of Treasons.⁴ During the Crimean War, it was made a misdemeanour to deal with securities issued by the Russian Government while the war lasted.⁵ When this country is at peace, the disclosure of information as to a Crown fortress, arsenal, or factory, and the breach of official trust by communication of Crown documents, are acts punishable under the Official Secrets Act, 1889. The first class of such acts are generally misdemeanours, but may be felonies if they are committed with the intention of communicating information to the agent of a foreign state. Breach of official trust is felony if the communication was made or attempted to be made to a foreign state. When the act is a felony, it is punishable under the Official Secrets Act, by either penal servitude for life or

¹ Naval Discipline Act.

² De la Motte's Case, (1782) 21 Howell's State Trials, 687.

³ Gregg's Case, 14 Howell's State Trials, p. 1371, referred to by Lord Mansfield at the trial of Dr. Hensey, 29 Howell's State Trials, 1342, 1344. Lord Mansfield there said: "Letters of advice and correspondence, and intelligence to the enemy, to enable them to annoy us or defend themselves, written and sent, in order to be delivered to the enemy, are, though intercepted, overt acts of both these species of treason that have been mentioned. And this was determined by all the judges of England, in Gregg's case. . . . The only doubt, there, arose from the letters of intelligence being intercepted and never delivered; but they held 'that that circumstance did not alter the case.'"

⁴ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 71, referring to 3 Inst. x. "Stephens' (Blackstone's) Comm." vol. iv. p. 192.

⁵ Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. cxxiii.; referred to by Sir R. Phillimore, *ibid., supra*.

for not less than five years, or by imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.

It is pointed out by Sir H. S. Maine in his lectures on International Law that the rapid progress of the inventive science of modern times has tended to entirely refute the axiom of Grotius, "War is not an art."

The astonishing discoveries of Marconi have tended still further to discredit the axiom of Grotius. A few days after the Hague Peace Conference, at the British naval manœuvres of that year (August 9, *et seq.*, 1899), this new application of science demonstrated itself to be, in the words of the *Times*, of "already the utmost value for a variety of naval purposes."¹ A correspondent of the *Times*, "Navalis," observed that, drawing deductions from the experience at the manœuvres, it was difficult to over-rate the value of wireless telegraphy as a new means of communications. The original drawback to wireless telegraphy that signals can be intercepted remains. This liability seems appreciably to have influenced important belligerent operations in the present war, and the risk of obstruction has perhaps even more clearly militated against its use. When wireless telegraphy can be rendered syntonic so that the transmitter shall only send and the receiver only respond to vibrations of a preconcerted pitch, communication between vessels out of sight of each other will be a perfectly safe operation in time of war. Nothing can be more instructive or convincing than the remarkable experience of the *Times'* experiment in wireless telegraphy in the Far East, under conditions which were not at all favourable.

The following explanatory facts collected from the *Times* are of general interest, and to some extent justify the Russian protest. Under favourable conditions it takes at least three weeks to bring a wireless station into working order. The De Forest system operates with certainty up to two hundred miles when there is a mast 180 feet high both at the receiving and remitting stations. The *Times'* plan involved, of course, the correspondence of a remitting station on the steamer and a

Experience of
the *Times'*
correspondent
in the Far
East.

¹ *Times*, August 18, 1899.

receiving station on land at Wei-hai-Wei. By means of an electric exciter it is possible to transmit messages from the shore station to a vessel. The experience of the *Times'* correspondent showed that messages could be sent, not only over the sea, but over intervening land, even when it was a mountainous corner of a promontory, the hills of which varied from 200 feet to 1860 feet, or islands such as the Prince Edward Islands. It appears that if two vessels fitted with wireless working stations are practically in juxtaposition, the rival sparks somewhat interfere with the messages even under the De Forest system. But it is claimed for this system that, unless this is the case, by means of the telephonic receiver messages can be sent through, over, and above those of competitors in the vicinity fitted with wireless stations.

It appears, from the experience of the *Times*, that the masts under the De Forest system, need not be exactly of the same height, whether the height is or is not supplemented by wire exposure. The shore station of the *Times* was 100 feet above the sea, and therefore while the top of one mast was 280 feet above the level of the sea, the top of the other was only 180 feet above sea level. The height of the mast on the station on the ship was supplemented by 102 feet of exposure on board the ship. This worked perfectly well, so far as transmitting messages from the vessel to the shore station up to one hundred miles was concerned. The remission of messages from a shore station is facilitated by attaching copper plates in the sea to a lead wire over the face of the cliffs. There is no difficulty in determining the nature of the act in the case of a rival operator at a wireless station who intercepts a despatch from one belligerent and transmits it, either by wireless telegraphy or otherwise, to the other belligerent. Such a person is clearly a spy as defined in military manuals, since he collects secretly information of the designs of one belligerent and communicates it to the other. It is, however, necessary to remember that secrecy and disguise are the essential characteristics of a spy. It was, in fact, just because these characteristics were wanting in persons travelling in balloons, that the view taken by the Germans in 1870 was

indefensible. The question, therefore, appears to depend, so far as the interception of messages is concerned, on the feasibility of disguising a vessel fitted up with a wireless station. But a message, it has been seen, may not only be intercepted, but also obstructed by competitors transmitting meaningless messages or even false information.

These liabilities lead to important consequences. A despatch may decide the fate of a whole campaign, as is pointed out by Phillimore, and is necessarily contraband of war. In the present war, if a Japanese vessel fitted with a wireless station could have successfully disguised herself as a Russian man-of-war she could either transmit false information to the shore station at Port Arthur, or receive thence valuable information, provided, of course, her commander had the key to the Russian cypher. In the latter case disguise would be necessary in order to consummate the deceit. A person who obstructs or prevents the delivery of a message from the commander of the land force of a belligerent to the commander of that belligerent's sea forces may be compared to a cavalry patrol of one belligerent which intercepts messages from one portion of the other belligerent's forces to another operating in the vicinity. A person who secretly intercepts despatches on land is clearly a spy. The problem seems to be confined to operations on a littoral. A person could not suddenly construct a wireless station on land and intercept the messages of a belligerent, since it takes at least three weeks to construct a wireless station. It is difficult to maintain that secrecy and disguise are as impossible in the case of a vessel fitted with a wireless station as they are in the case of a balloon. The two cases are further widely to be distinguished in the nature of the information it is possible to obtain. A person who travels in a balloon can only, under favourable circumstances, steal a transient glance at the disposition of an army. But the knowledge gained by intercepting a despatch, or the service rendered to a belligerent by preventing his enemy from transmitting a message, may easily in both cases be invaluable.

The employment of wireless telegraphy in war is a question

which presses more for a solution than the status of persons travelling in a balloon, however hostile may be their motives. It is far from certain that the Hague Conference will repeat, in the case of wireless telegraphy operation, the decision it gave (Art. 31) in the case of persons travelling in a balloon. The conviction of the *Times'* correspondent that, as far as neutrals are concerned, the use of wireless telegraphy in war will be forbidden, is probably well founded, and in future operators not identified with the public forces of either Power are not unlikely to be treated as spies by the belligerent to whom their presence is offensive.

CHAPTER VI.

LAYING MINES IN MID-OCEAN AND THE USE OF BALLOONS IN WAR.

THE above topic is connected with an important chapter in International law and the mitigation of war. A complete exposition of the subject would involve reversion to the Lateran Councils, the horrors of the siege of Magdeburg, and the humanitarian policy of Alexander II. of Russia. Sir H. S. Maine shows that the excesses of Tilly produced as indelible an impression on the mind of Grotius as the excesses of revolution produced on the imagination of Edmund Burke. Nor is it inconsistent with this view that "the fury of fighting" which appeared in the religious wars was calming down when Grotius began to write. Burke denounced Mirabeau while the Revolution in France was culminating, but at a time when people in England had their minds steadily opposed to events in France. Vattel, the most humane of publicists, was mitigating the severities of war in an age of maritime wars. Naval usages, Sir H. S. Maine observes, are reasonable and humane on the whole, because belligerents can be checked by neutrals in a maritime war. One need only recur to Mr. W. E. Hall's Introduction to his "International Law" to appreciate the fact that international law advances, as the Latin poet observed of justice generally, with slow progression. Mr. Hall anticipated that international law would arrive at maturity some time after the next great war. These presages were made in 1888, and the Russo-Japanese War seems to supply the situation which he contemplated.

The humanity
of the Middle
Ages.

In the Middle Ages weapons of a far more merciful character than the modern mine or torpedo were condemned. The poisoning of water and food, on the other hand, which is prohibited in modern military manuals, was equally disallowed by the Greeks and Romans.¹ The ancients may have prohibited poisoning either because arsenic (the only poison then known) causes death, coupled with the extremest pain, or because of the idea that poison was not fair fighting, a very strong feeling in ancient days. In the manual for English officers poisoning is prohibited because it is calculated to produce unnecessary pain or misery in connection with poisoned weapons. Sir H. S. Maine observes that "assassination began to be regarded with peculiar horror after the Reformation." He alludes to the fierce denunciations of assassination that arose on the assassination of William of Orange at Delft, 1584, by Balthasar Gerard. The execution of Gerard was, however, attended with terrible cruelty, greatly exceeding even that attending the punishment inflicted for treason in our law at that time.² "Cruciatus legibus invisi." The revulsion of the opinion of the civilized world reached its apogee during the great war, when Mr. Fox, then Foreign Secretary, warned the Great Napoleon of a scheme to assassinate him. Sir H. S. Maine observes, "The feeling elicited by this proceeding of the English Foreign Secretary was so strong and has so little decayed, that I think, with the writer of the 'Manual,' we may safely lay down that assassination is against the laws of war." It is curious to recall a passage of Sir H. S. Maine's lectures, where he says, "There will always, of course, be some danger of this crime being resorted to when a war, as is sometimes the case, appears to depend entirely on the life of one individual —a great statesman or a great general."³

Assassination,
when a
danger.

Cordua's plot,
August, 1900.

A Boer plot, which had for its object the kidnapping of

¹ Sir H. S. Maine's Lectures, "International Law," p. 130.

² Van Leeuwen's "Roman Law," vol. ii. p. 258, by Chief Justice Kotze; and cf. Emanuel van Merwen's History, bk. xii., and Peter Bowe's "Nederlandsche Historien," bk. xviii. p. 55.

³ Lectures, "International Law," p. 137.

Lord Roberts at Pretoria, August, 1900, will be in general recollection.¹

Sir H. S. Maine's observation, in view of General Kuropatkin's high reputation as the conqueror of Kashgaria, the enormous losses he inflicted on the Japanese at the battle of Liao-Yang, and his skilful retreat from that place, has a certain interest in connection with a more or less circumstantial account that an attempt was designed upon his life.² The incident is alleged to have occurred at Niu Chang, and the attempt was apparently frustrated by the vigilance of his Cossack Guards.

In 1139 the Lateran Council put an anathema on the use of the crossbow, which led to its disuse. When Richard I. revived the use of this weapon, anathematized by the Lateran Council as "artem illam mortiferam et Deo odibilem," his death by a crossbow bolt at the Castle of Chaluz, near Limoges, was regarded by a great part of Europe as a judgment. A most important consequence of this anathema was the continued employment of the older weapon, the longbow, which led to the English successes in the wars with France.

On the invention of the musket its use was proscribed during two or three centuries. "The Chevalier Bayard thanked God in his last days that he had ordered all musketeers who fell into his hands to be slain without mercy. He states expressly that he held the introduction of firearms to be an unfair innovation on the rules of lawful war. . . . Marshal Mont Luc (1503-1577), who has left memoirs behind him, expressly declares that it was the usage of his day that no musketeer should be spared. The bayonet, which turns a musket into a weapon which is at once a firearm and a lance, was known long before it was used."³ Frederic the Great used it universally, and is said to be the first commander who resorted to it. Sir H. S. Maine ascribes the green uniform of the Rifle Brigade to the proscription of the bayonet and

Attempt to
assassinate
Gen. Kuro-
patkin.

Lateran
Council, 1139,
proscribe the
crossbow.

Proscription
of the bayonet
in 15th and
16th centuries.

¹ Cf. Conan Doyle's "Great Boer War," complete edition, p. 498.

² *Times*, April 26, 1904.

³ Lecture, *supra*, pp. 139, 140.

musket. The green uniform was supposed to protect from observation, and this was more than ever necessary when no quarter was given to soldiers using the bayonet and musket.

Proscription of red-hot shot. The same writer observes that "Red-hot shot was at first prohibited," and he points out that the musket was proscribed long after the prohibition against the use of red-hot shot had fallen into desuetude. The musket was forbidden in the age of Chevalier Bayard and Marshal Mont Luc, that is, in the sixteenth century. The French Vice-Admiral, Marshal Conflans, issued an order of the day, November 8, 1759, forbidding the use of hollow shot against the enemy, on the ground that it was not generally employed by polite nations, and that the French ought to fight according to the rules of honour. The same view was taken of the use of hot shot, grape, chain shot, split balls.¹ The *Tourterelle*, a French ship, in an action with the *Lively*, used red-hot shot. The employment of hot shot is not usually deemed honourable warfare; but the blame, if any, rested with those who had equipped the ship for sea.² Among the langridge which the American privateer, the *General Armstrong*, used in 1814, against the British ship *Plantagenet's* boats, were nails, brass buttons, knife blades, and the consequence was that the wounded suffered excruciating pain before they were cured. These are among the examples cited in Halleck.³ Of course, he disapproves of the last instance, but the only limitation he places on the use of weapons is that the wounded must not be killed, nor injuries inflicted in a manner which does not contribute to the decision of the contest. This author regards every great discovery in the art of war as having a life-saving and peace-promoting influence. On this view scientific discoveries tend to shorten wars, and the same writer quotes the effect of railway communications in bringing to a decisive issue the battle of Montebello, in 1859, by enabling

¹ D. F. Butler, "Address Mil. Prof.", p. 25; Ortolan, "Diplomatie de la Mer," iii. c. I.

² James, "Naval History," vol. i. p. 283.

³ "International Law," vol. i. pp. 562, 563.

the French to hurry up large reinforcements at a critical moment. It is impossible not to observe that the railway has exerted a similar influence in many other battles, and it can certainly be credited with the abbreviation of many modern campaigns, especially in the Soudan and South Africa. Until the late war, it seemed clear that wars have tended to become shorter. This was observed by Lord Wolseley, in his anticipation that the next great European campaign would only last a fortnight. Sir H. S. Maine agrees, "It is a satisfactory reflection that wars have, on the whole, become less frequent, and they have also become shorter."¹ The Hundred Days of 1815 affords an instance to the contrary, since it was fought before all the extraordinary improvements in weapons of war had been made. The brevity of this campaign must be ascribed, *inter alia*, to political and dynastic reasons. The Soudan campaign of Lord Kitchener, the Transvaal War, and the recent struggle in the Far East show that, even with the more favourable circumstances, modern war may be of long duration. But it is not easy to deny that the effect of science has been to shorten wars both by affording rapidity of communication, and by furnishing weapons of great destructive power.

The landmarks of modern international law on the topic of the proscription of weapons are the Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868, the Conference of Brussels in 1874, and the Hague Peace Tribunal of 1899.

By a declaration between Great Britain, Austria, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Prussia and the North German Confederation, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Wurtemburg, signed at St. Petersburg, December 11, 1868, the contracting parties engaged to renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of any projectiles of weight below 400 grammes, which are either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substance. This engagement does not oblige when, in a war between contracting or acceding parties, a non-acceding party

St. Peters-
burg, 1868.

¹ Lecture, "International Law," vii. p. 141.

joins one of the belligerents. Maine observes of the Declaration of St. Petersburg that it "has no longer its humane effect in consequence of the progress of science, which, I am sorry to say, has often had the effect of defeating attempts to increase the area of humanity. It is alleged that the conical bullets, which are universal in modern armament, do, in fact, cause pain as severe, and wounds as incurable, as ever did the explosive bullets which were just coming in about the year 1868."¹ But this circumstance, in turn, Sir H. S. Maine observes, does not affect the opinion of the whole civilized world announced at St. Petersburg, that lawful usage does not warrant any state in causing injuries which give more pain than is necessary for a comparatively humane object, that of disabling the enemy.

Conference of Brussels, 1874. In 1874 a conference, attended by delegates from all the countries of Europe, assembled at Brussels, on the invitation of the Emperor of Russia, for the purpose of discussing a project of international rules on the laws and usages of war. A series of rules was agreed to, but no international compact followed. Nevertheless, though not absolutely binding, the rules were of great value as exhibiting the prevailing ideas in a definite form, and many of them have found a place in the Manuals of War now issued by civilized governments for the instruction of their officers in the field.

Reasons for comparative failure of. The Brussels convention was given its death-blow, Sir H. S. Maine observes, by the English Foreign Secretary of State. The reason alleged was that many of its suggestions owed their origin to military officers of the Great Powers, and were calculated to arouse opposition from the representatives of the smaller Powers, and from those of the Powers who had not yet adopted the system of great armies raised by conscription. In the opinion of Lord Derby, the effect of these provisions would have been to facilitate aggressive wars, and to paralyze the patriotic efforts of an invaded people. Sir H. S. Maine attributes the failure of the Brussels Conference, 1874, to the recency of the passions excited by the Franco-German War of 1870.

¹ Lectures, "International Law," vii. p. 136.

The final Act of the Hague Peace Conference contained three declarations, which prohibit on the part of the contracting Powers :

Final Act of
Hague Peace
Conference,
1899.

(1) For a period of five years, the launching of projectiles from balloons or by other similar new methods.

(2) The use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.

(3) The use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.

None of these declarations was signed by the British representatives, and the first only by those of the United States. It will be seen that neither the Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, the Declaration of Brussels, 1874, nor the Hague Peace Conference, 1899, contained any limitation of the use of mines or torpedoes. The Manual for the use of British officers in the field declares torpedoes and mines (which it associates) to be legitimate weapons, and therefore considers there is no reason why officers or soldiers using them should be refused quarter, or be treated in a worse manner than other combatants. When the torpedo was invented, it was received with downright execration. It first made its appearance in the war between the revolted colonies, now forming the United States, and the mother country, and it was then known as the "American Turtle." Many attempts to obtain an improved form of it were made during the war between England and France, when Napoleon and his armies were threatening the coast. The principle of using clockwork had already been invented, but the peace of 1814 put an end for the time to that method of invention, and it was long before the world heard again of the "catamaran," as the torpedo was next called.¹

While both mine and torpedo are now well established as between belligerents, a further question arises as to the rights of neutrals. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 has given rise to the very contingency which Sir H. S. Maine and

No limitation
set to use of
mines or
torpedoes.

Sir H. S.
Maine on the
history of the
torpedo.

The torpedo
and the mine
in the Russo-
Japanese War,
1904.

¹ Sir H. S. Maine's Lectures, "International Law" vii. p. 142.

a celebrated French admiral declared would involve the proscription of the torpedo as a weapon even between belligerents.¹ On July 16, 1904, the British steamer *Hipsang* was torpedoed by a Russian destroyer off Port Arthur, according to the finding of the Naval Court at Shanghai, August 23, without any just cause or reason. And another incident, while it did not actually involve consequences to a neutral, was of so dangerous a tendency as to attract wide notice. In May 1904, Admiral Togo reported: "While the fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the *Hatsuse* struck an enemy's mine. Her rudder was damaged, and she sent a message for a ship to tow her. One was being sent when another message brought the lamentable report that the *Hatsuse* had struck another mine and had sunk immediately after. She was then ten knots off the Liau-tie-Shan promontory. There was no enemy in sight, and her loss must have been caused by a mine or submarine." Three hundred officers and men were saved, and she sank in thirty minutes.

The destruction of the
Hatsuse, ten
miles from
land.

Neutral vessels
on the high
seas.

The significance of the incident, from the point of view of international law, is that the vessel was sunk in the open sea, apparently by a mine, far beyond the territorial limit of three miles, within which such an operation could only, according to Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. Theodore Woolsey, be safely conducted without constituting a most unwarrantable interference with the right of a neutral to navigate the ocean without incurring such a risk. The two fundamental postulates involved are (1) that, theoretically, neutral ships, whether public or private, have a right to pursue their ordinary routes on the high seas in time of war; (2) that belligerents have an absolute right to fight a naval battle on the high seas, the scene of which can be approached by neutral ships only at their proper risk and peril. But as the report of Admiral Togo specially states that the enemy were not in sight when the *Hatsuse* sank, the last consideration does not arise. A neutral ship passing at the time would not have contributed to her own loss if she, and not the *Hatsuse*, had been blown up.

¹ Sir H. S. Maine's Lectures, "International Law," viii, pp. 146-8.

Professor T. E. Holland observed, "It is certain that no Prof. T. E. international usage sanctions the employment by one belligerent against the other of mines, or other secret contrivances, which would, without notice, render dangerous the navigation of the high seas. No belligerent has ever asserted a right to do anything of the kind, and it may be in the recollection of your readers that strong disapproval was expressed of a design, erroneously attributed to the United States a few years since, of effecting a blockade of certain Cuban ports by torpedoes instead of by a cruising squadron. These, it was pointed out, would superadd to the risk of capture and confiscation, to which a blockade runner is admittedly liable, the total destruction of the ship and all on board. It may be worth while to add, as bearing upon the question under discussion, that there is a tendency in expert opinion toward allowing the line between territorial waters and the high seas to be drawn at a considerably greater distance than the measurement of three miles from the shore."¹

It is reasonably clear that the reason for the fixing of three miles from the coast as the limit of territorial jurisdiction was that it then represented the range of cannon shot. The expression of Bynkershoek is "quousque tormenta exploduntur," "ibi finitur armorum vis."²

If ever, therefore, the maxim "cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex" admitted of application, it applies to the case where, the limit of territorial jurisdiction being "fighting distance from land," improvements of artillery have caused that distance to be extended from three to fifteen miles. The first instance in which it was urged that modern improvements in artillery logically involve the extension of the limit of jurisdiction over territorial waters, was the protest of the U.S. Consul at the Cape, 1863, on the occasion of the capture of the American barge *Sea-Bride* by the *Alabama*, August 6, 1863. In this protest, addressed to Sir Philip Wodehouse, then Governor of the Cape, the Consul for the United States (Mr. W. Graham) observed, "I believe there is no law defining the word 'coast' other than international law. That law has always limited

¹ *Times*, May 25, 1904.

² "Quæstiones Juris Publici," c. viii.

neutral waters to the fighting distance from land, which, upon the invention of gunpowder, was extended to a distance of three nautical miles from land on a straight coast, and by the same rule, since the invention of Armstrong rifled cannon, to at least six miles.”¹ The *Alabama* captured the *Sea-Bride* two miles and a half from the nearest point of land, which was Robben Island. *Historicus* considered that this incident involved an infringement of the neutrality of Great Britain, as it clearly did, on the assumption that the capture took place two miles and a half from the nearest point of land.² It is difficult to understand why, if the capture took place within the three miles’ limit, the American Consul should have gone out of his way to insist that logically that limit should be extended. In any case, the incident deserves notice as constituting the first instance of the expression of the tendency in modern expert opinion.

The result of admitting this tendency in the case of the *Hatsuse* would be the conclusion that the mine by which the *Hatsuse* was blown up was laid, not in the high seas, but in territorial waters. The report of Admiral Togo states definitely that the *Hatsuse* was blown up ten miles from the nearest land. But the range of modern cannon is fifteen miles, and therefore, if this limit were adopted, it would be necessary to conclude that the *Hatsuse* was blown up in territorial waters. On the general issue, the views of American lawyers were declared in the *Times* to agree with those of Professor T. E. Holland. Mr. Moore, formerly of the State Department, and now Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia College, New York, while awaiting further evidence of Russian responsibility, or, as he said, “absolute proof,” observed: “However, as these mines were deliberately floated into waters where they were liable to endanger neutral ships, the act is undoubtedly inadmissible.” Dr. Theodore Woolsey, Professor of International Law at Yale University, observed: “My judgment would be that mines, whether anchored or intentionally set adrift in the straits of the Gulf

American
jurists on
laying mines
in mid-ocean.

¹ Parliamentary Papers, “Accounts and Papers,” 1864., 62.

² *Times*, February 17, 1864.

of Pe-chi-li, beyond the coast sea-limit, constitute an indiscriminate attack upon neutrals and belligerents alike, and are, therefore, illegitimate.”¹

In the *Kreuz Zeitung*, the experience of the Germans in 1870, when several German mines which had been laid in German harbours were set adrift by storms, was appealed to as showing that the *Hatsuse* might have been struck by a mine that had been originally moored.²


The Japanese employed balloons at the great battle of Liao-Yang.³ This was presumably only for purposes of observation, but this fact is not stated, though we are told that the Russians fired at one and missed it. Japan was a signatory of Declaration (1) of the Hague Peace Conference, and therefore undertook not to utilize balloons for dropping projectiles or explosives for a probationary period of five years from July, 1899; but she was, strictly speaking, not prohibited from so utilizing balloons at Liao-Yang in August, 1904. The incident did not lead to any Russian protest, and therefore it may be presumed that the Japanese balloon observed to the south-west of Liao-Yang was merely used for purposes of reconnaissance.

Great Britain was not a signatory of the Declaration (1) In present state of international law, projectiles may be thrown from balloons. of the Hague Peace Conference. But as the probationary period has now expired, no Power is prohibited from utilizing balloons in the manner detailed. However, by order of the Czar, February 28, 1904, Russia regards the Hague declarations as still in force.

¹ *Times*, May, 26, 1904.

² It was stated in the *Times*, March 11, 1905, that the navigation of the Gulf of Pechili was attended with considerable danger owing to floating mines.

³ *Times*, September 2, 1904.



PART III.

THE LAW GOVERNING STATES IN THE
RELATION OF NEUTRALITY.

that "it is unwise for a people to enact or to retain neutrality laws more severe than it believes the measure of its duty to compel."¹ The fact and generalization are alike interesting in view of the fact that the shipbuilding sections of our own Foreign Enlistment Act, creating a crime and embarrassing an important branch of British industry, are greatly in excess of the requirements of international law.²

Venice and Naples acted on the rule prohibiting construction of vessels for belligerents.

It is also of interest to note historically that the usage of the Western Mediterranean,³ the source of maritime law on which the *Consolato del Mare*, the authoritative sea-code of the Middle Ages, was founded, was thus the origin of a modern international usage on which the Conference of Geneva sets its seal. Till the Declaration of Paris, 1856, Great Britain adhered to the rule laid down by *Il Consolato del Mare*, c. 273, that "the enemy's goods, found on board a friend's ship, shall be confiscated;" and it was Great Britain's uniform adherence to this principle which arrayed the Northern Powers against her. At a later date the converse has been seen. If this country had adopted the later usages of the Western Mediterranean, the *Alabama* affair would have been rendered impossible.

Galiani, advocate of First Armed Neutrality, in the domain of theory, introduced prohibition.

The first authority for the international usage prohibiting the construction and outfit of vessels was an Italian, Abbate Galiani, Sicilian Secretary of Legation at Paris, whose work on the reciprocal rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals was written *pro re nata* to defend the conduct of the King of Two Sicilies in adhering to the Russian League in 1782. There exists considerable doubt as to the merit of Galiani's work, it is spoken of by Phillimore in a manner that implies commendation,⁵ but it was severely criticized by Historicus,⁴ and the other advocate of the First Neutrality disputed its position, and the same may be said of Azuni.⁶ Galiani made a naïve confession that his work was written under great pressure, at a time when he had no books to consult. This

¹ "International Law," 5th ed., p. 613.

² "Report of Neutrality Laws of Comm.," pp. 9, 10.

³ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 278.

⁴ Letters, "International Law," p. 25.

⁵ "Droit Maritime de L'Europe," 1805, cf. citation in "Letters of Historicus," p. 126.

circumstance, *Historicus* observed, may palliate the errors of Galiani, but hardly reinforces his authority.¹

Galiani, in fact, merely enunciated the principles of American neutrality as laid down by Story, C.J., in the *Santissima Trinidad*, (1822) Wheaton, 283, 340, and by the court in *The United States v. Quincy*, (1832) 6 Peter's Rep. 445, 466. Galiani said that "a ship built and armed for war in a neutral port cannot be there lawfully sold to a belligerent."²

The Neutrality Act of the United States, 1818, which must be supposed to still embody the United States view of international duty, is consistent with the conclusion of Galiani, because under it the essence of offence consists in a fixed or present, and not a future or conditional, intention on the part of the neutral subject fitting out or arming the vessel. If he is knowingly concerned in fitting out the vessel he can be convicted, though that intent should appear to have been defeated after the vessel sailed. A defendant cannot be convicted under the Neutrality Act of the United States if he has no fixed intention to sell the vessel when she sailed. The agreement between the view of Galiani and that of the court in *United States v. Quincy* is all the more remarkable because, as *Historicus* observed, continental views on maritime law differ from those of English or American publicist, as much as the views of "the Nominalists and Realists, the Thomists and the Dunses of the Middle Ages, or the Jansenists and the Jesuits of the last century."³ The

The United States, early in nineteenth century, upheld the prohibition of construction of vessels for belligerents.

Supreme Court of United States seem to concur with a continental jurist as to the existence of the prohibition.

¹ By a curious irony, in the Introduction to the "Letters of *Historicus*" (p. 10), we read that the author laboured under nearly the same disadvantage as Galiani. It appears that Manning, the author of the "Law of Nations," complained in 1839 that Schlegel's famous tract on Lord Stowell's judgment was not to be found in the Library of the Inner Temple. In an introduction issued several years after *Historicus* had ceased to contribute his brilliant letters, but before the Conference of Geneva, *Historicus* observed that, after thirty years, Manning's request was complied with, and Schlegel's tract reposed on the shelves of the Inner Temple. *Historicus* pronounced the Inner Temple Library to be absolutely useless, and complained bitterly of the absence of such well-known tracts as the *Pieces officielles* of Schoell, Ward's tract on Neutral Rights, 1801, and Lord Grenville's "Letters to Sulpicius." But in those days an eminent baron of the Exchequer pronounced international law to be "a necessarily vague science." *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 530.

² Wheaton, "History of International Law," p. 312.

³ Letters on "International Law on the Territoriality of the Merchant Vessel," p. 202.

Barons of the Exchequer, 1863, dissented from American view of usage.

2 H. & C. 430, 528, *per* Pollock, C.B., and *per* Bramwell at p. 542.

Mr. W. E. Hall
dissents.

Mr. W. E. Hall also rejects this construction, observing "that it must be permissible to give an order which it is permissible to execute."¹ But it is impossible to deny that this was the construction of neutral duties adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States.²

It is quite true that "it is generally unsafe to use municipal laws to define the view of international duty taken by a nation."³ But it is no less true that the Neutrality Act of 1818 "must be supposed to embody what are to the United States international duties."

Sir R. Phillimore silent as to the existence of a usage prohibiting neutrals from constructing vessels for bellicose purposes.

There is no trace of the rule making ships an exception to the general rule of contraband in Phillimore's "International Law," a work which seems to have been written, in part at least, before the conclusion of the Crimean War. Sir R. Phillimore treats ships as contraband when fitted for war and sent to a belligerent.

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 611.

² "Letters on International Law," by Historicus, p. 171.

³ Hall, "International Law," 5th ed., p. 612 and note.

belligerent's port with orders to sell if possible.¹ But a sale under such circumstances is a mere transaction in contraband, as has been just seen, by the Neutrality Act of the United States, 1818. According to Phillimore, a ship of ambiguous use, having been previously employed for purposes of trade, with a destination to be sold under circumstances not indicating a hostile use of her, is not contraband. The distinction taken in Phillimore is clearly the rationale of the decision under the English Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, which arose out of the events of the American Civil War. *The Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 430, decided that an unarmed vessel was contraband and nothing more, and therefore its sale under previous contract constituted no infringement of British neutrality, as interpreted by the Foreign Enlistment Act of that day.

According to the ground principle of neutrality, Mr. W. E. Hall considers a completely armed ship, in every respect fitted the moment it receives its crew to act as a man-of-war, to be a proper subject of commerce. But a special usage, substantially dating from the Conference of Geneva, is in course of growth.

In the celebrated reply of the English lawyers to the Treaty of Prussian "Exposition des Motifs," issued in connection with the Silesian Loan, it was contended that the familiar aphorism, "the exception proves the rule," is instanced by the operation of treaties in maritime law.² This view supplies a complete explanation of the Treaty of Washington, 1871, made in connection with the inquiry at Geneva into the *Alabama* affair. Washington, 1871, Art. 6, seems to have created exception. International practice on the subject.

In 1793 the United States prohibited the equipment of vessels in their ports which were of a nature solely adapted to war. This was followed by the Neutrality Act of 1818, making it penal to fit out and arm any ship or vessel with the intent that it should be employed in the service of a foreign State at war with a friendly State. The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, greatly exceeded the requirements of international law, and its provisions against ship-building therefore afford

¹ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 264, p. 360.

² "Collectanea Juridica," vol. i., piece v., p. 145.

no key to international usage. In France the State accommodates its rules to international law by making all persons exposing the State to reprisals, or to a declaration of war, liable to punishment under the Penal Code. It is interesting to note that this policy indemnified France against any such proceedings as were taken by the United States against this country in connection with the *Alabama* and her consorts. The French Government were able, under their Proclamation of Neutrality in 1861, to arrest six vessels which were in course of construction in French ports for the Confederate States. Italy adopted a like rule on the outbreak of the Danish War in 1864.

In 1866 the Government of the Netherlands, for the first time, undertook to see that the equipment of vessels of war intended for the belligerent parties should not take place in the ports of the Netherlands.¹ The codes of Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark prohibit any one from procuring arms, vessels, or munitions of war for the service of a foreign Power.² Mr. W. E. Hall observes of these last codes that though the intention may have been to prevent the use of privateers, the language would, no doubt, restrain the construction of vessels for belligerent use.

Mr. W. E. Hall
on the ground
principles of
neutrality as
regards build-
ing ships for
belligerents by
 neutrals.

As there was no universal or even partial adhesion to the principles of the Treaty of Washington, 1871, Mr. W. E. Hall considers that the exception it sought to establish is not binding. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent a ship of war (1) being built and armed to the order of a belligerent, and delivered to him outside neutral territory ready to receive a fighting crew; (2) being delivered to a belligerent within neutral territory, and issuing as belligerent property if—

- (a) It is neither commissioned nor so manned as to be able to commit immediate hostilities;
- (b) There is no good reason to believe that an intention exists of making the neutral territory a basis of operations.

¹ Note of M. Zuglen de Nyevelt to Mr. Ward, 1867. For this and the whole continental practice in the matter, see Neutral Laws Commission Report, Appendix iv., note. Hall's "International Law," p. 614.

² "Rev. de Droit International," vi. 502.

On the other hand, it is evident that an international usage, operating by way of exception to the general rule that ships, even built and armed for war, are contraband and nothing more, is in course of growth. The Institute of International Law in 1875 sought to impose an obligation on neutral States to prevent persons other than its own agents from placing at the disposal of a belligerent State a ship of war in the neutral's ports or waters. On the one hand it must be remembered that a ship of war is "a most powerful instrument of mischief, of contraband ready made up in its most malignant form."¹ But this clearly constitutes a reason for introducing a ship of war as an exception to the general rule permitting the sale of contraband on neutral territory. Another reason also seems to exist in the tendency of wars to become more and more naval.

Mr. W. E. Hall objects to the present indefinite form of the international usage, and considers it would be elucidated by planting the doctrine, not as now, upon the intention of the neutral trader or belligerent agent, but upon the character of the vessel. This would have the effect of excluding large mail steamers from the rule, which, as it is, clearly prohibits their construction and outfit in neutral ports. But the vessels whose operations gave birth to the international usage were vessels which experts were not able to distinguish as built for warlike use. Either the *Alexandra*, the *Florida*, or the *Alabama* might have been used as a yacht.² If the true interpretation of the usage is that it is confined to vessels built primarily for war, where are we to look for its origin? Nor can it be said, as can be urged on some other topics of contraband, that the interest of the origin of the international usage in question is purely historical. If there is one thing certain, it is that the commerce destroyer—and a large mail steamer when armed is the type of a commerce destroyer—is likely to play as prominent a part in the naval wars of the future as ever the *Alabama* and her consorts maintained.

Prohibition an
inchoate inter-
national usage.

Reasons for
growth of
usage.

Mr. W. E.
Hall's objec-
tion to inten-
tion of builder
being regarded
as foundation
of doctrine.

¹ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 264, p. 360; Hall's "International Law," p. 615.

² *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 430.

This is alike the view of Captain Mahan and of Sir H. S. Maine. On juridical principles, it is difficult to understand how the doctrine could be planted except in the intention of the belligerent agent or neutral trader. The international usage in question, like every other law, prohibits or restrains an act; and *actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea*.

Alleged sales
of vessels by
Governments
of neutral
States to bel-
ligerents, Rus-
so-Japanese
War.

In the late war there have been repeated, if not confirmed, rumours as to the purchase of vessels by both belligerents from the subjects of neutral States in both hemispheres, and it would seem in one case even from the Government of a neutral State. In April, Japan was reported to be purchasing submarines in America.¹ There was some confirmation, which seemed circumstantial, of this report. In May the Government of the Tzar was said to have purchased the *Deutschland* and *Maria Theresia* from the North-German Lloyd Company. The Japanese about the same time were stated to have purchased the *St. Irene*. Later in the month, the Russian Government were alleged to have purchased the Hamburg-American liners, *Pretoria*, *Augusta Victoria*, and *Columbia*.² Some of this information was no doubt well founded. It was definitely stated in the *Times* several months afterwards that the Russian Government had acquired "the *Fürst Bismarck* and the *Columbia*, from the Hamburg American Steamship Company, and the *Kaiserin Maria Theresia* and the *Augusta Victoria* from the North-German Lloyd Steamship Company. These four ships have now been formally enrolled in the naval service of Russia. They have been re-christened respectively the *Don*, the *Terek*, the *Ural*, and the *Kuban* by the Russian naval authorities, and now rank officially as second-class cruisers. All four, according to Brassey's naval annual for 1904, were classed as merchant cruisers, auxiliary to the Imperial Government navy. Details of their armaments are given."³ It was also contended by the *Times*' correspondent, with considerable plausibility and force, that the German Government must have been cognizant of, and have given its sanction to, the

¹ *Times*, April 25, 1904.

² *Ibid.*, May 12, 26, 28, 1904.

³ *Ibid.*, September 19, 1904.

transfer of such important vessels as these to the Russian Government. Assuming that the Imperial German Government took no part in the transfer, there was no infraction of neutrality in the transfer of the vessels to Russia. But if, on the other hand, the German Government was a party to the transfer to a belligerent of their own auxiliary cruisers, it is no less clear such a transaction is both opposed to authority and to recent international usage.¹

In Vattel's time (1758) the sale of ships had not become a branch of the law of foreign enlistment; but Vattel observes in the analogous case that if a neutral State furnishes troops to a belligerent, such assistance is incompatible with neutrality.

Ortolan says that if a neutral State engages in the carriage of products which have a direct connection with military operations, whether it does so for nothing or receives consideration for it, it becomes then an accessory in the struggle, and consequently commits an infraction of neutrality.²

Phillimore points out that Prussian and Russian ports are practically indistinguishable for purposes of contraband trade, and he attributes to this fact the prolongation of the Crimean War. Prussian subjects carried on a most lucrative trade in contraband with Russia during the Crimean War, and had it not been for the facilities they enjoyed for doing so, Phillimore conjectures that Prussia would have cast in her lot with the Allies in the Crimea. It is clear that Russia entertained some apprehensions of Prussia during the Crimea, since Prince Bismarck stated, in his last speech in the German Reichsrath, that Russia massed large forces in Eastern Europe along the German frontier during the Crimean War.³

At the close of the important statement made by the Prime Minister to the London Chamber of Commerce, reported in the *Times*, August 26, 1904, he observed—

"There can be no doubt that merchant ships may be sold by neutrals to any Government, and that that Government

¹ On March 15, 1905, Count Bülow definitively stated that the sale of German ships to Russian agents were legitimate transactions according to international law. See *Times*, March 16.

² "Règles Internationales," vol. ii. pp. 156-9.

³ February, 1888, was the date of this speech.

may turn these ships into cruisers if they please. I believe that one of these vessels bought was a British ship."

This statement, Mr. Balfour added, was delivered on the authority of the law officers of the Crown. It is of the utmost importance to note that the opinion of the law officers was directed exclusively to the operation of international law on [the facts. According to Mr. W. E. Hall, there is nothing in the ground principles of neutrality which prohibits the subject of a neutral State from selling a merchant vessel to a belligerent Government, since he may even sell an armed vessel built to the order of a belligerent without any infraction of neutrality. The principles enunciated by the Treaty of Washington, 1871, and the Conference of Geneva having failed to procure adhesion from other States, all the learning derived from those sources is irrelevant, and imposes no duties on neutral States.

But there cannot be a doubt that a British subject selling a merchant vessel to a belligerent Government which converts it into a cruiser commits an offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, if he has sold it having reasonable cause to believe that it will be employed in the naval service of a foreign State at war with a friendly State. It was suggested by a speaker at the London Chamber of Commerce, that the purchase of steamers by the Russian Government raised all the facts of the *Alabama* case. The answer of Mr. Balfour showed that in the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, following the reasoning of Mr. W. E. Hall, the *Alabama* case is not a precedent in the present state of international law, inasmuch as it only gave rise to an international usage which is in course of growth. The questions raised by the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, are of a different kind.

Another rumoured purchase of the Russian Government is even less difficult to deal with. It was reported, and confirmed at a later date, that the Russian Government had purchased from the Argentine Government four powerful armoured cruisers—*Garibaldi*, *General Belgrano*, *General San Martin*, *Puerreydon*—all of 7,000 tons displacement, and

armed with Armstrong cannons.¹ The statement is made with reserve. But if true, it cannot be doubted, for the reasons already stated in connection with the purchase by Russia of German auxiliary cruisers during the late war, that such action was incompatible with neutrality.

¹ *Times*, May 26, 1904.

CHAPTER VIII.

BELLIGERENT OPERATIONS IN NEUTRAL WATERS AND THE CHEMULPHO AND CHIFU INCIDENTS.

Prohibition of
infraction of
neutral terri-
tory.

IT is observed in Kent, "It is not lawful to make neutral territory the scene of hostility, or to attack an enemy while within it; and if the enemy be attacked, or any capture made, under neutral protection, the neutral is bound to redress the injury and effect restitution. . . . No use of neutral territory for the purpose of war can be permitted. . . . No act of hostility is to be commenced on neutral ground. . . . No measure is to be taken that will lead to immediate violence."¹

Infraction of
neutral terri-
tory gives no
right of re-
clamation to
private per-
sons.

It seems necessary to distinguish between a public armed vessel and a merchant vessel belonging to a subject of a belligerent, in the case of a capture or destruction effected by a public vessel of the other belligerent within neutral waters. It is, on the one hand, undoubtedly true that no private person can rest a claim for the restoration of prize in the courts of the captor on the ground that the capture was made in neutral waters, and that the neutral nation whose rights have been infringed alone can interpose. The *Lilla*, 2 Sprague, 177; the *Sir William Peel*, 5 Wall, 517; the *Adela*, 6 Wall, 266; the *Anne*, 4 Wheat. 435; Wheat. Dana's note, 209. Historicus, in his paper on belligerent violation of neutral rights,² lays it down that the right which is injured by the act of the offending belligerent is the right of the neutral Government, and not that of the belligerent, and therefore it is the neutral and not the belligerent who is strictly

¹ Kent's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 118.

² "International Law," p. 147, *et seq.*

entitled to claim or to enforce the remedy. This seems to be the law so far as regards a merchant vessel. But in the well-known case of the *General Armstrong*, an American privateer destroyed by British war vessels in a Portuguese harbour during the war of 1812, when the matter was submitted to arbitration nearly forty years afterwards, the injured belligerent State sought to claim compensation at the hands of the neutral State whose territorial rights had been infringed.

The matter was referred to Louis Napoleon, when President of the French Republic, and though he decided against the United States, who were the belligerent State, he seems to have considered that on principle a neutral State was liable to a belligerent State when it allowed the latter's enemy to destroy his vessel within neutral waters.

Two incidents of this nature occurred during the Russo-Japanese War, one the destruction of the cruisers *Variag* and *Korietz*, off the Polynesian Islands on February 9, and the other the destruction of the Russian torpedo destroyer *Reshitelni*, in August, in Chifu harbour.

On February 8 Admiral Uriu, with six cruisers, two of whom were armoured, and eight torpedo boats, appeared off Chemulpho, on the north-west coast of Korea. At the time there were lying in the harbour three war vessels of other Powers, and two Russian war vessels. The Russian gunboat *Korietz* on this day had exchanged shots with the Japanese fleet off Round Island, and then returned to Chemulpho. Early on the morning of the 9th, Admiral Uriu notified Captain Roudinoff of the cruiser *Variag* that as hostilities existed between Russia and Japan—the rupture of diplomatic relations having taken place on February 6—unless he came out and engaged him before 4 p.m. he would be attacked at his anchorage. At the same time Admiral Uriu warned the commanders of the neutral vessels to take measures for the safety of their ships. The challenge sent by Admiral Uriu recalls that addressed by Captain Winslow of the Federal warship *Kearsage* to Captain Semmes of the *Alabama*, to come out of Cherbourg, June 21, 1864. Like Captain Semmes,

the captain of the *Variag* accepted the challenge to sally forth from the neutral harbour and with the like disastrous result.

The notification of Admiral Uriu to the commanders of the neutral war vessels gave rise to an incident of an unusual kind. This was a protest by the commanders against the violation of neutral territory involved by the Japanese attacking the Russian war vessels in the harbour.¹

Whether one takes the view of Historicus, or of the editor of Kent's Commentaries, it is alike necessary to conclude that when a belligerent uses neutral territory for the purposes of war, there can generally only be two parties against whom a wrong is inflicted: (1) The neutral State whose territory is violated; (2) the other belligerent. No ordinary construction of neutral rights can render an act like that threatened by Admiral Uriu, indefensible as it may be, injurious to other neutral States, none of whom had any territory in those regions. But if so, it is difficult to see by what right the commanders of the public armed vessels of such States protested. Nor can it be said that, high-handed as the warning of Admiral Uriu may appear, he contemplated an ordinary infringement of neutral territory. In the same month Japan concluded an agreement with Korea, by which the latter is generally considered to have assumed the position of a mi-souverain State. The occurrence excited some animadversion in the Press at the time.

It is, however, not irrelevant to recall that England and France, early in 1902, entered at different dates into agreements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Korea. Dr. T. J. Lawrence considers that this circumstance does not constitute

¹ The following is the text of the protest as taken from the *Times*:² "We consider that, in accordance with the recognized rules of international law, the port of Chemulpho being a neutral port, no country has the right to attack the vessels of another Power lying in that port, and that the Power which contravenes those laws is solely responsible for any loss of life or damage to property in such a port. We accordingly protest energetically against such a violation of neutrality and shall be happy to learn your decision on the subject."

"(Signed)

"LEWIS BAYLEY, Capt., *Talbot*.

"BOREA, Capt., *Elba*.

"SÉNÉS, Capt., *Pascal*."

* Cf. *Times*, April 18, 1904.

a vindication of the protest of the British and French commanders, since the independence of Korea is a nullity.¹ On this view it is difficult not to regard either the Anglo-Japanese convention or the Franco-Russian declaration as equally nullities. An agreement to guarantee that which does not exist cannot be regarded as serious. But even making full allowance for the fact that Korea is not a member of the family of nations, it is a little difficult to regard an independence guaranteed by the four Powers in 1902 as a nullity. Guarantees of independence seem destined to the same futility in the Far East as they have procured in Europe. In 1790 Prussia guaranteed the independence of Poland, though she played a leading part in its partition two years later.²

It is, perhaps, interesting to note that in the cases of the *Florida*, 1864, and *General Armstrong*, 1812, action was actually taken by a belligerent resembling that contemplated by Admiral Uriu. But in these cases the neutrals whose territorial integrity was infringed had not received a territorial guarantee from other Powers a short time before the infraction occurred. In the case of the *Florida*, the United States surrendered the vessel and the men, and made an apology for the violation of territory, of which its officers had been guilty. It may be inferred from the decision of Louis Napoleon in the case of the *General Armstrong* that Korea might have escaped liability to Russia if Admiral Uriu had proceeded to carry out his expressed intention. In the former case, the neutral was excused for allowing its territorial integrity to be infringed because of the feebleness of its military resources on the spot. But this excuse is, on the facts, more open to Korea in 1904 than it was to Portugal in 1812.³

It was reported in the *Times*⁴ that the Russian Admiral Protracted stay
of Admiral
Wirenius, with a battleship, several cruisers, torpedo-boats, Wirenius in
and destroyers, was at or in the vicinity of the French port vicinity of
of Djibutil, Somaliland, for part of the month of February, Djibutil,
Feb., 1904.

¹ "War and Neutrality in the Far East," 2nd ed., p. 284.

² "Annual Register," 1795, p. 23.

³ Cf. Kent's Commentaries, vol. i. pt. i., c. vi. p. 117, for an account of the case of the *General Armstrong*.

⁴ February 23, 1904.

The right of asylum.

after the commencement of hostilities. The incident formed the subject of a question addressed by Mr. Lawson, Walton, K.C., to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons.¹ In view of later events, it is arguable that Admiral Wirenus made a neutral port the base of his operations. It is also singular to note the inconsistency of the French observance of neutrality. While Admiral Wirenus, with a large squadron, was allowed to linger in the vicinity if not at the port of Djibutil, for at least ten days after the declaration of war, the Russian cruiser *Diana*, on taking refuge at Saigon after a sortie from Port Arthur, was peremptorily required to leave within twenty-four hours or be dismantled. This involves an unusual construction of a belligerent's right of asylum, a right which is essentially founded on the humanity of the neutral State. It cannot be supposed that it is the view of international law that the hospitality shown by the neutral State to a belligerent is unlimited in the case of a powerful squadron absolutely intact, but limited in the case of that a single cruiser flying from a victorious foe. As will be seen, the rule adopted in this war, that a defeated vessel must submit to dismantlement on taking refuge in a neutral harbour, was rejected by Mr. W. E. Hall as unwarrantable. It is difficult to admit, in view of the international relations of Japan and Korea, that there was anything more than a nominal infraction of neutrality by Admiral Uriu's squadron. It seems clear that there may have been infraction to this extent, as although the Russian cruisers were not defeated in Chemulpho harbour itself, they were defeated off Phalmi, an island four miles from Chemulpho, which presumably is a territorial unit of Korea.

The Chifu
incident and
the cutting
out of the
Ieshitelnii,
Aug., 1904.

Japanese
account of.

A far more serious case of an act of hostility perpetrated on neutral ground was the cutting out of the Russian destroyer *Reshitelnii* by the Japanese destroyers *Asashio* and *Kasumi* in Chifu harbour, after the desperate sortie of Admiral Wittegeft's squadron from Port Arthur in the middle of August. The following is a *résumé* from Japanese sources: "On the night of August 10, while cruising in search of the scattered

¹ June 7, 1904.

Russian ships, two destroyers, the *Asashio* and *Kasumi*, sighted one, apparently Russian destroyer, steaming westward at full speed, and immediately pursued her, but the latter disappeared in the darkness. Continuing this search till the next morning they found that the enemy's destroyer had entered Chifu. They remained outside territorial waters till night, in vain expecting her to come out. They then entered Chifu, and found that the enemy's destroyer was the *Reshitelni*. There was no sign of her being dismantled. Accordingly, Lieut. Terashima was sent to offer the Russian commander the alternative either to leave the port before dawn or surrender. The latter accepted neither, and while the discussion was proceeding, the Russian commander ordered his men to destroy the machinery and to fire. Then, suddenly taking Lieut. Terashima in his arms, he jumped overboard. Another Russian also jumped into the water with the Japanese interpreter. The other Russians commenced hostilities. Meanwhile, the magazines of the *Reshitelni* exploded, causing casualties among our men. Thereupon the *Reshitelni* was captured and towed out. The casualties were one killed and fourteen wounded."¹

The account furnished to the Tzar by Lieut. Rostachakovski, ^{Russian ac-}^{count of.} the commander of the *Reshitelni*, exhibits, as might be expected, some material variation from the Japanese account. Thus he represented that he lowered his flag and dismantled his vessel before the Japanese attacked him in the harbour. An account from Chifu, despatched from that place after the *Reshitelni* had entered it, but before she was attacked by the Japanese, stated that her commander had agreed, at the request of Admiral Sah, to render the engines absolutely useless and to disarm the vessel. But it was not alleged that Lieut. Rostachakovski had actually effected this.²

Lieut. Rostachakovski's account continues: "On the night of the 11-12th, I was in port when I was piratically attacked by the Japanese, who had approached with two torpedo boats and a cruiser, and sent a party under the command of an officer as though to enter into pourparlers. Not having arms

¹ Cf. *Times*, August 16, 1904.

² Ibid., August 12.

to resist, I gave orders for preparation to be made to blow up the ship. When the Japanese began to hoist their flag, I insulted the Japanese officer by striking him and throwing him into the water. I then ordered the crew to throw the enemy into the sea. Our resistance, however, was unavailing, and the Japanese took possession of the boat. Explosions occurred in the engine-room and in the forepart of the vessel, but the *Reshitelni* did not sink, and was taken from the port by the Japanese."¹

Admiral Alexeieff also represented to the Tzar that the *Reshitelni* was dismantled before the Japanese attacked her. The fact is important in another connection, but can hardly be considered relevant to the merits of the question of infringement of Chinese neutrality by Japan. Even if the *Reshitelni* was not in fact disarmed when attacked by the Japanese, her captain had agreed to disarm. Again, supposing that the neglect to disarm² the *Reshitelni* was wilful, it only proves that her commander also was infringing Chinese neutrality. But a neutral State cannot call upon one belligerent to protect her neutrality against his enemy. Nor does this dispose of the matter. It was stated in the *Times* that while the Chinese fully recognized that Japan had committed an infraction of neutrality, she considered that Japan was morally exonerated by the constant violations of the neutrality of Chinese neutral territory between the Great Wall and the Liau River by Russia, and by the latter Power's disregard of the neutrality of the treaty-port of Niu-Chang.² It is also curious to note that the torpedoing of the British steamer *Hipsang* by the Russians was considered as some excuse for the Japanese destruction of the *Reshitelni*. It cannot be said, it is submitted, that, from the point of view of international law, these arguments are void of force. The definition of a neutral is *in bello medius*; and if in fact one belligerent, by consent or otherwise, is constantly deriving military advantages by infractions of neutrality, his enemy is not bound to acquiesce indefinitely in such a state of affairs. Professor T. E. Holland has pointed out that the Chinese have not yet

¹ *Times*, August 15, 1904.

² August 7, 1904.

attained to a respect for the laws of war, and it appears from her action during the late Russo-Japanese War that China has not even a rudimentary conception of the somewhat exacting obligations of the modern neutral State, as expounded by Historicus or Hall. It is justly questioned by Wheaton's editors how far China has entered into the pale of public law.¹

It seems, at least, possible to take the view that Russia's right in Manchuria is to be explained as a right of continued passage, derived from the Trans-Siberian Railway Treaty of 1896. This treaty conferred on Russia a right, not merely to construct a railway, but also to station troops for its protection. On this view Russia has, perhaps, a prior right to station troops in Manchuria. Vattel observes that "the infinite evils" of a neutral country becoming a theatre of war "are an unexceptionable reason for refusing the passage."²

The case is stronger against Japan, after her landing in Manchuria in May, 1904. Japan has thus forced a passage, and attacked an enemy in a neutral country. Vattel observes, "He who attempts to force a passage does an injury to the neutral nation, and gives her most just cause to unite her arms with those of his adversary." It is unlawful, he adds, to attack an enemy in a neutral country. If the view taken by Kent's editor is the correct one, and the party who is entitled to claim and enforce a remedy for an infraction of neutrality is the injured belligerent, it is only possible to conclude that this war will leave in its wake a great number of important questions outstanding, which will have to be ultimately settled by arbitration before the Hague Court or otherwise. If the precedent of the *General Armstrong* be followed, both belligerents in this war seem committed to a course of litigation, more or less fruitless, with China for permitting infractions of her neutrality.

The only conceivable excuse for China is her weakness, though it may be questioned whether this excuse avails. In a case in which international law bearing on neutral duties

¹ Wheaton's "International Laws," ed. 1904, p. 22.

² "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. vii. s. 129.

was much discussed,¹ Lord Selborne (then Sir W. Roundell Palmer, A.G.), in his argument, argued that a powerful belligerent would necessarily exact a higher standard of neutrality from a weak neutral than if the balance of power was reversed. But in the late war, assuming, as it is clearly necessary to assume, the weakness of China, the reverse has happened. Two powerful belligerents have repeatedly condoned infractions of neutrality by a weak neutral which would have meant war if perpetrated or suffered by a strong neutral like England or Germany. As regards the *Reshitelni* affair, it is clear that one of the excuses which availed Portugal in the *General Armstrong* affair cannot be pleaded in justification of China. In that case the President of the French Republic held (*inter alia*) that Portugal was not liable because the garrison was feeble, and the American commander did not apply in the proper time for protection. But China had, in the case under discussion, a commodore and a naval force in Chifu which was amply adequate to afford protection against two torpedo destroyers, and the Russian commander had previously applied for protection. The epigram of Catherine of Russia on the Armed Neutrality, *nullité armée*, applies to the neutrality of China at the present day. A neutrality which permits its territories to be used for purposes of war by both belligerents, and its waters by the victorious belligerent can only be described as a nullity, whether armed or not. A final comment on the *Reshitelni* incident is that it shows that, as far as the observance of neutral duties is concerned, the equality of States, "always a fiction, promises to become an absurdity."²

The reply of the Japanese Government to strictures on the *Reshitelni* incident was, it must be admitted, the best possible defence that could have been made under the circumstances. It commenced by observing, "The status of China in the present struggle is quite unique. Nearly all the military operations are carried on within her borders, but she is not a party to the conflict. Nevertheless, her territories

¹ *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 511.

² Article by Sir J. Macdonnell, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1904.

are in part belligerent and in part neutral. That condition of things is, as regards international law, an anomaly and a contradiction." It proceeds to contend that China's neutrality is imperfect, and applicable only to those places which are not occupied by the armed forces of either belligerent, and that Russia cannot escape the consequences of an unsuccessful war by moving her army or navy into those portions of China which have by arrangement been made conditionally neutral. With the termination of the *Reshitelni* incident the neutrality of the port of Chifu was revived. The statement then continues that the Russian gunboat *Mandjur* remained for weeks at Shanghai after being requested to leave, and that the same was in a limited sense true of the cruiser *Askoll* and the destroyer *Gromoboi*. The case of the *Reshitelni* is then distinguished from that of the *Florida*. During the American Civil War the neutrality of Brazil was perfect and unconditional, and the port of Bahia was a long distance from the seat of war, whereas the neutrality of China is imperfect and conditional, and the port of Chifu is in close proximity to the zone of military operations. The statement proceeds to compare the case of the *Reshitelni* with that of the British ship *Queen Anne*, and the American privateer *General Armstrong*, when the injured belligerent unsuccessfully sought compensation because he had been the aggressor.¹

It may be at once admitted that the status of China in the late war was unique. The only hypothesis which could have reconciled the attitude of Russia in Manchuria with the laws of war is that she was the ally of China, who was also belligerent. During the Great War at the close of the eighteenth and commencement of the nineteenth centuries, Russia maintained large armies at a distance of thousands of miles from her frontiers, fighting the French with allies in Italy and Germany. But as Russia conducted military operations on a vast scale in Chinese territory, neither as the ally nor enemy of China, the situation must be considered unique. The maxim of Grotius, "Distinguendus erit belli status," is more applicable now than it has ever been in the course of history.

¹ *Times*, August 17, 1904.

There cannot
be an "imper-
fect neu-
trality."

In the domain of theory, and even of practice, the contention of Japan that there is such a thing as an imperfect neutrality is untenable. The Counter Declaration of the Court of Denmark in 1793, "one of the most admirable state papers, and one of the soundest expositions of the general principles of International Law which any age or country can boast,"¹ contained these memorable words, "Where a neutrality is not quite perfect, it ceases to be neutrality."² Since they were written, the standard of duty has been raised by the events of the American Civil War. Other portions of the Japanese statement implicitly deny the belligerent right of asylum. But authority and precedent are entirely to the contrary. It has always been assumed to be a feature common to the law of either land or maritime belligerency. The Prussians did not follow the army of General Clinchant into Switzerland in 1871; and the *Tuscarora* did not attempt to cut out the *Nashville* at Southampton in 1861. The only possible construction of the somewhat naïve statement that the neutrality of the port of Chifu "revived" after the *Reshitelni* incident is that it must have been previously infringed by Japan, and therefore *cudit quæstio*.

How little there is in the Japanese objection that the *Mandjur*, *Gromoboi*, and *Askold* remained a long time in Shanghai without being dismantled, can be best inferred from the express statement of Mr. Hall, that there is nothing in principle which requires a belligerent vessel to be disarmed when she takes refuge after defeat in a neutral harbour.

It is purely a question of port regulations. But a belligerent cannot demand that a neutral shall adopt port regulations to suit the exigencies of a maritime campaign. It is, further, mere refinement to insist that the Russians were the aggressors in the *Reshitelni* incident, because the Russians offered resistance after the Japanese had boarded their vessel. So far as the *Reshitelni* incident is a question between the belligerents it is difficult, on any construction of the case of the *General Armstrong*, to defend the action of Japan, which was clearly the

¹ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pp. 338, 339.

² Ibid., *supra*, p. 343.

aggressor. That case, further, seems no less clearly to show that China has incurred some liability to Russia. If anything is certain in the matter it is that the Russian commander had previously applied to the Chinese commodore for protection. But this circumstance decisively distinguishes the *Reshitelni* incident from the case of the *General Armstrong*, where the neutral was held not liable. As an instance of faithful compliance with neutral duty, the action of the French at Martinique in 1862 may be contrasted. The famous *Alabama* having put in, she was followed shortly afterwards by the Federal warship *San Jacinto*. But the commander of a French warship in the harbour took up a station between the two vessels, and thus prevented any incident like the cutting out of the *Florida* by the *Wachusett* in 1864 being attempted.

CHAPTER IX.

RECEPTION OF BELLIGERENT CRUISERS IN NEUTRAL PORTS.

Absence of express prohibition, semib, implied permission by neutral.

IN the absence of positive prohibition, a belligerent cruiser was not only entitled to seek an asylum and hospitality in neutral ports, but also to bring in and sell her prizes within those ports.¹ Loccenius (1651) considered that a State could not lawfully exclude the prizes of a belligerent without previous treaty stipulations to that effect.² But Loccenius,

Limitation of above rule, due to modern tendency to restrict neutral obligation.

like Bynkershoek, was a great advocate of belligerency, and international law for a century and a quarter has shown a distinct tendency to minimise the duties of neutrals. The reception of belligerent cruisers in neutral ports is naturally a branch of law which reflects this tendency. Sir R. Phillimore even considered that no uniformity of practice has prevailed upon the subject of permitting prizes to be brought into neutral ports. He says, "The matter has been governed (1) by domestic regulations, and sometimes (2) by treaties. In the absence of such provisions, it should seem that the presumption is in favour of the permission. It is a *prima facie* presumption, however, only, and capable of being easily rebutted."³ Mr. W. E. Hall points out that Phillimore (*supra*) seems to look upon a treaty made before outbreak of war as needed to make the reception of prizes a strictly legitimate act.⁴ It would follow from this that the law has entirely changed since the date of Loccenius, and Mr. W. E.

¹ Bynkershoek, "Quæst. Jur. Pub." lib. i. c. 15. Vattel, liv. iii. c. 7. s. 132 Valin, "Comm. sur l'Ordonn. de la Marine," tom. ii. p. 272.

² "De Jure Maritimo," l. i. c. iv. s. 7.

³ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 363.

⁴ Hall's "International Law," p. 619.

Hall admits that it is in the course of being changed. It is equally clear that he approves of the tendency of the change in the direction of exclusion which has been developing since the seventeenth century, insomuch as he contends that a belligerent cruiser who is allowed to bring in his prizes into a neutral port continues an act of war, and is thus allowed to bring in property which does not belong to him.

The history of the subject is as follows. In 1742 a treaty ^{Treaties on the subject.} was made between Spain and Denmark authorizing the reception and sale of prizes reciprocally. In 1778 a treaty was entered into between France and the United States whereby no ship of the enemy of either party was allowed to sell her prize or discharge her cargo, or buy more provisions than were immediately indispensable, in the ports of the other. In 1782 a treaty was entered into between the United States and Holland, then one of the principal maritime Powers, whereby the sale of prizes brought by either party into the ports of the other was legalized. In 1794 a treaty of exclusion was made between England and the United States. In 1800 France and the United States entered into a treaty of exclusion similar to that of 1778. At the treaty of Ghent, after the war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812, the stipulations of the treaty of 1794, providing for the exclusion of prizes captured by the enemies of either State from the ports of the other, were not renewed. The Confederates, therefore, during the Civil War, contended that Great Britain was under no treaty obligation to exclude their prizes. But as the subject is one which may be provided for by the domestic regulations of a State, it seems that it was competent for the British Government to issue the Orders in Council of 1861, excluding the prizes of either party from British ports and territorial waters.

In 1826 all belligerents were prohibited from bringing ^{Regulations of neutral States.} (except in cases of distress) any prize, or any part of the cargo of prizes, into Gibraltar, or from making that port a rendezvous for any warlike purposes. A belligerent within a neutral port was forbidden to give notice by signals or guns to her consorts outside of the movements of an enemy.

In 1854 Spain prohibited the fitting out or admission into Spanish ports of privateers under the Russian flag.

During the American Civil War a captor who brought his prize into British waters was required to depart and remove such prizes immediately. A vessel *bonâ fide* converted into a ship of war was, however, not to be deemed a prize. In case of stress of weather, or other extreme and unavoidable necessity, the necessary time for removing the prize was to be allowed. If the prize was not removed by the prescribed time, or if the capture was made in violation of British jurisdiction, the prize was to be detained until her Majesty's pleasure should be made known. Cargoes were to be subject to the same rule as prizes.¹ A subsequent order provided that no ship of war of either belligerent should be allowed to remain in a British port for the purpose of being dismantled or sold.

The hostilities between France and China in 1884-5 were conducted without any formal declaration of war. Complaints were made in Parliament that, although the French operations were chiefly injurious to British merchants, cotton having been declared contraband, the French warships were suffered to use Hong-Kong as practically their base of operations. This circumstance recalls the reproaches addressed to the British Government by that of the United States regarding the *Shenandoah* at Melbourne in 1865. The *Alabama* undoubtedly destroyed, in some cases, British ships and British cargoes. Early in 1885, however, Great Britain decided to regard the French notification of the blockade of Formosa as equivalent to a declaration of war. Permission to refit was, consequently, denied to the *Triomphante* when she arrived at Hong-Kong; but she was allowed, as were other ships in like circumstances, to take on board sufficient coal to carry her to the nearest French port, Saigon.²

During the Franco-German War of 1870-1, armed ships of either belligerent were interdicted from carrying prizes made by them into the ports, harbours, roadsteads, or waters of the

¹ Circular to Governors of Colonies, June 2, 1864.

² *Times*, December 29, 1884; "Annual Register," 1885, p. 331. And see an article in the "Revue de Droit International for 1903," p. 488, by M. Sakuya Takahashi, "Hostilités entre la France et la Chine."

United Kingdom, or any of her Majesty's colonies or possessions abroad.¹ But the case of the *Gauntlet*, (1872) L. R. 4 P. C. 184, shows that the exclusion of 1870, like that of 1861, was subject to exception when a prize was driven into a British port by stress of weather. In that case a Prussian ship captured in the English Channel by a French ship of war was driven by stress of weather into the Downs, anchored within British waters, and lay there two days. Both in 1898 and 1904² armed ships of a belligerent were interdicted from carrying prizes made by them into ports, harbours, roadsteads, or waters of the United Kingdom, or any of her Majesty's colonies or possessions abroad.

While the American Civil War lasted France prohibited all ships of war or privateers of either part from remaining in her ports with prizes for more than twenty-four hours, except in case of imminent perils of the sea. No prize goods were permitted to be sold in French territory.³ The prohibition by France as regards privateers during the American Civil War seems to have been supererogatory, as neither the Federals nor the Confederates issued letters of marque. Neither Belgium, Holland, nor Prussia issued any regulations during the American Civil War on the subject of excluding the prizes of either belligerent. In the subsequent wars between Brazil and Paraguay, and Spain and Chili, Holland prohibited ships of war or privateers, with prizes, from entering or refitting in her harbours, unless overtaken by evident necessity. In the late war, the subject of admitting the prizes of belligerents into neutral ports has not required consideration, partly owing to geographical conditions, and partly because, by the action of the neutrals, the presumption of admission has been rebutted. Indirectly the subject possesses considerable interest in future war, since "the growing indisposition of neutrals to admit prizes within the shelter of their waters, together with the wide range of modern

¹ Lord Granville to Admiralty, *London Gazette*, July 19, 1870. Hertslet, "Commercial Treaties," xxi. p. 834.

² Lord Lansdowne to Admiralty, *London Gazette*, February 10, 1904.

³ "Ref. Neutrality Laws Comm." 1868, p. 69.

commerce," will have the probable effect of inducing belligerents to insist upon their full rights, and destroy their prizes.¹ It is curious to note that though Mr. W. E. Hall seemed to consider that the destruction of prizes was a probable consequence of exclusion, he nevertheless expressed an ardent wish that exclusion might come to be regarded as

Distinction between limiting the stay of cruiser with prize or without prize.

a neutral duty.² On the other hand, he considered that the somewhat analogous rule in course of growth limiting the stay of a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port could never become a rule of international law, on the grounds that it

was a mere port regulation, and that a neutral can never be deprived of the right to vary his own port regulations. The distinction is probably due to the consideration that the admission of a cruiser with her prize into the neutral port, as it may be the continuance of an act of war, constitutes an injury to the other belligerent, while the mere admission of the cruiser without her prize does not constitute an injury to the other belligerent.

Urgent topic of Russo-Japanese War as to stay of cruiser without prize.

The reception of belligerent cruisers in neutral ports without prizes is a topic that has been keenly agitated in connection with the events of the Russo-Japanese War. The facts will be fully noticed later. The general principle used to be laid down

that as long as the neutral supplies both parties equally, neither has any right to complain. It is not a rule of international law that the supplies purchased by a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port should be limited to any particular quantity. This was the state of the law in 1861, in the outbreak of the American Civil War.³ But in 1861 the use of steam had by no means entirely supplanted the use of sails as a means of propulsion. The *Alabama* herself, by far the fastest war vessel afloat at the time, though fitted with engines, relied almost exclusively on her sailing powers. In his "Memoirs of Service Afloat," c. xxxii. p. 419, Captain Semmes observes, "I was much gratified to find that my new ship proved to be a fine sailer under canvas. This quality was of inestimable advantage to me, as it enabled

¹ Hall's "International Law," p. 459.

² Mr. Lea, p. 619.

³ British counter case at Geneva. Parliamentary Papers, North America, 1872 (No. 4), p. 13. Ortolan, "Diplomatic de la Mer," tom. ii. p. 283.

me to do most of my work under sail. . . . I adopted the plan, therefore, of working under sail in the very beginning of my cruise, and practised it to the end. With the exception of half a dozen prizes, all my captures were made with my screw hoisted, and my ship under sail, with but one exception, I never had occasion to use steam to escape from an enemy."¹

The importance of a neutral port as a coaling station at the present day cannot be exaggerated, but it is equally true that this is a modern feature of maritime warfare. The conditions of modern warfare are not susceptible of adequate consideration under the principle that obtained before the American Civil War, that there was no compulsory restriction on the reception of a belligerent cruiser in neutral ports. When steam is practically the sole means of propulsion, coal is as obviously a necessity to a cruiser as gunpowder and provisions always were and are. Again, since steam has rendered the duration of voyages approximately determinable beforehand, it is only consistent that the supply of provisions meted out to a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port should be equally limited. When a vessel was more or less completely at the mercy of the winds and waves, there was not the same reasonableness in limiting the store of provisions a belligerent vessel might purchase in a neutral port, simply because it was far less possible to state definitely the duration of its voyage to the nearest port in its territory. Further, the political and territorial conditions prevalent between those nations, such as England, France, and Spain, which carried on naval operations in distant regions, suggest that these Powers did not avail themselves of the entire absence of restrictions which then existed as to the reception of a belligerent vessel in neutral ports. All the above countries were then provided with colonies in distant regions.

¹ It is observed by Wheaton's editors that the depredations of the *Alabama* were mainly possible because, for one reason, British coaling stations all over the world were open to her for coaling. There can be no doubt British (and foreign) ports were open to the *Alabama* for coaling. But, from the above explicit statement of Captain Semmes, this fact had little or nothing to do with the success of her depredations. Again, when she sailed for the China Seas in 1863, coals were engaged in advance for the *Alabama*, not at any British port, but at Madagascar.

It was pointed out by Captain Semmes, in a remarkable letter addressed to the *Times* (June 16, 1864), that belligerents do not, other things being equal, favour the carrying of their prizes into neutral ports because it is desirable, from their point of view, that the prize court should have the actual custody of the prize; and there is more opportunity of dealing with prize property, which may be bought in by the Government, if the prize is carried into a native port of the belligerent.

Opinion of Mr. W. E. Hall
that licence to
a belligerent
to coal amounts
to a right of
continued pas-
sage over terri-
tory.

Mr. Hall observes on this point: "If a belligerent vessel, belonging to a nation having no colonies, carries on hostilities in the Pacific by provisioning in a neutral port, and by returning again and again to it, or to other similar ports, without ever revisiting her own, the neutral country practically becomes the seat of magazines of stores which, though not warlike, are necessary to the prolongation of the hostilities waged by the vessel. She obtains as solid an advantage as Russia, in a war with France, would derive from being allowed to march her troops across Germany. She is enabled to reach her enemy at a spot which would otherwise be unattainable."¹ It was a frequent comment in Federal quarters that the *Alabama* never visited a Confederate port, and this was one of the reasons commonly assigned by the Federals at the time for regarding her as a pirate. The parallel between Mr. Hall's hypothesis and the current events of the Russo-Japanese War, recalls the presage of Sir H. S. Maine, made, it is curious to note, about the same time, that there would be "a struggle to include coal and provisions as contraband."² The topic of the reception of belligerent vessels in neutral ports is connected with the general principle that a belligerent may not make neutral territory the basis of his operations, and that all use of the neutral territory for hostile purposes is prohibited. In 1865 the *Shenandoah*, a Confederate cruiser, entered Melbourne in need of repairs, provisions, and coal, and with a crew insufficient for purposes of war. She was refitted and provisioned, and obtained a supply of coal, which seems to have enabled her

*Case of the
Shenandoah,
1865.*

¹ Hall's "International Law," part iv. c. iii. p. 605.

² Lectures, "International Law," vi. p. 114.

to commit depredations in the neighbourhood of Cape Horn on whalers belonging to the United States, her crew having been surreptitiously recruited at the moment of her departure from Port Philip. It was urged on the part of the Government of that country that the main operation of the naval warfare of the *Shenandoah* having been accomplished by means of the coaling and other refitment, Melbourne had been converted into her base of operations. The argument was unsound, because continued use is, above all things, the crucial test for the purpose of affecting a neutral with responsibility for acts in themselves innocent or ambiguous. A neutral has no right to infer evil intent from a single innocent act performed by a belligerent armed force; but if he finds that it is repeated several times, and that it has always prepared the way for warlike operations, he may fairly be expected to assume that a like consequence is intended in all cases to follow, and he ought therefore to prevent its being done within his territory.¹ There is no rule of international law limiting the supplies purchased by a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port to any particular quantity. There are no treaties on the subject. But on the outbreak of a maritime war, neutral ports generally make some rules on this topic. It is a violation of the essential principles of neutrality for a State to permit more supplies to be obtained than can reasonably be considered necessary for reaching a place of safety.

Mr. W. E.
Hall's opinion,
Not a case of
continued user.

"There can be little doubt," Mr. Hall observes, "that no neutral State would now venture to fall below this measure of care; and there can be little doubt that this conduct will be as right as it will be prudent."²

It seems implicit that neutral regulations limiting supplies, unlike regulations limiting the stay of a belligerent vessel in a neutral port, are not mere municipal regulations, but are an enforcement of international law. Sir Alexander Cockburn, in his Reasons for not signing the Geneva Award, observed that the hypothesis of pre-existence is essential to the very conception of legal obligation. The exclusion of

¹ Hall's "International Law," part iv. c. iii. p. 605.

² *Ibid.*, p. 606.

prizes from neutral ports is a mere enforcement of pre-existing international law, but municipal neutral regulations limiting the stay of a vessel in a neutral port can never give rise to a rule of international law, since they do not reflect any principle of pre-existing neutral obligations, but are based exclusively on the territoriality of sovereignty.

Treaties may operate either as an exception to some principle of international law, like the article declaring "free ships, free goods" in the Declaration of Paris, or they may be declaratory of international law.

But a treaty may be concerned only with a topic of municipal regulation since the object of a treaty may be commercial. Treaties limiting the departure of a belligerent cruiser from a neutral port to twenty-four hours after the sailing of the vessel of another belligerent were concluded with the Barbary States in the seventeenth century.¹ Such treaties, since practically they are mutual port regulations, may be compared to a Customs Union. But the rule limiting the supply of coal or provisions a belligerent cruiser may obtain in a neutral port, has never been provided by treaty. As has been seen, coal was not really an imperative necessity so late as the American War, and hence probably the fact that its supply has not been regulated by treaty. The machinery adopted in this country for these purposes is his Majesty's Orders in Council. During the American Civil War, England prohibited all ships of war and privateers of either party from using any port or waters subject to British jurisdiction, as a station or place of resort for any warlike purpose, or for obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment; and no vessel of war or privateer of one belligerent was to be permitted to leave any British port, from which any vessel of the other belligerent (whether a ship of war or a merchant vessel) should have previously departed, until twenty-four hours after the departure of the latter. In its original form this regulation only applied to privateers, and a commander of a vessel of war was only required to give his word that he would not commit hostilities

Rule limiting supplies of belligerent ships in neutral ports never regulated by treaty.

Universal operation of 24 hours' rule.

¹ Bernard's "Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain," p. 273.

against any vessel issuing from a neutral port shortly before him. Privateers were not infrequently entirely excluded from resorting to a neutral port, save in cases of danger from the sea or absolute necessity. Italy, France, England, the United States, and Holland have long since adopted the rule. Mr. Hall speaks of it as a regulation which is practically sure to be enforced in every war.¹ The history of the subject shows that so long ago as 1759 Spain laid down the rule that the first of two vessels of war belonging to different belligerents to leave one of her ports should only be followed by the other after an interval of twenty-four hours.² In 1778 the Grand Duke of Tuscany forbade both ships of war and privateers to go out for twenty-four hours after a ship, whether enemy or neutral (*di qualsivoglia bandiera*). At this date the rule "free ships, free goods" did not obtain, but the goods of an enemy, on board the ships of a friend, were lawful prize, hence the latter restriction.³ The Genoese rule was the same; Venice was contented with the promises of the neutral commander that he would not molest an enemy or neutral for twenty-four hours, but she retained privateers for that time in port.⁴ The Austrian proclamation of neutrality of 1803 ordered vessels not to hover outside the Austrian ports, nor to follow their enemies out of them; it also imposed the twenty-four hours' rule on privateers, and in the case of ships of war required the word of the captain. The distinction seems to be similar in principle to that distinction between the sale of contraband on neutral territory, and its conveyance to a belligerent, which was discussed by *Historicus*. The sale of contraband on neutral territory is a question of municipal, not of international law, and can be restrained under the Customs Consolidation Act, when it would fall under the operation of port regulations.

The origin of the issue of the Order in Council of January, 1862, was the blockade of the Confederate cruiser *Nashville* in Southampton by the Federal *Tuscarora*. The *Tuscarora* took

¹ "International Law," p. 628.

² Ortolan, "Diplomatie de la Mer," ii. 257.

³ De Martens, Rec. iii. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

up a position outside the harbour, thereby preventing the *Nashville* from landing. The *Tuscarora* always kept up steam, and thus was able to precede the other ship whenever she attempted to leave. The *Tuscarora* having left, the *Nashville* could not leave for twenty-four hours; before the close of twenty-four hours the *Tuscarora* would return to her anchorage. Repeating this operation, she effectually prevented the *Nashville* from leaving.¹ By this Order in Council nothing but provisions requisite for the subsistence of the crew, and so much coal as would carry the ship to the nearest port of the country, or to some nearer destination, was to be supplied to ships of war or privateers; the coal was only to be supplied once in three months to the same ship, unless this was relaxed by special permission.² Similar rules were put in force during the Franco-German War, 1870-1;³ in the

Rules adopted by Great Britain during Russo-Japanese War, 1904.
Spanish-American War of 1898; and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The rule in this latter case limited the supply of coal to "so much as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer named neutral destination."⁴ Holland, during the wars between Brazil and Paraguay, and Spain and Chili, prohibited ships of both parties, being in a Dutch harbour at the same time, from departing until twenty-four hours after the other. Japan adopted what is practically the British twenty-four-hours' rule as far back as 1870.⁵

Negrin on the admission of belligerent vessels into neutral ports. "Negrin (p. 180)," says Mr. W. E. Hall, "well sums up as follows the condition upon which belligerent vessels are now admitted into neutral ports:—

"Las condiciones," he says, "del asilo respecto de los beligerantes son:—

"1. Observar la mejor armonía y una paz completo en el puerto, aún con los mismos enemigos.

"2. No reclutar gente para aumentar ó completar las tripulaciones.

¹ Cf. Halleck, vol. ii. p. 165, and note.

² Earl Russell to the Admiralty, *London Gazette*, December 15, 1863.

³ Lord Granville to Admiralty, *London Gazette*, July 19, 1870.

⁴ *London Gazette*, February 11, 1904.

⁵ M. Sakuvé Takahashi in the "Revue de Droit International," 1901, p. 264.

"3. No aumentar el calibre de la artilleria, ni embarcar armas y municiones de guerra en buques militaires y corsarios.

"4. No hacer uso del asilo para vigilar los buques enemigos ni obtener noticias sobre sus futuros movimientos.

"5. No abandonar el puerto hasta veintecuatro horas despues de haberlo hecho la escuadra ó buque enemigo, mercante ó de guerra que en el se hallaba.

"6. No intentar apoderarse, ya sea por la fuerza ó por la astucia de las presas que pueda haber en el puerto.

"7. No proceder á las venta de las que se conduzcan al mismo, miéntras no hayan sido declaradas legitimas por el tribunal competente."

It is, however, impossible not to observe that Negrin makes no definite, or even implicit, pronouncement on the subject of coaling.

The events of the Russo-Japanese War which merit attention in connection with the topic of the reception of belligerent cruisers in neutral ports are the Declaration of the Governor of Malta, and the dismantlement of the armaments, and internment of the crews, of Russian war-vessels in the territorial waters of neutral Powers.

The effect of the proclamation was that belligerent vessels proceeding to the seat of war, or to any positions on the line of route with the object of intercepting neutral vessels conveying contraband, were entirely prohibited from making use of British territorial waters for the purpose of coaling. It made no difference whether the vessels presented themselves assembled together or singly, nor whether the coaling was sought to be effected from the shore or from colliers. The proclamation was not to apply to vessels in distress, and it was understood that similar instructions were sent to the Governors of the Colonies.¹ Few writers on international law could be cited as having anticipated with such precision the working out of the principle as Mr. W. E. Hall on the point under consideration. He contended that as it constituted a violation of the essential principles of neutrality to mete out more supplies to

Declaration of
Governor of
Malta, Aug.,
1904.

¹ *Times*, August 23, 1904.

a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port than could reasonably be considered necessary for reaching a place of safety, nations would adopt the right and prudent conduct of not falling below the standard of care which they adopted in recent wars.

**Case of the
*Mandjur.***

The first case of dismantling was that of the gunboat *Mandjur*. This vessel arrived at Shanghai about February 15, and on March 31 its disarmament was satisfactorily verified by the Japanese Consul-General, M. Odagiri. Not only was the vessel disarmed, but important parts of the machinery were removed.

**Internment of
Russian war-
ships after
battle in Ger-
man, Chinese,
and French
ports.**

On August 10, 1904, a great naval battle took place between Admiral Togo's squadron and the Russian squadron from Port Arthur under Admiral Vitoff, who was killed. According to Admiral Togo's reports, five of the six Russian battleships were seriously damaged. The Japanese had a slight superiority in battleships, seven to six, and a great superiority in cruisers. As a result, the Russian destroyer *Grosovoi* and cruiser *Askold* were driven to take refuge in Shanghai, the *Diana* was driven to Saigon, and the Russian flagship, the *Tsarevitch*, the cruiser *Novik*, and some Russian destroyers were forced to take refuge in Kiao-Chau.¹ All the ammunition in the four Russian war vessels was removed and stored in the German magazines, and the guns were completely dismantled. The terms of parole obliged the Russians to remain at Tsingtau till the end of the war. The crews of the Russian ships which fled for refuge, numbering approximately 1000 officers and men, were to remain at Tsingtau till the end of the war.² On August 29 it was announced in the *Times* that the *Askold* and *Grosovoi* had been dismantled at Shanghai. The precedent of Tsingtau was followed in all respects, the crew being interned in a specific place or places. On September 10 the cruiser *Diana*, from Port Arthur, was dismantled at Saigon, and the crew were interned there till the end of the war.

On or about September 13, the Russian transport *Lena*

¹ The *Novik* reached Tsing-tau uninjured, and left after a stay of ten hours (*Times*, August 16, 1904), and was therefore not disarmed. She was sunk in Korsakovsk Harbour, Sakhalin, by the Japanese cruisers *Chitose* and *Tsushima* (*Times*, August 22, 1904).

² *Times*, August 19, 1904.

**Case of the
Lena, Sept.,
1904, at San
Francisco.**

arrived at San Francisco. The United States authorities notified the commander of the vessel that he would be required to depart or dismantle in a brief period. It has been conjectured that the vessel came from Vladivostock, the great number of men and guns being accounted for on the hypothesis that she had on board the crew of the *Novik*, which had been driven on shore after the defeat of the Vladivostock squadron. It was announced in the *Times* on September 16 that it had been finally agreed that the vessel should be dismantled. The American view of dismantling requires the removal of all the fighting weapons of the vessel. The crew and officers of the *Lena* were placed on parole pending agreement between the belligerent Powers and the United States as to their disposal.

It may safely be anticipated that the true construction of these facts in the light of international law will afford controversy to future writers on international law. If the disarmament had been entirely voluntary, or even if it had merely been the result of an agreement between the neutral Power and the belligerent to whom the vessel disarmed belonged, the situation might be explained. But it is clear that this was not the case, but that, on the contrary, Japan took a leading part in the negotiations that led to disarmament, and that it was owing to her action that the crews were interned at a specified place in the neutral ports. There seems a precedent for this action in the protest addressed by Captain Winslow, the commander of the *Kearsage*, to the agent of the Confederates at Cherbourg, after the engagement in which the *Alabama* was sunk, June 21, 1864, off Cherbourg. In this protest Captain Winslow demanded the surrender to him of that portion of the crew of the *Alabama* who had escaped capture by taking refuge on French soil. But this only affected the destiny of a few score sailors, and the threat of Captain Winslow was a mere *brutum fulmen*, inasmuch as that portion of the crew of the *Alabama* which escaped to land were not interned. But the result of Japanese action at Shanghai, Tsingtau, Saigon, and San Francisco has been that thousands of men have been interned practically as prisoners

Dismantlement of belligerent vessel in neutral port after defeat condemned by Mr. W. E. Hall.

of war on neutral soil. As between the neutral Powers, Germany, France, China, and the United States, and Russia, the belligerent, it should appear that the exterritoriality of the public armed ship of war, a fundamental postulate of maritime law, constitutes an insuperable obstacle to any dismantling or disarmament which does not take place with the full consent of the belligerent. But as the other belligerent appears to have taken a leading part in the proceedings leading to dismantlement in each case, this can hardly have been the case.

Mr. W. E. Hall explicitly states: (1) "That a vessel of war is not liable to be disarmed on taking refuge after defeat;" (2) "To disarm a vessel, or to render her permanently immoveable, is to assist her enemy."¹ Thus the incident above detailed appears indefensible, so far as the facts are yet known, even allowing full weight to Mr. W. E. Hall's contention that the tendency, which he approved, would be for neutrals to limit the stay of belligerent cruisers. But he equally considered that the neutral was under no international obligation to do so. This last conclusion renders the current events all the more inexplicable. There is certainly nothing in Mr. W. E. Hall's work from which one could reasonably infer that he considered that the sanction of municipal regulations limiting the stay of the belligerent cruiser in the neutral port was the dismantlement and disarmament of the vessel. It may, of course, be said that the facts are not yet all known. Historicus declined to discuss the *Alabama* affair because of the want of evidence in 1863. But it is difficult to believe that any very material circumstance remains to be known about the dismantlement of the Russian war vessels.

It must, however, be admitted that the analogies of land warfare support the action of the neutral Powers in the present war towards Russian war vessels who have taken refuge after defeat. There seems a difference between the two cases, because the theory of exterritoriality cannot be invoked in the case of an army which has taken refuge on neutral territory after defeat, like the army of General Clinchant in

¹ Hall's "International Law," pt. iv. c. iii. pp. 626, 627.

Switzerland in 1871. When it is the case of a defeated army taking refuge in neutral territory, "It has been the invariable practice in late wars to disarm the troops crossing the neutral frontier, and to intern them till the conclusion of the peace."¹ If the cost of supporting the defeated army is levied upon the defeated belligerent, this has the indirect effect of favouring unduly the victorious belligerent, since the latter would have had to support the vanquished force if it had surrendered to him. On the other hand, it is very onerous on a neutral to support for a long time a considerable body of men. The Hague Convention (Article 58) imposes upon the neutral State the duty of supporting the interned troops, subject to reimbursement on the conclusion of hostilities. Mr. W. E. Hall suggested that perhaps the equity of the case and the necessity of precaution might both be satisfied by the release of such fugitives under a convention between the neutral and belligerent States by which the latter should undertake not to employ them during the continuance of the war.

¹ Hall's "International Law," p. 626.

CHAPTER X.

THE RULE OF THE WAR IN 1756.

The rule of
the war in
1756, a bel-
ligerent claim.

Its original
operation in
1756.

Extension in
1793.

THE right of neutrals to carry on all legitimately acquired trade was seriously threatened by what is known as the rule of war of 1756. In the eighteenth century European countries, by legislation upon the lines of the English navigation laws, were in the habit of restricting the commerce of their colonies to vessels of their own country. During the war against this country in 1756 the French became disabled, through their relative weakness upon the sea, from carrying on trade with their colonies. They then handed over the trade between the mother-country and her dependencies to Dutch vessels, but continued to exclude other neutral traders. The English prize courts thereupon condemned all Dutch vessels captured in the course of such traffic, on the ground that vessels so engaged had, in fact, passed into the merchant service of France. The rule was extended in 1793 so as to prohibit all neutral trade with the colonies and coast towns of the enemy which had not been open before the war. The principle upon which the English decision proceeded was stated as follows by Lord Stowell in the *Immanuel* :—

“Upon the interruption of a war, what are the rights of belligerents and neutrals respectively regarding (colonies)? It is an indubitable right of the belligerent to possess himself of such places, as of any other possession of his enemy. This is his common right, but he has the certain means of carrying such a right into effect, if he has a decided superiority at sea: such colonies are dependent for their existence, as colonies, on foreign supplies; if they cannot be supplied and defended, they must fall to the belligerent, of course—and if the belligerent chooses to direct his means to such an object, what

right has a third party, perfectly neutral, to step in and prevent the execution? No existing interest of his is affected by it: he can have no right to apply to his own use the beneficial consequences of the mere act of the belligerent, and to say, 'True it is, you have, by force of arms, forced such places out of the exclusive possession of the enemy, but I will share the benefit of the conquest, and by sharing its benefits prevent its progress.'

On behalf of the United States, Mr. Munroe, in a letter to Lord Mulgrave of September 23, 1803, insisted that neutrals were entitled to trade, with the exception of blockades and contrabands, to and between all ports of the enemy, and in all articles, although the trade should not have been opened to them in time of peace. This view has, upon the whole, prevailed among American statesmen and jurists, though Chancellor Kent has intimated a different opinion.

The question is not free from difficulty, and the answer depends upon the familiar compromise between neutral and belligerent rights. Sir R. Phillimore¹ usefully distinguishes the following cases:—

(1) The carrying on by the neutral of the trade between the belligerent mother-country and the colonies.

(2) The carrying on the coasting trade of the belligerent—such trade being confined in time of peace to the belligerent subjects.

(3) The carrying on the trade by a neutral from a port in his own country to a port of the colony of the belligerent.

(4) The carrying on by a neutral of a trade between the ports of the belligerent, but with a cargo from the neutral's own country.

In the first two cases the view seems reasonable that a neutral accepting a licence to trade in effect incorporates himself in the enemy fleet, and may fairly be treated as belligerent.

As Mr. Justice Story expressed it: "The property is considered *pro hac vice* as enemy's property, as so completely identified with his interests as to acquire a hostile character." English lawyers will find little to criticize in the conclusion of the same high American authority on the general question.

Dispute between Great Britain and United States, 1803.

Sir R. Phillimore's division of the subject.

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 299.

Opinion of Story, J., that rule ought not to be extended to neutral trade with the colonies of a belligerent.

where no ulterior belligerent destination.

"The British," he continues, have extended the doctrine to all intercourse with the colony, even from or to a neutral country, and herein it seems to me they have abused the rule. This, at present, appears to me to be the proper limits of the rule, as to the colonial trade (with the mother-country) and the coasting trade; and the rule of 1756 (as it was at that time applied) seems to me well founded, but its late extension is reprehensible." In fact, the extension with which Mr. Justice Story quarrels can only be defended on the assumption that the rights of neutrals are confined to trade which they possessed before the outbreak of war—an assumption quite impossible to reconcile with many facts which are not in question.

The doctrine of continuous voyage.

Application of, where no genuine importation into neutral country.

Opinion of Lord Stowell: importation genuine when goods landed and duties paid.

The English application of the rule in 1793 was rendered still more severe by what was known as the doctrine of continuous voyage. Orders in Council had so far relaxed as to allow the importation of the produce of the enemy's colonies into a neutral country, and its exportation thence in a neutral bottom. This led to colourable evasions by neutral shippers, and the question was much discussed by what evidence the *bona fides* of a transhipment was to be established. Lord Stowell held that the landing of the goods and the payment of duties in a neutral harbour was evidence enough of a *bona fide* importation. "If these criteria are not to be resorted to, I should be at a loss to know what should be the test; and I am strongly disposed to hold that it would be sufficient that the goods should be landed and the duties paid."¹

The real issue in such cases was well shown in a short conversation between the court and counsel in the *Polly*:²

Court: "Is it contended that an American might not purchase articles of this nature (in Spain) and import them, *bona fide*, to America on his own account, and afterwards export them?"

It was answered, "No, that was not contended; but that the truth and reality of the importation for his own account was the point in question; that all the circumstances in the case pointed to a near connection with Spanish interests; and that

¹ The *Polly*, 2 C. Rob. at p. 369.

² Ibid., p. 365.

no proof was brought of the payment of the duties in America, nor that the transaction was in any way conducted like a *bonâ fide* importation for the American market."

In the latter case of the *William*,¹ the test was stated by the Court of Appeal to be more general.

"Let it be supposed," the judgment ran,² "that the party has a motive for desiring to make the voyage appear to begin at some other place than that of the original lading, and that he therefore lands the cargo purely and solely for the purpose of enabling himself to affirm that it was at such other place that the goods were taken on board, would this contrivance at all alter the truth of the fact? If the voyage from the place of lading be not really ended, it matters not by what acts the party may have evinced his desire of making it appear to have been ended. That these acts have been attended with trouble and expense cannot alter their quality or effect. The trouble and expense may weigh as circumstances of evidence, to show the purpose for which the acts were done; but if the evasive purpose be admitted or proved, we can never be bound to accept, as a substitute for the observance of the law, the means, however operose, which have been employed to cover a breach of it."

Since the Declaration of Paris, the only interest attaching to the Rule of the War of 1756 is that, according to many writers, it has bequeathed to the law of contraband the doctrine of continuity of voyage. It seems both historically and logically inconsistent that the United States, who were opposed to the Rule of the War of 1756, should have been the State that first engrafted one of the leading doctrines of that rule on the law of contraband. It is elsewhere urged that decisions of Lord Stowell's time appear to justify the conclusion that the doctrines of continuous voyage and the conveyance of contraband were not regarded as radically disparate conceptions in English prize courts.

¹ 5 C. Rob. 385.

² *Ibid.*, at p. 395.

Sir W. Grant
in the *William*,
(1806) 5 C.
Rob. 385, 395.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RIGHT OF VISITATION AND SEARCH.

The right of visitation and search a fundamental postulate.

Vattel on the right of search.

Lord Stowell in the *Maria*, (1799) 1 Rob. 340, 343.

SIR H. S. MAINE observes that "from the very beginning of international law a belligerent has been allowed to prevent a neutral from supplying his enemy with things capable of being used immediately in war."¹ Vattel supplies the corollary: "We cannot prevent the conveyance of contraband goods without searching neutral vessels that we meet at sea, therefore we have a right to search them. . . . At present, a neutral ship refusing to be searched would from that proceeding alone be condemned as lawful prize."² In what Phillimore considers "one of the most careful and best reasoned judgments" of Lord Stowell, that great judge reminds us that, in the above passage, Vattel was to be considered not as a lawyer merely delivering an opinion, but as a witness asserting facts as to the existing practice of modern Europe (*i.e.* in 1758). Lord Stowell then proceeded to express some surprise that Vattel should have mentioned it as a modern law, since it is a principle of the civil law, on which international law is founded, that a contumacious refusal to submit to fair inquiry infers all the penalties of convicted guilt. Lord Stowell proceeded, "Conformably to this principle we find in the celebrated French Ordinance of 1681, now in force, Article 12, 'That every vessel shall be good prize in case of resistance and combat;'" and Valin, in his smaller Commentary, p. 81, says expressly, that although the expression is in the conjunction, yet resistance alone is sufficient. He refers to the

¹ Lectures, "International Law," v. p. 105.

² "Droit des Gens," l. iii. c. viii s. 114.

Spanish Ordinance, 1718, evidently copied from it, in which it is expressed in the disjunctive, 'in case of resistance or combat.' "And recent instances are at hand and within view from which it appears that Spain continues to act upon this principle. The first time in which it occurs to my notice on the inquiries I have been able to make in the institutes of our own country respecting matters of this nature, excepting what occurs in the Black Book of Admiralty,¹ is in the Order of Council, 1664, Article 12, which directs, 'That when any ship, met withal by the Royal Navy or other ship commissionated, shall fight or make resistance, the said ship and goods shall be adjudged lawful prize.' A similar article occurs in the Proclamation of 1672. I am aware that in those orders and proclamations are to be found some articles not very consistent with the law of nations as understood now, or indeed at that time; for they are expressly censured by Lord Clarendon (*Life*, p. 242)."² Even supposing that these seventeenth-century proclamations are inconsistent with the right of visitation and search as understood now, the astonishing fact remains that this belligerent right was admirably described in the "Liber Niger Admiraltatis" so far back as the middle of the fourteenth century. It is, therefore, curious to note that prize law in this country, the most essential part of the maritime law of war, seems to claim a considerably earlier notice than the maritime law of general average, the first case of which occurred in Elizabeth's reign.³ In this country the law of general average does not apply to the case of a successful defence of a private armed vessel. It does not seem irrelevant, in view of the important part that might conceivably be played by mail steamers of large size armed for purposes of

¹ The reference here is to the "Blache Booke of Admiralty" (*Liber Niger Admiraltatis*), B. 7 & 8. Sir Travers Twiss assigns the date of this portion of the "Blache Booke" to somewhere between 1337 A.D. and 1351 A.D., *Introd.* p. xix. He further points out that "An early instance of the Admiral's judicial authority to decide the question of prize or no prize occurs in A.D. 1357" ("Rym. Fold.", p. 14). It is interesting to note that No. 7 B., beyond all question, is a provision on the right of search in time of war. (See also Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. p. 436, and note.)

² *The Maria*, (1799) 1 Rob., 340, 363, *et seq.*

³ *Hicks v. Palington*, (1590) F. Moore, 297.

self-defence in time of war, to recollect that by the laws of other European countries, a construction has been placed upon the law of general average by which, in the case of a successful defence by a private armed vessel, the owners of the different interests in vessel and cargo are liable to contribute in general average both to the "wounds of the ship" and the wounds of the sailors.¹ It is submitted that this circumstance throws a light on the Continental tendency to fit out Volunteer Fleets as instanced by the action of Prussia in 1870, and by that of Russia in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the *Nereide*, ((1814) 8 & 9 Cranch, I. Wheaton, Curtis' Decrees Supreme Court of the United States, 322, 426-7), Story, J., said—

Story, J., on
incontrover-
tible nature
of the right of
visitation and
search.

"The Black Book of the Admiralty expressly articulates that any vessel making resistance may be attacked and seized as enemies; and this rule is enforced in the memorable prize instructions of Henry VIII.: Clerk's *Praxis*, 164; Rob. Collect. Marit., p. 10, and note, and p. 118. The ordinance of France, 1584, is equally broad; and declares all such vessels to be good prize; and this has ever since remained a settled rule in the prize code of that nation. Valin informs us that it is also the rule of Spain; and that in France it is applied as well to French vessels and cargoes, as to those of neutrals and allies, Coll. Marit., 118; Valin, 'Traité des Prises,' c. v. s. 80. There is not to be found in the maritime code of any nation or in any commentary thereon, the least glimmering of authority that distinguishes, in case of resistance, the fate of the cargo from that of the ship."

Mr. W. E. Hall. Mr. W. E. Hall observes—

"The privilege has never been denied to a belligerent of intercepting the access to his enemy of such commodities as are capable of being immediately used in the prosecution of hostilities against himself."

The right of visitation and search is indissolubly connected, as Vattel observes, with the prevention of the conveyance of contraband. One quotation given by Halleck from the "Blache Booke of Admiralty" has clearly nothing to do with the belligerent right of search, but seems confined to the execution of revenue laws or other municipal regulations in

¹ *Taylor v. Curtis*, (1816) 6 Taunt., 608.

the ports and bays or within one marine league of the coast.¹ But Sir Travers Twiss, in a note to No. 7 B. "Blacke Booke," says that the law and custom on the subject of the belligerent right of search are set forth in a letter from Edward III. to Peter, King of Aragon. In Kent's Commentaries it is stated that "the right of visitation and search is founded upon necessity, and is strictly a war right, and does not rightfully exist in time of peace, unless conceded by treaty."² Lord Stowell said, "No one can exercise the right of visitation and search upon the high seas, except a belligerent power."³ A great number of treaties or conventions were concluded (1831-40) by which different countries conceded to each other the right of visitation and search in time of peace for the suppression of the slave trade.⁴ A discussion arose between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States out of the claims of British cruisers on the coast of Africa to visit American vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. It was common ground that "the Right of Approach," as it is called, on the high seas in time of peace could be exercised in the case of piracy. The issue between the two countries was whether the slave trade was piracy or not. It had previously been decided by the courts, both of England and America, that the slave trade was not contrary to the law of nations.⁵ In 1858 Lord Lyndhurst stated that any interference by a British cruiser with a vessel which bore the American flag would involve apology and reparation if the vessel were justified in using that flag. In 1862, by treaty, Great Britain and the United States mutually conceded the right to visit merchant vessels of the other country which were suspected of engaging in the slave trade. The subject is now regulated by the General Act of the Brussels Conference relative to the slave trade, signed at Brussels, 1890. Within a certain zone, the signatory Powers have agreed to exercise the right of visit, search, and detention (*droit de visite, de*

Right of visitation and search exclusively an incident of war.

Right of approach in time of peace for prevention of piracy.

Whether the slave trade is piracy.

By General Act of Brussels Conference, 1890, right of approach may be exercised for prevention of slave trade.

¹ "International Law," vol. ii. p. 240.

² *Commentary on American Law*, vol. i. p. 153.

³ *The Louis*, 2 Dods., Rep. 210.

⁴ Pistoys and Duverdy, "Des Prises," tit. i. c. iii.

⁵ *The Antelope*, 10 Wheat, R. 66; *The Diana*, 1 Dods., R. 95.

recherche et de saisie) of vessels at sea of less than 500 tons burden, which there is reason to believe are engaged in the slave trade. In the early part of the nineteenth century, Great Britain claimed and exercised a right of search over the public armed vessels of the United States for deserters from the British army and navy. Such a pretension cannot now be seriously urged.¹ The result is that the right of visitation and search in time of peace is limited to the purpose of ascertaining the national character of a suspected vessel. It is thus called in French *droit d'enquête de pavillon* as opposed to the right of visitation and search in time of war (*droit de visite ou de recherche*). The former may be exercised either—

- (1) In the case of suspected piracy;
- (2) In the case of vessels committing crimes against municipal law in the territorial waters of the Power making the visit;
- (3) In the case of vessels suspected of having hostile intent against a Power in time of peace;
- (4) Under the General Act of the Brussels Conference, 1890.

With the above exceptions, therefore, in modern times the right of visitation and search (*droit de visite et de recherche*) can only be exercised in time of war.

Method of exercise of right of visitation and search.

Mode by firing gun not universal.

The usual mode adopted by most of the maritime Powers of Europe of summoning a neutral to undergo visitation is the firing of a cannon on the part of the belligerent. This is called by the French *semonce, coup d'assurance*, and, in English, affirming gun.² It is, undoubtedly, the duty of the neutral to obey such a summons, but there is no positive obligation on the belligerent to fire such an affirming gun, for its use is by no means universal. Moreover, any other method, as hailing by signals, of summoning a neutral to submit to such an examination is no less effective than the affirming gun, if the summons is actually communicated to, and understood by, the neutral. The means used are not essential, but the fact of

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 718.

² "Semoncer" means "to warn in a loud voice," not "to summon;" cf. Halleck's "International Law," vol. i. p. 580.

summons actually communicated is necessary to acquit the visiting vessels of all damages following upon neutral disobedience.¹ Treaties in international law operate as exceptions.² Several treaties have affirmed, modified, or taken away, between the contracting parties, the right of visitation and search. It is to be remarked that all treaties which have been concerned with this subject have admitted the exercise of this right in time of war.³ The leading treaty which affirms and incorporates the common law of nations upon this subject is the famous Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) between France and Spain, Article 17. It is noticeable that the article of the Treaty of the Pyrenees confines the right of search to the examination of the passports and certificates, and omits, or, indeed, implicitly excludes, the right of search of the cargo. It is clear, from the judgment of Lord Stowell in the *Maria*, (1799) 1 Rob. 340, 359, that the right of visitation and search in English law extends to search of the cargo. It is of some interest to note that in a debate on the Appropriation Bill,⁴ on which the question of British shipping and Russia was raised, the Prime Minister, apparently following the judgment of Lord Stowell (*supra*), expressed a decided opinion that a belligerent who captured a vessel had a right to examine the cargo.

The right of search is sometimes denied in the case of vessels under convoy. The first instance in which the immunity of convoyed vessels was asserted was by a declaration of Queen Christina of Sweden, August 16, 1653. The most recent chapter to the history of the question is the scheme of the *Institut de Droit International*⁵ for a *Réglement des Prises Maritimes*, by which the visit of neutral vessels, convoyed by ships of war of their own State, is prohibited. The naval prize code of the institute represents the modern Continental

¹ Cf. Halleck's "International Law," vol. ii, p. 258, and authorities there cited.

² Cf. English Reply to Prussian "Exposition des Motifs," *Collectanea Juridica*, vol. i. p. 144, styled by Historicus (Letters, "International Law," p. 202) as "best model of reason and common sense which can be proposed to a juridical writer." It seems at a latter date to have been the view of Pitt ("Speeches," vol. iii. p. 227, 228) that treaties operated as creating exceptions.

³ "De Hautefeuille," t. iii. p. 450. ⁴ *Times*, August 12, 1904.

⁵ "Annuaire," 1883, p. 215.

Continental doctrine that
right of search
cannot be ex-
ercised over
convoyed ves-
sels.

Institute of
International
Law, 1883.

Disputed by
Great Britain.

view of prize law as opposed to that of England and the United States. It was passed by a majority of the members of the institute, but opposed by the English representatives.

The Institute of International Law, on the subject of the immunity of convoyed vessels from the right of search, did little more than reaffirm the principle of the armed neutrality. England has always from the first resisted the doctrine of the immunity of convoyed vessels.

But limited
mode of, ac-
cepted by,
1801.

But in 1801, by treaty with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, Great Britain modified her resistance to the doctrine so far as to abstain from exercising a right of search over convoyed vessels, except where ground for suspicion existed, and then only in the presence, if required, of an officer of the neutral public armed vessel convoying the merchant ships. But by treaty in 1812 and 1814 matters reverted to their old footing, and left the Baltic powers free to assert, and Great Britain to refuse, the immunity of convoyed vessels. England has perhaps sacrificed something in the late war by adhering to her traditional policy. Russia, of all Powers in the world, could least complain of another Power asserting the doctrine of the immunity of convoyed vessels.

Doubtful ex-
pediency of
English re-
fusal to recog-
nize immunity
of convoyed
vessels.

Great Britain could ground her adhesion to the doctrine on the prize code of the Institute of International Law with more reason as Russia purports to derive her naval regulations from that prize code. At the present day the result of Great Britain adhering to the doctrine of the immunity of convoyed vessels would be the protection of all her shipping in the Far East, except such as wilfully engaged in the conveyance of contraband. The *Malacca* incident would have been impossible. When it is remembered that the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, not only embarrasses an important branch of British industry, but also greatly exceeds the requirements of international law, the self-denying character of the neutrality of Great Britain becomes clear. In the interests of what *Historicus* called "the sacred traditions of neutrality," Great Britain embarrasses industry at home, and, in the light of the experience of the late war, to some extent injures her mercantile marine. And all this could be remedied by a repeal of the shipbuilding section of

the Foreign Enlistment Act, and by our accession to a principle passed by the majority of the members of the Institute of International Law in 1882. The fact that, with the exception of the American Civil War, this country has never been called upon to consider its position as a neutral in a war between two powerful maritime nations, constitutes an obviously sufficient reason for withdrawing its refusal to the doctrine of the immunity of convoyed vessels. Were we to adopt that principle, our powerful navy would afford complete protection to all the mercantile marine which is engaged in legitimate trade. There would be no real apostasy in our doing so, since there is the precedent of 1801. And, in any event, no future historian could compare our action with that of the States who formed the first armed neutrality. In that case the moral sense is justly offended at a renunciation of principles only a few years after they were openly adhered to. But it is practically nearly a century since Great Britain refused to admit immunity to convoyed vessels. Since then England has made memorable sacrifices, in 1856 and in 1872, to the sacred traditions of neutrality, and the result on neither occasion has been such as to warrant either a repetition or continuance of the process.

It may be said that our present assumption of neutrality only fulfils the high ideals which Mr. Canning advocated "with an imagery wrought up with consummate skill, and expressed in language of extraordinary beauty."¹ But the theme of Mr. Canning in 1819 was that the neutrality suitable for this country was to be dictated by a chivalrous regard for the weakness of Spain. A weak State, Spain could not enforce from Great Britain, a powerful neutral, any exact standard of neutrality. This very circumstance, Mr. Canning argued, ought to make this country adopt the same standard of neutrality that she would adopt if she were a weak neutral and Spain a powerful belligerent. It would not be reasonable to apply this reasoning to the present political position, especially when it is remembered, as it must be, that we have even bettered Mr. Canning's instruction, and

¹ May's "Constitutional History," vol. ii. p. 119.

imposed neutral duties on ourselves beyond the requirements of international law. It is a question which demands consideration whether the injury to Great Britain when a belligerent of freeing convoyed vessels would not be compensated in periods of neutrality.

In giving evidence before the Royal Commission on supply of food and raw material in time of war, Professor T. E. Holland, K.C., observed that it was "a most striking fact" that the whole of the European Continent and America were apparently against us in maintaining the right of visiting a convoyed fleet. Almost all the authorities on the Continent are in favour of the exemption of convoyed neutral vessels from visit, search, and capture. The exemption, in the case of the United States, is enforced by Article 3 of the Naval War Code. Professor T. E. Holland, K.C., also pointed out on this occasion that not only would conceding immunity to convoyed vessels act beneficially on the maritime interests of this country when it was neutral, but in time of war, Great Britain being a belligerent, it would have the effect of enabling supplies of food to reach this country from America.¹

The following are leading decisions on the subject of the right of visitation and search in English and American Courts:—

Cases on the
right of visita-
tion and search
and the right
of approach.

(1) The *Nereide* (1814), 9 Cranch, 440, which decided that the right of search is not a right wantonly to vex or control neutral commerce, or indulge idle curiosity; but it grows out of and is ancillary to the right of capture, and can never arise except as a means to that end.

(2) The *Maria*, (1799) 1 Robson, 340. This case is referred to by Mr. W. E. Hall² as the recognized expression of English doctrine. Lord Stowell (then Sir W. Scott) said *supra*, pp. 359, 360, "That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestible right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. I say, be the ships, the cargoes, and the destination what they may, because, till they are visited and searched, it does not appear what the ships, or the cargoes, or the destinations are; and it is for the purpose of ascertaining these points that the necessity of this right of visitation and search exists.

¹ Report of Royal Commission, *ibid.*, *supra*, v. ii. Cd. 2644, p. 232. Evidence.

² "International Law," 5th ed., p. 724 and note.

This right is so clear in principle that no man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can legally be captured, it is impossible to capture. . . . The right is equally clear in practice; for practice is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man in the least degree conversant in subjects of this kind has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it. The right must unquestionably be exercised with as little of personal harshness and of vexation in the mode as possible; but soften it as much as you can, it is still a right of force, though of lawful force—something in the nature of civil process, where force is employed, but a lawful force, which cannot lawfully be resisted. The only case where it can be so in matters of this nature, is in the state of war and conflict between two countries, where one party has a perfect right to attack by force, and the other has an equally perfect right to repel by force. But in the relative situation of two countries at peace with each other, no such conflict of rights can possibly exist."

(3) The *Marianne Flora*, (1826) 9 Wheaton, 39, decided that though the right of search of foreign vessels does not exist in time of peace, yet a cruiser has a right to approach for purposes of observation. There is no obligation to affirm a flag with a gun by an American cruiser in time of peace. The vessel so approached in time of peace is under no obligation to lie by, but neither has she a right to fire at a cruiser approaching, upon a mere conjecture that she is a pirate, and if this be done, the cruiser may lawfully repel force with force, and capture her.

(4) The *Catherine Elizabeth*, (1804) 5 Robson 232, which decided that resistance by an enemy master will not affect the cargo, being the property of a neutral merchant.

(5) The *Eleanor*, (1817) 2 Wheaton 262, which decided that the commander of a squadron is liable to individuals for the trespasses of those under his command, in case of positive or permissive orders, or of actual presence and co-operation. Where a capture has actually taken place, with the assent express or implied, of the commander of a squadron, the prize-master may be considered as a bailee to the use of the whole squadron, who are to share in the prize money, and thus the commander may be made responsible; but not so as to mere trespasses, unattended with a conversion to the use of the squadron. The commander of a single ship is responsible for those under his command, as are, likewise, the owners of

privateers for the conduct of the commanders appointed by them. To detain for examination is a right which a belligerent may exercise over every vessel, except a national vessel, which he meets with on the ocean. The principal right necessarily carries with it all the means essential to its exercise; among these may, sometimes, be included the assumption of the disguise of a friend or an enemy, which is a lawful stratagem in war.

If, in consequence of the use of this stratagem, the crew of the vessel detained abandon their duty before they are actually made prisoners of war, and the vessel is thereby lost, the captors are not responsible. Whenever an officer seizes a vessel as prize, he is bound to commit her to the care of a competent prize-master and crew: not because the original crew, when left on board (in the case of the seizure of a vessel of a citizen or neutral), are released from their duty without the assent of the master, but from the want of a right to subject the captured crew to the authority of the captor's officer. But this rule does not extend to the case of a mere detention for examination, which the commander of the cruising vessel may enforce by orders from his own quarter-deck, and may therefore send an officer on board the vessel detained in order more conveniently to enforce it, without taking the vessel out of the possession of her own officers and crew.

The modern usage of war authorize the bringing one of the principal officers of the vessel detained on board the belligerent vessel with the papers for examination.

(6) The *Fanny*, (1814) 1 Dods. 443, which decided that salvage is due for the recapture of neutral goods previously taken by the enemy on board a British armed ship.

(7) The *Eliza and Katy*, (1805) 6 Rob. 185, which decided that even when the master, supercargo, and owners of a ship are implicated in the same intention ofconcerting fraud against the belligerent rights of this country, the vessel will be restored when she is seized after she has been released, and is sailing with a copy of her restitution on board. A captor cannot recover his costs if he withholds papers.

(8) The *Nicholas and Jan* was alluded to by Lord Stowell in the case of the *Betsey*, (1798) 1 Rob. 92, 96, in the following terms: "The *Nicholas and Jan* (1784) was one of several Dutch ships taken at St. Eustatius, and sent home under convoy to England for adjudication. In the mouth of the Channel they were retaken by the French fleet; there was much neutral property on board, sufficiently documented, and in that case a demand was made on behalf of a merchant of Hamburg for restitution in value from the original captor. It was argued, I remember, that the captors had wilfully exposed the property to danger by bringing it home, whilst they might have resorted to the Admiralty Courts in the

West Indies; and, therefore, that the claimants were entitled to demand indemnification from them. But on this point the court was of opinion that, under the dubious circumstances in which those cases were involved, and under the pressure of important concerns in which the commanders were engaged, they had not exceeded the discretion which is necessarily intrusted to them by the nature of the command. It was also urged against the claimants in that case that since the property had been retaken by their allies, they had a right to demand restitution in specie from them; and on these grounds our courts rejected their claims."

(9) The *Sarah*, (1801) 3 Rob. 330, which decided that a prayer to admit extraneous evidence on the part of the captor to show an illegal course of trade will not be granted, there being nothing in the original evidence to point to such a suspicion. The Court of Admiralty is at all times studious to preserve the simplicity of prize proceedings.

(10) The *Rising Sun*, (1799) 2 Rob. 104, which decided that though spoliation of papers is not a cause of condemnation, a master will be refused his freight when there is a spoliation unaccounted for and unexplained traced home to him, and when the master asserts himself, on the strength of incredible evidence, to be the owner of a great part of the cargo, a great part of which consists of specie.

(11) *Livingston & Gilchrist v. Maryland Insurance Company*, which decided that a policy of marine insurance is not avoided by the concealment of spurious papers covered with a belligerent character, if it be necessary and allowable to have on board such papers by the usage and course of trade. The rule that concealment and spoliation of papers, while they do not ordinarily induce a condemnation of the property, always afford cause of suspicion, and justify capture and detention, does not apply to spurious papers covered with a belligerent character for the purpose of protection.

(12) The *Hunter*, (1815) 1 Dods. 480, where it was held that though by the law of every maritime court of Europe spoliation of papers not only excludes further proof, but does *per se* infer condemnation, the laxity of our code has, however, modified the rule to this extent, that, if all other circumstances are clear, this circumstance alone shall not be damning, particularly if the act was done by a person who has interests of his own that might be benefited by the commission of this injurious act. The reason for the rule that spoliation works condemnation is that it is founded on a presumption *juris et de jure* that it was done for the purpose of suppressing evidence.

Even in English prize law spoliations generate a most unfavourable presumption, Sir W. Scott observing that "a case that escapes with such a brand upon it is only saved so

as by fire." In such cases further proof consists partly of affidavits and papers not on board the vessel, partly of the conduct of the parties. The further proof, in order not to let in condemnation of the vessel, where there has been spoliation of papers, must be overwhelming proof.

(13) The *Commercen*, (1816) 1 Wheaton, 382, which decided that a neutral ship, laden with provisions, enemy's property, and the growth of the enemy's country, specially permitted to be exported for the supply of his forces, is not entitled to freight. In this case, Story, J., held that, *inter alia*, the spoliation of papers affects the neutral with the forfeiture of freight.

(14) The *Frow Johanna*, (1803) 4 Rob. 348, which decided that the responsibility of captors under a commission of unlivery does not extend to forcible robbery of goods properly deposited in turn.

Sir W. Scott observed, "The goods were taken *jure belli*. The captor had a right to bring them in, and if any accident had happened in so doing, he would have been excusable, except for want of due care on the part of himself or his agents. When the goods were brought in, they were placed under the custody of the law. It became necessary to take them out of the ship, and the captor obtained a commission of unlivery from the court; they were put into warehouses, and nothing had been advanced to show that these warehouses were not proper places and sufficiently secure. The question comes forward, therefore, on the general principle, and on this point I am disposed to think that the captor is not responsible for a loss happening to goods whilst they were under the custody of the law." The captors, after obtaining a commission of unlivery from the court, are not liable in assumpsit.

(15) The *Pizarro*, (1817) 2 Wheaton, 227. In a prize cause the ship's papers should be brought into court and verified on oath by the captors, and the examinations of the captured crew taken upon standing interrogatories, and not *viva voce*. The cause should be heard, in the first instance, upon those papers and examinations, and upon such bearing it is for the court to determine whether further proof shall be allowed. If the court below deny an order for further proof when it ought to be granted, or allow it when it ought to be denied, and the objection is taken by the party and appears on the record, the appellate court can administer the proper relief.

But if evidence in the nature of further proof be introduced and no formal order or objection appear on the record, it must be presumed to have been done by consent, and the irregularity is waived. Concealment or spoliation of papers is not *per se* a sufficient ground for condemnation in a prize court. It is

calculated to excite the vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court, but it is open to explanation.

(16) The *St. Juan Baptista and La Purissima Concepcion*, (1803) 5 Rob. 33, decided that a resistance to search not substantiated is not a criminal act in the case of neutral ships sailing prior to hostilities.

The dicta of Sir W. Scott on this case are of great interest. A mere attempt to escape, before any possession assumed, never draws with it the consequences of condemnation.¹

Sir W. Scott said—

"The principle of the law (of visitation and search) is fully established and admitted on all sides. It is, indeed, a principle which has found its way into most of the maritime codes of civilized countries. It has undergone much discussion lately, and the consequence has been to give additional sanction to the principle, and to establish it more firmly in practice."

In saying that it must be shown that the vessel had reasonable grounds to be satisfied of the existence of war, otherwise there is no such thing as neutral character, nor any foundation for the several duties which the law of nations imposes on that character, Sir W. Scott showed how completely he differed from the views of the advocates of the armed neutralities, that the state of neutrality is not a new state, but a continuation of a former one. The facts of this case possess some historical interest. A modified right of visitation and search (*droit d'enquête de pavillon*) exists in time of peace, but only where piracy is suspected. In the case of the *St. Juan and Baptista and La Purissima Concepcion* it was held that the British privateer would have been justified in stopping a vessel on the high seas if suspected of piracy. But it appears that the Spanish vessels which were seized by the privateer entertained suspicions that the British privateer was a pirate. These suspicions Sir W. Scott considered were perfectly justifiable. At that time the Spaniards greatly dreaded Barbary cruisers, and the vessels were stopped "at a considerable distance from land, but not in any place so

¹ "International Law," 5th ed., p. 35.

remote from the scenes that Barbary pirates usually haunt" as to make apprehensions unreasonable. The case establishes the reality of piracy so late as 1803. The *Johanna Emilie*, (1854) 1 Spinks, 317, decided that the legal consequences of destruction or spoliation depend for the most part upon the circumstances of each case. Lord Stowell's judgments, Dr. Lushington observed, do not contain any direct definition of the word "spoliation." Destruction of papers is not necessarily spoliation unless it is destruction of papers relevant to the adventure. The destruction of a private letter, after the vessel had left her port, if construed as a spoliation of papers, would carry the doctrine to an absurd length. The case of the *Hunter*, 1 Dod. 480, only showed that further proof is allowed after a grave spoliation of papers in the absence of best evidence. The case of the *Two Brothers*, 1 C. Rob. 131, did not turn on the spoliation of papers, but on a defect of proof by the claimant that he had any interest in the question. It is a strong case of spoliation when papers are destroyed on the appearance of the chasing vessel. Time is of great importance. It is the strongest proof that papers contain some matters which would inure to condemnation when the papers are destroyed: (1) when the capturing vessel is in sight; (2) when there is a chance of capture; (3) at the time of capture; (4) clandestinely after capture. The case remains one of spoliation, but of a less stringent nature, when papers are destroyed a long time antecedently.

The *Der Mohr*, (1802) 4 Rob. 314, decided that when a ship is lost by the negligence of the prize-master, the whole freight is due in value from the captor.

Die Fire Damer, (1805) 5 Rob. 357, decided that where the prize is lost by the wilful neglect of the prize-master in refusing to receive advice or take a pilot on board, restitution will be decreed with costs and damages. This was a case of wilful misconduct and vexation on the part of the captors. The capturing vessel was a privateer, which appears to have been lost after the capture. If that had not been the case, Sir W. Scott stated that he would have directed measures to be taken for the forfeiture of her letter of marque. This case

is an authority for inflicting severe damages upon those captors who have behaved with cruelty towards the captured crew.

It is necessary to consider what are the papers whose spoliation involves the condemnation of the vessel in other countries, and has a material effect in that direction according to English prize law.

"According to the English practice these documents ought generally to be—
By English
prize law.

"(1) The register, specifying the owner, name of ship, size and other particulars necessary for identification, and to vouch the nationality of the vessel.

"(2) The passport (sea letter) issued by the neutral State.

"(3) The muster roll, containing the names, etc., of the crew.

"(4) The log book.

"(5) The charter-party, or statement of the contract under which the ship is let for the current voyage.

"(6) Invoices containing the particulars of the cargo.¹

"(7) The duplicate of the bill of lading, or acknowledgment from the master of the receipt of the goods specified therein, and promise to deliver them to the consignee or his order.

"And the information contained in these papers is in the main required by the practice of other nations. For the papers which may be expected to be found on board vessels of the more important maritime nations, Professor T. E. Holland's "Admiralty Manual of Naval Prize Law" must be consulted, pp. 52-9. The Institut du Droit International proposes to require possession of the following papers as a matter of international legal rule :—

Proposal of
Institute of
International
Law.

"(1) Les documents relatifs à la propriété du navire ;

"(2) Le connaissance." (Bill of lading.)

"(3) Le rôle d'équipage, avec l'indication de la nationalité du patron et de l'équipage ;

"(4) Le certificat de nationalité, et les documents mentionnés sous le chiffre 3 n'y suppléent ;

"(5) Le journal du bord. 'Ann. de l'Inst.' 1883, p. 217.

¹ At the common law an invoice is not evidence of the contract, "as it is frequently not sent out till long after the contract is completed" (*Per Best, C.J.*, in *Jones v. Bright*, (1829) 5 Bing., 533, 543). But a document which is inadmissible for some purposes, may be admissible for others.

"The modern practice of the right of visit is fully expounded in the instructions drawn up by the Spanish Minister of Marine and communicated to the British Foreign Office, May 3, 1898. See *London Gazette* of that date, and Hertslet's 'Comm. Treaties,' vol. xxi. p. 888.

"If the inspection of the documents reveals no ground of suspicion, and the visiting officer has no serious anterior reason for suspecting fraud, the vessel is allowed to continue its voyage without further investigation; if otherwise, it is subjected to an examination of such minuteness as may be necessary."¹

Usage of summoning master of vessel visited on board the belligerent cruiser.

Modern usage allows the master of the merchantmen to be summoned with his papers on board the cruiser,² and the regulation of the German and Danish navies order that this shall be done,³ but Pistoye and Duverdy (i. 237) think the practice open to objections both from the point of view of the belligerent and neutral. The former may be easily deceived by false papers; and the latter is exposed to the less obvious risk that the documents necessary to prove the legitimacy of his adventure may be detained. The proposed Réglement des Prises Maritimes de l'Institut provides that "le navire arrêté ne pourra jamais être requis d'envoyer à bord du navire de guerre de son patron ou une personne quelconque, pour montrer ses papiers ou pour tout autre cause." "Ann. de l'Institut," 1883, p. 214.⁴

Usage condemned by Institute of International Law.

Improper exercise of right of visit does not invalidate capture.

It is of the utmost importance to remember that the absence of due conformity to the forms of visit, and of attention to the evidences of nationality, prescribed by the regulations of the State to which the visiting ship belongs, is not sufficient to invalidate the capture if it be proved before the prize court that due cause of capture was, in fact, existing. "La Tri-Swiatitela, Dalloy, Jurisp. Gen. Ann.," 1855, vol. iii. p. 73.⁵

Right of visitation and search can be exercised on three conditions.

To sum up: the right of visitation and search can only be exercised—

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pp. 727, 728.

² The *Eleanor*, 2 Wheaton, 262.

³ "Rev. du Droit Int.," x. 214, 238.

⁴ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 727.

⁵ See Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 728 q.v.n.

- (1) By vessels provided with a commission from their sovereign since privateering is abolished;
- (2) Over neutral mercantile vessels;
- (3) Upon the high seas, or within the territorial waters of the belligerent or his enemy.

During the late Russo-Japanese war the *Malacca* incident raised, in a very acute form, questions connected with the right of search. The *Malacca*, a P. & O. steamer, was arrested on the morning of July 13 two miles and a half off the Great Harnish, near Jebel Zugur, off the coast of Eritrea, near the southern end of the Red Sea, by the Russian volunteer cruiser *Petersburg*, and was definitely taken possession of by a prize crew of forty men, in spite of the protests of the captain, who declared that the ammunition on board was the property of the British Government, and was for the use of the British Navy at Singapore and Hong-Kong. The British crew were kept under strict arrest. The *Malacca* arrived at Suez at dawn on the 19th, but no communication was allowed with the shore. On July 20, 2.10 p.m., she reached Port Said flying a naval ensign. The crew and passengers were landed. She then proceeded to Algiers, where she was released on July 27. Although the seizure took place on July 13 it was not reported till five days afterwards in the *Times*. It was stated on behalf of the P. & O. Company that the only explosives or munitions of war on board the *Malacca* were the consignment of forty tons of lyddite, which were shipped by the British Government for Hong-Kong.¹ It will be in general recollection that the vessel was released at Algiers on July 28 without being taken before a prize court. The complexity of the situation created by the seizure of the *Malacca* is instanced by the fact that the incident involved—

- (1) The doctrine of the territoriality of marginal seas within which a belligerent may not exercise his right to intercept contraband.²
- (2) The improper exercise of the right of visitation and

¹ *Times*, July 21.

² Cf. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. p. 424, and the official log of the *Malacca*, *Times*, August 26, 1904.

search, inasmuch as the *Malacca* was searched at Algiers, a neutral port.¹

The commander of the *Malacca* complained—

(a) That he was treated as a prisoner of war, and “although a captor may detain persons in order to secure their presence as witnesses, he cannot treat them as prisoners of war.”²

(b) That five of his men were summoned on board the *Petersburg*. This is contrary even to the modern Continental view of the right of visitation and search as expressed in the Réglement des Prises Maritimes of the Institut du Droit International, “Annuaire de l’Institut,” 1883, p. 214. It is only legitimate to summon on board the captor vessel the master of the neutral vessel seized as far as usage is concerned.³ Additional circumstances of aggravation in the case of the *Malacca* are that Captain Skalsky of the *Petersburg* threatened to employ force if the English sailors resisted being brought over to the *Petersburg*. They were detained five hours or more, and each severely questioned as to the nature of the cargo received on board at Antwerp, and were all informed that the Russian Government would liberally allow them a percentage on what would be prize for any information they might give. On Captain Street informing Captain Skalsky of the *Petersburg* that he regarded this as “a very unfriendly and high-handed proceeding,” inasmuch as no portion of the *Malacca*’s crew could be considered prisoners of war, he was threatened with arrest.⁴

Further, the seizure of the *Malacca* by the *Petersburg*, not being a vessel entitled to exercise belligerent rights, involved—

(3) Infringement of the succession of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, Art. 7, and concluding with the Treaty of Berlin, providing for the inviolability of the Dardanelles against the armed vessels of any foreign Power.

(4) Infraction of the declaration respecting maritime law signed at Paris, April 16, 1856, by Russia as regards Art. 1, “La course est et demeure abolie.”

¹ The right of visitation and search may not be exercised in the ports, harbours, or territorial waters of a neutral. Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. iii. p. 424; Hall’s “International Law,” c. x. p. 746; Halleck’s “International Law,” vol. ii, p. 240. Vattel observes that we may search neutral vessels “we meet at sea” (“Droit des Gens,” I. iii. c. vii. s. 114).

² Hall’s “International Law,” p. 734, and *Times, supra*, for official log of the *Malacca*.

³ Cf. Hall’s “International Law,” 5th ed., p. 727.

⁴ Cf. official log of the *Malacca*, *Times*, August 26; and letter of the Secretary of the P. and O., *Times*, August 4, 1904.

It was recognized by Mr. Balfour¹ that the material issue in the *Malacca* incident did not arise from the improper exercise of the right of visitation and search, but from the facts that the *Petersburg* was an unqualified cruiser, and that Great Britain was prepared to claim the incriminated cargo as belonging to the British Government. Mr. Balfour regarded "the whole episode of the *Malacca*" as "exceptional," and considered that it did not involve considerations connected with the rights or liabilities of neutral navigation and commerce.

No conceivable construction of the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* can extend it to the detention of the military stores of the Government of a neutral State, consigned in its own vessels to a neutral destination. The *Petersburg* and *Smolensk* detained not only the military stores of the British Government, but also those of the Government of Germany and of the United States. The *Smolensk* captured the Hamburg-American vessel *Scandia*, carrying ammunition for the German Government in the South Sea, and the *Ardova*, carrying 250 tons of gunpowder for the United States War Department in the Philippines. Both these last two vessels were released on or about July 25-26, at Suez. All three cases, therefore, illustrate the familiar rule that when the neutral Government is prepared to claim the incriminated cargo as its own property, the belligerent captor must release the vessel conveying it, without bringing the vessel before a prize court.

¹ *Times*, August 28, 1904.

CHAPTER XII.

THE DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL VESSELS.

THE English law on this subject is contained in two decisions of Lord Stowell arising out of the war between this country and the United States in 1812. During this war the navy of the United States acted uniformly on the principle of destroying enemy's vessels at sea.

Decisions of
Lord Stowell:
The *Zee Star*,
(1801) 4 Rob.
71.

There is, however, one earlier decision of Lord Stowell, on the subject of the destruction of a neutral vessel by a captor.¹ This was the case of a neutral ship and cargo restored by consent, having been taken July 9, 1799, on a voyage from Archangel to Lisbon. The case came before the court on an application for the captor's expenses on the one side, and for costs and damages on the part of the other. The captors consented to restitution, and therefore the case is an authority for the position that to destroy a neutral ship is a punishable wrong.² It establishes further that where a captor exhibits a want of due diligence by delaying the giving of his consent to restitution for nearly three months, demurrage will be given against him. The neutral owner in this case must have contributed to his own loss, as the court held he was only entitled to simple restitution, and not to costs and damages.

Peculiar con-
ditions of the
war of 1812.

The two principal cases are the *Acteon*, (1815) 2 Dods. 48, and the *Felicity*, (1819) ibid. 381, both decisions of Lord Stowell's. It will be seen that they are, strictly speaking, instances, not of the destruction of a neutral vessel by a belligerent captor,

¹ The *Zee Star*, (1801) 4 Rob. 71.

² Cf. Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 735.

but of the destruction of a vessel belonging to a subject of one belligerent State, trading under a licence granted by the Government of the other belligerent, by a captor of the latter State. But it seems quite clear, from Sir W. Scott's judgments, that a subject of a belligerent State who trades under a licence granted by the other belligerent State is in *pari materia* with the subject of a neutral State, provided he trades in strict conformity with the conditions of the licence, and produces it when required to do so. The ship and cargo owned by the subject of the belligerent State are equally exempt from capture with one owned by the subject of a neutral state. The circumstances under which the licences were granted were as follows. In 1812 the town of Cadiz was almost the only spot in Spain that was not occupied by or influenced by the French. The British Government, therefore, being very desirous that the port of Cadiz should receive a constant supply of American flour, granted numerous licences, authorizing any vessels not being French vessels or bearing the French flag to import from any port of the United States, cargoes of grain, meal, flour, or rice without molestation on account of any hostilities which might exist between his Majesty and the United States, even if the ships and cargoes belonged to American citizens. Such ships were to return to any port not blockaded. Licences were issued for this purpose, which were to be in force for nine months. These licences were transmitted from this country by various merchants, brokers, or agents who applied for them to the United States. The date of the licence was the date of their clearing from the port of entry, and each licence was endorsed with the names and tonnage of the vessel and the names of the master. The first of the cases above alluded to—the *Acteon*, (1815) 2 ^{The Acteon,} Dodson's Rep. p. 48—was the case of an American ship which, ^{(1815) 2 Dod.} Rep. 48. on January 24, 1813, sailed from Norfolk in Virginia to the port of Cadiz, laden with a cargo of about 4200 barrels of flour, which had been shipped under a British licence, dated August 13, 1812, and to be in force for nine months from the time of its date. On the 27th of February the vessel arrived at Cadiz, and the master, having delivered its cargo,

produced the licence under which he sailed to the British Minister resident at that place, who granted him a further licence, permitting him to ship a cargo of lawful merchandise, and to return with it to any port of the United States of America. On the 1st of April the master set sail from Cadiz, bound to Boston. In the course of his voyage he was boarded by several British ships, the commanders of which examined his licence, and permitted him to proceed on his voyage, which he accordingly did till about noon on the 12th of May, when he was captured by his Majesty's ship *La Hogue*, commanded by the Hon. Captain Capel, who, on the evening of the same day, set fire to the vessel and destroyed it. A claim was made for the ship and cargo as the property of citizens of the United States of America, protected by licences granted by his Majesty's Government and by his Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain at the Court of Spain, and at the instance of the claimant a monition was issued calling upon the captors to proceed to the legal adjudication of the ship and cargo. An appearance was given under protest for the captor. The captors did not contend against a sentence of restitution, but objected to the payment of costs and damages. In his judgment, Sir W. Scott observed that the only question was what was to be the measure of the restitution. The natural rule is, that if a party be unjustly deprived of his property he ought to be as nearly as possible placed in the same state as he was before the deprivation took place; technically speaking, he is entitled to restitution, with costs and damages. But this general rule was subject to modification. If, for instance, any circumstances appear which show that the suffering party has himself furnished occasion for the capture, if he has by his own conduct in some degree contributed to the loss, then he is entitled to a somewhat less degree of compensation, to what is technically called "simple restitution." It makes no difference what are the motives of the party inflicting the injury, the suffering party is entitled to a full compensation if he has not contributed to the loss, even if the captor has been guilty of no wilful misconduct. The destruction of the property by the captor may have been

a meritorious act towards his own Government, but still the person to whom the property belongs must not be a sufferer. As to him, it is an injury for which he is entitled to redress from the party who inflicted it upon him, and if the captor has by the act of destruction conferred a benefit on the public, he must look to the Government for his indemnity. The loss must not be permitted to fall upon the innocent sufferer. In the case of the *Acteon*, Sir W. Scott considered that the following considerations urged in justification of the capture and destruction of the vessel were immaterial. It was immaterial that some of the licences had been transferred from one vessel to another, that the particular licence in the case of the *Acteon* had been bought, or that an untrue allegation that the time had expired had been made and was believed. It was further immaterial that there were on board private letters written home by the officers of the American squadron, as the fact they were not exhibited demonstrated that they were not of a public nature or dangerous tendency. A further and more important conclusion of Sir W. Scott on the *Acteon* was that it was even immaterial to urge in justification of the destruction of the vessel that the British commander could not spare men from his own ship to carry the captured vessel to a British port, and that he could not suffer her to go into Boston because she would have furnished valuable information. These circumstances may have afforded very good reasons for destroying this vessel, and may have made it a very meritorious act in Captain Capel as far as his own Government was concerned, but they furnished no reason why the American owner should be a sufferer. Sir W. Scott considered that there was nothing that could be imputed to the owner which justified capture or destruction, and therefore that he was entitled to receive the fullest compensation from the captor. The American claimant, it may be finally observed, was considered entitled to restitution with costs and damages, although the court expressly held that the belligerent commander, having acted from a sense of duty and obedience to orders, would in turn be entitled to be indemnified on making a proper representation to his Government. At the

conclusion of the report of the case of the *Acteon*, it is stated that a similar decree was made in another case, the *Rufus King*, where the facts were similar to those in the case of the *Acteon*.

The *Felicity*,
(1819) 2 Dod
381.

The second authority on the subject of the destruction of a neutral ship by a belligerent is the *Felicity*, (1819) 2 Dodson, 381. This case decided that if a captor destroys a ship for which a belligerent licence has been granted, he or his Government is responsible for the loss occasioned by such destruction ; but if the existence of the licence was not disclosed to him by those whose duty it was to inform him, and he had no sufficient means to inform himself, he is exempt from responsibility.

The *Felicity* was an American ship which originally sailed from Charleston with a cargo of rice for Cadiz, where she arrived at the end of May, 1813, and delivered her cargo. At Cadiz she took on board a return cargo, consisting of wine and fruit. She sailed therewith on October 31, 1813, bound for Boston ; but having met with bad weather and sprung a leak, and being in great distress, jettisoned nine hundred boxes of raisins between the 14th and 16th of December. The leak still continuing, and the vessel being within one hundred miles of the Bermudas, the master and crew resolved to steer for those islands, and approached within seven leagues of them ; but, the wind proving adverse, it was determined to shape the course of the vessel for Charleston. On January 1, 1814, they fell in with H.M.S. *Endymion*, which immediately hoisted English colours and fired a gun. A boat's crew immediately boarded the *Endymion*, and the *Felicity* was found to be in a leaky state, with her sails split, and her rigging in an unserviceable state and much disabled. The master of the *Felicity* was taken on board the *Endymion*, when, his papers having been inspected and examined and no licence found, he was repeatedly asked if he had a licence, and he invariably replied he had not. As it was doubtful if the *Felicity* could have ever reached a British port, and as the *Endymion* was the only ship on the station of corresponding force to an American frigate which she was detached to watch, the captain of the

Endymion determined to destroy the *Felicity*. A lieutenant sent with a boat's crew from the *Endymion* to destroy the *Felicity*, asked the supercargo and mate of the latter if there was any licence. They replied they did not know of any, and the ship was then set fire to. When the master of the *Felicity* perceived the vessel to be on fire, he called for his chest and produced a paper, purporting to be a licence, from a concealed place, and requested to be put on board his ship. At this time there was a heavy sea running and it was impossible to comply. The claim was for ship and cargo, as the property of citizens of the United States, protected from seizure by a licence granted by Sir H. Wellesley, envoy extraordinary, in pursuance of an order in council bearing date April 13, 1812.

Sir W. Scott said, "Taking this vessel and cargo to be merely American, the owners could have no right to complain of this act of hostility, for their property was liable to it, in the character it bore at that period of enemy's property. There was no doubt that the *Endymion* had a full right to inflict it, if any grave call of public service required it. Regularly a captor is bound by the law of his own country, conforming to the general law of nations to bring in for adjudication, in order that it may be ascertained whether it be enemy's property; and that mistakes may not be committed by captors, in the eager pursuit of gain, by which injustice may be done to neutral subjects, and national quarrels produced with the foreign states to which they belong. Here is a clear American vessel and cargo, alleged by the claimants themselves to be such, and consequently the property of enemies at that time. They share no inconvenience by not being brought in for the condemnation, which must have followed if it were mere American property; and the captors fully justify themselves to the law of their own country, which prescribes the bringing in, by showing that the immediate service in which they were engaged, that of watching the enemy's ship of war, the *President*, with intent to encounter her, though of inferior force, would not permit them to part with any of their own crew to carry her into a British port.

Under this collision of duties nothing was left but to destroy her, for they could not, consistently with their general duty to their own country, or indeed its express injunctions, permit enemy's property to sail away unmolested. If impossible to bring in, their next duty is to destroy enemy's property. Where doubtful whether enemy's property, and impossible to bring in, no such obligation arises, and the safe and proper course is to dismiss. Where it is neutral, the act of destruction cannot be justified to the neutral owner, by the gravest importance of such an act to the public service of the captor's own state; to the neutral it can only be justified, under any such circumstances, by a full restitution in value. These are rules so clear in principle and established in practice, that they require neither reasoning nor precedent to illustrate or support them." On the particular point of the licence, Sir W. Scott held that the captor would have been liable to the extent of the whole mischief done, if knowledge of its existence could have been imputed to him, either from its production or estimate. But the rule *de non existentibus et non apparentibus* clearly applied to the case of a licence whose existence was not disclosed. The decision, therefore, was against the claimants on the point of the licence.

The *Leucade*, (1855) 2 Spinks, 228.

These decisions were followed, as Professor T. E. Holland observes,¹ by Dr. Lushington in the case of the Ionian ships. This case decided that when it is doubtful whether the status of a vessel seized is that of a neutral or of a belligerent, the decision turning on the nice construction of public documents, the captor is not liable in costs and damages for having seized the vessel without probable cause. In this case Dr. Stephen Lushington observed—

"The general rule, therefore, is that if a ship under neutral colours be not brought to a competent court for adjudication, the claimants are, as against the captor, entitled to costs and damages. Indeed, if the captor doubt his power to bring a neutral vessel to adjudication, it is his duty to release her."²

¹ *Times*, August 7, 1904.

² The *Leucade*, (1855) 2 Spinks, 228.

It would appear, therefore, that prize courts in this country never gave law costs in the proper acceptation of the term, *i.e.* costs without damages. But costs and damages, constituting complete indemnity for the capture, were given, never upon the ground that the papers of the captured vessel did not disclose a probable cause of capture, but where it appeared the captors were guilty of misconduct or vexation. Dr. Stephen Lushington observes in the case of the *Leucade*¹ that there are in the books only some fourteen or eighteen cases of this kind, though the volume of work in the prize court was so great that on one occasion Lord Stowell commenced with an arrear of nearly eight hundred cases. It would have been "more than a Herculean task" to have investigated all these cases, and as all claimants were desirous of obtaining restitution as soon as possible, since ships and cargoes are perishable commodities, simple restitution took place in hundreds of cases simply on payment of captor's expenses. The usual evidence adduced was that of the master and crew of the captured ship, excluding all evidence from the captors. The reason for this was that captors, from the nature of their occupation, were constantly moving about from place to place. It was, however, an everyday practice to admit evidence from the captors for incidental questions, as to prove a blockade *de facto*. Captor's evidence to procure condemnation was nearly always excluded. As the courts refused to condemn in almost all cases, there was little practice as to the admission of captor's evidence to show probable cause of capture. It was observed in the case of the *Leucade* that Lord Stowell adhered most pertinaciously to the great rule that the case should be heard on the claimant's evidence, and that restitution should pass without admitting captor's evidence. In the same way Lord Stowell refused to decree costs and damages.² In the *Leucade* Dr. Stephen Lushington followed the principles of Lord Stowell, observing that if the question had been raised before Lord Stowell, he would not have allowed it to occupy five minutes of his most valuable time. Dr.

¹ The *Leucade*, (1855) 2 Spinks, p. 234.

² Ibid., 228, 244.

Stephen Lushington allowed in the case of the *Leucade* the captors to give explanatory evidence of notorious facts and circumstances, such as that the Ionian islands were at that time under the exclusive protection of Great Britain, and that their flag was, to some extent, joined with the British. Therefore the claimants, the owners of an Ionian vessel trading in the Sea of Azoff, though that trade was in fact legal, were held not entitled to costs and damages from the British captors. In a letter to the *Times*, under the heading of "Russian Prize Law," already referred to, Professor Holland states, with reference to the last three cases—

"I had summarized the effect, as I conceived it, of the group of cases above mentioned in the following terms: 'Such action (*i.e.* the destruction of a neutral vessel by a captor) is justifiable only in cases of the gravest importance to the captor's own State, after securing the ship's papers, and subject to the right of the neutral owner to receive full compensation.'¹

Whether destruction of
neutral vessel
a wrong or
conditionally
justifiable.

Professor T. E. Holland thus considers the destruction of a neutral vessel conditionally justifiable. This appears to be the view taken by Lord Stowell in the *Felicity*,² though in the case of the *Acteon*, Lord Stowell described the destruction of a neutral vessel as an unjust deprivation of property, an injury that required redress.³ Perhaps there is more than a mere verbal distinction. It seems clear that as far as prize court proceedings are concerned, the destruction of a neutral vessel, which has not by its own conduct in some degree contributed to its loss, must be an actionable wrong. The prize court, according to the principles laid down by Lord Stowell, is bound to decree restitution with costs and damages to the neutral owner whose vessel has been destroyed. The captor must look to his own government for indemnity where the destruction of neutral property is, as Lord Stowell admitted it might be, a meritorious act towards his own government.

¹ *Times*, August 30, 1904.

² The *Felicity*, (1819) 2 Dods. Rep., 381, 386.

³ The *Acteon*, (1815) 48, 51, 52.

The destruction of a neutral vessel is always unjustifiable as between captor and neutral, while it may be justifiable between the captor and his government. According to the view of international law taken in the United States, the principle of the immunity of a neutral vessel before adjudication does not seem to be so strictly regarded as in this country. In the case of the *Felicity*, Lord Stowell attributed no weight to the argument that a captor may destroy a neutral vessel when he cannot spare a prize crew; while in a case arising out of the war between the United States and Mexico, Taney, C.J., held that when the public service does not admit of detaching a prize crew, the captor may destroy the vessel. However, the vessel in that case was not a neutral vessel.¹

Both in theory and usage the distinction must be maintained between the destruction of neutral property and that of enemy property. There exists some difference of opinion as to whether the destruction even of an enemy vessel without adjudication is justifiable.² From the point of view of

¹ *Jecker v. Montgomery*, (1851) 13 Howard, p. 615, 616; referring to 4 Cd. 263; 7 ibid., 423; 2 Gall. 368; 2 Wheaton, App. 11, 16; 1 Kent's Com. 359; 6 Rob. 138, 194, 229, 257.

² The following authorities are in favour of the view that enemy vessels may be destroyed without adjudication. Valin's "Ordonnance de la Marine," ii. 281. In 1862, the Law Officers of the Crown (Sir Roundell Palmer, Sir Robert Collier, and Dr. R. Phillimore) advised Lord Russell that "there is no foundation in law for the idea that a valid title cannot be made to property taken in war, by enemy from enemy, without prior sentence of condemnation." Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, vol. i. p. 319; Geneva Arbitration: Washington Government Printing Office. Calvo appears to approve of it, s. 2187. On the other hand, M. Bluntschli, s. 672, and Dr. Woolsey, s. 148, entirely disapprove of the destruction of an enemy vessel before adjudication. It is opposed to the theory of the immunity of all private property at sea in time of war. This principle was first announced by the United States in 1856, though the practice of that Power has always been to destroy enemy merchant vessels, and though the ravages wrought by the *Alabama*, *Florida*, and *Shenandoah* undoubtedly remain the most conspicuous instances of the destruction of private property at sea. In the Franco-German War of 1870, the French commander Desaix burned two German merchantmen, on the ground that he could not spare prize crews; and when in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, the Russian ports in the Black Sea were blockaded, the Russians burned the prizes which they were unable to keep. The *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International* permits a captor to sink or destroy an enemy vessel, *Règlement des Prises Maritime*, Article 50. Captain Semmes, of the *Alabama*, abstained from destroying enemy vessels when they had neutral goods on board, and took ransom bonds instead. It is the policy of the United States to permit contracts for ransom to be made in all cases. In England, unless the circumstances of the case justified release,

international law, there can be no doubt that the destruction of neutral vessels by a captor is unjustifiable. Dr. T. G. Lawrence has declared that the act is "counter to the opinion of the civilized world."¹ The only support that can possibly be given to the view that the destruction of a neutral vessel is justifiable is derived from Naval Regulations, certainly not a recognized source of international law. Professor T. E. Holland, K.C., has observed that there is no doubt that by the Russian regulations of 1895, Article 21, and instructions of 1901, Article 40, officers are empowered to destroy their prizes at sea, no distinction being drawn between neutral and enemy property, under such exceptional circumstances as the bad condition or small value of the prize, risk of recapture, distance from a Russian port, danger to the Imperial cruiser or to the success of her operations. The instructions of 1901, it may be added, explain that an officer "incurs no responsibility whatever" for so acting if the captured vessel is really liable to confiscation and the special circumstances imperatively demand her destruction. It is fair to say that not dissimilar, though less stringent, instructions were issued by France in 1870 and by the United States in 1898; also that, although the French instructions expressly contemplate "l'établissement

captors were liable to fines for liberating a prize on ransom. When an English ship is captured, unless ransom is permitted by Order in Council, a person entering into such a contract is liable to a fine of £500 (Stat. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 45). In France, public vessels of war may not ransom. Privateers, both in France and Spain, might ransom. Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands wholly forbid the practice. The indulgence of ransom constitutes a distinct mitigation of the laws of war, and its adoption by the great maritime nations would imply an advance towards the desired end of the immunity of private property at sea in time of war.

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 459; Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 333. According to a weighty opinion, Article 50 of the carefully debated Code des Prises Maritimes of the Institut du Droit International permits the destruction only of enemy vessels. Cf. Letter of Professor T. E. Holland, K.C., *Times*, August 6, 1905. The eminent Russian jurist, M. de Martens, in his book on "International Law," published some twenty years ago, in mentioning that the distance of her ports from the scenes of her naval operations often obliges Russia to sink her prizes, so that "ce qui les lois maritimes de tous les états considèrent comme un moyen, auquel il n'y a lieu de recourir qu'à la dernière extrémité, se transformera nécessairement pour nous en règle normale," foresaw that "cette mesure d'un caractère général soulèvera indubitablement contre notre pays un mécontentement universel." Cf. Professor T. E. Holland's letter, *supra*.

des indemnités à attribuer aux neutres," a French Prize Court in 1870 refused compensation to neutral owners for the loss of their property on board of enemy ships burnt at sea.¹ The final decision of the Supreme Prize Court at St. Petersburg in the case of the *Knight Commander* rests upon the principle that a prize court cannot go behind the Naval Prize Code of the captor, whatever may be the pronouncements of international law.² A more perversely wrong decision cannot be imagined, since it amounts to nothing less than the assertion that prize courts do not administer international law. A prize court, Lord Stowell observed, is a Court of the Law of Nations.³ The facts in the case of the *Knight Commander* were that, early in the morning of July 24, 1904, she fell in with the Russian cruisers of the Vladivostock squadron of the peninsula Idzu, on the eastern side of the gulf near which Yokohama is situate. The Russians ordered the captain and crew to come on board one of the warships in ten minutes, at the expiration of which they sank the vessel. The European passengers were detained by the Russians, and the crew were placed on board another British steamer, *Tsinan*, and taken to Yokohama. The *Knight Commander* was subsequently adjudged a lawful prize by the Vladivostock Prize Court; and the sentence was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Prize Court of St. Petersburg. The decision, as has been seen, proceeded purely on the grounds of naval discipline, and not by an reference to international law. No compensation will apparently be obtainable for the ship; as, under the Russian rule, she was good prize because more than half the goods she carried were contraband. There were repeated protests made against the sinking of the *Knight Commander*.⁴ As the decision of the prize court of St. Petersburg proceeded upon a wrong principle, it is difficult not to view with regret the development

¹ *Times*, August 6, 1904.

² *Times*, May 12, 1906. Sir E. Grey's answer to Mr. Hart-Davies.

³ The *Recovery*, 6 Robinson's Admiralty, Rep., 348, 349; the *Snipe* and others, Edward's Admiralty Rep., p. 381; the *Fox* and others, Edward's Admiralty Rep., p. 312.

⁴ Cf. speech of Lord Lansdowne, *Times*, August 12, and *ibid.*, August 29, 1904; and speeches of Mr. A. J. Balfour reported in *Times*, August 12, and *ibid.*, August 26, 1904.


of the incident. It was stated on March 16, 1905, in the *Times*, that Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador, had handed to Count Lamsdorff the British claim for compensation on account of the sinking of the *Knight Commander*, amounting to £100,000. An appeal was then lodged, which has recently been heard,¹ with such unsatisfactory results. The dilatoriness of the Russian prize court is noticeable. In Lord Stowell's time a delay of two months and twenty days in bringing in the prize was the ground of adjudicating demurrage to the claimants.²

¹ May, 1906.

² *Zee Star*, 4 Rob. 71.

CHAPTER XIII.

NOTES ON CHART OF CONTRABAND.



FROM a purely logical point of view a subject admits of division before it admits of definitions. The above classification is principally founded on the well-known classification of Grotius. Two reasons may be assigned for the increasing tendency in the domain of practice for perfectly new kinds of contraband to make their appearance: (1) War has become an art; (2) wars have tended to become more naval. It may be questioned whether, in the domain of theory, the law of contraband is at all uncertain. Logically speaking, Vattel's definition of contraband is adequate, precise, and clear. But for practical purposes what is required is a definition by quantitative enumeration—an extremely difficult matter.

Reasons for
perfectly new
kinds of
contraband
making their
appearance.

Modern instance of axioms of Grotius on treaties declaring contraband.

Absolute contraband; what is?

Treaty of Utrecht, 1703,
Art. 20

Grotius, in his discussion of the subject of contraband,¹ observes that nothing can be inferred which is binding upon all from special conventions. The wisdom of this observation admits of a striking illustration in very recent times. Germany, in three commerce and navigation treaties with States similarly situated—San Salvador, Mexico, and Costa Rica—between 1869 and 1875, pledged herself to three different lists of articles prohibited as provisional contraband.² Historically speaking, nearly the same uncertainty exists as to what constitutes absolute contraband. It is submitted, however, that it is accurate to enumerate in the category of absolute contraband, horses and arms and munitions. It is quite true that horses have been expressly excluded by treaty. But this was by Russia, a State which is not now likely to restrict the category of contraband. Salt-petre was, and still is, universally considered absolute contraband, though the progress of warlike invention has deprived it of the importance which it once possessed in connection with operations of war. Nor is it wise to neglect instruction derived from treaties as to contraband character. If no reliance at all is placed upon treaties as to what constitutes contraband, the subject can only be treated abstractedly. But even Hautefeuille considers that the leading principles of the law of contraband have been more or less settled by general treaties, such as the Treaty of Utrecht and the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

Mr. W. E. Hall considers that coal, because it has only become important in war in modern times, is the subject of a very limited usage.³ In giving his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, November, 1903, Professor T. E. Holland observed, “I think coal stands in the same position as provisions [in regard to the liability of becoming contraband]. The question of coal is rather a new one; it has not, like the question of provisions, been debated for centuries, and could not have been.”⁴ But by

¹ “De Jure Belli et Pacis,” c. iii. c. 1, s. 5.

² Perels, “Droit Maritime, Paris,” 1884, p. 274.

³ “International Law,” 5th ed., part iv. c. v. p. 660.

⁴ Report, *ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 240.

Article 20 of the Commercial Treaty of Utrecht, April 11, 1713, it was recognized that there were articles "qui pourraient donner lieu à quelques difficultés, à cause de leur usage commun en paix et en guerre." Among these articles were food (les substances alimentaires de toute espèce) and coal (le charbon). The other articles which, though not declared contraband by the Treaty of Utrecht, were as clearly considered to be liable to become so, were precious metals, money, whether coined or not, all cloths, ordinary metals, and raw materials suitable for the repair or construction of vessels. In view of the extraordinary importance of the Treaty of Utrecht to a student of international law, an importance which cannot be deemed to be purely academic, since it was considered necessary to abrogate one of the articles of that treaty by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, it becomes of some interest to observe, that it adumbrated categorically the entire controversy that subsequently arose as to what articles are conditionally contraband.¹

Apart from treaty, England in 1741 considered that only arms, saltpetre, and horses with their furniture were contraband.² Finally, in 1896, at Venice, the Institute of International Law laid down rules on contraband which were of a far-reaching character. It only recognized five categories of articles which would constitute absolute contraband as being of immediate use to the army or navy in actual warfare, when carried by sea at the cost] of a belligerent and to the destination of a belligerent. Accidental or relative contraband was not recognized; but a belligerent had the right of sequestration or pre-emption of articles which might be useful for warlike as well as for peaceful purposes.³ Though the "reglementation" of the Institute proposed to do away with provisional or accidental contraband, it cannot be said to have done so, as the right of pre-emption is reserved

"Reglementations" of
Institute of
International
Law, 1896.

Abortive
proposal to
abolish
provisional
contraband.

¹ Hautefeuille's "Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en Temps de Guerre Maritime," t. ii. titre viii. p. 321, referring to Dumont, "Corps Diplomatique," t. viii. part i.

² See Burrell's "Admiralty Reports," p. 378.

³ Address of Lord Reay, *Times*, September 23, 1904.

to the belligerent in the case of objects *ancipitis usus* seized while on the road towards a port of his adversary.¹ This express recognition of articles *ancipitis usus* and of a right of pre-emption is destructive of any proposal to abolish the category of provisional contraband. Articles *ancipitis usus* are all those articles which are provisionally contraband, the two expressions being merely synonymous.

In the above chart an attempt has been made, necessarily inadequate, to instance rather than exhaustively enunciate the division of articles given in Grotius, and further to indicate the increasing tendency of modern times for perfectly new kinds of contraband to make their appearance.

¹ Annuaire for 1896, p. 230. In giving his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, in November, 1903, Professor Holland observed that the resolution of the Institute of International Law restricting contraband to articles useful in war, was at variance with, and contradictory to, another resolution providing that objects which are of a dubious character may be stopped on their way to an enemy's port. The Institute must therefore have meant an enemy's port of naval or military equipment, or where the enemy's forces are (Report of Royal Commission on Supply of Food, etc., vol. ii. Evidence, p. 234, Cd. 2644). The five categories of absolute contraband of war promulgated in the "Reglementation" of the Institute of International Law at Venice in 1896 are respectively as follows: (1) Les armes de toute nature; (2) Les munitions de guerre et les explosifs; munitions de guerre sont les objets qui pour servir immédiatement à la guerre, n'exigent qu'une simple réunion ou juxta position; (3) le matériel militaire; (4) les vaisseaux équipés pour la guerre; (5) les instruments spécialement faits pour la fabrication immédiate de munitions de guerre; lorsque ces divers objets sont transportés pur mer pour le compte ou à destination d'un belligérant.

In giving his evidence before the Royal Commission, Professor T. E. Holland observed that it was a difficult question whether a future belligerent of this country would not be justified in treating Liverpool as a naval port, and therefore confiscating as contraband the enormous quantities of wheat and flour shipped through Liverpool, because the *Etruria* and other auxiliary cruisers would be fitted out there. But the largeness of the amount of the supplies reaching Liverpool from the United States ought of itself to prevent a Prize Court of the enemy of this country from concluding that they were destined to the use of the Army or Navy.

CHAPTER XIII—(*continued*).

PARTS I., II., III.

CONTRABAND OF WAR AND THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN DECLARATIONS, 1904.

CONTRABAND OF WAR.

The term “contraband” was originally applied to a prohibited domestic trade in time of peace, such as that in salt.¹ The word does not occur in “Il Consolato del Mare,” the authoritative sea-code of the Western Mediterranean, which largely determined the maritime policy of England till the Declaration concerning maritime law signed at Paris, 1856. Neither does the word, as opposed to the thing, occur in Cleiracq’s “Guidon de la Mer,” or in Grotius. The Treaty of Southampton, September 17, 1625, between Charles I. and the States-General of Holland, affords the first mention of the word “contraband” as used in public international law to denote a prohibited neutral trade with a belligerent.

The thing itself, the conveyance of arms to an enemy, on Early prohibi-
tions of the practice.

¹ “Contrabannum—merces banno interdicta, Ital is contrabbando, Gallo contre bande, Charta, anno 1445, tom. iii. Cod. Ital. Diplom. col. 1756, item quod non permittant committentes contrabanna, dicti salis vel aliarum rerum . . . in dictis locis tute et secure permanere.”—Du Cange. Gloss (ed. Carpentarius), Parisiensis, 1842. It is usual in dictionaries to represent the word as compounded of *contre* against; and *bande*, Low Latin *bandum*, a flag, standard, or emblem of authority. The word *bandum* is derived from Anglo-Saxon *ban*, *gebann*, interdict, proclamation, edict; Fr. *ban*, from O.H.G. *ban*, a summons; G. *bann*, the word belonging originally to the Teutonic languages: D. *ban*, excommunication; Icelandic and Swedish *bann*, proclamation; Dan. *band* or *ban*, band to curse. Grimm connects this word with Gothic *bandra*, a sign, whence *bandrjan*, to beckon. With reference to continental (especially Teutonic) history and usages, an edict of interdiction or proscription, whole cities were put under the ban; that is, deprived of their privileges. In the case of the celebrated Ban of Hungary, the word *ban* seems to have the meaning either of sign or signal summoning to insurrection, or else an association of territorial leaders raising the flag of a nation. The object of the conspiracy, which was organized by the Croatian *ban*, was to separate Hungary from the house of Hapsburg in 1664.

the other hand, must have existed from the earliest times. Von Martens in a note observed, "We find, even among the ancients, prohibitions concerning arms carried to an enemy. L. 1, C. 2, D. quæ res exportari non debeant, L. C. de litoris et itinerum custodiis. Many popes, as Alexander III. (c. 6, 12, 17, *De Judæis, Saracenis*), Innocent III., Clement V., Nicholas V., Calixtus III., forbade the Christians, under pain of ban and confiscation, to carry arms to the infidels. Cf. 'Die Freiheit der Sciffart,' s. 66, Galiani, l. i. introduction, p. 4, n. 1. Cf. also the prohibition contained in the recess of the Hans Towns of 1417. 'Maarperger neuerröffnetes Handelsgesetz,' p. 175."¹ Grotius treats the topic of contraband as one regulated by natural law, considering that instituted law was silent on the question. In two passages² Grotius adduces, as his custom is,³ innumerable examples. One of his precedents may remind us that the Corcyreans held the same view of foreign enlistment that Vattel does, since they contended that the Corinthians ought not to raise troops in Attica without the consent of the Athenians. The precedents quoted by Grotius from Greek and Roman history induce the conclusion that among the ancients, the conveyance of contraband was universally considered to be incompatible with neutrality. Nor does modern international law conflict with those opinions, inasmuch as they are all cases of the neutral State, and not its subject, furnishing provisions or money to a belligerent. According to the whole current of authority, this constitutes a breach of neutrality by the neutral State, giving rise to reprisals or war.

History of the subject in the Middle Ages. The history of the subject in the later Middle Ages is discussed by Grotius in a note of some length. He says, "In modern times the book 'Consolato del Mare' was published in Italian, and contains the constitutions of the Emperors of Greece and Germany, the Kings of the Franks, of Spain, Cyprus, the Balearic Isles of the Venetians and of the

¹ "Law of Nations," by G. F. Von Martens, (1802) book viii. c. 6, s. x. ii., pp. 331, 332.

² "De Jure Belli et Pacis," lib. iii., c. xvii. s. 3; "De His. Qui in Bello Medii sunt;" and id. lib. iii. c. i. s. 5, "Quantum in Bello liceat, Regulæ Generales ex Jure Naturæ."

³ Sir H. Maine, Lecture vii., p. 125.

Genoese. In tit. 274 of this book,¹ controversies of this kind are treated; and the rule given is this, that if the ships and lading both belong to the enemy, the matter is plain, and they become the property of the captors. If the ship belong to a neutral, the goods to an enemy, the belligerent may compel the ship to go into a port of his own, paying the navigators for the freight. If, on the other hand, it is an enemy's ship with the goods of a neutral, the ship is to be ransomed, and if the navigators refuse this, they may be taken into a port of the captors, and the captor must be paid for the use of the ship.

"In the year 1438, when the Hollanders were at war with Lubeck and other cities on the Baltic and the Elbe, they decided in full Senate that goods of neutrals found in the enemy's ship were not good prize, and that law was afterwards maintained. So also in 1597 the King of Denmark judged, when he sent an embassy to the Hollanders and their allies, asserting for his subjects the right of carrying goods into Spain, with which the Hollanders were then in fierce war. The French always permitted neutrals the right of carrying on commerce with those who were the enemies of France, and so indiscreetly that their enemies often covered their goods with neutral names, as appears by an edict of 1543, c. 42, which was copied again in an edict of 1584 and the following year. In those edicts it is plainly declared that the friends of the French shall be allowed to carry on commerce during war, provided that they do it with their own ships and their own men; and that they may land where they please, provided that the goods are not munitions of war; but if these are carried, it is declared to be lawful for the French to take such goods, paying a fair price for them. Here we note two points, that even munitions of war were not declared prize, still less goods of a peaceful character. I do not deny that the northern nations asserted other rules but variously, and rather for an occasional purpose than as a permanent rule of equity; for when the English, under pretence of their wars, had interfered

¹ It may be remembered that the reply of the English lawyers to the Prussian Exposition du Motifs, 1753, on the Silesian loan, which Historicus conjectures was drawn up by Lord Mansfield, speaks of "Il Consolato del Mare" as a "book of great authority," "Collectanea Juridica," vol. i. piece v.

with the Danish commerce, a war arose between these two nations, of which the event was that the Danes imposed tribute in England, which under the name of the Dane's penny remained, although the alleged reason was changed at the time of William the Conqueror, the founder of the present dynasty in England, as Thuanus notes in the history of 1589. Again, Elizabeth, the sagacious queen of England, sent in 1575 Sir W. Winter and Robert Beal, Secretary of State, to Holland to complain that the English could not allow the Dutch in the heat of war to detain, as they had done, English ships bound to Spanish ports. So Reidan relates in his Batavian history at the year 1575, and Camden at the following year. But when the English had themselves gone to war with the Spanish, and interfered with the rights of German cities to sail to Spain, how doubtful the right was by which they did this appears from the above arguments of both nations, which deserve to be read for the purpose of understanding the controversy. And it may be noted that the English themselves acknowledge this, since the two main arguments which they allege are, that what the Germans carried into Spain were munitions of war, and that there were old conventions which prohibited such an act. And conventions of this kind were made by the Hollanders and their allies, with the Lubeckers and their allies in the year 1613, to the effect that neither party should permit the subjects of an enemy to traffic in their country, nor should assist the enemy with soldiers, ships, or provisions. And afterwards, in 1627, a convention was made between the kings of Sweden and Denmark to the effect that the Danes should prevent all commerce with the Dantzickers, the enemies of the Swedes; and should not allow any merchandize to pass the Sound to the other enemies of the Swedes, for which terms the King of Denmark stipulated in turn certain advantages to himself. But these were special conventions, from which nothing can be inferred which is binding upon all, for what the Germans said in this declaration was, not that all merchandise was prohibited by this convention, but that only which was once carried to England, or made in England. Nor were the Germans the only party who refused to acknowledge

the doctrines of the English, forbidding commerce with the enemy. For Poland complained by her ambassador that the laws of nations were infringed when, on account of the English war with Spain, they were deprived of the power of trafficking with the Spanish, as Camden and Reidan mention, under the year 1597. And the French, after a peace of Vervins with Spain, when Elizabeth of England persisted in the war, being requested by the English to allow their ships going to Spain to be visited, that they might not privily carry munitions of war, would not permit this, saying, that the request, if granted, would be made a pretext of spoliation and disturbance of commerce. And in the league which the English made with the Hollanders and their allies in the year 1625, a convention was indeed made that other nations, whose interest it was that the power of Spain should be broken, should be requested to forbid commerce with Spain ; but if they would not agree to this, that their ships should be searched to see whether they carried munitions of war, but that beyond this neither the ships nor the cargoes should be detained, nor that any damage should be done to neutrals on that ground. And in the same year it happened that certain Hamburgers went to Spain in a ship laden for the most part with munitions of war, and this part of the lading was claimed by the English, but the rest of the lading was paid for. But the French, when French ships going to Spain were confiscated by the English, showed that they would not tolerate this. Therefore, we have rightly said that public declarations are required. And this the English themselves saw the necessity of, for they made such public declaration in 1591 and 1598, as we see in Camden. Nor have such declarations always been obeyed, but times, causes, and places have been made grounds of distinction. In 1458 the city of Lubeck refused a notice given them by the Dantzickers, that they were not to trade with the people of Malmoye and Memel. Nor did the Hollanders in 1551 obey, when the Lubeckers gave them notice to abstain from traffic with the Danes, with whom they were then at war. In the year 1552, when there was a war between Sweden and Denmark, when the Danes had asked the Hanseatic cities not to have

commerce with the Swedes, some of the cities who had need of their friendship conformed to this, but others did not. The Hollanders, when war was raging between Sweden and Poland, never allowed their commerce with either nation to be interdicted. The French always restored the Dutch ships which they took either going to or coming from Spain, then at war with them. See the pleading of Louis Servinus held in 1592 in the case of the Hamburgers. But the same Dutch did not allow the English to carry merchandise into Dunkirk, before which they had a fleet, as the Dantzickers in 1455 did not allow the Dutch to carry anything into Konigsberg.”¹

It is clear from this passage of Grotius that, according to the practice of the Middle Ages, the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* was very far from established. Sir H. S. Maine observes: “From the very beginning of international law a belligerent has been allowed to prevent a neutral from supplying his enemy with things capable of being used immediately in war.”² Little more than a quarter of a century before the appearance of Grotius’ work this could not be said, since he expressly states that after the peace of Vervins the French unequivocally refused to allow their ships to be searched for munitions of war when Elizabeth was at war with Spain. Again, the edicts of France in 1543 and 1584 did not confiscate even munitions of war. Pothier, who wrote at a time when the law was quite settled, commented on the common tendency to confuse enemy goods on neutral vessels, neutral goods in enemy vessels, and contraband goods in neutral vessels.³ Since the Declaration of Paris, 1856, all these difficulties except contraband have been removed. But the early history of the subject, as detailed even by Grotius, fails sufficiently to distinguish between munitions of war and enemy property, as appears by his reference to “Il Consolato

¹ Note to Hugo Grotius’ “De Jure Belli et Pacis,” lib. iii. c. i. s. 5, accompanied by an abridged translation by William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, with notes of the author, Barbeyrac, and others, vol. iii. pp. 9, 10, 11, 12. This note of Grotius is considered so important by Dr. Whewell that he translates it.

² “International Law,” Lecture v., p. 105.

³ “Traité du Droit de Propriété,” l. i. part i. c. ii. s. 2, Art. 2.

del Mare." Again, under the treaty referred to by him between Sweden and Denmark, the object was to totally prohibit commerce, quite another thing from prohibiting contraband transactions. Grotius alludes to "old conventions" between the Hanseatic cities and England, and Holland with the Lubeckers, under the terms of which the contracting parties bound themselves, when one of them was at war, not to supply munitions of war to their enemy. This seems to imply that the belligerent right to intercept contraband *in transitu* depended on conventions, and from what Grotius further adds, it was requisite there should be declaration (*publicæ significaciones*). These declarations are not declarations of war, for which the term used by Grotius is *denuntiatio*.¹ Apparently, therefore, the *publicæ significaciones* of Grotius correspond to the contraband regulations of the modern state; at all events, they are equally unavailing to bind neutrals.² Even when there are conventions and declarations it does not appear that Grotius held the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* to be indubitable, since he expressly says that nothing can be inferred from special conventions which is binding upon all. It is inconsistent with the derivation of the belligerent right from natural law, and the observation that instituted law is silent on the subject, to conclude that Grotius derived it from conventions. There is a whole volume of treaties on the subject of contraband.³ But these are after the date of Grotius, who lived in an age of land wars,⁴ and the doctrine of contraband is exclusively a branch of the maritime law of belligerency.⁵ Hautefeuille, who has examined the subject at great length,

¹ "De Jure Belli et Pacis," lib. iii. c. ii. ss. 67.

² Cf. Note of Grotius to "De Jure Belli et Pacis," c. iii. c. i. s. 5, cited above as to the effect of *significationes publicæ*. But Von Martens considers the declarations, issued by a belligerent advertising neutrals, that they shall look upon such and such declaration as contraband, as only dating from 1681, when Louis XIV. set the example. "Law of Nations," 1802, book viii. c. vi. s. 12, pp. 331, 332.

³ Cf. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pp. 380, 381.

⁴ Sir H. S. Maine, "International Law," Lecture vii., p. 123.

⁵ Cf. the important inference deduced from this fact by MM. Pistoye and Duverdy, the commentators on Valin, "Traité des Prises Mar.," t. i., pp. 394, 395, to the effect that consistency demands that the sale of contraband on neutral territory should be prohibited. It would then be prohibited as much between States with contiguous territories as between those separated by the sea.

observes that few treaties anterior to the seventeenth century contained categories of contraband of war.¹

Grotius' division the natural framework of the work of the subject.

In view of this fact Grotius' definition and classification of contraband illustrate the Greek saying, that what has once been well said, does not admit of being said again. In a long note to the case of the *Franklin*, (1801) 3 Rob. 217, 222, it is pointed out that Grotius did not particularly discuss the case of a ship carrying contraband. It constitutes, therefore, the greater tribute to his sagacity that "the division (of the subject of contraband) which was made by him still remains the natural framework of the subject,"² although both precedent and authority were wanting to him.

He placed all commodities under three heads. "There are some objects," he says, "which are of use in war alone, as arms; there are others which are useless in war, and which serve only for purposes of luxury; and there are others which can be employed both in war and peace, as money, provisions, ships, and articles of naval equipment. Of the first kind it is true, as Amalasuntha said to Justinian, that he is on the side of the enemy who supplies him with the necessities of war. The second class of object gives rise to no dispute. With regard to the third kind, the state of war must be considered. If seizure is necessary for the defence, the necessity confers a right of arresting the goods, under the condition, however, that they shall be restored unless some sufficient reason interferes."³

Various causes have enhanced importance of topic of contraband. The observation of Grotius that the state of the war must be considered in estimating whether articles become contraband under the third head, when examined in relation to Lord Stowell's generalization, that wars show a tendency to become more and more naval, throws some light upon the controversy between the Northern Powers and Great Britain on the subject of naval stores. Mr. A. J. Balfour pointed out in the House of Commons that there are many more important navies in the world than there were a quarter of a century ago.

The tendency which Lord Stowell observed may fairly be

¹ "Des Droits and des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en temps de Guerre Maritime," t. ii. p. 318.

² Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 640.

³ "De Jure Belli et Pacis," l. iii. c. i. s. 5.

said to have culminated in our day, and with it the acuteness of the controversy as to what is and what is not contraband. It is usual to designate the articles in the first and third classes of Grotius as absolute and conditional or relative contraband (*contrebande relative* or *par destination*) respectively. In the first case the article is confiscated, in the second the carrier loses freight and expenses, and the belligerent exercises his right of pre-emption. The subject of the penalty will be later discussed. It is here sufficient to observe, as showing the severity of the Russian law of prize instanced in the Russo-Japanese War, that this Power classes coal and provisions as absolute contraband, and during the Crimean War confiscated ship and cargo in all cases.

Vattel observes, "Commodities particularly useful in war and the importation of which to an enemy is prohibited are called contraband goods. Such are arms, ammunitions, timber for shipbuilding, every kind of naval stores, horses—and even provisions, in certain juncture, when we have hopes of reducing the enemy by famine."¹ Sir H. S. Maine noted that "changes in the structure and mode of propulsion of ships tend to make timber and other articles of that sort obsolete for contraband purposes. Steam renders sails of little utility and diminishes their number. The hulls are now more and more made of iron, and iron wire even takes the place of cordage."² But the British Admiralty Manual of Prize Law, 1888, makes not only ship-timber, considered contraband by Vattel in 1758, absolute contraband, but also hemp and cordage. Besides absolute and conditional or relative contraband, it is customary in modern times to speak of "Analogues of Contraband" (*Contrebande Accidentelle*). Such are despatches and persons of a military character. Upon the subject of definition and classification it may be advisable to recur to Sir R. Phillimore's division. According to him, Sir R. Phillimore's division of the subject for purposes of exposition. absolute contraband is constituted of articles *bellici usus*; relative, of articles *ancipitis vel promiscui usus*, and contraband *per accidens*. Contraband *per accidens* is a term devised

¹ "Droits des Gens," livre iii. c. vii. s. 112.

² "International Law," Lecture vi., p. 114.

by continental jurists.¹ It is proposed to adopt the arrangement under which Phillimore discusses the subject :—

1. The carrying of unquestionable munitions of war, military or naval, in their perfected and completed state.

2. The permitting the sale of such articles to a belligerent within the territory of the neutral.

3. The carrying of material of a kind which does not certainly indicate whether their destination be for belligerent or ordinary commercial purposes. Articles *ancipitis vel promiscui usus*, especially of *commeatus*, provisions, and money.

4. The doctrine of pre-emption.

5. The carrying of military persons in the employ of a belligerent, or being in any way engaged in his transport service.

6. The carrying of the despatches of a belligerent.

7. The penalty of carrying contraband.

8. The principal treaties upon the subject of contraband.

Conveyance by a neutral to a belligerent of articles absolutely contraband. Prohibited by the Ordonnance of Louis XIV. By the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713.

1. The carriage of munitions of war is penalised by international law.² The Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV. may be cited as a public instrument by which munitions of war were declared contraband. The Ordonnance provided by the Eleventh Article : “Les armes, poudres, boulets, et autres munitions de guerre, même les chevaux et équipages, qui seront confisqués en quelque vaisseau qu'ils soient trouvés, et à quelque personne qu'ils appartiennent, soit de nos sujets ou alliés.”³ Wheaton⁴ and Hautefeuille⁵

allude to the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, as confining the list of contraband strictly to munitions of war. The commercial treaty provided, “On comprendra sous le nom des marchandises de contrebande or defendues, les armes, canons, arquebuses, mortiers, petards, bombes, grenades, saucisses, cercles poissez, affuts, fourchettes, bandoulières, poudre à canon, mesches salpêtre, balles, piques, espees, morions, casques, cuirasses, hallebardes, javelins, fourreaux de pistolets, baudriers, chevaux

¹ Phillimore, vol. iii. s. 243.

² Hall's “International Law,” p. 640; Sir H. S. Maine's Lecture, “International Law,” p. 105.

³ “Noveau Comment., sur l'Ordonnance,” etc., t. ii. p. 264; and cf. Wheaton p. 650.

⁴ “International Law,” p. 653.

⁵ “Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en temps de Guerre Maritime,” t. ii. titre viii. s. 3, p. 321

avec leurs harnais, et tous autres semblables genres d'armes et d'instrumens de guerre, servant a l'usage des troupes." The treaty of the Pyrenees, 1759, between France and Spain, also confined contraband to munitions of war. The classing of munitions of war as contraband is the irreducible minimum of the whole subject. Phillimore observes that no Hübner, no professed advocate of neutral claims, has as yet maintained a contrary position to that stated by Lord Grenville, "If I have wrested my enemy's sword from his hands, the bystander who furnishes him with a fresh weapon can have no pretence to be considered as a neutral in the contest."¹ Grotius says, "Verum est dictum . . . in hostium esse partibus qui et bellum necessaria hosti administrat."²

2. As to permitting the sale of such munitions to a belligerent within the territory of the neutral. This is the topic on which Historicus wrote his letters. The Conference of Geneva, 1872, has hardly impaired the future value of his arguments, though it declared that a neutral subject may not sell a ship to a belligerent. The subject is elsewhere discussed: it is here only necessary to remark that at present the Treaty of Washington cannot be said, in view of the general non-accession to its principles, to have definitely established an exception to the principle which Historicus contended was the unanimous sentence of Bynkershoek, Vattel, Lampredi, Azuni, Wheaton, Kent, Ortolan, Story, Martens, Kluber, and, finally, that of the Supreme Court of the United States.³ All these authorities held that "the traffic in contraband of war within the neutral territory is absolutely lawful."⁴

In *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 476, it was argued that contraband trade was *contra bonos mores*. Historicus pointed out that no decided case had established the validity of the contract of insurance on contraband goods, and that a policy of marine insurance on goods whose transport involved a breach of blockade was invalid. But decisions delivered shortly after the letters of Historicus appeared have

¹ "Letters of Sulpicius," p. 26.

² "De Jure Belli et Pacis," I. iii. c. i. s. 1.

³ Letters, "International Law," Neutral Trade in Contraband of War, p. 130.

⁴ Letters of Historicus, On Neutral Trade in Contraband of War, p. 135.

established that, by English law, "the carriage of contraband goods, or voyages in breach of blockade, are not considered illegal; and it necessarily follows that insurances on such goods or voyages are not illegal" (Arnould's Mar. Ins., s. 760, referring to *ex parte Chavasse*, *In re Grazebrook*, *per Lord Westbury* (1865), 34 L. J. Bank 17; the *Helen* (1865), L. R. 1 A and E 1, and also earlier American decisions). This had a material bearing on his argument that the conveyance of contraband goods was not prohibited by municipal law, and possibly not by international law, as it was a mere case of the conflict of rights. By the laws of some other European countries a policy of insurance on contraband goods is null.¹

Policy of
insurance on
contraband
transaction
valid by law
of England.

But trade in
contraband
may become
illegal.

In such cases insurances upon ships and goods engaged in contraband trade are void.² The case of the *Ruys v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation* (1897) shows that a policy of insurance on contraband goods is valid by the law of England. By the Customs Consolidation Act (Stat. 42 & 43 Vict. (1879), part 1, s. 8) the exportation of contraband articles may be prohibited by proclamation or Order in Council under the penalty of forfeiture of goods exported. Further, the agent or shipper of such goods is liable to a fine of £100. The Prussian Government has incorporated in its Code of Municipal Law an article prohibiting the carriage by its subjects to any other nation of contraband, consisting of munitions of war, or of articles forbidden by treaties of the nation to whom it is carried.³ It seems clear that this provision, which was in force at the time of the Crimean War, was infringed and evaded as widely as the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, was infringed during the American Civil War, 1861-64.⁴ It is too soon to say whether Japan will insist on her belligerent rights in 1904 as the United States insisted in 1871, in reference to the sale of vessels of war.⁵ The subject has been elsewhere discussed. It is sufficient to say here that Phillimore,⁶

¹ Cf. "Maritime Code of Holland, Marine Insurance," Art. 599, c. iv.; Spanish Code, Art. 781, ss. 4; Portuguese Code, Art. 600, ss. 3.

² Cf. "Maritime Codes," by His Honour Judge Raikes; *Effingham Wilson*, 1896.

³ "Preussisches Landrecht," B. ii. s. 2034, p. 416.

⁴ Phillimore, vol. iii. s. 210.

⁵ Cf. Article on "International Law and the War," by Sir J. Macdonnell, *Nineteenth Century Magazine*, July, 1904, p. 146.

⁶ "International Law," vol. iii. ss. 230-233.

Hautefeuille,¹ Galiani,² Pistoys and Duverdy³ consider that a neutral State is bound to prohibit the sale of contraband on its own territory, a view which constitutes the *Ultima Thule* of neutral obligation.

Writers who would prohibit the sale of contraband articles on neutral territory.

3. The carrying of materials of a kind which does not certainly indicate whether their destination be for belligerent or ordinary commercial purposes—*res anticipitis vel promiscui contraband. usus.*

It is proposed to discuss the question here from the point of view of the authoritative writers, from the judgments of Lord Stowell, and from unilateral acts, such as naval regulations and commercial codes of different countries. The subject will be discussed from the point of view of treaties later.

Grotius says on this head that the conditions of the war are to be considered. “For if I cannot defend myself except by intercepting what is sent, necessity, as elsewhere explained, gives us a right to intercept it, but under the obligation of restitution, except there be cause to the contrary. If the supplies sent impede the exaction of my rights, and if he who sends them may know this—as if I were besieging a town, or blockading a port, and if surrender or peace were expected—he will be bound to me for damages, as a person would who liberates my debtor from prison or assists his flight to my injury: and to the extent of the damage, his property may be taken and ownership thereof be assumed for the sake of recovering my debt. If he have not yet caused damages, but have tried to cause it, I shall have a right by the retention of his property to compel him to give security for the future by hostages, pledges, or in some other way. But if, besides, the injustice of my enemy to me be very evident, and he confirms him in a most unjust war, he will then be bound to me not only civilly for the damage, but also criminally, as being one who protects a manifest criminal from the judge who is about to inflict punishment: and on that ground it will be lawful to take such measures against him as are suitable

Views of Grotius.

¹ “Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres,” t. ii. tit. viii. s. 3.

² “De’ Doveri de’ Principi Neutrali verso i Guerregianti, e de questo verso i Neutrali,” c. ix. s. 4.

³ “Traité des Prises Mar.,” t. i. pp. 394, 395.

to the offence, according to principles laid down in speaking of punishment, and therefore to that extent he may be subject to spoliation.”¹ Grotius gives previously as examples of articles *ancipitis vel promiscui usus*, money, provisions, ships, and their furniture.

View of
Bynkershoek.

Phillimore observes that Bynkershoek² “justly rejects the opinion of Grotius so far as it relates to any distinction between the justice and injustice of a war.” It is clear, however, that Vattel was in the habit of drawing this distinction.³ Bynkershoek came to the conclusion that warlike instruments and all things capable of use in war were contraband. But he drew a distinction between *materia* (1) *per se bello apta*; (2) *ex qua quid bello aptari possit*. To interdict the last-named as contraband, he observes, would be a total prohibition of all commerce, and it might be as well so expressed and understood. The fact that Bynkershoek excepted raw materials from the category of contraband suggests that he cannot be considered universally a great champion of belligerent rights, as he was described by Historicus. The arguments of Bynkershoek from treaties on this subject are severely criticized by Sir R. Phillimore.⁴ He relied on two treaties between the Swedes and Dutch in 1675 and 1679, and one between the English and Dutch in 1674, as constituting the semblance of a general custom excluding the materials, out of which contraband goods are formed, from the category of contraband. Elsewhere he admits that one or two treaties, which vary from the general usage, do not alter the law of nations.⁵ Phillimore observes that nobody was better aware than Bynkershoek that three treaties are quite insufficient to constitute the semblance of a general custom. Again, he cites three edicts of the Dutch in the seventeenth century pronouncing raw materials contraband, which he summarily pronounces exceptions. Bynkershoek devotes a considerable discussion to the question whether saltpetre ought to be admitted in the catalogue of contraband articles. Prince Bismarck, it would appear,

¹ “De Jure Belli et Pacis,” I. iii. c. i. s. 5.

² Q. J. P. c. x.

³ “Droit des Gens,” book iii. c. x. s. 180.

⁴ “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 236.

⁵ Q. J. P. l. i. c. x.

regarded the retention of saltpetre in the lists of contraband as being objectless under the conditions of modern war.¹ Notwithstanding these doubts, saltpetre always has been considered contraband, being in Bynkershoek's time considered as synonymous with gunpowder.

Zouch, the English authoritative writer on international law, argues the question upon first principles. On the one hand, he says, it may be contended that the law of contraband, being of a penal character, is not to be extended beyond its strict meaning, and the argument from the prohibition of a composite thing to the prohibition of the elements of which it is compounded is illogical. On the other hand, it consists with sound reasoning to say that where the reason for the prohibition of both is applicable, the law is equally applicable to both ("ubi est eadem ratio prohibitionis, materiae et speciei, idem jus in utraque censendum est"), especially when the object is to prevent fraud; and therefore it was that in the Roman law the famous Senatus Consultum Macedonianum, when it forbade loans to a minor, forbade also the things for which money could be procured, *cum contractus fraudem sapit*. So it is according to the *jus commune* that when weapons made of iron are pronounced to be contraband, the iron of which they are made should fall under the same ban.²

Heinneccius, considered by Bynkershoek and Phillimore to be the principal writer on the subject of conditional contraband, observes, "Sometimes it is of great importance—in wars even things of the smallest importance acquire importance—if the enemy is labouring in want: nor is there elsewhere any resource for things of the kind required. Often strongly fortified cities experience the want of fuel, or of burnt wine, and the soldier of the garrison more readily endures thirst than the want of these things. Who, therefore, denies it? Both citizens and foreigners deserve badly of the Republic, who render such things to our enemies, without which they should have been easily reduced to surrender. But it is still true that in time of war, not only does commerce cease between enemies, but

¹ See quotation in "Geffcken," Holtzendorff's Handbook, iv. 723.

² "Juris et Judic. Focial," Quaest. Pars. 2, s. 8.

even intercourse with friends and with peoples of neutral position cannot be freely permitted with the enemy (unless the former stipulate for security from both belligerents). For since everything is lawful indefinitely for one belligerent against the other which is necessary for prosecuting war, it will clearly be lawful to obstruct even a friendly nation from carrying things to the enemy by means of which his circumstances may be rendered more secure and more suited to conduct war.”¹

In another passage Heinneccius says, “It has been established by several treaties between States what goods it is considered wrong to convey to an enemy. On this subject there are extant treaties of the King of Spain with the Belgians, of the King of France with the Hanseatic States, with the Dutch, of the English with the Poles and the Swedes, and several others of the like kind, in which we observe that all arms of an explosive character are classed with prohibited goods, and their apparatus, such as engines for hurling missiles, bombs, mortars, petards, powders, balls of pitch, carriages for guns, forks, bandoliers, nitrate powder, ropes fit for catching fire, nitrate of salt, fire-balls, so also spears, swords, helmets of leather or metal, breastplates, battle-axes, spikes, horses, saddles, and other warlike instruments. Nay, also wheat, barley, oats, pulse, salt, wine, oil, sails, ropes, and everything else connected with fitting out ships. . . . But there are some things concerning which there has been some difference between States, whether they are to be considered in the category of prohibited articles. There has been some doubt as to sword sheaths. . . . Sword sheaths are not less necessary to a belligerent than swords; and although he may not wound with a scabbard, or deal out slaughter with it, yet the swords themselves would be rendered useless unless the scabbards protected them from rain and rust. Therefore, the very same reason that impels to the prohibition of sails, ship-ropes, corn, easily admits of being applied to scabbards themselves.”²

¹ “De Jur. Princ. circ. Com.,” s. 12.

² “De Navib. ob. Vect. Merc. Vetit. Comm.,” xiv.

Heinneccius was a privy councillor of the King of Prussia, a circumstance which renders it remarkable that he should have included in the category of contraband naval stores and provisions of every kind. In spite of his position, his writings do not seem to have inspired the policy of his country. The category of contraband as stated by Heinneccius is far more extensive than any adopted by Great Britain, though it may exhibit a counterpart to the Russian naval regulations of 1904. It is difficult to refrain from commenting on the indecisive and almost puerile discussion instituted by Bynkershoek and Heinneccius as to whether scabbards are contraband. The serious issue of the subject is whether, under the pretext of contraband, all commerce between maritime nations shall be interdicted. Heinneccius, after practically interdicting all commerce between the neutral nations and a belligerent, enters with zest upon the discussion whether a neutral should sell scabbards to a belligerent.

Phillimore speaks slightly of Hübner's "De la Saisie des Batimens Neutres." Nevertheless, this writer merely enunciates a principle of Vattel when he says that the only duty of the neutral is to be *in bello medius*, and not to refuse to one belligerent what he grants to another.¹ Hübner gives a long list of contraband, and attempts to make a "fixation de la contrebande de guerre au premier et au second chef." "Contrebande au premier chef" includes the class of goods useful only for war, and some of those *ancipitis usus*, but only when supplied to besieged or blockaded places. "Contrebande au second chef" includes articles of both classes which are furnished to one belligerent and refused to another. Ward² observes that the conclusion of Hübner's long argument is that none of the things in his long catalogue can ever become contraband at all, so long as the neutral is content to furnish both belligerents with them at the same time. Sir R. Phillimore³ considers that Hübner's views have neither reason nor usage to recommend them.

In *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 508,

Opinion of
Hübner, the
great
champion of
neutrality.

¹ Cf. Bynkershoek, Q. J. P., l. i. c. ix.; Vattel, "Droit des Gen," l. iii. c. 7.

² "Contraband," p. 180.

³ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 241.

Pollock, C.B., observed that jurists differed widely from each other on the subjects of belligerent rights and neutral duties, and even generally on international law. But since the date of this case and the Geneva Conference, the Institute of International Law has been founded, and "professors of, and writers on, international law have done a great deal towards rendering doctrine harmonious and consistent."¹ The Hague Conference must be added to the other occasions adduced by Mr. W. E. Hall on which the body of civilized nations have united in prescribing general rules of international conduct. The fact that a powerful belligerent like Russia should have modified her regulations in deference to neutral representations is a feature of good omen in international law, and none the less so that the concession was made during a contest which was marked by patent derelictions from the highest standard of either belligerent right or neutral duty.

It is quite impossible to deduce any general law of contraband from treaties, since for the last fifty years there have been repeated instances of the same nation concluding treaties in a different sense on the subject with different States at the same time.² But Grotius seems to derive the belligerent right of stopping contraband *in transitu* from treaties or "old conventions." The remedial branch of the law of contraband may thus be based on treaty law.

Loccenius.

Whether
balance of
naval power
cause of
variance in
contraband
lists. *Que.*

Loccenius comprehends provisions generally in his class of contraband.³ In the "Encyclopædia of Laws" it is stated,⁴ "In the domain of theory there are two distinct tendencies. Jurists belonging to the maritime powers, jealous of their belligerent rights, tend to sustain the existing uncertainty. Those who belong to the weaker and neutral States would restrict contraband to a limited number of articles."

This generalization does not apply to the authoritative writers. Bynkershoek wrote before Holland lost her maritime supremacy.⁵ Yet, as has been seen, he considered that

¹ Hall's "International Law," Introduction.

² Cf. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. p. 345, and "Encyclopædia Laws of England," art. "Contraband."

³ "De Jure Marit.," l. i. c. iv. n. 5, p. 41.

⁴ p. 5, art. "Contraband."

⁵ Cf. Hall's "International Law," p. 644.

materials out of which contraband goods are formed are not contraband, and herein puts neutral rights on their highest footing. Historically, Prussia has always been a weak naval Power. But Heinneccius, who was a Prussian privy councillor,¹ regarded every species of provisions as unconditionally contraband. Again, Zouch, the English authoritative writer on international law, does not approach in severity the views of Heinneccius. While Zouch considered ship-building materials contraband, he does not, like Heinneccius, include every class of provisions, as well as naval stores, in the category of contraband. Further, while Heinneccius classed ship-building materials as unconditionally contraband, Zouch evidently only considers them contraband by destination, laying down that their seizure can only be justified where there is fraud. Again, Hautefeuille is, perhaps, the writer who has, in modern times, advocated with most detail the inclusion of mere munitions of war as contraband. But in 1848, when Hautefeuille's work appeared, France, though in the throes of revolution, could not be called a weak neutral Power.²

In the domain of theory, the last word on the subject seems to be that of the "Annuaire de l'Institut du Droit International," 1896, p. 230, where it is proposed to do away with "les pretendues contrebandes désignées sous le nom, soit de contrebande relative, concernant des articles (*usus ancipitis*) susceptibles d'être utilisés par un belligerent dans un but militaire, mais dont l'usage est essentiellement pacifique, soit de contrebande accidentelle, quand les dits articles se servent spécialement aux buts militaires que dans une circonstance particulière." The right of pre-emption, however, is reserved to the belligerent in the case of objects *ancipitis usus* seized while *in transitu* towards a port of his adversary. Lord Reay, in presiding at the recent session of the

*"l'Institut du Droit International,"
1896, to abolish
relative con-
traband.*

¹ "Collectanea Juridica," vol. i., piece v.

² Sir H. Maxwell's "Life of the Duke of Wellington," vol. ii. pp. 359, 363; "Earl Stanhope's Conversations," p. 314; whence it appears that about this date the Duke of Wellington had considerable apprehension of invasion, and declared that England could not afford to protest against the Spanish marriages of the sons of Louis Philippe.

*But right of
pre-emption
reserved in
case of objects
*ancipitis usus.**

Institute of International Law, alluding to the subject of contraband of war, said that in 1896, at Venice, the Institute laid down rules on contraband which had been of a far-reaching character. It only recognized five categories of articles as being absolute contraband when carried by sea at the cost of a belligerent, and to the destination of a belligerent. Accidental and relative contraband were not recognized, but a belligerent had the right of sequestration or pre-emption of articles which might be useful for warlike as well as for peaceful purposes. In 1895 the committee had proposed the following rules :—

Articles which can be of use both for warlike and for pacific purposes are not, in general, to be considered contraband. They can be considered such if they are immediately and specially intended for the military or naval forces or for military operations of the enemy, if they have been included in a previous declaration issued by the belligerent Government at the commencement of the war, in accordance with Clause 30 of the rules adopted by the Institute with regard to maritime prizes in 1882. The Institute had given to neutrals a greater immunity than they could claim in accordance with the well-established practice of international law, which admitted the rights of a belligerent to proclaim what it considered absolute and relative or accidental contraband. An international conference should meet to deal with the subject of contraband in order that the difficulties might be avoided which arose after declaration of war, and which were the result of the right claimed by a belligerent to give his own interpretation of the character of contraband.¹

Prof. T. E.
Holland.

Professor T. E. Holland, in a letter to the *Times*, March 12, 1904, observed, "Articles are 'contraband of war' which a belligerent is justified in intercepting while in course of carriage to his enemy, although such carriage is being effected by a neutral vessel. Whether any given article should be treated as contraband is, in the first instance, entirely a question for the belligerent Government and its prize court. A neutral Government has no right to complain of hardships which may thus be incurred by vessels sailing under its flag,

¹ *Times*, September 21, 1904.

but is bound to acquiesce in the views maintained by the belligerent Government and its courts, unless these views involve, in the language employed by Lord Granville in 1861, ‘a flagrant violation of international law.’ This is the beginning and the end of the doctrine of contraband. A neutral Government has none other than this passive duty of acquiescence. Its neutrality would not be compromised by the shipment from our shores of any quantity of cannon, rifles, and gunpowder.”

It is now proposed to examine the question of conditional contraband from the view of English prize law as contained in the judgments of Lord Stowell.

In the famous case of the Swedish convoy, determined in Views of Lord Stowell. the English Court of Admiralty in 1799, Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell) states, “That tar, pitch, and hemp, going to the enemy’s use, are liable to be seized as contraband in their own nature, cannot, I conceive, be doubted under the modern law of nations, though formerly, when the hostilities of Europe were less naval than they have since become, they were of a disputable nature, and perhaps continued so at the time of making that treaty” (that is, the treaty of 1661 between Great Britain and Sweden, which was still in force when he was pronouncing this judgment), “or, at least, at the time of making that treaty which is the basis of it—I mean the treaty in which Whitlock was employed in 1656; for I conceive that Valin expresses the truth of this matter when he says, ‘*De droit ces choses*’ (speaking of naval stores) ‘*sont de contrebande aujourd’hui et depuis le commencement de ce siècle, ce qui n’était pas autrefois néamoins;*’¹ and Vattel, the best recent writer upon these matters, explicitly admits amongst positive contraband, ‘les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction et à l’armement de vaisseaux de guerre.’ Upon this principle was founded the modern explanatory article of the Danish treaty entered into in 1780, on the part of Great Britain by a noble lord (Mansfield) then Secretary of State, whose attention had been peculiarly turned to subjects of this nature. I am, therefore, of opinion that although it might be shown that the

¹ Valin, “*Comm. sur l’Ordon.*,” liv. iii. tit. 9, “*Des Prises*,” art. 11.

nature of these commodities had been subject to some controversy in the time of Whitlock, when the fundamental treaty was constructed, and therefore a discreet silence concerning them was observed in the composition of that treaty, and of the latter treaty derived from it, yet that the exposition which the later judgment and practice of Europe had given upon this subject would, in some degree, affect and supply what the treaties had been content to leave on that indefinite and disputable footing, on which the nations then more generally prevailing in Europe had placed it."¹

It is, however, objected to this decision by Wheaton (in the text, p. 651), that the treaty of 1661 made no mention of naval stores, and the subsequent treaties of 1664 and 1665 expressly declared that nothing should be contraband except what they made so, together with the treaty of 1661. The treaties of 1664 and 1665 were equally silent as regards naval stores. Mr. W. E. Hall observes that according to the opinion of Sir Leolin Jenkins, the chief English authority on international law in the latter end of the seventeenth century,² "articles of direct use for warlike purposes were alone contraband under the common law of nations, but that each State, in order to meet the special conditions of a particular war, possessed the right of drawing up at its opening a list of articles to be contraband during its continuance."³

The *Staadt Embden*, (1798) 1 Rob. 26, was the case of a prize ship taken from the English and carried into Christiansand, South Norway. A pretended sale had passed there, and the vessel was retaken on a voyage from Riga to Amsterdam, laden with deals and masts. It was adjudged on the facts that the vessel had become the property of the neutral. The vessel was captured in the first instance by a French privateer, and recaptured. Sir W. Scott observed, "Most clearly the masts are liable to be considered contraband in the judgment of the most zealous advocates of neutral commerce."⁴ The circumstances of the case were very

¹ The *Maria*, 1 C. Rob. 372.

² "Life and Correspondence of Sir L. Jenkins," vol. xi. p. 751.

³ "International Law," p. 642.

⁴ *Ibid., supra.*

peculiar, as the vessel was taken on a voyage from Riga, a Russian port, to Amsterdam, then considered a port in the possession of the French, and blockaded by a Russian and English fleet. Under these facts it was difficult to consider the cargo neutral. Sir W. Scott suggested a doubt which seems a little difficult to understand, saying, "An auxiliary fleet is not of itself sufficient to make its Government a principal in a war."¹ It therefore seems that the doctrine of pacific blockade is of far earlier origin than that usually assigned it in books on international law. The earliest instance of a pacific blockade usually adduced is the blockade in 1827 by France, Great Britain, and Russia of all the coasts of Greece occupied by Turkish forces.² But it seems quite clear from the words of Sir W. Scott in the *Staadt Embden*, (1798) 1 Rob. 26, 30, that the doctrine of pacific blockade has an earlier origin. A further fact of interest in this case is that in the event of recapture the practice of the prize court in Lord Stowell's time was to order the vessel to be sold, and to award the recaptors one-eighth of the proceeds as salvage. The *Staadt Embden* also decided that the relaxation of the principle of confiscating naval stores, when the stores were native produce, going to enemy's ports on account of the country which produced them, was not of absolute application. Lord Stowell referred to the solemn judgment of the Lords of Appeal in "the famous case" of *Med. Goods Hielp*, Soderberg, where a cargo of pitch and tar, going on Swedish (neutral) account to Port Louis, was condemned. Innocent articles are liable to be confiscated when they are found in the same ship as contraband, and they belong to the owner of the contraband.³

The *Twee Juffrewen*, (1802) 4 Rob. 242, decided that tar and pitch, not being the produce of the exporting country, are contraband. The *onus probandi* of showing that the articles are the produce of the exporting country lies on the claimant. The *Twee Juffrewen* was a Prussian ship, and claimed as the property of a Prussian merchant.

¹ "International Law," p. 30. ² Wheaton, p. 415; Hall, 371.

³ *Bynkershoek*, 12 Q. J. P., bk. i. c. 12.

In this case Sir W. Scott observed that the subject of the contraband character of naval stores continued a vexed question between Great Britain and the Baltic Powers throughout the whole of the eighteenth century.¹ He added, "With respect to what has been said of a different understanding prevailing in that country, I am afraid it is not the only instance in which our exposition of the law of nations differs from what they (*i.e.* Prussia) are inclined to hold upon the same article; but I must remember it is my duty to adhere to what I understand to be the exposition authorized by former decisions of this court, founded on general and disinterested views of the subject."²

But it is a curious fact that Heinneccius, a Prussian privy councillor, took the English view, and considered that anything of use in outfitting a ship was unconditionally contraband. Upon the particular point in issue in the *Twee Juffreven*, Sir W. Scott observed, "I take it to be established doctrine of this court that pitch and tar are universally contraband, unless protected by treaty, or unless it is shown that they are the produce of the country from which they are exported, in which latter case they are considered on the lenient and modern application of the rule as subject to pre-emption only. In certain instances, where they constitute the great staple commodity of the exporting country, as of Sweden, the presumption may be allowed in favour of the claimant without absolute proof; but in respect to East Friesland, or any part of Prussia, the same presumption does not arise."³

In the *Apollo*, (1802) 4 Rob. 161, a question arose respecting a quantity of hemp, being the produce of Russia, and the property of a Russian merchant, taken on board a Prussian

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," p. 654.

² "Twee Juffreven," (1802) 4 Rob. 242, 244; and cf. the observation of Gibbs, C.J., in *Taylor v. Curtis*, (1816) 6 Taunt. 608, 624, as to the differences between the English and foreign views of the law of general average, by which neither the wounds of the sailors defending a private armed vessel, nor the "wounds of the ship," in the case of the successful defence of a private armed vessel, form the subject of contribution in general average by the law of England. The observations of Pollock, C.B., in *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 508, as to the antinomies prevailing in international law on the subject of contraband, may also be compared with those of Lord Stowell in the *Twee Juffreven* (*supra*).

³ *Ibid.*, *supra*, p. 243

ship, on a voyage from Libau in Courland to Amsterdam. The cargo was restored on further proof that the hemp was the produce of Russia.

In 1801 England contracted a treaty with Russia, by which it was agreed not to consider as contraband the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral Power, and should be transported for their account. But Sir W. Scott held that the treaty did not apply, as the hemp was taken not in a Russian but a Prussian vessel. In these treaties commerce meant commerce connected with navigation. When, therefore, the treaty spoke of "neutral ships" it did not mean the vessels of any neutral State, but only those of the contracting parties. The question was decided apart from the treaty, which at this date, of course, is not in force. But the question which remained to be decided in the *Apollo* (*ubi supra*) was—"Whether hemp, being the produce and property of the country, was liable to confiscation?" The case of *Jonge Pieter*, Adm., November 12, 1781, Lords, 1783, was exactly parallel because it was also the case of a cargo of hemp on board a foreign ship. The effect of this and other cases was that the presence of the hemp in a foreign ship did not render it contraband if it could be shown that it was a staple commodity of the country of its owner. Sir W. Scott said, "Hemp is certainly liable to be considered as generally contraband; but in relaxation of the strict principle, the general rule now prevailing is that being the produce and property of the exporting country, and going in a vessel of that country, it is not liable to confiscation." The last circumstance being considered immaterial, it was regarded as a case for further proof, and the cargo was restored on its being shown that it was the produce of the country of the exporter.

It is now proposed to examine unilateral acts of different countries, defining the category of contraband and to compare them with the Russian and Japanese declarations regarding contraband issued on the commencement of hostilities. An interesting point bearing on the subject is mentioned in the

Unilateral
Acts declaring
contraband.

Declarations
of ambassador.

reply of the English lawyers to the Prussian Exposition de Motifs, issued in connection with the seizing of Prussian ships as a security for the Silesian loan, 1753. The Prussian lawyers alleged that Lord Carteret in 1744, by two verbal declarations, gave assurances to the King of Prussia in the name of the King of England that nothing on board a Prussian ship should be seized, except contraband; consequently, that all effects not contraband, belonging to the enemy, should be free; and that these assurances were afterwards confirmed in writing by Lord Chesterfield, January 5, 1747. The English lawyers replied that the verbal declarations of a minister in conversation might show what he thought to be the law of nations, but never could be understood to be equivalent to a treaty derogating from that law.¹

Mercantile
Marine Code
of Italy.

Raw materials
not contra-
band.

“British Ad-
miralty
Manual of
Prize Law,”
1888.

By the Mercantile Marine Code of Italy² it is provided that, “Unless otherwise agreed by treaties or by special declarations made at the commencement of hostilities, the following articles are declared to be contraband of war. Cannons, muskets, carbines, revolvers, pistols, swords, as well as other firearms, whether such as can be carried or of any other description, munitions of war, military implements of all descriptions, and generally all things which, without manufacture, can be at once used for fitting out military or naval forces.”³ “The British Admiralty Manual of Prize Law,” 1888, enumerates as absolutely contraband—Arms of all kinds and machinery for manufacturing arms, ammunition and material for ammunition, including lead, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, chlorate and its materials, saltpetre and brimstone; also gun-cotton, military equipments and clothing, military stores, naval stores, such as masts, spars, ladders, and ship-timber, hemp and cordage, sail cloth, pitch and tar, copper fit for sheathing vessels, marine engines, and the component parts thereof, including screw propellers, paddle wheels, cylinders, cranks, shafts, boilers,

¹ “Collectanea Juridica,” vol. i. p. 152.

² “Neutral Rights,” c. iii. Art. 216.

³ Cf. “Maritime Codes of Italy,” translated and annotated by His Honour Judge Raikes, ed. 1904.

tubes for boilers, boiler plates and fire bars, marine cement and the materials used in the manufacture thereof, as blue lias and Portland cement; iron in any of the following forms—anchors, rivet iron, angle iron, round bars of iron from $\frac{3}{4}$ to $\frac{5}{8}$ -inch diameter, rivets, strips of iron, sheets, plate iron exceeding a quarter of an inch, and Low Moor and Bowling plates. Conditionally contraband—Provisions and liquors fit for consumption of army or navy, money, telegraphic materials, such as wire, porous caps, platina, sulphuric acid, and zinc; materials for the construction of a railway, as iron bars, sleepers, coals, hay, horses, rosin, tallow, timber.

The Prussian Prisen Reglement of June 20, 1864,¹ the Austrian ministerial *verorderungen* of March 3, 1864, s. 7, and of July 9, 1866, s. 4, define contraband, the former as "all things which may be employed directly (*unmittelbar*) for the war;" the latter adds the exception of such reasonable provisions of prohibited articles as may be necessary for the ship's protection. The Japanese declaration regarding contraband in the late war, as transcribed from the *Times*, February 10, 1904, was as follows:—

First class: Military weapons, ammunition, explosives, and materials, including lead, saltpetre, sulphur, etc., and machinery for making them; uniforms, naval and military, military accoutrements, armour-plated machinery, and materials for the construction or equipment of ships of war, and all other goods which, though not coming under this list, are intended solely for use in war. The above-mentioned articles will be regarded as contraband of war when passing through or destined for enemy's army, navy, or territory.

Second class: Provisions, drinks, horses, harness, fodder, vehicles, coal, timber, coins, gold and silver bullion, and materials for construction of telegraphs, telephones, railways. The above-mentioned articles will be regarded as contraband of war when destined for enemy's army or navy, or in such cases where, being goods arriving at enemy's territory, there is reason to believe they are intended for use of enemy's army or navy. Exception has been made as regards articles mani-

The Prussian
Prisen Regle-
ment and
Austrian
ministerial
verorderungen
of 1864.

¹ Cf. Art. 8.

festly intended for use of vessels carrying them. Prize courts at Sasebo, Tokio.

Russian declarations regarding contraband, *Times*, March 1, 1904.

The following are the Russian regulations declaring contraband which recently acquired prominence in connection with seizures of British ships:—Declared contraband of war: Arms, munitions, explosives, and substances used for manufacture of explosives; materials used for artillery, engineering, and baggage trains, such as gun-carriages, campaign kitchens, carts, barbed wire, pontoons, harness, etc.; articles of military equipment and clothing, ships constructed for purposes of war, boilers, and all kinds of ship machinery; every kind of combustible, such as coal, naphtha, alcohol, and similar substances; materials and objects for telegraphic and telephonic installations, or for construction of railways generally; all objects intended for war by sea or land, including rice, provisions, horses, etc. Assimilated to contraband are the following acts: Transport of enemy's troops, despatches, and correspondence, and furnishing transports and ships of war to the enemy. Neutral ships captured while engaged in flagrant act of contraband can, according to circumstances, be seized and even confiscated. Further, early in May the Russian Government issued an additional notification declaring cotton to be contraband.¹

G. F. von Martens on history and force of belligerent declarations regarding contraband.

The following observations on the history and effect of belligerent regulations regarding contraband are of interest: “The maritime Powers have begun, especially since the latter end of the last century,² to issue declarations at the beginning of the war to advertise the neutral Powers that they shall look upon such and such merchandises as contraband, and to forewarn them of the penalties they intend to inflict upon those who shall be found conveying them to the enemy. These declarations are rather advertisements than laws; nor can their effect by any means be extended to these neutral Powers with which the powers that issue them have treaties of commerce.”³

¹ *Times*, March 1, 1904.

² Louis XIV. set the example, 1681. See Henning's “Abhandlung der Neutralität,” p. 30. See another declaration, 1744, in Bouchard, “Theorie,” p. 397.

³ “Law of Nations,” 1802, by G. F. von Martens, book viii. c. vi. s. 12 pp. 331, 332.

CHAPTER XIII—(*continued*).

PART IV.

CONTRABAND OF WAR (*continued*).

IT is proposed now to discuss what has been termed *Nobilissima Juris Gentium Quæstio*, viz. Whether ever, and if ever, under what circumstances, provisions are contraband ?¹

Professor T. E. Holland, in a letter to the *Times*, elicited by the sinking of the *Knight Commander*, made the following observations: “A far more important question is, I venture to think, raised by the Russian list of contraband sweeping, as it does, into the category of ‘absolute contraband articles’ things such as provisions and coal, to which a contraband character, in any sense of the term, has usually been denied on the continent, while Great Britain and the United States have admitted them into the category of ‘conditional contraband’ only when shown to be suitable and destined for the armed forces of the enemy, or for the relief of a place besieged. Still more unwarrantable is the Russian claim to interfere with the trade in raw cotton. Her prohibition of this trade is wholly unprecedented, for the treatment of cotton during the American Civil War will be found on examination to have no bearing on the question under consideration. I touch to-day on this large subject only to express the hope that our Government, in concert, if possible, with other neutral Governments, has communicated to that of Russia a protest in language as unmistakable as that employed by our Foreign Office in 1885: ‘I regret to have to inform you, M. l’Ambassadeur,’ wrote Lord Granville, ‘that her Majesty’s

Professor T. E.
Holland and
absolute and
conditional
contraband.

¹ Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 245, p. 335.

Government feel compelled to take exception to the proposed measure, as they cannot admit that, consistently with the law and practice of nations, and with the rights of neutrals, provisions in general can be treated as contraband of war.' A timely warning that a claim is inadmissible is surely preferable to waiting till bad feeling has been aroused by concrete application of an objectionable doctrine."¹

The question
whether
cotton can be
contraband.

It is, perhaps, reasonable to assume that the Russian negotiations declaring raw cotton contraband are at least partially to be explained by the rapid rise of Japan as a cotton-spinning country—a rise well attested by consular reports, and by more than one impartial observer. It need hardly be insisted that there is nothing in international law which can justify Russia in aiming a blow at the industries of Japan under the pretext of regulating contraband trade. Such action is driven for a precedent to the Berlin decree of Napoleon. As early as Von Martens the principle was familiar. "Sometimes the list of contraband has been swelled out with merchandises which are not evidently and unequivocally intended for the purposes of war though they may be useful to the enemy (ship timber, cables, hemp, coined money, corn, spirituous liquors, tobacco, and other provisions), and at other times such merchandises have been expressly declared not contraband. This last ought always to be presumed between nations that have no treaty with each other."² As Russia has not concluded any treaty with the United States, the great cotton-producing country, declaring cotton contraband, the innocence of that article ought certainly to be presumed. Moreover, the action of Russia seems directly to conflict with the principles laid down by Lord Stowell, in the case where the conveyance of cotton is most likely to occur,

Raw cotton
exported from
United States
seems to fall
under Lord
Stowell's
principle of
exemption in
favour of
native pro-
ducts.

¹ *Times*, August 6, 1904. How entirely anomalous the action of Russia was in declaring food absolute contraband clearly appears from the fact that, in giving his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, three months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Declaration, Professor Holland observed that "the Continent in modern days would never allow that food was contraband, because they do not allow that there is any such thing as conditional contraband" (Report, etc., vol. ii. p. 233).

² "Law of Nations," 1802, bk. viii. c. vi. s. 12.

that of cotton shipped on account of American cotton growers in American vessels.¹ Even where the ship did not belong to the same country as the neutral owner of the product transported, Sir W. Scott refused to confiscate the cargo when it consisted of the produce of the country of the neutral on whose account it was shipped. In the *Apollo* (*supra*) a cargo of hemp was restored to the Russian owner when, on further proof, it was proved to be Russian produce. Sometimes it was regarded a case for pre-emption, but never for confiscation. The idea that Russia condemned cotton as a possible element in the manufacture of explosives may be dismissed in view of the smallness of quantity used for that purpose.

The most important question which has arisen during the late war from the point of view of Great Britain, is the propriety of including food among articles contraband of war. The question whether provisions are contraband.

The authority of Grotius has been invoked in favour of the practice. But having regard to the fact that he both admits the obligation of restitution and confines the right of intercepting supplies to occasions when they are sent to a blockaded or besieged town which is about to surrender, it is clear that he treated supplies as being conditionally and not absolutely contraband.²

Loccenius (1651) comprehends provisions generally in his class of contraband.³ Valin⁴ refers to the view of Loccenius, but adds, "Par nos lois, et le droit commun, elle (la prohibition) n'a lieu en cette partie que par rapport aux places assiégées." It has been seen that Heinneccius, on the strength of treaties, classes provisions as absolute contraband, since he does not define any condition, or even seem to consider there can be any doubt on the point.⁵

Vattel is in favour of the doctrine that provisions may be contraband, saying that "even provisions" are contraband in

¹ Cf. Sir W. Scott's decision in the *Twee Juffreven*, (1802) 4 Rob. 242; the *Apollo*, (1802) 4 Rob. 161, referring to *Jonge Pieter*, Adm. 1781 and 1783.

² "De Jure Belli et Pacis," I. iii. c. i. s. 5.

³ "De Jure Marit.," I. i. c. iv. n. 5, p. 41.

⁴ I. iii. t. ix. art. xi.

⁵ "De Navib. ob Vect. Merc. Vetit. Comm." xiv.

"certain junctures, when we have hopes of reducing the enemy by famine."¹ There is, however, a great want of precision in Vattel's observation on contraband.² Sir H. S. Maine speaks of Vattel as beyond comparison the most humane of publicists.³ It is a little surprising that Vattel, who reproved his master Wolf for severity, should have considered provisions unconditionally contraband, and, indeed, the qualifications he imposes hardly suggest that he really held that view. However, in 1793, when England, by way of retaliation, detained all neutral vessels bound for France and laden with corn, meal, or flour, the authority of Vattel was appealed to as sanctioning the position that provisions may be absolute contraband.

Pothier.

Pothier classes provisions as merely conditionally contraband. After saying that it is necessary to distinguish enemy goods from neutral goods, he insists on the exception that contraband goods form to the general immunity of neutral commerce. "Il faut néanmoins excepter certain espèces de choses qu'on appelle effets de contrabande, qu'il n'est pas permis aux sujets des Puissances neutres de porter à l'ennemi et qui sont de bonne prise, quel que soit le vaisseau sur lequel elles sont chargées. . . . A l'égard des munitions de bouche, que des sujets des Puissances neutres envoient à nos ennemis, elles ne sont point censées de contrebande, ni par consequent sujettes à confiscation : sauf dans un seul cas, qui est lorsqu'elles sont convoyées à une place assiégée ou bloquée."⁴ All writers on international law attest the conflicting nature of the testimony rendered by treaties on the subject, whether provisions are contraband or not, and it would appear that no decisive appeal could be made to authority on the point. The subject is one of far-reaching importance, and the action of Russia in declaring provisions absolute contraband created a precedent of great gravity. Sir Henry Maine, with great prescience, pointed to the failure to define

Sir H. S.
Maine on "the
unexampled
danger" of
declaring food
contraband.

¹ "Droit des Gens," bk. iii. c. vii. s. 112.

² Phillimore, vol. iii. p. 348; Duer on "Marine Insurance," vol. i. p. 750.

³ Lectures, "International Law," vii., p. 126.

⁴ "Traité du Droit de Domaine de Propriété," 1772, t. i. Pte. 1, c. ii. s. 2;
Art. 2, s. 2.

contraband in the Declaration of Paris, and to the tendency to establish new classes of contraband, as a source "of unexampled danger" to this country. He predicted that there would be a struggle to include coal and provisions as contraband, and that the danger would necessarily arise on the mere outbreak of hostilities.¹ He suggests that the path of safety for this country lies in accession to the United States' principle of the immunity of private property at sea. It would, however, appear probable, for good or bad, that if the immunity of private property at sea became an accepted doctrine, the modern public commerce-destroyer and the privateer would alike lose their vocation. The only goods which could be seized would then be contraband goods, the actual property of a belligerent Government, which are not likely to be carried to any great extent in neutral bottoms.

Sir H. S.
Maine's pro-
posed pro-
vision against
contingency.

The gravity of the precedent created by Russia in declaring provisions absolute contraband was recognized in the speeches of Lord Lansdowne and the Prime Minister. Lord Lansdowne, alluding to the British protest against the Russian declaration, observed, "We took up, in particular, the inclusion amongst articles unconditionally contraband of war of provisions, in which I need not say this country is very largely interested. We pointed out that the inclusion of all provisions in this category was a very serious innovation, and we added to our despatch a statement that we felt

Statement of
Lord Lans-
downe, Aug.
12, 1904.

¹ Lectures, "International Law," vi. p. 121. In giving his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, Professor T. E. Holland stated that he did not think for a moment the principle of the inviolability of private property would be ever accepted (Report, etc., vol. ii. p. 236). Dr. J. Westlake considered that there would be no difficulty in procuring an acceptance of the principle if England consented, unless her consent was only given when war was very nearly in prospect (*ibid., supra*, p. 241). In his memorandum submitted to the Commission, Professor Holland stated that the general opinion of continental jurists on the alteration of existing law which would exempt all private property from maritime capture, whether ship or cargo, not being contraband of war, finds expression in the *Règlement International des Prises* of the Institut de Droit International. Article 4 of the *Règlement* is to the effect that "la propriété privée est inviolable, sous la condition de réciprocité, et sauf les cas prévus au s. 23 (see "Annuaire de l' Institut," tt. vi., vii., viii.). The political department of the United States has long favoured exemption (Marcy Amendment, 1861; action at the Hague Conference, 1899), though their "Naval War Code," of 1900, naturally still provides (Article 14) to the contrary. (Cf. Reports, etc., vol. iii. p. 255).

bound to reserve our rights by protesting at once against the doctrine that it is for the belligerent to decide that certain articles or classes of articles are, as a matter of course, and without reference to other considerations, to be dealt with as contraband of war, regardless of the well-established rights of neutrals.”¹ On the day on which Lord Lansdowne made the above statement, Mr. Balfour observed in the House of Commons, “We certainly have felt it to be our duty to point out to the Russian Government that we protest in the strongest way against the idea that food is to be regarded as contraband of war.”

A fortnight later, speaking at the Foreign Office, in answer to resolutions presented to him by an important deputation,

Statement of
Mr. Balfour,
Aug. 26, 1904.

representative of British shipping interests, Mr. Balfour said,

“But the principle we have laid down as, we believe, in absolute conformity with the laws and practice of nations, is that the warlike stores carried to a belligerent are undoubtedly contraband of war, that coal carried to a belligerent for the purpose of aiding him in his warlike operations is undoubtedly contraband, that food stuffs carried to an army in the field, or to a beleaguered fortress, or carried to a foreign country to aid the troops or fleet, are contraband; but that we do not accept the doctrine which is apparently laid down—and I lay stress on the word ‘apparently’ because there is some ambiguity about it—we do not accept the doctrine apparently laid down in the Russian notification, that coal, food stuffs, cotton, and many other things are absolute contraband of war, and that the mere fact that they are found on board ship justifies the seizure of the goods and, in certain circumstances, the capture and retention and confiscation of the vessel.”² It has been an instructive result of the Russo-Japanese War that the neutrality of Great Britain has received more discussion in Parliament than at any other date in the history of this country, except during the American Civil War, 1861–5.

The speeches of Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour showed an adequate grasp of a situation which was by no means free from difficulty. In fact, the problems created by maritime war

¹ *Times*, August 12, 1904.

² *Ibid.*, August 26, 1904.

are almost as numerous as at any period in the history of international law. The Declaration of Paris has proved, as Sir H. S. Maine anticipated, totally inadequate to solve these nice questions. It was contended in one of the most famous documents of maritime law that treaties declaring "Free Ships, Free Goods" were to be regarded as so many exceptions to the principle of maritime law, as defined in the "Il Consolato del Mare," c. 276.¹ The effect of the Declaration of Paris has been to make the exceptions eat up the rule, in Lord Campbell's phrase. But the entire absence of any definition of contraband in the Declaration has left neutral commerce as exposed to the encroachment of belligerent rights as before 1856. Goods which were formerly seized in neutral vessels because they were the property of enemy subjects are now liable to seizure on the pretext that they are contraband. The description of the Declaration of Paris as a code of maritime law is most misleading, for definitions constitute an indispensable element of a code, and the Declaration of 1856 does not contain a single definition.

The *Times* of September 26 contained the announcement that Russia had recognized the British protest by consenting to include food in the category of conditionally contraband articles. This concession brought Russian practice into line with the best opinions. Phillimore had long ago admitted that "to assert that provisions going to an unblockaded port can never be contraband is surely too large a proposition;" and, in fact, the weight of authority is overwhelming to the effect that provisions are contraband *sub modo*. The position from which Russia receded was that food is absolute contraband —a pretension which was adequately treated in the American protest: "Articles which, like arms and ammunition, are by their nature of self-evident warlike use are contraband of war if destined to enemy's territory; but articles which, like coal, cotton, and provisions, though of ordinarily innocent, are capable of warlike use are not subject to capture and confiscation unless shown by evidence to be destined, etc., to the military or naval forces of a belligerent."²

The Declaration of Paris, 1856, an unsatisfactory settlement.

The Russian concession of Sept., 1904, satisfactory as far as food is concerned.

The protest of the United States, *Times*, Sept., 1904.

¹ "Collectanea Juridica," vol. i. piece v.

² *Times*, September 21, 1904.

Russian Prize Courts require an impossible proof.

The note in question proceeded to argue that the technical rule which was apparently enforced in Russian Prize Courts to the effect that the owners of the captured cargo must prove that no part of it might eventually come into the hands of the enemy's forces, demanded an impossible proof, and one which would have the effect of rendering all commerce impossible with the non-combatant population. The ruling of the Vladivostock Prize Court was described by Mr. Hay as "a declaration of war against commerce of every description between the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent State."

A declaration of war against commerce.

But this, in the language of Vattel, "is a violation of the rights of neutral nations, a flagrant injury to them."¹ Further, it had the effect of rescinding by implication two Articles of the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Consistently with these principles the Government of the United States refused to accept the decision of the prize court confiscating flour and railway material as absolutely contraband with reference to the seizure of the *Arabia*. Clause 5, Article 10, of the Russian Imperial Order was criticized by Mr. Hay in the light of the maxim, "Quod dolus versatur in generalibus." The order condemned, as unconditional contraband, provisions (*inter alia*) if transported to an enemy destination. But the order failed to distinguish between territory on the one hand, and naval or military forces of the enemy on the other, thus permitting a construction which condemned as contraband all food stuffs proceeding to any part of Japan.

Inconsistent with declaration of Paris.

Enemy destination does not mean the entire littoral of a belligerent State.

International law on topic declared by Lord Stowell.

The American contention may be reinforced by the great authority of Lord Stowell, who delivered careful judgments upon the subject in the *Jonge Margaretha*, (1799) 1 Rob. 188, and the *Ranger*, (1805) 6 Rob. 125.

The *Jonge Margaretha* was the case of a Papenberg ship taken on a voyage from Amsterdam to Brest with a cargo of cheese. A store-keeper's certificate was produced, stating the cheeses to be such cheeses as were used for English ship stores, where foreign cheeses were served, and such as at that time were being exclusively used in French ships.

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. vii. s. 112.

Sir W. Scott described the transaction as "that of a neutral carrying a cargo of provisions, not the product and manufacture of his own country, but of the enemy's ally in war—of provisions which are a capital ship's store—and to the great port of naval equipment of the enemy." An additionally aggravating circumstance was, Sir W. Scott proceeded, that there was in Brest a considerable French fleet in a state of preparation for sallying forth on a hostile expedition; its motions at that time were watched with great anxiety by a British fleet which lay off the harbour for the purpose of defeating its supplies. "Was the carriage of such a supply," Sir W. Scott asked, "to such a place, and on such an occasion, a traffic so purely neutral, as to subject the neutral trader to no inconvenience?" The court laid down no such position as that cheese, being a provision, is universally contraband. Sir W. Scott proceeded, "The catalogue of contraband has varied very much, and sometimes in such a manner as to make it very difficult to assign a reason of the variations owing to particular circumstances, the history of which has not accompanied the history of the decisions. In 1673, when many unwarrantable rules were laid down by public authority respecting contraband, it was expressly asserted by Sir R. Wiseman, the then King's Advocate, upon a formal reference made to him, that, by the practice of the English Admiralty, corn, wine, and oil were liable to be deemed contraband. In 1747, butter in the *Jonge Andreas* cutter going to Rochelle, was condemned; how it happened that cheese at the same time was more favourably considered, according to the case cited by Dr. Swabey, I do not exactly know, the distinction appears nice; in all probability the cheeses were not of the species which is intended for ship's use. Salted cod and salmon were condemned in the *Jonge Frederick*, going to Rochelle in the same year; in 1748, in the *Joannes*, rice and salted herrings were condemned as contraband. These instances show that articles of food have been so considered—at least where it was probable—that they were intended for naval or military use."

But the doctrine, as thus laid down, was carefully limited. "I take the modern established rule to be this, that generally

In 1673 an unwarrantable rule was laid down by King's Advocate that corn, wine, and oil were contraband.

The first half of 18th century provisions were considered at least conditionally contraband in English prize courts.

Established rule provisions not contraband. [provisions] are not contraband, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the particular situation of the war or the condition of the parties engaged in it.”¹ Both in

the case of provisions and naval stores, certain grounds of mitigation have secured a degree of recognition which varies in different countries. Special indulgence is shown—

Grounds of inferring articles innocent. (1) Where the articles are the growth of the country of the exporter.

(2) Where the articles are in their native and unmanufactured state, *e.g.* iron, hemp, and wheat as contrasted with anchors, cordage, bread.

(3) Where the articles are intended for the ordinary uses of life, or even for mercantile ship's use; an intention which ought to be presumed from a general commercial destination.

Grounds of condemnation of articles. On the other hand, to summarize the most authoritative practice, articles are liable to be treated as contraband, being either naval stores or provisions, when—

(1) They are not the growth of the country which exports them;

(2) They are manufactured articles prepared for immediate use;

(3) They are going with a highly probable destination to military use, because they are consigned to a port, “the great predominant character” of which is a port of naval or military equipment.²

Lord Stowell's opinion impossible to ascertain final application of an article *ancipitis usus.* The technical rule of the Vladivostock Prize Court was anticipated and condemned more than a hundred years ago, in the judgment of Lord Stowell in the *Jonge Margaretha*. The rule of the Russian Prize Court is that the owners of the captured cargo (when it consists of conditionally contraband articles) must prove that no part of it may eventually come to the hands of the enemy's forces.³ Mr. Hay observed that this was a proof of an impossible nature. In the *Jonge Margaretha*, pp. 188, 195, Sir W. Scott observed,

¹ pp. 188-192.

² Cf. Observations of Sir W. Scott, in the *Jonge Margaretha*, pp. 188, 194, 195

³ See *Times*, September 21, 1904.

"it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article *ancipitis usus*, it is not an injurious rule which deduces both ways the final use from the immediate destination."

The fact that Brest was essentially a port given over to naval equipment, and that a large expedition was preparing there, to the knowledge of those who owned the *Jonge Margaretha*, no doubt very greatly influenced the decision to confiscate the cargo. As to what constitutes a port, "the great predominant character" of which is a port of naval or military equipment, Sir W. Scott considered that Brest was, and Bordeaux was not, such a place. Agreeably to this distinction between ports of immediate destination, Dutch cheeses going from Amsterdam to Bordeaux on account of a merchant of Altona were restored on further proof.¹ In the case of the *Jonge Margaretha*, the cargo was pronounced contraband, but the ship was not confiscated, although it belonged to the owner of the cargo, because he acted without dissimulation, and there was some ground for supposing he had been misled as to the expedition preparing at Brest.

The Ranger, (1805) 6 Rob. 125, was the case of an American ship with a cargo of biscuit and flour which had been shipped from the public stores at Bordeaux and destined, as the court found, for Cadiz, though ostensibly documented for Villa Real in Portugal.

Sir W. Scott observed, "This is a very gross attempt to abuse the instructions which were issued for the supply of provisions to Spain. It must always be remembered that this Government might have availed itself of the interior distress of the enemy's country as an instrument of war. It did not, however, but humanely permitted cargoes of grain to be carried, without molestation, for the relief of the necessities of famine under which Spain had for some time laboured. It was natural to expect that a grant made with so much liberality would have been used with the most delicate honour and good faith, both by Spain and her allies. But what is the use now made of it? A large quantity of biscuit, evidently destined for sea-stores, is put on board, as it is impossible to dissemble, from

¹ Welvaart, K., 1 Rob. 195 and note.

the public store-house at Bordeaux, and sent into the port of Cadiz."

Both the vessel and cargo were condemned, the former as having been "employed in carrying a cargo of sea-stores to a place of naval equipment under false papers." As an additional penalty the claimant was condemned to pay captor's expenses.

At a time of great public danger, England regarded food only conditionally contraband.

This case shows that even during a life-and-death struggle like that which signalized the year of Austerlitz and Trafalgar, the Government of Great Britain refused to include provisions in the category of absolute contraband, a circumstance which may properly be urged in mitigation of the indefensible pretensions of Great Britain in 1793. Nor must it be forgotten that the claim to treat provisions as contraband put forward in that year was, at least to some extent, provoked by the unprecedented international relations then subsisting between this country and France.

The *Edward*, (1801) 4 Rob. 68.

A destination to a port of naval equipment inferred from untruthful entries in log-book.

In the *Edward*, (1801) 4 Rob. 68, a Prussian ship and a cargo of wines were captured on June 16, 1801, on a voyage from Bordeaux, ostensibly to Embden, but so near the Isle of Saints, and with such apparent contradictions in the log-book respecting the course the ship had held for two or three days before, that the King's Advocate, resting on that point chiefly, to prove a false destination, prayed the court to request the attendance of one of the masters of the Trinity House.

Captain King, a master of Trinity House, observed (*inter alia*) that the contradictions in the log-book for two days were such that they could not have been honest or truthful entries. The vessel was taken at a point which she could not have reached while pursuing a proper course to Embden, if the master had been a man of ordinary skill, and unless the weather had been stormy. There was no ground for doubting the former, and no evidence of the latter supposition.

Wines conditionally contraband.

Under these circumstances the court inferred intention of going to Brest. Sir W. Scott proceeded, "The consequences of this will be indubitable, for though wines are not an article generally contraband *per se*, yet in conjunction with all the

circumstances of the voyage, they are unquestionably to be considered as naval stores. It was a voyage to Brest, where there was notoriously a large armament lying, very much in want of articles of this kind, articles of an indispensable nature. In Lord Stowell's time conditional contraband confiscated. If such articles had gone with an avowed destination to such a place and at such a conjuncture, the rule of pre-emption would have been a rule of excessive and undue indulgence to apply to such a case; but where the destination is dissembled, confiscation is the clear and necessary consequence. The voyage, being a voyage from one part of the enemy to another, cannot be deemed a voyage of supply to him; but it is to be remembered that Brest is a port not situated within a wine province of that country." . . .

"The rule has been already established, that the transfer of contraband from one port of a country to another, where it is required for the purposes of war, is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation into the country itself."¹

In the case of the *Edward* (*supra*) the ship was involved in condemnation with her cargo because of the false representation of her voyage.

The inference from this decision, though not the principle upon which it was decided, requires considerable qualification in these days of rapid railway communications.² Sir H. S. Maine³ points out that if a port of France were now blockaded, the effectiveness of the operation would be very considerably influenced by the increased facilities of railway communication. In the case of a blockade of Brest at the present day, wines would ordinarily be transported by rail from Bordeaux. *Mutatis mutandis*, cases like the *Edward* (*supra*) could not arise. But this consideration does not affect the instructiveness of the decision in point of law. If wines at the present day were conveyed by sea from one belligerent port to another of the same belligerent, being a port of which "the great predominant character" was a port of naval and military

¹ The *Edward*, 1801, 4 Rob. 68, 70.

² Cf. Letter of Professor T. E. Holland, *Times*, July 13, 1904.

³ Lecture, "International Law," vi., p. 116.

equipment, there can be little doubt that the principle of Sir W. Scott's decision would be followed.

The case of the *Allanton*,
Russo-Japan-
ese War; and
the doctrine
of continuous
voyage.

The case of the *Allanton*¹ makes it clear that the Russian Prize Courts have adopted a most singular extension of what is known as the doctrine of continuous voyage. The *Allanton*, a British steamer belonging to the North of Ireland Steamship Company, left Murora, in Japan, on January 13, with a cargo of coal for the neutral port of Singapore. She was captured by the Vladivostock squadron and condemned by the Prize Court at Vladivostock.

The doctrine
of continuous
voyage perma-
nently en-
grafted on the
law of contra-
band.

The condemnation of the vessel was, apparently, based upon the Russian construction of the doctrine of continuous voyage—a doctrine historically connected with the rule known as the rule of war of 1756. Professor T. E. Holland, in the *Times* (July 13, 1904), while not appearing in any way to defend the action of the Russian Prize Court, pointed out that the American view of the doctrine of continuous voyage could not be entirely dismissed, adding that it would be disastrous if shipowners and insurers were to assume that a neutral vessel, if destined for a neutral port, is necessarily safe from capture. It is true that words capable of this construction may be quoted from one of Lord Stowell's judgments now more than a century old; but many things have happened (notably, the innovation of railways) since the days of that great judge. The United States cases, decided in the 'sixties, in which certain ships were held to be engaged in the carriage of contraband, although their destination was a neutral port, were substantially approved by Great Britain. This principle was adopted by Italy in the *Doeljwijk* in 1896, and was supported by Great Britain in the correspondence which took place with Germany in 1900. It was endorsed after prolonged discussion by the Institut de Droit International in 1896.

Authorities
rejecting
conclusion.

Historicus.

Sir W. Harcourt, in his discussion of the *Trent* affair, 1861, had used language which suggested a different conclusion: "In order to constitute contraband of war, it is absolutely essential that two elements should concur, namely, a hostile quality and a hostile destination." This view coincided

¹ Cf. *Shipping Gazette*, June 24, 1904.

generally with that of the late Mr. W. E. Hall, that there was no analogy between the cases in which Lord Stowell applied the doctrine of continuous voyages and the cases of contraband and blockade to which that doctrine was applied by the American courts. The gravamen of Mr. Hall's argument is that Lord Stowell's doctrine was applied only to the trade between the mother-country and its colonies, and that the Americans extended it to contraband trade generally. But Sir W. Grant, M.R., in the case of the *William*, (1806) 5 Rob. 385, a case to which Mr. Hall refers,¹ expressly referred to an instance in which the doctrine of continuous voyages had been applied to a case of contraband. This was the case of the *Eagle*, 1803; in regard to which the Master of the Rolls observed: "By the original evidence it appeared that the cargo had come from Bilbao to Philadelphia, where it had been landed, and where it was proceeding in the same vessel to the Havannah. The condemnation in the court below had proceeded on the ground that the cargo was contraband of war. The only question here was with regard to the continuity of the voyage."² Restitution was decreed on the ground that the case was not one of continuous voyage, because there had been a *bonâ fide* importation into America. But as the Court of Appeal considered the question of continuous voyage without disturbing the decision of the court below on contraband, it is reasonable to infer that the doctrine of continuous voyage was not wholly inapplicable, even in Lord Stowell's time, to the conveyance of contraband. Wheaton's editors consider that it created an innovation in the law of prize to apply the principle of continuous voyages to the conveyance of contraband.³ But this can hardly be successfully maintained in view of the explicit nature of Sir W. Grant's judgment in the *William*. It may, of course, be properly pointed out that the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to the conveyance of contraband is hardly consistent with one of the best known of Lord Stowell's

Whether
doctrine of
continuous
voyage con-
sidered in-
applicable to
carriage of
contraband in
English Prize
Courts during
Great War
Question. Que.

¹ "International Law," p. 669.

² *Per* Grant, M.R., in the *William*, 1806, 5 Rob. 385, 401.

³ Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1904, p. 685.

judgments, the *Imina*.¹ But the case of the *Eagle* can be reconciled with even this last case, if it is treated as a case of a vessel with a false destination. There would appear to be considerable analogy between sailing under false papers from a neutral port to a belligerent port, and sailing from a neutral (or belligerent) port to a belligerent port *via* an interposed neutral port. There is the same fraud practised on the other belligerent, and it is essential to recollect, as appears from Lord Stowell's judgments, that the ground of condemnation in the prize court of a belligerent is the fraud practised upon him under the neutral's flag. Whether fraud exists or not is to be inferred from the ship's papers, and when proved to exist, fraud always involved the condemnation of the vessels as well as the cargo.² Where there is no fraud, as in the case of the *Jonge Margaretha*, (1799) 1 Rob. 188, the cargo may be liable to either pre-emption or confiscation, but the ship is not confiscated.

The *Imina* was the case of a cargo of ship timber which had sailed (July 1798), from Dantzic, bound originally for Amsterdam, but making at the time of capture for Emden, in consequence of the blockade of its port of destination.

Lord Stowell's opinion, no penalty can be incurred if neutral port is the real destination. Sir W. Scott said: "This is a claim for a ship taken, as it is admitted, at the time of capture sailing for Emden, a neutral port, a destination on which, if it is considered as the real destination, no question of contraband arises, inasmuch as goods going to a neutral port cannot come under the description of contraband."³ The papers of the *Imina* left the matter in some doubt whether the cargo was contraband. Sir W. Scott proceeded to observe that he could not fix the character of contraband upon them "in the present voyage," even if the goods were liable to be considered contraband on a hostile destination. "The rule respecting contraband," Sir W. Scott observed, "as I have always understood it, is that the article must be taken *in delicto*, in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy's port. Under the present understanding

¹ 1800, 3 Rob. 167.

² *Per* Sir W. Scott in the *Ringende Jacob*, (1798) 1 Rob. 89, 91, referring to *Eliza Holtz*, Adm., July 3, 1794.

³ *Imina*, (1800) 3 Rob. 167-169.

of the law of nations, you cannot generally take the proceeds in the return voyage. From the moment of quitting a port on a hostile destination the offence is complete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if the goods are not taken *in delicto*, and in the actual prosecution of the voyage, the penalty is not now generally held to attach."¹

The offence of conveying contraband, unlike the offence of preparing an illegal expedition under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 11, is not completed by the intention. Even a criminal deviation by the master does not immediately implicate the cargo. In the case of the *Imina*, the master, on receiving information of the blockade of Amsterdam, changed his course and shaped for Emden. This was "a favourable alteration of his course." A favourable alteration cannot protect cargo where there is a guilty act at the time of capture. But here there was no guilty act at the time of capture. A criminal deviation does not immediately implicate the cargo, because the master is not *de jure* agent of cargo owners unless so specially constituted by them. In the case of the *Imina*, if the capture had been made a day before the alteration of the course, different considerations would have arisen. But the owners were entitled to the benefit of the change of course, which was an absolute defence to the charge of contraband. However, the court held that the captors of the *Imina* were entitled to their expenses, because the original destination furnished an abundant excuse for bringing the vessel in to stand her trial.

Having regard to the attempt which is likely to be repeated to apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to the carriage of contraband, it may be worth while shortly to recall some further decisions on the subject of continuous voyage.

In the *Maria*, (1805) 5 Rob. 365, an American ship sailed from Havannah to New Providence, with a cargo of colonial produce, and was proceeding at the moment of capture with a considerable part of that cargo on board to the port of Amsterdam. The head note of the case states that

A vessel ostensibly engaged in conveyance of contraband may make a favourable alteration of her course.

¹ *Imina*, (1800) 3 Rob. 167-169.

the question raised was that of a continuous voyage in the colonial trade of the enemy country, viz. Spain. But as the destination was not to the mother-country, Spain, it is very difficult to understand how the case ever came to be regarded as a case of a continuous voyage, even though Amsterdam was a belligerent port. A note to this case shows that colonial produce, re-exported by means of drawbacks from America to Europe, was estimated to amount to twenty eight-millions of dollars out of a total of seventy-five millions of dollars exports annually at this date. The extent of this commerce was naturally the cause of much resentment in England, which did not at that time recognize the doctrine of Free Ships, Free Goods. Sir W. Scott observed that two questions had been made on the facts: (1) Whether the goods were liable to condemnation? (2) Whether the ship as concerned in the same illegal transaction was subject to the same penalty?

Large definition of continued voyage enunciated by Lord Stowell.

The learned judge added, "It is certainly true that a continued voyage from the colony of the enemy to the mother-country, or to any other ports but those of the country to which the vessel belongs, will subject the cargo to confiscation; and the only point which the court has to decide is whether the voyage in question is to be considered a continuous voyage or not."¹ It is, perhaps, proper to point out that this very sweeping enunciation of the doctrine of continuous voyage must be read with the judge's equally express statement,² that the fact that the destination was not to the mother-country of the colony had its "due weight" in favour of the claimants. It must always be remembered that in 1805, the English interpretation of the law of nations was that the goods of an enemy, on board the ship of a friend, were lawful prize. If the goods were enemy goods, it was not necessary to invoke the doctrine of continuous voyage to justify their confiscation. Again, goods going to a neutral port might be

The principles of continued voyage considered settled by Lord Stowell. on account of belligerent owners. The principle of continued voyages was declared by Sir W. Scott not to be a new principle, "On the contrary, it is an inherent and settled

¹ *The Maria*, (1805) 5 Rob. 368.

² At p. 371.

principle in all cases in which the same question can have come under discussion, that the mere touching at any port without importing the cargo into the common stock of the country will not alter the nature of the voyage, which continues the same in all respects, and must be considered a voyage to the country to which the vessel is going actually for the purpose of delivering her cargo at the ultimate port." A very important case on the subject was the *Essex*, (1805) C.A., a case of a trade from the mother-country to the colony, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, and a distinct adoption of the purpose on the part of the owner. The *Essex* was an American vessel, which had gone from America to Lisbon, where, meeting an indifferent market, she went to Barcelona, and there took on board a cargo of Spanish produce for Havannah. This step was taken under the direction of the agent in Europe, that she should go to Havannah, first touching at Salem, in America. The owner, who was resident at this place, adopted the plan and allowed the vessel to proceed. The court found that it was the intention, originating in the mind of an authorized agent, acting under full powers, that the vessel should go to the Havannah and that this purpose was adopted by the owner; but that it was in reality a continued voyage from Spain to Havannah, that as to the intention all doubt was done away with by the adoption on the part of the owner, who had the vessel in his own port, and was fully implicated in the projected voyage.

The *William*, (1806) 5 Rob. 385, was a question on the continuity of a voyage in the colonial trade of the enemy, brought by appeal from the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, where the ship and cargo, taken on a destination to Bilbao in Spain, and claimed on behalf of claimants from Marblehead, Massachusetts, were condemned, July 17, 1800.

It appeared in evidence that the ship had gone to Martinique, where the outward cargo was disposed of; that she then proceeded to La Guaira, Venezuela, at that date a colony of Spain, and took on board a cargo of cocoa, the property of the owners, which was brought to Marblehead on May 29, 1800. The ship was then unladen, after which she again took on

A continued
voyage,
merely made
from trade
exigency, in-
curs liability.

The goods shipped at interposed neutral port may not all have been brought from belligerent colony by vessel making continued voyage.

board the chief part of the former cargo, with some sugars brought from Havannah in other ships, and then on June 7 sailed upon a destination to Bilbao. The case came before the Lord of Appeal in 1804, who reversed the sentence of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, but directed further proof to be made as to the cocoa imported into, and exported from, Marblehead, America, within nine months.

Sir W. Grant, M.R., observed, "According to our understanding of the law, it is only from his Majesty's instructions that neutrals derive any right of carrying on with the colonies of our enemies, in time of war, a trade from which they were excluded in time of peace. The instructions had not permitted the direct trade between the hostile colony and the mother-country, but had, on the contrary, ordered all the vessels engaged in it to be brought in for lawful adjudication; and what the present claimants accordingly maintain is, not that they could carry the produce of Laguira directly to Spain, but that they were not carrying the cargo in question, inasmuch as the voyage in which it was taken was a voyage from North America, and not directly from a colony of Spain. What, then, with reference to this subject, is to be considered as a direct voyage from one place to another? Nobody has ever supposed that a mere deviation from the straightest and shortest course, in which the voyage could be performed would change its denomination and make it cease to be a direct one within the intendment of the instructions . . ." The act of importation is necessarily the same, whether the voyage is really ended, or whether it is only effected to give it the appearance of being ended. The landing at the Custom House and the payment of duties are mere voluntary ceremonies in the case of a fictitious importation with a view to a continued voyage. But when the truth is discernible about the transaction, the payment of the custom duties may be only a means whereby the doctrine of continuous voyages may be defeated as it is understood in an English Prize Court. In the case of the *William*, it was shown that the unlading, re-shipping, and payment of the customs duties all took place within a few days. The landing was almost instantaneously

Difference
between a
genuine and a
fictitious im-
portation.

followed by the reshipment. There was, therefore, no genuine importation, and what was done was intended only to pass for importation in the prize court.

Sir W. Grant then proceeded to refer to other cases in which the doctrine of continuous voyages had received construction.¹ In the *Maria*, (1805) 5 Rob. 365, 368, Sir W. Scott expressed his surprise that any one should represent the doctrine of continuity of voyage as new, and treated it as an inherent and settled principle. But as applied to a colonial trade, the doctrine was clearly only five years old, and the fundamental or leading case on the doctrine of continuity of voyage was decided in the House of Lords only a few months before Sir W. Scott decreed restitution in the *Maria*. This seems to show that the principle of continuity of voyage may have had an earlier connection with the conveyance of contraband, with which it was undoubtedly associated in the case of the *Eagle* (q. v. *ante*).² In the case of the *William*, it was held that the voyage was illegal, as there was no proof of actual payment of the import duties at the port in Massachusetts.

Doctrine of
continuity of
voyage applies
where no proof
of payment of
import duties
at interposed
port.

The American cases which applied the doctrine of continuity of voyage to the conveyance of contraband arose out of the events of the American Civil War.

The doctrine
in the United
States.

In the *Bermuda* (1865), 3 Wallace 515, the principles enunciated were the following. Vessels conveying contraband cargo to belligerent ports not under blockade, under circumstances of fraud or bad faith, or cargo of any description to belligerent ports under blockade, are liable to seizure and condemnation from the commencement to the end of the voyage. A voyage from a neutral to a belligerent port is one and the same voyage, whether the destination be ulterior or direct, and whether with or without the interposition of one or more intermediate ports, and whether to be performed by one vessel or several employed in the

¹ *Essex*, Lords, June 22, 1805; considered by Sir W. Scott the leading or fundamental case in the *Maria*, 1805, 5 Rob. 365, 369; *Polly*, Adm. 1800; *Mercury*, 1802; *Eagle*, Adm. 1803; the case in which the doctrine of continuity was applied to a contraband cargo. *Free Port*, 1803.

² Adm. 1803.

same transactions and in the accomplishment of the same purpose.

The *Circassian*, (1864) 2 Wallace, 135, on the principle of continuity of voyage, decided that a vessel sailing from a neutral port with intent to violate a blockade is liable to capture and condemnation as prize from the time of sailing; and the intent to violate the blockade is not disproved by evidence of a purpose to call at another neutral port, not reached at the time of capture, with ulterior destination to the blockaded port.

Where
doctrine of
continuity of
voyage does
not apply.

The *Springbok*, (1866) 5 Wallace, 1, laid down the following principles on the doctrine of continuity of voyage. Where the papers of a ship sailing under a charter party are all genuine and regular, and show a voyage between ports neutral within the meaning of international law; where there has been no concealment nor spoliation of them; where the stipulations of the charter party in favour of the owners are apparently in good faith; where the owners are neutrals, have no interest in the cargo, and have not previously in any way violated neutral obligations, and there is no sufficient proof that they have any knowledge of the unlawful destination of the cargo;—in such a case, its aspect being otherwise fair, the vessel will not be condemned because the neutral port to which it is sailing has been constantly and notoriously used as a port of call and transhipment by persons engaged in systematic violation of blockade and in the conveyance of contraband of war, and was meant by the owners of the cargo carried on this ship to be so used in regard to it.

The case of
the *Allanton*,
July, 1904.

The letter of the owner of the steamship *Allanton* rendered the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court incomprehensible in the light of prize law as understood both in this country and in the United States.¹ The vessel was carrying coal, which is absolute contraband under the Russian regulations. But she was proceeding away from belligerent territory to a neutral port. Even if she had previously been engaged in contraband transactions, she could not have been confiscated according to English prize law, as Lord Stowell said in the

¹ Cf. *Times*, July 8, 1904.

Imina, (1800) 3 Rob. 167, 168: "Under the present understanding of the law of nations you cannot generally take the proceeds on the return voyage." However, the Prize Court at Vladivostock did not even allege that the *Allanton* had been engaged in previous contraband transactions. The only conceivable ground on which the decree could have proceeded was that the *Allanton* was a case of false destination and fraudulent papers, like the *Edward*, (1801) 4 Rob. 68. It is sufficient to say that no such suggestion has been made. The Russian Prize Court are stated to have grounded their decree (*inter alia*) on the supposition that the *Allanton* intended to proceed to some port in Japan. But this supposition would only have been justifiable if the vessel was out of its proper course. It was stated by the owner, Mr. Rea, that so far from this being the case, the *Allanton* was seized when proceeding in a perfectly straight line from Muroran to Singapore. In a case before Lord Stowell a false destination was inferred when a ship, being ostensibly bound for Lisbon, was taken with contraband out of her proper course, steering towards one of the Spanish ports in the Bay of Biscay.¹ In another case already noticed, Sir W. Scott inferred that the ostensible destination was false when it was stated to be Emden, but the vessel was found near the Isle of Saints, and had been hovering about, and adhering to, the French coast.² In the case of the *Allanton* there were no apparent inconsistencies in the vessel's conduct that required explanation, arising either from the place where she was seized or from false or contradictory papers, and hence the decision seems altogether inexplicable. It is satisfactory to know that this wholly unwarrantable decision was reversed on appeal.

The case of the German vessels seized in African waters was defended by Professor Holland in the *Times*, though it involved an extension of the principle of continuous voyages to the conveyance of contraband, as "an innovation which seems to be demanded by the conditions of modern commerce."³ If the case of the *Bundesrat* be regarded as a case

¹ The *Franklin*, (1801) 3 Rob. 217.

² The *Edward*, (1801) 4 Rob. 68.

³ *Times*, January 3, 1900.

of a continuous voyage, it cannot be regarded as affording an instance of an innovation in prize law, since, as has been seen, Sir W. Grant, M.R., in the case of the *Eagle*, applied the doctrine of continued voyages to a case of contraband. The circumstances of the seizure of the German vessels in 1900 recall the observation of Grotius, "Distinguendus erit belli status." The situation of the belligerents in the South African War was altogether exceptional, and afforded a striking instance of the different consequences attaching to a contraband traffic by sea and a contraband traffic by land. Valin's commentators, Pistoye and Duverdy, observed that, while both kinds of traffic were equally unneutral, only the transportation by sea was prohibited.

A view similar to the American view, applying the principle of continued voyages to the conveyance of contraband, was taken by the Italian Court in the recent case of the *Doeljvik*, a Dutch vessel captured and declared good prize on the ground that, though bound for the French colonial port of Djiboutil, it was laden with an extraordinary provision of arms of a model out of use, which could only be intended for the Abyssinians, with whom the Italians were at war.¹

The case of the *Doeljvik* was tried in the Commercial Court before the Master of the Rolls in 1897.² The ship was captured and declared good prize on the ground that, though bound for the French colonial port of Djiboutil, it was laden "with an extraordinary provision of arms of a model out of use." The principle of continuity of voyage, therefore, came specifically up for adjudication in the Italian Prize Court on the issue whether it is applicable to the conveyance of contraband. As regards proceedings in the Commercial Court, notice of abandonment was given, but refused, and before the action came up for trial, though after it was commenced, the ship was restored by the Italian Government on the ground that the war was over.

¹ *Brusa*, "Rev. Gin. de Droit International Public," 1897; *Fauchille*, id. 1897, p. 291; *Fedozzi*, "Rev. de Droit International et de Legislation comparée," 1897, p. 55; *Diena*, "Journal du Trait International Prise," 1897, p. 268.

² Cf. *Ruys v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation*, *Times*, April 14, 15; May 21, June 1.

The Master of the Rolls, then Mr. Justice Collins, held that the plaintiffs were estopped by the decision of the Italian Prize Court as far as the findings of fact were concerned. The question was solely whether there was concealment or misrepresentation of material facts, unless it was shown that the ship was confiscated for carrying false papers, an act of the shipowners outside the risk insured. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, but the further point was reserved for argument whether the vessel should be regarded as a total or a partial loss. Mr. Justice Collins, in a very learned judgment, held that the commencement of the action was the crucial date, and that matter arising after an action will not defeat an abandonment before action, but must be dealt with according to the rights of the parties under the abandonment. The plaintiffs, therefore, were entitled to recover as for a total loss.¹

¹ *Times*, May 25 and June 1, 1897.

CHAPTER XIII—(*continued*).

PARTS V., VI., VII.

CONTRABAND OF WAR (*continued*).

Pre-emption to THE doctrine of pre-emption only applies to articles conditionally or provisionally contraband (*contrebande relative ou par destination*). There can only be pre-emption where the declaration of a belligerent regarding contraband recognizes two classes. In the recent war, as has been seen, the Japanese regulations contained the division, while the Russian regulations did not. When pre-emption is exercised, the penalty is loss of freight and captor's expenses. Pre-emption is also introduced in the case of products native to the exporting country, even when they are affected by an inseparable taint of contraband. Lord Stowell appears to have considered that articles, the produce of the country which exported them, were not contraband because they were subject to the right of pre-emption.¹ There was no universal principle of relaxation in favour of the export of native produce.² Again, Lord Stowell confiscated provisions, which he expressly allowed were only articles conditionally contraband.³ It is clear that there was a rule of pre-emption in Lord Stowell's time, but it seems to have been defeasible in operation.⁴

Claimants
lose freight
and captor's
expenses.

Former un-
certainty as to
incidence of
pre-emption.

The law is now clear that articles conditionally contraband are liable to pre-emption only, though it is to be presumed

¹ Cf. observations in the *Twee Juffreven*, (1802) 4 Rob. 242, 243.

² The *Staat Emden*, (1798) 1 Rob. 28, 29.

³ *Jonge Margaretha*, (1799) 1 Rob. 188.

⁴ Cf. case of the *Eliza Holtz*, Adm. July 3, 1784, referred to by Sir W. Scott in the *Ringende Jacob*, (1798) 1 Rob. 91.

that they would be confiscated in cases where there are circumstances of falsehood and fraud, as to papers and destination of the voyage.

The Statute 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 38, provides that—

"Where a ship of a foreign nation passing the seas, laden with naval or victualling stores intended to be carried to a port of any enemy of her Majesty, is taken and brought to a port of the United Kingdom, and the purchase, for the service of her Majesty, of the stores on board the ship appears to the Lords of the Admiralty expedient, without the condemnation thereof in a prize court, in that case the Lords of the Admiralty may purchase on the account or for the service of her Majesty all or any of the stores on board the ship; and the Commissioners of the Customs may permit the stores purchased to be entered and landed within any port."

By Statute 27
& 28 Vict.
c. 25, s. 38,
Admiralty
may exercise
pre-emption
without bring-
ing in.

The English practice is usually to purchase at the market English value with a reasonable allowance, usually 10 per cent. for profit. Rules for ascertaining the value of the merchandise seized, and for other matters of detail connected with the practice, were laid down in the treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 1794, and in that between the former country and Sweden in 1803. The fact that pre-emption was exclusively applied to the new kinds of contraband has caused MM. Heffter (s. 161) and Calvo (ss. 2517, 2518) to look upon pre-emption, not as a mitigation, but as an intensification of the privileges of a belligerent.

Mr. W. E. Hall, on the other hand, considers¹ pre-emption a belligerent concession. It may, however, be recalled that Grotius quotes with approval the French edicts of 1584 and 1585, by which even munitions of war were to be paid for by the belligerent, and denies that the confiscation of munitions of war, practised at that date by the northern countries, could be regarded as "a permanent rule of equity." Grotius, therefore, rather suggests that the permanent rule of Opinion of Grotius that pre-emption should apply to absolute contraband.

¹ "International Law," p. 665, and note. ² *Ante*, "International Law," p. 196.

the whole law of contraband. While Ortolan clearly did not consider that pre-emption ought to apply to munitions of war—he confined the category of contraband to munitions of war—M. Bluntschli (ss. 806 and 811) considers that pre-emption ought to apply to intercepted munitions of war.

M. Heffter thinks that pre-emption ought to be calculated on the basis of the profit which would probably be realized if the voyage were completed. Sir W. Scott said on this point—

Sir W. Scott's opinion, pre-emption not to be estimated by price enemy would give, "I have never understood that . . . on the side of the neutral, the same exact compensation is to be expected, which he might have demanded from the enemy in his own port; the enemy may be distressed by famine, and may be driven by his necessities to pay a famine price for the commodity if it gets there; it does not follow that, acting upon my rights in war in intercepting such supplies, I am under the obligation of paying that price of distress."¹

This last case is cited by Phillimore as containing the best enumeration of the principles which govern the British courts on the subject of pre-emption. A point arose as to whether the charge of insurance ought to be included in the pre-emption valuation. It appears that, shortly before the decision, cases of this kind were settled by the Navy Board, and the charge of insurance allowed, without the policy being called for. But Sir W. Scott refused to include the charge of insurance, because—

Pre-emption does not include premiums.

(1) Payment of insurance money is only due on the event of the risk having been actually incurred. The risks here spoken of are ordinary sea risks. Sir W. Scott spoke of these as not having been incurred, because the vessel, on a voyage from Altona to Cadiz, had been seized in the British Channel.

(2) The cargo of wheat in the case of the *Haabet* was, in its own nature, liable to be intercepted by a belligerent.

The despatches of the ambassador of a belligerent accredited to a neutral court are not liable to seizure, as they are presumed to have reference to matters between the belligerent

¹ The *Haabet*, (1799) 2 Rob. Adm. Rep. pp. 174, 182.

and neutral States. Consular despatches are also exempt from seizure under the same circumstances. Phillimore considers that it is competent to a belligerent to stop the ambassador of his enemy on his passage.¹ This was written in 1857, and seems to be inconsistent with the result of the *Trent* affair, 1861, in which two commissioners of the United States, Messrs. Slidell and Mason, were taken out of a British mail steamer, on the high seas, by the captain of the *San Jacinto*, an American ship-of-war. This proceeding was unanimously condemned by all the Powers, who united with Great Britain in demanding the restoration of the commissioners. Messrs. Slidell and Mason were accordingly released.² One of the reasons alleged by the captain of the *San Jacinto* for not bringing the *Trent* for adjudication before a prize court was that he wished to spare the other passengers the inconvenience of deviating from their voyage. It is interesting to recall this in connection with the fact that during the late war the Russian volunteer cruisers in the Red Sea detained a German mail steamer, the *Prinz Heinrich*, and took two bags of mails out of her. Such a proceeding exhibits considerable analogy to the action of Captain Wilkes of the *San Jacinto* in 1861, and what was deemed an inadequate explanation in the one case can hardly be considered adequate in the other.

It is convenient now to consider the question of the carriage of military persons in the employ of a belligerent, or being in any way connected with his transport service. The crucial test on this subject is whether the ship carrying the military persons is hired by the belligerent.³ If the vessel is hired by the belligerent, it is liable to condemnation as prize, whether the persons conveyed are few or many, important or insignificant. Sir R. Phillimore holds that the importance of the persons conveyed is an essential element in determining whether the vessel in which they are seized may be confiscated; "to

Vessel conveying them must be hired by belligerent.

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 368.

² Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861.

³ Montague Bernard, "Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War," p. 223.

send out one general may be a more noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment."¹ The *Orozembo* was the case of a vessel admittedly American, and therefore neutral, and the title to restitution was impugned, on the ground that it was employed at the time of its capture, 1807, in conveying military persons first to Macao, and then to Batavia. Holland at this date was in alliance with Napoleon. The charter party was not a genuine document; it spoke of a cargo, but none was placed on board. The military persons were carried as supercargoes, who were themselves made the subject of stipulations as to freight. The events of the Russo-Japanese War cannot be said, in view of the incident of the *Prinz Heinrich*, to establish the presage of Mr. W. E. Hall, that "much tenderness would, no doubt, now be shown in a naval war to mail vessels and their contents; and it may be assumed that the latter would only be seized under very exceptional circumstances."² It cannot, of course, be said that the Russians have very repeatedly stopped mail vessels, but the *Malacea* incident must be associated with that of the *Prinz Heinrich*. During the late war, English vessels conveying Japanese troops have been sunk by the Vladivostock squadron. There seems to have been no offer to surrender, and under these circumstances the destruction of the vessels, though an act of great severity, was within the belligerent rights of Russia. The Russian regulations declaring contraband "assimilate" the conveyance of troops to the conveyance of absolute contraband.

The carrying of despatches—being official communications from an official person in the public affairs of the belligerent Government—is ground for confiscation of the ship, and of the cargo, if both belong to the same owner. The case of the *Prinz Heinrich* is the single instance during the Russo-Japanese War of seizure for the conveyance of despatches. But the vessel was not detained, though mail-bags were taken out of her.

¹ Phill. vol. iii. ss. 272, referring to the case of the *Orozembo*, 4 Rob. Adm. Rep. pp. 453, 454.

² Ibid., p 679.

It is convenient next to consider the penalty for carrying contraband articles when they are unconditionally or absolutely contraband.

In the case of the *Neutralitat*, (1801) 3 Rob. 295, 296, Sir W. Scott defined the practice, "The modern rule of the law of nations is, certainly, that the ship shall not be subject to condemnation for carrying contraband articles. The ancient practice was otherwise, and it cannot be denied that it was perfectly defensible on every principle of justice. If to supply the enemy with such articles is a noxious act with respect to the owner of the cargo, the vehicle which is instrumental in effecting that illegal purpose cannot be innocent. The policy of modern times had, however, introduced a relaxation on this point; and the general rule now is, that the vessel does not become confiscable for that act. But this rule is liable to exceptions—

- (1) "Where a ship belongs to the owner of the cargo, or (2) where the ship is going on such service under a false destination or false papers, these circumstances of aggravation have been held to constitute excepted cases out of the modern rule, and to continue them under the ancient one."

It follows that the penalty for conveying absolute contraband is (1) the confiscation of the contraband article, and any other articles belonging to the owner of the contraband, including the ship; (2) "loss of freight; (3) captor's expenses."

In the case of the conveyance of conditional contraband, the only loss incurred is freight and captor's expenses. If the owner of the ship is privy to the carriage of the contraband goods, the vessel is involved in their fate. Lord Stowell illustrated the same principle in holding that where the ship conveys contraband under a false destination or false papers, she is liable to be confiscated. The fact that a ship has false papers or false destination affords circumstantial evidence of conclusive character that the owner of the vessel knows that she is conveying contraband.

The variance between the ancient rule of involving the ship

in the fate of the cargo, and the modern one exempting the vessel *sub modo* from confiscation, is explained by the ancient presumption that the master knew the contents of his cargo. The knowledge of the master is the knowledge of the owner, since the former is the latter's agent. Therefore, formerly it was presumed that the owner knew the contents of the cargo.¹ But according to Valin² his contemporaries consistently rejected the excuse of a master's ignorance. But if this excuse be rejected, the logical consequence is the confiscation of the vessel in all cases where it is carrying absolute contraband.

Mr. W. E. Hall³ speaks of the *Ordonnance de la Marine* of Louis XIV. as sanctioning the confiscation of the ship, semble, in all cases. But Pothier very definitely says—

“Observez une difference que l'Ordonnance met entre les marchandises de contrebande et les effets appartenants aux ennemis; par cet article, il n'y a que les marchandises de contrebande que sont sujettes, à confiscation; le navire où elles se sont trouvées, n'y est, point sujet; au lieu que le navire où se sont trouvées les effets, appartenants aux ennemis est par l'Art. 7, declaré de bonne prise avec son chargement.”⁴

In view of this very definite statement of Pothier, there are grounds for supposing that before and after 1681 it was

¹ Cf. the case of the *Oster Risoer*, (1802) 4 Rob. 199, where the court held that if the master could be permitted to aver his ignorance of the contents of his cargo it might be applied to excuse the carrying of all contraband. It seems clear, therefore, that the rule as applied by Lord Stowell, as regards the effect of knowledge of the master, and therefore of the owner, is really less stringent than that which now prevails. In Lord Stowell's time a master was always supposed to know the contents of the cargo, but that knowledge had not the effect of confiscating the ship unless there was dissimulation. But the rule as stated by Mr. W. E. Hall makes the mere fact of the owner of the cargo being privy to the conveyance of contraband the cause of confiscation, without any further concealment or dissimulation. It seems clear that the maxim, “Ignorantia juris neminem excusat,” cannot be said to be susceptible of any exact insistence in the case of the belligerent's regulations declaring contraband. Such regulations, it has been seen, are not prohibitions by international law, and prize courts administer international law. Therefore, in the case of conditional contraband, a *bonâ fide* ignorance of the master that he was conveying contraband might be a good defence in a belligerent prize court, when the article is one, as it easily might be, that has no apparent connection with belligerent operations.

² “Traité des Prises,” c. v. s. 5.

³ “International Law,” p. 166 and note.

⁴ “Traité de Droit de Domaine de Propriété,” (1772) t. i. Pt. 1., c. ii. s. 2, Art. ii. ss. 2.

not the practice to confiscate the vessel in France for conveyance of contraband. A note of the learned reporter to the case of the *Franklin*, (1801) 3 Rob. 217, affords some valuable information as to the early practice. Bynkershoek and Heinneccius both agree that on principle the penalty ought to attach equally on the ship as well as on the cargo. "Si scientibus dominus contrabanda ad hostes deferrent, et nisi pacta impedianit." And so the ancient practice appears to have been (v. "Collect. Marit.", p. 58; and with regard to land wars also, and carriage by land and sea, *Bcerius Decis. Burdegal*, 178). By the Roman law a vessel might be forfeited to *fiscus* if anything illicit was placed on it (D. L. 39, c. iv. s. 11).

Soon after the time of Grotius (1625), who did not particularly discuss the case of a ship carrying contraband, a relaxation is first met with in treaties.

The first treaty in which an exception was introduced in favour of the ship was in 1650 between Spain and Holland, in which the terms are general and admit of no particular observation. The second was a treaty between France and the Hans Towns, May 10, 1655, in which the terms are very special, and point distinctly to the principle on which the relaxation was founded, when the owner of the vessel might be supposed to be a stranger to the transaction. Stipulations in treaties to this effect became more general.¹ The Ordinances of France, 1778, declared that ships should be deemed prize when three-fourths of cargo was contraband. But this was after the date of Pothier's treatise cited above.

The topic of the penalty of contraband becomes important in view of Russia's regulations declaring contraband. According to the Russian declaration issued in 1854, the ship was confiscated in all cases. According to the Russian declaration, 1904—

"Neutral ships captured while engaged in flagrant act of contraband can, according to circumstances, be seized and even confiscated."²

¹ Cf. "Treatise of the Dominion of the Sea," p. 472.

² *Times*, March 1.

Since this declaration Russia has sunk neutral vessels at sea, without the adjudication of a prize court, and after the confiscation of the *Allanton*, little regard will be paid to her intimation that she proposes to abate the full severity of the ancient rule, relaxed by Great Britain for more than a hundred years.

The only authority among the text-book writers for a single inflexible classification of contraband is afforded by Hübner. But though he includes both munitions of war and articles *ancipitis usus* in the same catalogue, he is careful to stipulate that articles *ancipitis usus* are only contraband when conveyed to blockaded places.

CHAPTER XIII—(*continued*).

PART VIII.

TREATIES DECLARING CONTRABAND.

ACCORDING to Phillimore no general inference can be derived from an investigation of treaties to elucidate the question whether naval stores and materials for shipbuilding¹ or provisions² are contraband or not.

No exact inference can be drawn from treaties as to what is contraband.

It is necessary to recollect that treaties respecting contraband are framed for cases where one party is in a state of neutrality, and not where they are allies in war. As between allies, questions of contraband are to be determined by the Common Law of Nations, and not by treaties, though it cannot be said that the relations of the Allied Powers in the Crimea were generally determined as to the rights of maritime capture by the Common Law of Nations, inasmuch as the principle of free ships, free goods, which they adopted, rested on the authority of treaties. It is, however, sufficiently clear that no general inference can be derived from treaties to decide what is and what is not contraband.

A writer who has examined the subject at great length³ concludes that while the treaties containing an extended category of contraband of war are only nine in number, those limiting contraband to munitions of war, horses, and saltpetre number nearly fifty. He points out that few treaties before the seventeenth century contained categories of contraband, but the first treaty he cites as containing a list of contraband was one between Philip of Spain and James I. of England, 1604, by which contraband was not confined to munitions of war.

Treaties declaring contraband do not apply to allies or belligerents.

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 354.

² Ibid., p. 345.

³ Hautefeuille, "Droits et Devoirs des Nations Neutres en Temps de Guerre Maritime," 1848, t. ii. titre viii. s. 2, ss. 2, p. 234.

Instance of
Hautefeuille's
inaccuracy.

But his con-
clusions
morally true.

Whether
Treaty of
Utrecht can
be classed as
a treaty with
restricted
category of
contraband.

It is always recognized that Hautefeuille wrote strongly under the influence of the idea that primitive law prohibited the inclusion of any articles except munitions of war in lists of contraband. Mr. W. E. Hall observes that he excludes from the list all treaties which conflict with his theory. He even deduces contradictory inferences from the same treaty, by placing it both in the category of those treaties which extend, and those which do not extend, the list of contraband.¹

It is not, however, the fact that all Hautefeuille's conclusions have been shaken, and a scientific analysis would probably reveal the conclusion that the majority of treaties restrict contraband to munitions of war, horses, and saltpetre. Both Hautefeuille² and Mr. W. E. Hall³ concur as to the effect and influence of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, which limited contraband to munitions of war, saltpetre, and horses, and formed the basis of European maritime law; a great number of treaties borrowed the definition of contraband furnished by the Treaty of Utrecht. Even the treaties concluded by England during the eighteenth century in the main followed the Treaty of Utrecht, which would suggest that during this period Great Britain did not consider either provisions or naval stores to be contraband. The tendency of wars to become more and more naval caused Great Britain to include naval stores as contraband by treaty with Sweden in 1812, and with Denmark, 1814.

Article 20 of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, premised that certain articles, among them all kinds of provisions, coal, and naval materials, were likely to give rise to difficulties, because of their common usage in peace and war. This is noticed by Hautefeuille (*t. ii. p. 321*), though it to some extent impairs his argument that the Treaty of Utrecht restricted

¹ The treaty between England and Holland, 1654 (Dumont, *t. vi. pt. 2, p. 74*), is placed by Hautefeuille among the treaties containing an extension of contraband vol. *ii. p. 324*; and among those restricting it at *p. 319*. The treaty is alluded to by Mr. W. E. Hall, "International Law," *p. 741* and note. It included provisions and money as contraband, and, therefore, cannot be classed as a treaty restricting contraband.

² "Droits et Devoirs des Nations Neutres en Temps de Guerre Maritime," *t. ii. titre viii. s. 3, p. 321.*

³ "International Law," *p. 643.*

contraband to munitions of war. But apparently the Treaty of Utrecht only embodied the limited category of contraband adopted by France. France consistently acted upon the principle that provisions were not contraband, though, by one treaty concluded with Denmark, 1742, naval stores were made contraband. The practice of Spain has been identical in principle with that of France, with one conspicuous exception. The Spanish Decree of April 23, 1898, did not expressly include horses among contraband of war. The practice of France, consistently followed by Spain, was to class horses as contraband ever since the *Ordonnance de la Marine* of Louis XIV.¹ The Japanese notification of Feb. 10, 1904, classes horses as provisional contraband, an undoubted concession to neutral trade.² Russia, on the other hand, classes horses as absolute contraband, though she had previously insisted upon free trade in horses, and expressly struck out horses from the list of contraband in a treaty with England in the eighteenth century. Grotius, in one place, indicates that a nation is apt to regulate its lists of contraband not only by the necessities of its opponents, but according to its own, and we may perhaps construe the policy of Russia in the light of the fact that she never required horses for military purposes, owing to her abundant supply.

¹ Valin, "Ordonnance de la Marine," ii. 264.

² *Times*, March 1, 1904. It is of some interest to observe that for the purpose of the law of *postliminium*, an ancient distinction existed between munitions of war and horses. The general rule always was that movables do not return by *postliminium*, when carried *infra praesidia* of a belligerent. But from the time of Cicero and the Romans, to the era of Boethius and the Goths, there were exceptions to the general rule (Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," I. iii. c. ix. s. 14). Cicero enumerates these exceptions: "Postliminio redunt haec, homo, navis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa, quae recipere solet" (Ad. Trebat Topica, s. 36). On the other hand, arms fell under the general rule, and constituted an exception to the exception. Therefore, arms when captured in war became prize, the reason being, Grotius observes, that they who lost them were little favoured—indeed, were disgraced. Grotius then proceeds to accentuate an important distinction in this respect between arms and horses, for the horse may be lost without the fault of the rider (*ibid., supra*). In the era of Grotius all movables became prize, and were excepted from the operation of *postliminium*, and the distinction between arms and horses was for this purpose abolished. But as the distinction clearly exists according to the reason of the thing, it seems to explain the uncertainty which appears even in very modern usage, whether munitions of war and horses can be comprised in the same category of absolute contraband.

CHAPTER XIV.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, THE HAGUE CONVENTION, AND INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS EXHIBITING ANALOGY TO THE NORTH SEA CRISIS, WITH A HISTORY OF THE NORTH SEA INCIDENT.

1.—PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

Mr. W. E.
Hall on con-
ditions of
successful
arbitration.

Scheme of
arbitral pro-
cedure drawn
by Institute of
International
Law, 1875.

Vattel on
arbitration.

MR. W. E. HALL observes that recourse to international arbitration will be successful where the matter at stake is unimportant, when the issue is one of fact, when there is good faith on both sides, and the arbitrator can be trusted to be equitable.¹ But he points out that the rejection by the United States in 1831 of the award given against it in the British-American boundary dispute of that year shows how little calculated the method is to put an end to disputes of any magnitude unless honesty of intention exists on every hand.² It is interesting at this moment to reflect, in view of the great Hague Peace Convention of 1899, that a scheme of arbitral procedure drawn up by a Committee of the Institute of International Law was adopted at the meeting of the Institute held at the Hague in 1875.³ Vattel observes—⁴

“When sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions, and are, nevertheless, desirous of preserving or restoring peace, they sometimes submit the decision of their disputes to arbitrators chosen by common agreement. When once the contending parties have entered into articles of arbitration, they are bound to abide by the sentence of the arbitrators; they have engaged

¹ “International Law,” 5th ed., c. xi. pp. 362–4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364, and author’s note.

³ Cf. “Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International” for 1877, pp. 123–133.

⁴ “Droit des Gens,” I. ii. c. xvii. s. 329.

to do this, and the faith of treaties should be religiously observed. If, however, the arbitrators, by pronouncing a sentence evidently unjust and unreasonable, should forfeit the character with which they were invested, their judgment would deserve no attention; the parties had appealed to it only with a view to the decision of doubtful questions. Suppose a board of arbitrators should, by way of reparation for some offence, condemn a sovereign State to become subject to the State she has offended, will any man of sense assert that she is bound to submit to such decision? If the injustice is of small consequence it should be borne for the sake of peace; and if it is not absolutely evident, we ought to endure it as an evil to which we have voluntarily exposed ourselves. For if it were necessary that we should be convinced of the justice of a sentence before we would submit to it, it would be of very little use to appoint arbitrators.

"There is no reason to apprehend that, by allowing the parties a liberty of refusing to submit to a manifestly unjust and unreasonable sentence, we should render arbitration useless; our decision is by no means repugnant to the nature of recognizances or arbitration articles. There can be no difficulty in the affair, except in case of the parties having signed vague and unlimited articles, in which they have not precisely specified the subject of the dispute, or marked the bounds of their opposite pretensions. It may then happen, as in the example just alleged, that the arbitrators will exceed their power, and pronounce on what has not been really submitted to their decision. Being called in to determine what satisfaction a State ought to make for an offence, they may condemn her to become subject to the State she has offended. But she certainly never gave them so extensive a power, and their absurd sentence is not binding. In order to obviate all difficulty, and cut off every pretext of which fraud might make a handle, it is necessary that the arbitration articles should precisely specify the subject in dispute, the respective and opposite pretensions of the parties, the demands of the one and the objections of the other. These constitute the whole of what is submitted to the decision of the arbitrators, and it is upon these points alone that the parties promise to abide by their judgment. If, then, their sentence be confined within these precise bounds, the disputants must acquiesce in it. They cannot say that it is manifestly unjust, since it is pronounced on a question which they have themselves rendered doubtful by the discordance of their claims, and which has been referred as such to the decision of the arbitrators. Before they can pretend to evade such a sentence they should prove, by incontestable facts, that it was the offspring of corruption or flagrant partiality."

"Arbitration is a very reasonable mode, and one that is

perfectly conformable to the law of nature, for the decision of every dispute which does not directly interest the safety of the nation. Though the claim of justice may be mistaken by the arbitrators, it is still more to be feared that it will be overpowered in an appeal to the sword. The Swiss have had the precaution in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they have contracted with the neighbouring Powers, to agree beforehand on the manner in which their disputes were to be submitted to arbitrators, in case they could not adjust them in an amicable manner. This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the Helvetic republic in that flourishing state which secures her liberty, and renders her respectable throughout Europe."

Vattel and Mr.
W. E. Hall
confine the
province of
arbitration to
relatively
unimportant
questions.

The concluding words of this passage show that the Swiss, in the eighteenth century, anticipated the formation of a Peace Tribunal such as that formed at the Hague in 1899. Vattel, moreover, like Mr. W. E. Hall, points out that the true function of international arbitration is confined to the decision of disputes which do not directly concern the safety of the nation.

Sir H. S.
Maine's ob-
jections to
arbitration in
1887.

Sir H. S. Maine, in his discussion of the subject of international arbitration, considers that it is open to the following objections :—

- (1) That it is wanting in the irresistible coercive power of municipal tribunals;
- (2) That England is an unpopular litigant in the forum of nations;
- (3) That jurists who make a special study of international law are an extinct class in this country, while on the continent they are the salaried functionaries of foreign chanceries, and therefore that international quasi-courts of arbitration are not always satisfactorily constituted;
- (4) That international quasi-courts of arbitration are constituted *ad hoc*, and do not exercise any continuous jurisdiction, and, therefore, that it is quite uncertain what weight is to be attached to the award of international arbitrators;
- (5) That the Geneva arbitration, which was perhaps the greatest of all arbitrations, introduced uncertainty into international law if it did not actually alter it for the worse by imposing additional obligations on neutrals;

(6) International arbitrations, judging from the Geneva arbitration, are not likely to sufficiently safeguard the rights of neutrals, and this tendency will have the effect of enlarging the area of maritime wars.

Sir H. S. Maine further suggests that arbitration in international questions, like arbitration in municipal law, is almost necessarily confined to questions of fact. It is noticeable that the issue of the Geneva Conference turned on an issue of law, whether a nation was bound to use due diligence to prevent the equipment and outfit in its territorial waters of a vessel intended for the military or naval service of a belligerent. The famous sixth Article of the Treaty of Washington declared such a neutral duty to exist, and therefore withdrew from the Conference of Geneva the deliberation of the only question of international law which could determine the facts. In fact, therefore, the element which rendered the Geneva award both dangerous and reactionary was the unsound direction of law contained in the previous Treaty of Washington. But this mistake was not repeated, or at all events not in the same degree, in any of the international arbitrations which succeeded the Geneva Conference.

Since the formation of international tribunals with continuous jurisdiction under the Hague Convention, it is unlikely that a mistake like the submission by Great Britain to the Treaty of Washington, 1871, will be repeated. A permanent court of arbitration can obviously be better trusted to adjust its awards to the entire body of international principles, distinctions, and rules than occasional adjudicators like those composing the arbitration court which sat at Geneva, 1871-2. How little the decisions of the Conference of Geneva were guided by a regard for the principles of international law can be inferred from Sir A. Cockburn's summary of the reasoning of M. Stæmpfli, the president, that there was no such thing as international law, because the practice of nations has undergone great changes at times, and the views of jurists on points of international law have often been, and still are, conflicting.¹

Sir H. S. Maine points out that famous writers are apt to

W. E. Hall,
Sir H. S.
Maine confine
the province
to questions of
fact.

The Geneva
Conference
turned on a
question of
law.

A court of
continuous
jurisdiction
now exists at
the Hague.

¹ Cf. Halleck's "International Law," vol. ii. p. 159.

be strongly affected by their official connection with their respective Governments, and by their knowledge of the interest which they suppose their Governments to have in the establishment, maintenance, or development of particular features of the international system. There are, however, as well in Russia as elsewhere, men superior to national prejudice. Professor T. E. Holland, in a letter addressed to the *Times* on the subject of the destruction of the *Knight Commander*,¹ recalled the integrity of the Russian jurist, M. de Martens. In his book on International Law, published some twenty years ago, M. de Martens pointed out that the distance of her ports from the scenes of naval operations often obliged Russia to sink her prizes, so that "ce que les lois maritimes de tous les états considèrent comme un moyen auquel il n'y a lieu de recourir qu'à la dernière extrémité, se transformerera pour nous en règle normale," foresaw "cette mesure d'un caractère général soulevera indubitablement contre notre pays un mécontentement universel." This outspoken expression of opinion may, for its learned integrity, be compared to the refusal of the Law Officers of the Crown, during the American Civil War, to institute proceedings in the case of the *Alabama*.

Professor de Martens presided over an arbitration tribunal which is recalled by the learned editor of Hall's "International Law" as one of the two most successful arbitrations of modern times, and he was, in addition, an arbitrator in the Pious Fund Case, the first decision under the Hague Convention. It has been stated that the absorbing nature of his official duties prevented him from assisting at the International Tribunal which recently dealt with the North Sea crisis.

Criticism of
Sir H. S.
Maine in 1887,
that inter-
national
arbitrations do
not safeguard
the rights
of neutrals.

The observation of Sir H. S. Maine that, judging from the Geneva Conference, international arbitrations do not sufficiently guard the rights of neutrals, and that this tendency is likely to have the effect of enlarging the area of future maritime wars, is a generalization of great interest. Historically, neutral obligation in maritime wars was more restricted than neutral

obligation in land wars. The naval belligerent's rights were limited in the days when there was a restricted category of contraband, and when there was a tendency to assert an almost complete inviolability for the neutral merchant vessel on the high seas. In the great naval wars of the eighteenth century, though England seized the goods of an enemy on board the ship of a friend, continental jurisprudence favoured the doctrine of free ships, free goods. The tendency of wars to become more and more naval, noted by Lord Stowell, is not likely to be abated at this day, when there are many more important navies in the world than there were a quarter of a century ago. In the Russo-Japanese War we have seen the right of a maritime belligerent advanced to the highest possible limit.

The tendency of international tribunals to favour the rights of maritime belligerents coincides with, and is perhaps caused by, the great increase in the number of States possessing important navies. Historically, when there was practically only one powerful maritime belligerent, England, it was consistent with the reason of the thing that, owing in part to the jealousy our ascendancy provoked, the rights of neutrals at sea were far greater than those of a maritime belligerent. The marked tendency of modern times for belligerent maritime right to encroach on neutral maritime obligation follows naturally upon the multiplication of navies.

Calvo¹ gives a list of twenty-one disputes settled by arbitration from 1794 onwards. Mr. John Bassett Moore, in his "History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a party," has compiled a list of arbitral decisions in general up to the year 1898.²

Mr. W. E. Hall's openly expressed opinion that arbitration is only successful when confined to relatively unimportant matters might well have occasioned anxiety at the time of the North Sea reference. It may, of course, be admitted with Mr. W. E. Hall's editor, that the arbitral method of settling international differences has acquired new authority from the dignity and ability which marked the course of the proceedings in the Behring Sea Fur Seal Fisheries and the Venezuela

¹ Ss. 1489-1510.

² See pp. 4821, 4851 *et seq.*

Tendency to resort to arbitration coincides in time with increase of naval power throughout the world.

Calvo and
Moore's lists
of arbitra-
tions.

boundary.¹ But in neither of these two instances of reference was the matter at stake of the first importance. The most successful instance of recent arbitration was King Edward's award in the case of the boundary dispute between the Argentine and Chili. Arbitration is no doubt specially suited to decide boundary disputes.

The North Sea crisis was hardly a case where the matter at stake was unimportant, nor did it exhibit much analogy to the subject-matter of previous successful arbitrations. The outrage was a far worse insult to the flag than the case of the *Trent*, 1861, or that of the *Virginianus*, 1873, had the latter vessel, as was at first believed, been entitled to fly the American flag. In the case of the *Trent* the Powers were unanimous in sustaining, through their ambassadors at Washington, the demands of Great Britain.² Without in any way disparaging the satisfactory sequel of the North Sea crisis under the rules of the Hague Convention, it would have been even more satisfactory if the Powers had acted in 1904 as they acted in 1861.

Powers ought to have made representations to Russia as they did to the Federals in 1861.

The case of the *Trent* turned on the question whether persons can be contraband. In the case of the *Bundesrath*, and the other German ships in 1899, the British Government acted on the view that military persons can be contraband, contrary to the opinion of the late Mr. W. E. Hall. But where the law of contraband is involved, the doctrine of the territoriality of the merchant vessel has no application. It was because of the irrefragable nature of the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* that Historicus, in an amusing passage, declared that a merchant vessel on the high seas in time of war no more resembled territory than Hamlet's cloud was like the weasel or the whale. So far from a merchant vessel on the high seas in time of war being like territory, and therefore inviolable, Historicus observed that the real truth was that it was not like territory, because it was violable. But the action of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the North Sea did not involve any construction of the belligerent right of search. It involved, on the other

¹ Hall's "International Law," p. 364.

² Wheaton, ed. 1904, p. 179.

hand, and most directly, the inviolability and immunity of persons and property belonging to a neutral State, under circumstances which afforded no pretext for belligerent interference. And a question of this importance was raised, *pendente bello*, during a great war, and a war in which the fury of fighting has unfortunately even more than vindicated the misgivings of Mr. W. E. Hall. Even the week of battles round Metz must yield, as far as the sacrifice of life is concerned, to the battle of the Shaho, if not to that of Liao-Yang. It is certain that both those battles involved a greater loss of life than that which occurred at St. Privat, and Port Arthur has witnessed worse scenes than Bazeilles. The moment did not appear favourable for a recourse to arbitral methods, and the success of the North Sea reference was therefore all the more gratifying.

2.—SOME ACCOUNT OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.

The arbitration which first demands notice is the Geneva Conference, which arose out of the *Alabama* claims. Mr. W. E. Hall regards the Geneva Conference as the most important case of arbitration which has yet occurred (1888), but he adds that both its proceedings and issues were little calculated to enlarge the area within which confidence in the results of arbitration can be felt.¹ The *Alabama* case and its developments suggest that when an infraction of neutrality is alleged, war may often be more successfully averted by the efforts of an ambassador than by arbitration. There can be no doubt of the sincerity and strenuousness of the efforts of Mr. Adams to keep the peace between the two countries, and he has himself testified to the difficulty of the task. But the success which attended his efforts was obviously in no way due to the submission of the *Alabama* claims to arbitration ten years after the vessel cleared from Liverpool. In this country, at all events in legal circles, the award of the Conference of Geneva was not foreseen. But none of the disadvantages under which

Important arbitrations from Treaty of Washington to present time.

¹ "International Law," 364.

Great Britain recently proceeded to arbitration can be compared to those attending her appearance at the Geneva Conference with a previous consent to be judged by *ex post facto* rules, which put her out of court before the arbitration began.

The Conference of Geneva, 1872. After thirty-two conferences, the president, M. Stämpfli, in September, 1872, presented the decision of the Tribunal of Geneva, which was signed by Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Count Frederic Sclopis, M. Jacques Stämpfli, and Viscount d'Itajubá, arbitrators. Four of the arbitrators found that Great Britain had failed in the case of the *Alabama* by omission to fulfil the duties prescribed by the first and third rules of the Treaty of Washington.¹ Sir Alexander Cockburn agreed, but differed in his reasons. A similar decision (four against one) was pronounced in the case of the *Florida*, under the second and third rules of the same articles. In the case of the *Shenandoah*, the tribunal held, unanimously, that Great Britain had not failed in any duty with respect to that vessel, prior to her arrival at the port of Melbourne, but (by majority of three against two, Count Sclopis and Sir A. Cockburn) that she had so failed after such arrival. As to the *Retribution*, that Great Britain had not failed, by three to two. As to the *Georgia*, the *Sumter*, the *Nashville*, the *Tallahassee*, and the *Chickamauga* respectively, the same finding was unanimously reached. And by a majority of four voices against one, they awarded to the United States a sum of 15,500,000 dollars in gold, for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the Tribunal, conformably to the provisions contained in Article VII. of the said treaty.²

The San Juan award of Emperor William I. of Germany, 1872.

In 1872 negotiations were conducted between Great Britain and the United States with the view of determining the ownership of the Island of San Juan, which lies in the very middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island. The Island of San Juan is somewhat larger than the Isle of Wight, and is surrounded by several smaller islets. Previous treaties on the subject—the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, and Lord Ashburton's Treaty, the Treaty of

¹ Cf. "The Annual Register" for 1871, p. 294.

² Ibid., 1872, pp. 109, 110.

Washington, 1846—had referred to the middle of the channel in which San Juan is situate, but had not specifically assigned it to either Great Britain or the United States. In 1851, a United States officer, General Harvey, attempted to carry the point by *coup de main* by occupying San Juan with an armed force. Afterwards the Americans withdrew this unjustifiable step and a joint occupation was agreed upon. The island then gradually acquired an increased importance to both Great Britain and the United States by the colonization of Vancouver's Island and British Columbia.

By the 34th Article of the Treaty of 1871, it was determined that "the respective claims of the two Governments should be submitted to the arbitration and award of Emperor William I. of Germany, who should decide thereupon, finally and without appeal, which of the said claims is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the Treaty of Washington, June 15, 1846. The Emperor delivered his award in December, 1872, unreservedly in favour of the American claim, which was that the line of the forty-ninth parallel of latitude should be continued to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver, and thence southerly through the middle of the channel and the straits of De Arro, or De Haro, between San Juan and Vancouver, to the Pacific Ocean.¹

A brief account may be given of the award by which Portugal acquired Lorenço Marques and Delagoa Bay, which acquired such importance during the Transvaal War. In 1835 the discontented Boers under Ohrich had attempted to form a settlement on the bay, and in 1868 the Transvaal president, Martin Wessel Petronius, incorporated the country on each side of Umzati down to the sea. The whole matter in dispute between the three Powers, Portugal, Great Britain, and the Transvaal was submitted to the arbitration of M. Thiers, the French President, and on April 19, 1875, his successor, Marshal Macmahon, declared in favour of the Portuguese.

The Lorenço
Marques
award of
Marshal Mac-
mahon, 1875.

In 1892 Great Britain preferred some claims against the United States in respect of the seizure of Behring Sea fishing

¹ "Annual Register," 1872.

vessels. The matter was referred to an international tribunal presided over by Baron de Courcelles. The tribunal sat at Paris, and Lord Hannen and Sir J. Thompson, K.C.M.G., were appointed arbitrators on behalf of Great Britain. The proceedings commenced at Paris in April, 1893, Sir Charles Russell, K.C., M.P., then Attorney-General, and afterwards Lord Chief Justice of England, appearing in support of British interests with the present Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Alverstone. The award of the Behring Sea Arbitration Tribunal, issued in August, 1893, was in great measure favourable to the contention of the counsel appearing for Great Britain. The address of Lord Russell of Killowen on this great occasion is generally considered one of the greatest of his triumphs at the bar, and a tribute was rendered to his eloquence by Baron de Courcelles, the President of the Tribunal. As a result, the United States settled the British claims by a payment of six hundred thousand dollars.

The arbitration between Great Britain and Venezuela, 1898.

In March, 1898, Great Britain and Venezuela communicated the first part of the historical documents and maps in support of their respective claims in the boundary dispute between the two countries to Professor Martens, of St. Petersburg, the chief arbitrator. The British case was in eight large volumes with an immense atlas, and the Venezuelan in four volumes with an atlas. In August, each Government prosecuted a counter-case against the first arguments and historical papers of its opponent. Venezuela sent three new volumes, and Great Britain two large new volumes. In all, more than two thousand two hundred documents in the English, Spanish, and Dutch languages were communicated to the members of the Arbitration Court, which it was arranged should meet at Paris to hear the verbal arguments and give the final decision.

In the early days of October, 1899, within a week before the issue of the Boer ultimatum, an arbitration tribunal, sitting in Paris, composed of American and English judges, with M. Martens, presiding, gave judgment unanimously in the matter of this long-standing territorial dispute. The decision was substantially in favour of this country, and authorized the inclusion within British Guiana of the great bulk of the

territory embraced by what is known as the Schomburgh line. The only exception of any note to this sweep of the award lay in the fact that it assigned to Venezuela a settlement at Barima Point, on the delta of the Orinoco, to which, on strategical grounds, the Venezuelans had always attached high value. From the British point of view, Venezuela being what she was, the new acquisition of the tract in question could not be considered of importance. On more than one occasion British Governments had offered Venezuela, by way of settling the difficulty, more than the Paris award gave her. The settlement made by the Arbitration Tribunal leaves free for undisturbed development a territory believed to possess considerable mineral wealth, and already administered for several years on British lines.¹

It is observed in the "Annual Register"² that the most important event for the Argentine Republic and Chile was the settlement of the boundary dispute under the reference to the arbitrament of the British Sovereign. Early in the year Sir Thomas Holdich and a staff were dispatched to survey the Southern Andes, where they spent several months, returning to England in the autumn. The award of King Edward was issued on November 27, and for the purposes of reference the geographical points may be placed in record—

The arbitral award of King Edward VII. in the territorial dispute between Argentina and Chile, 1902.

"Article I.—The boundary in the region of the San Francisco Pass shall be formed by the line of water-parting extending from the pillar already erected on that pass to the summit of the mountain named *Tres Cruces*.

"Article II.—The basin of Lake Lacar is awarded to Argentina.

"Article III.—From Perez Rosales Pass, near the north of the lake Nahuel Huapi, to the vicinity of Lake Viedma, the boundary shall pass by Mount Tronador, and thence to the river Palena by the lines of water-parting determined by certain obligatory points which we have fixed upon the rivers Manso, Puelo, Fetaleufu, and Palena (or Carrenleufu), awarding to Argentina the upper basin of those rivers above the points which we have fixed, including the valleys of Villegas, Nuevo, Cholila, Colonia de 16 Octubre, Frio, Huemules, and Corcovado, and to Chile the lower basins below these points. From the

¹ "Annual Register," 1899, p. 235.

² *Ibid.*, 1902, pp. 458-60.

fixed point on the river Palena the boundary shall follow the river Encuentro to the peak called Virgen, and thence to the line which we have fixed crossing Lake General Paz, and thence by the line of water-parting determined by the point which we have fixed upon the river Pico, from whence it shall ascend to the principal water-parting of the South American Continent at Loma Baguales, and follow that water-parting to a summit locally known as La Galera. From this point it shall follow certain tributaries of the river Simpson (or southern river Aisen) which we have fixed, and attain the peak called Ap Ywan, from whence it shall follow the water-parting determined by a point which we have fixed on a promontory from the neutral shore of Lake Buenos Aires. The upper basin of the river Pico is then awarded to Argentina, and the lower basin to Chile. The whole basin of the river Cisnes (or Frias) is awarded to Chile, and also the whole basin of the Aisen, with the exception of a tract at the head waters of the southern branch, including a settlement called Koslowsky, which is awarded to Argentina. The further continuation of the boundary is determined by lines which we have fixed across Lake Buenos Aires, Lake Pueyrredon (or Cochrane), and Lake San Martin, the effect of which is to assign the western portions of the basins of those lakes to Chile and the eastern portions to Argentina, the dividing ranges carrying the lofty peaks known as Mountain San Lorenzo and Fitzroy. From Mount Fitzroy to Mount Stokes the line of frontier has been already determined.

Article IV.—From the vicinity of Mount Stokes to the fifty-second parallel of south latitude, the boundary shall first follow the continental water-parting defined by the Sierra Baguales, diverging from the latter southwards across the river Vizcachas to Mount Cazador, at the south-eastern extremity of which range it crosses the river Guillermo, and rejoins the continental water-parting to the east of Mount Solitario, following it to the fifty-second parallel of south latitude, from which point the remaining portion of the frontier has already been defined by mutual agreement between the respective States.

Article V.—A more detailed definition of the line of frontier will be found in the report submitted to us by our tribunal, and upon the maps furnished by the experts of the Republics of Argentina and Chile, upon which the boundary which we have decided upon has been delineated by the members of our tribunal and approved by us.

“ Given in triplicate, under our hand and seal, at our Court of St. James’, this 20th day of November, 1902, in the second year of our reign.

“ EDWARD R. AND I.”

The writer in the "Annual Register" notes the fact that Regarded as
the award was represented to be satisfactory to both sides. Chile considered that she had obtained the larger portion of
the disputed territory, while Argentina thought the richer and
more valuable lands had fallen to her. Meanwhile, an im-
portant treaty had been arranged between the parties con-
solidating good relations. It provided that all future disputes
should be referred to the arbitration of the British Govern-
ment, or, in the event of a rupture with Great Britain, to the
Swiss Government.

In October, 1902, King Oscar of Sweden, who was accepted Samoan award
by Great Britain, the United States, and Germany to assess of King Oscar
the damages to foreigners in Samoa, arising from the landing of Sweden,
of American and British troops, and from the destruction of 1902.
British and American property by the rebels, decided that Great Britain and the United States were liable because they were not justified in landing troops. This decision aroused great irritation in the United States, as it was the enunciation of a principle which, if accepted as a precedent, would seriously restrict the assertion of American rights in foreign countries in case of revolution or riots, in which the lives and property of American citizens were placed in peril, and would practically disable a Government from protecting its own citizens when the local Government was powerless or unwilling to afford protection. The United States expressed its willingness to pay whatever damages might be assessed, but it refused to be bound by the principle, or to recognize it as a precedent which might be incorporated into the laws of nations.

In 1904, the King of Italy delivered his award as to the boundary dispute between British Guiana and Brazil. In view of the great length at which the British case was elaborated at a boundary dispute in which Guiana was concerned a very few years previously, it is a little curious to note that the award of the King of Italy stated that the documents submitted to arbitration did not afford the means of judging with completeness or precision on the question of the preponderating rights of the litigant Powers over the territory in dispute. The award further stated that it was not possible to divide the

disputed territory into equal parts either as regards superficial area or value. Preference, therefore, had to be given to that line, which being the best throughout its whole length, lent itself best to an equitable division of the contested territory. It became necessary to divide the disputed territory by taking into account the line drawn by Nature. This was considered to be the line which determined the frontier by starting from Mount Yakontipu, proceeding east to source of Treng (Mahu), and down the Treng to its confluence with the Tacutu, and thence to the source of the latter river, where such line then joins the line of frontier established by the declaration annexed to treaty of arbitration concluded in London, November 6, 1901, between Great Britain and Brazil. All territory east of the line of frontier of the zone in dispute was awarded to Great Britain, and all the territory west of the line settled belongs to Brazil. As a result of this recent award of the King of Italy, and the previous arbitration between Great Britain and Venezuela in 1898, all the boundaries of the Colony of British Guiana are now definitely settled.¹

Alaskan
Boundary
award, 1903.

The learned editor of Hall's "International Law" observes that the tribunal in the case of the disputed Alaskan boundary was in all essentials a court of arbitration, though its constitution was unusual. The manner in which the United States chose to construe the term "impartial jurists of repute" was, he observes, a serious blot on the proceeding. This criticism recalls that of Sir H. S. Maine on the composition of courts of international arbitration.²

Among the arbitrators of the Alaskan boundary dispute Lord Alverstone was the Commissioner representing Great Britain, while Sir Louis Jetté, K.C., of Quebec, and Mr. A. B. Aylesworth, K.C., of Toronto, were the Canadian Commissioners. The principal matter with which the tribunal dealt was the interpretation of the treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. The effect of the Alaskan Boundary decision was, in brief, to exclude the Canadians from all the ocean inlets as far as the Portland Channel, thus

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1904, pp. 459, 460.

² "International Law," Lecture xii., pp. 214, 215.

cutting them off from the water approaches to the Yukon and other goldfields, and, in the case of the channel just mentioned, to assign the two outer and smaller islands, Kannagunat and Sitklau, to the United States, but the two inner and larger islands, Pearse and Wales, to Canada. In the main it was regarded as a very unfavourable decision for Canada, and the Canadian members of the tribunal refused to sign the award. Though the immediate effect of the decision was to bring about a serious feeling of irritation in the minds of the Canadians, this sentiment was, to some extent at any rate, modified by the publication of the careful statement by Lord Alverstone of the reasons which led him to arrive at the conclusions which he adopted, both as to the true course of the Portland Channel, and as to the other questions involved.¹

In 1902 Dr. Asser, the Hague jurist, presided over a fishery dispute between the United States and Russia. The machinery of the Hague Convention of July 27, 1899, was not employed on this occasion. This circumstance called forth a protest from Baron D'Estournelles de Constant and others. The facts out of which the dispute between the United States and Russia arose were, that in 1891 some American whalers were overtaken and captured by a Russian schooner in Behring Sea, in violation, it is said, of the ordinary rules of sea fishing. Not only did the cruiser capture the vessels, but, being short of hands, compelled the American seamen to work under a very severe *régime*. The United States lodged a formal complaint, and claimed damages on various accounts, including, in addition to the value of the whalers, compensation for the crews, and also the prospective profits to officers accruing from the expedition. The Russian defence was based on the *droit de nécessité*, because the whalers had knowingly transgressed their proper limits. It seems an inference from Vattel² that the plea of inevitable necessity is one that can only be raised in a state of war.

The Annual Register for 1904 and 1905 contained no notice of this case. It must, therefore, be supposed that Dr. Asser has not delivered his award.

¹ "Annual Register," 1903, p. 438.

² "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. 7.

Fishery dispute
between
United States
and Russia,
1902.

3.—THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1899.

Names of
States accept-
ing invitation
to Hague Con-
ference, 1898.

The invitation of the Tzar in 1898 to the International Peace Conference, was accepted by Germany, Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Mexico, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Bulgaria ; and in the spring of 1899 the Conference duly assembled at the Hague. Great Britain was represented by Sir Julian (afterwards Lord) Pauncefote and Sir Henry Howard, with Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher, and Major-General Sir John Ardagh as technical delegates; the United States by Messrs. M. White, Stanford Nevill, Seth Low, Captain Mahan, and Captain Crozier. From May 18 to July 29 the International Peace Conference, as it was designated, held continual session, the members being divided for greater convenience into three commissions, to deal with the various topics propounded. The labours of the Conference to formulate a scheme for the gradual reduction of existing armaments, and for checking any further increase, were doomed to failure from the first.

Session of
International
Peace Confer-
ence, May-
July, 1899.

Proposals at.

But a convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention was signed by representatives of the following Powers :—Germany, Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Mexico, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

The representatives of all the States assembled at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, with the exception of China, signed a convention, based to a large extent on the Declaration of Brussels, concerning the laws and customs of land warfare.

The final act of the Hague Peace Conference contained three declarations, which prohibit on the part of the contracting Powers—

(1) For a period of five years the launching of projectiles from balloons or by other similar new methods;

(2) The use of projectiles, the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases;

(3) The use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.

None of these declarations was signed by the British representatives, and only the first of them by the United States.

It is observed by the learned editor of Hall's "International Law" that the second of the three declarations of the final act of the Hague Peace Conference was presumably aimed at lyddite.¹

4.—THE CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES SIGNED AT THE HAGUE CON- FERENCE.

At the moment, in view of the North Sea incident, the Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes which was signed on July 29, 1899, by the representatives of twenty-four of the States assembled at the Hague. Apparently the only Powers attending the Hague Peace Conference who did not ratify this convention are Turkey and China, who, however, appear among the signatories. The adhesion of Turkey to the principle of arbitration was clogged by a declaration which robbed it of all value;² the course of events in China since the summer of 1899 is sufficient explanation for the non-appearance of that country. The Republics of Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay, as well as the Empire of Corea, have subsequently requested to be admitted to the benefits of the convention. The fact that the Empire of Corea has applied to be admitted to this convention for the pacific settlement of international

Que. as to
Turkey and
China.
Other
accessions.

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 533.

² "Nouv. Rec. Gén.," l. c. p. 737.

disputes, recalls the anomalous status of that country during the Russo-Japanese War. As has been seen, Corea, previous to the commencement of the war, issued a declaration of neutrality. Yet, at the very commencement of the war, she concluded a convention with Japan, by which she was universally considered to have become a protectorate of Japan. A convention of later date, ratified some months after the commencement of hostilities between Russia and Japan, places this fact beyond any apparent doubt. Corean troops further seem to have come into conflict with Russian troops, though Japan has, for motives that can doubtless be appreciated by those who have an intimate knowledge of the political environment, insisted on a great reduction of the Corean army.

5.—INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY UNDER TITLE III. OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. ¶

International Commissions of Inquiry under Title III. of Convention of July, 1899.

Terms of Title III.

The text of Title III. of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at the Hague is as follows:—

“*Title III.*—On International Commissions of Inquiry.

“*Article IX.*—In differences of an international nature, involving neither honour nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact, the Signatory Powers recommend that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry to facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.

“*Article X.*—The International Commissions of Inquiry are constituted by special agreement between the parties in conflict. The convention for an inquiry defines the facts to be examined and the extent of the Commissioners' powers. It settles the procedure. On the inquiry both sides must be heard. The form and the periods to be observed, if not stated in the Inquiry Convention, are decided by the Commission itself.

“*Article XI.*—The International Commissions of Inquiry are

formed, unless otherwise stipulated, in the manner fixed by Article XXXII. of the present convention.

"Article XII."—The Powers in dispute engage to supply the International Commission of Inquiry, as fully as they may think possible, with all means and facilities necessary to enable it to be completely acquainted with and to accurately understand the facts in question.

"Article XIII."—The International Commission of Inquiry communicates its report to the conflicting Powers, signed by all the members of the Commission.

"Article XIV."—The report of the International Commission of Inquiry is limited to a statement of facts, and has in no way the character of an arbitral award. It leaves the conflicting Powers entire freedom as to the effect to be given to this statement.

"Article XXXII."—Referring to the formation of the International Commission of Inquiry is as follows:—

"The duties of arbitrators may be conferred on one arbitrator alone or on several arbitrators selected by the parties, as they please, or chosen by them from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the present Act. Failing the constitution of the tribunal by direct agreement between the parties, the following course shall be pursued. Each party appoints two arbitrators, and these latter together choose an umpire. In case of equal voting, the choice of the umpire is entrusted to a third Power, selected by the parties by common accord. If no agreement is arrived at on this subject, each party selects a different Power, and the choice of the umpire is made in concert by the Powers thus selected."

Mr. Balfour, in his speech at Southampton on the subject of the North Sea crisis, alluded in the following terms to the pending international inquiry :—
Speech of Mr.
A. J. Balfour,
Oct. 29, 1904.

"An inquiry will be instituted into the facts, and we and the Russian Government are agreed upon an international commission of the kind provided for by the Hague Convention—I should say that that has nothing to do with arbitration, that is, the constitution of an International Commission to find out facts—and any person found guilty by this tribunal will be tried and adequately punished."¹

It is, therefore, clear, from the language of the late Prime Minister, that the reference of the North Sea incident is to an International Commission of Inquiry under Title III., and not to the Permanent Court of Arbitration constituted under the

¹ *Times*, Saturday, October 29, 1904.

succeeding title of the Hague Convention, July 29, 1899. This fact is of some importance. An International Commission of Inquiry has, as has been seen,¹ in no way the character of an arbitral award. It resembles a preliminary finding of fact such as is ordered in some cases in English law,² or the *actio præjudicialis* of the Roman law. Such a commission is even more wanting in "irresistible coercive power" than an international arbitration before the Hague Convention.³ Its province being merely to define fact, this want of coercive force possibly constitutes no objection. But it remains clear that the ruling of the commission cannot possibly be decisive, and that its finding might quite logically lead, either to a reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which would then specifically adjudicate upon the facts raised by the Commission of Inquiry, or else to war. By Article 14, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry is "to leave the conflicting parties entire freedom as to the effect to be given" to its statement. It can hardly be supposed that both this country and Russia will draw the same inference from the facts found by the International Commission, seeing that they are now at entire variance. It is only on what seems to be the most improbable result, that both countries should concur alike in the facts and the inference, that the Report of the Commission of Inquiry seems destined finally to solve the issue.

Difference
between
report of
International
Commission
of Inquiry and
an arbitral
award.

The following are the most important differences between an International Commission of Inquiry and the Permanent Court of Arbitration:—

(1) The Arbitration Convention implies an engagement to submit loyally to the award (Article 18). The Report of an International Commission of Inquiry leaves the conflicting Powers entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement it makes (Article 14).

(2) The International Commissions of Inquiry are constituted by special agreement between the parties, whereas

¹ Tit. iii. Art. 14.

² *Drummond v. Van Ingen*, (1887) 12 A. C. 284.

³ Maine, Lecture xii., p. 213.

the Permanent Court shall be competent for all arbitration cases unless the parties agree to institute a special tribunal.

(3) The Permanent Court of Arbitration decides questions of law and fact, whereas an International Commission of Inquiry decides only questions of fact.

(4) The Powers who have recourse to arbitration sign a special act (*compromis*), which is a document of the court itself. But a reference to an International Commission of Inquiry is preceded by a convention between the two parties. This course has been adopted since the institution of the Hague Court, in a case where a reference, involving issues of law and fact, was made to arbitration without any appeal to the Hague Court.

(5) Reference to an International Commission of Inquiry must be voluntary, by the conflicting parties themselves, under the terms of a convention. The signatory Powers, on the other hand, may recommend two or more of their number, between whom a serious dispute has broken out, to appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and such a reminder is only to be regarded as a friendly act (Article 27).

(6) The forms and procedure of a reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration are settled by the articles of the Hague Convention (Articles 39-57). The forms and periods to be observed by an International Commission of Inquiry under Title III. of the Hague Convention, if not stated in the inquiry convention, are decided by the commission itself (Article 10).

(7) The Permanent Court of Arbitration sits at the Hague, in the absence of any special agreement by the parties. Where there is such special agreement the tribunal may, in cases of necessity, alter the place fixed by the parties (Article 36). The articles of Title III. of the Hague Convention, relating to International Commissions of Inquiry, provide nothing on this subject.

(8) A tribunal sitting as members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration decides on the choice of languages to be used by itself, and to be authorized for use before it (Article 38). Title III., relating to International Commissions of Inquiry, provides nothing on this subject.

(9) When an arbitrator dies, his place is filled in accordance with the methods of his appointment (Article 35). Nothing is provided on this head as regards Commissions of Inquiry.

(10) There can be a revision of the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Revision can only be made on the ground of the discovery of some new fact calculated to exercise a decisive influence in the award, which, at the time the discussion was closed, was unknown to the tribunal and to the party demanding the revision (Article 55). There are no provisions in Title III. rendering possible a revision of the Report of an International Commission of Inquiry.

(11) There are no rules relating to evidence, or the expenses of an International Commission of Inquiry. In the case of an arbitral award each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of those of the tribunal.

All these material differences between a tribunal which sits as a branch of the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the Hague Convention (Title IV.), and an International Commission of Inquiry under Title III., result from the fact that the only articles of the convention which relate to procedure deal with "arbitral procedure" (except Article 32, which provides either for the appointment of arbitrators or commissioners), and by Article 14 the Report of an International Commission of Inquiry "has in no way the character of an arbitral award." In the case of an International Commission of Inquiry under Title III. "the forms and periods" to be observed may be settled either by the inquiry convention or by the commission (Article 10). There is nothing in the convention as to the payment of the expenses of the commission or of the parties under Title III., the title which relates to International Commissions of Inquiry. The question of expenses, probably one of very considerable importance, may presumably be settled by the inquiry convention or by the commission. As regards "forms and periods" in the case of an International Commission of Inquiry, these may be regulated by the commission, but are primarily regulated by the inquiry convention.

It may be noted that neither arbitrators nor commissioners

are necessarily selected from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the Hague Convention. On the other hand, both commissioners and arbitrators may be so selected by the parties. If the parties so please, the reference may be to a single arbitrator or a single commissioner. The most material difference is that there is no Apparent omission in revision possible of the Report of a Commission of Inquiry. Title III. as But a statement of facts delivered by a commission under Title III. is as likely to be decisively influenced by the given to discovery of a new fact, unknown at the time a discussion closed, as an arbitral award under Title IV.

6.—CASES BEFORE THE ARBITRATION COURT AT THE HAGUE.

Before alluding to the few cases which as yet have come before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, it is convenient to point out that the tendency of recent years to enter into agreements to submit to arbitration prospective differences, is due in no small degree to the Hague Convention. By Article 19 of the Hague Convention the Signatory Powers have reserved to themselves, both retrospective and prospectively, the right of extending obligatory arbitration to all cases that can possibly admit of it, by new agreement, which may be of a private nature. Thus, Article 3 of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 contains an agreement to refer to an arbitral tribunal which, however, is not the Permanent Court of the Hague, but a specially constituted tribunal, claims for indemnity of French citizens engaged in fishing on the treaty shore of Newfoundland, who are obliged to give up their occupation in consequence of the convention prohibiting French fishermen from fishing in the rivers of Newfoundland.¹

The recent Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Arbitration, signed at Windsor immediately before the State banquet, Wednesday, November 16, 1904, unlike the Anglo-French Agreement, specifically contemplates a reference to the Permanent Court at the Hague of any differences which arise between the

¹ Article 2, Anglo-French Agreement, 1904.

The Pious Fund of the California Case.

contracting parties, provided that they do not affect the vital interests, independence, or the honour of the two contracting States. The first case brought before the Hague Court was the so-called Pious Fund Case, relating to church property in California and Mexico. The reference to the Hague Tribunal was largely due to the initiation of President Roosevelt, who, in this respect, to paraphrase the saying of Montesquieu, has played a leading part in the unveiling of the statues of Perpetual Peace.

When California belonged entirely to Mexico, President Quesada, being in need of money, laid hold of Californian Church property, and promised to pay a pension to the clergy. This promise was kept so long as California remained a Mexican province. But when the United States absorbed California they did not take over President Quesada's promise, and the Californian clergy claimed its money from Mexico, which refused it to the United States. Over a million dollars and the interest thereon were laid in the Mexican Treasury awaiting distribution. The arbitrators for the United States were Sir E. Fry and Professor de Martens. The arbitrators for Mexico were Judge Guarischelli, of the Italian Court of Cassation, and Judge Lohman of Holland. After some little delay Senator Stewart began his pleadings before the Hague Court, sitting at the Hague, on behalf of the United States. The arbitral decision, which was unanimously delivered on October 14, 1902, was to the effect that Mexico was to pay to the United States the sum of 1,420,682 dollars, Mexican currency; and Mexico was further directed to pay the United States for ever an annual sum of 43,051 dollars. It must be remembered that the Pious Fund was an arbitral award under a reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration instituted under Title IV. of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at the Hague, and not to an International Commission of Inquiry under Title III. The reference of the Dogger Bank incident is of the latter kind, as has been seen.

The Venezuelan (preferential payments)

During the punitive measures undertaken by Great Britain and Germany against Venezuela, President Castro offered to

summit the claims of the allies to arbitration. This action also arbitration case, 1902-3. procured the good offices of the United States, but President Roosevelt declined to act as arbitrator, and suggested that the case be referred to the Hague Tribunal. The year 1902 accordingly closed with negotiations towards this end. In February next year, Mr. Herbert Bowen, the American Minister to Venezuela, acting on behalf of that Government, signed at Washington protocols by which England, France, Germany, and the other Powers having claims against Venezuela agreed to submit them to the adjudication of the Hague Tribunal. Great Britain and Italy each received an immediate cash payment of £5500 on signing the protocols, and Germany a sum of £76,000, to be paid in instalments. The arguments began before the Hague Tribunal on September 21, and were closed on November 15. It was agreed that 30 per cent. of the Customs revenues of the ports of La Guayva and Porto Cabello should be allocated to extinguish the claims of foreign creditors. The question submitted to the Hague Tribunal was whether the debts due to the subjects of "the blockading Powers" should be paid before those due to the subjects of the peace Powers." On February 27 the arbitrators at the Hague delivered their award considering that Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, the blockading Powers, were entitled to preferential treatment in the payment of such indemnities as Venezuela had been forced to pay in consequence of the blockade.¹

The reference to the Hague Court in the case of the house-tax in the foreign concessions in Japan was decided upon in 1902, though the award was not delivered till 1905. In December of the former year, Sir John Ardagh, who was nominated a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the decease of Lord Pauncefote, designated M. Gram, member of the Court of Arbitration for Sweden and Norway, to act as arbitrator in the Japanese house-tax case. The Hague Tribunal met in May, and the other arbitrators were M. Louis

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1902, p. 436; "Ann. Reg." 1903, p. 429; "Ann. Reg." 1904, p. 437.

Renault, of the Institute of France, and M. Motono, the Japanese Minister in Paris. The Japanese Government retained the services of Baron Descamps, the well-known Belgian jurist. The other Powers appearing before the tribunal were England, France, and Germany. The European Powers demanded that the proceedings should be conducted in German, while Japan made a similar request with respect to the Japanese language. On May 22, 1905, the Hague Tribunal gave judgment. The majority of the Court decided that according to the articles of the various treaties and other engagements submitted to them, not only is the ground ceded by Japan under perpetual leases free from all taxes and charges whatsoever, but also all buildings erected or about to be erected thereon, unless such charges are expressly stipulated, which the Hague Tribunal found not to be the case.¹

Inchoate
references to
Hague Court.

In 1902 various questions of a minor order were referred to the Hague Tribunal, which do not yet seem to have been decided, since the decision in the Venezuela claims, decided February, 1904, was, though not the first, as asserted in the *Times*, apparently only the second case in which the court has adjudicated. Thus in July, 1902, there was a proposed reference to the terms of the sale by Denmark to the United States of the Island of St. Thomas, one of the Virgin group in the West Indies. It also seems that about that date Holland and Germany desired to submit a point of difference relative to submarine cables.

The conservatives in the Landsting managed to frustrate the Government measure for the sale of the West India Islands, and hence the reference to the Hague Tribunal was defeated.² In 1902 the tribunal was occupied with

¹ The decision of the Hague Tribunal therefore turned exclusively upon a question of fact, that there was no reservation of any tax in the original leases. A tax was payable in respect of emphyteusis, the form of perpetual lease in the Roman Law. In the absence of an express waiver of the right, a nation can undoubtedly tax foreigners. General Halleck observes that "the law of Louisiana, imposing a tax on legacies payable to aliens, probably is not opposed to International Law" ("International Law," vol. i. p. 461). Vattel holds that the master of the country may impose a tribute on aliens ("Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. ix, s. 125). M. Motono, the arbitrator of Japan in the house-tax case, placed on record his dissent from the judgment of the Hague Tribunal.

² "Annual Register," 1902, p. 353.

administrative matters, and with a question of private international law. In February of that year Dr. Asser presided over a convention for the adjustment between the laws of various European countries of discrepancies with respect to questions of marriage, divorce, judicial separation, and the guardianship of minors. Great Britain was not a party to this convention, and Denmark and Russia seemed to have abstained from becoming signatories to the proposals mooted. They were, however, accepted by the great majority of European countries. It is, of course, strictly proper that an international tribunal should concern itself with questions of private international law.

Action of the
Hague Court
in the sphere
of private
international
law.

7.—THE TERMS OF THE NORTH SEA CONVENTION,
NOVEMBER 25, 1904.

The following are the terms of the North Sea Convention, signed at St. Petersburg on November 25, by his Majesty's ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, and Count Lamsdorff:—

Terms of the
North Sea
Convention
between
Russia and
Great Britain,
Nov. 25, 1904.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial Russian Government, having agreed to entrust to an International Commission of Inquiry—assembled conformably to Articles 9 to 14 of the Hague Convention of July 29, 1899, for the pacific settlement of international disputes—the task of elucidating by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation the question of fact connected with the incident which occurred during the night of October 21–22, 1904, in the North Sea, on which occasion the firing of the guns of the Russian fleet caused the loss of a boat and the death of two persons belonging to a British fishing fleet, as well as damages to other boats of the fleet and injuries to the crews of some of those boats, the undersigned, being duly authorized, therefore have agreed upon the following provisions:—

Article I.—The International Commission of Inquiry shall be composed of five members—Commissioners—of whom two shall be officers of high rank in the British and Imperial Russian navies respectively. The Governments of France and of the United States shall each be requested to select one of their naval officers of high rank as a member of the Commission. The fifth member shall be chosen by agreement between the four members above mentioned. In the event of no

agreement being arrived at between the four Commissioners as to the selection of the fifth member of the Commission, his Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, will be invited to select him. Each of the two high contracting parties shall likewise appoint a legal assessor to advise the Commissioners, and an agent officially empowered to take part in the labours of the Commission.

“Article II.”—The Commission shall inquire into and report on all the circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and particularly on the questions as to where the responsibility lies and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties, or to the subjects of other countries in the event of their responsibility being established by the inquiry.

“Article III.”—The Commission shall settle the details of the procedure which it will follow for the purpose of accomplishing the task with which it has been entrusted.

“Article IV.”—The two high contracting parties undertake to supply the International Commission of Inquiry to the utmost of their ability with all the means and facilities necessary, in order to enable it to acquaint itself thoroughly with, and appreciate correctly, the matters in dispute.

“Article V.”—The Commission shall assemble at Paris as soon as possible after the signature of this agreement.

“Article VI.”—The Commission shall present its report to the two high contracting parties, signed by all the members of the Commission.

“Article VII.”—The Commission will take all its decisions by a majority of the votes of the five Commissioners.

“Article VIII.”—The two high contracting parties undertake each to bear on reciprocal terms the expenses of the inquiry made by it previous to the assembly of the Commission. The expenses incurred by the International Commission after the date of its assembly in organizing its staff, and in conducting the investigations which it will have to make, shall be equally borne by the two Governments.”

LORD STOWELL, CHIEF JUSTICE STORY, AND PROFESSOR T. E.
HOLLAND ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF VESSELS,
BELONGING TO STATES IN AMITY, NAVIGATING THE
OCEAN.

The action of the Baltic Fleet in firing the last section of Admiral Rohzdestvensky's fleet in opening fire for twenty minutes on the Hull trawlers on the Dogger

Bank on the 22nd October, 1904,¹ raised a question which is created a situation *prima impressionis*.
 perhaps *prima impressionis* as far as either English or American reports are concerned. It was purely an issue of fact, and may be said to be outside the purview of law. No legal question seems to have been discussed before the North Sea Commission, the assumption being made throughout that a more or less gross abuse of power had been committed. While the fact that Great Britain was a passive ally or auxiliary of Japan² complicated the political crisis, it was of course evident that she was not at war with Russia, and therefore her merchant vessels were neutral. Further, the attack of the battleship *Suvoroff* on the trawlers exposed them to a risk which not even a state of war could have justified. The gravity of the crisis was purely due to questions of fact and policy, and in this respect the North Sea Commission exhibits a great contrast to the Geneva Conference.

A hundred years before, the English Government, under Spanish apprehension that an armament was fitting out at Ferrol, directed a British squadron to attack certain Spanish vessels on the high seas in time of peace. The Spanish Government of that day, on the other hand, is considered to have disproved the intelligence on which the English Government acted, and therefore the incident seems in *pari materia* with the North Sea Incident. At the North Sea Commission, the Commissioners, by a majority, virtually declared that the apprehensions of Admiral Rohzdestvensky were unfounded, since they concluded that there was no torpedo-boat on the Dogger Bank.³ Admiral Rohzdestvensky therefore acted on intelligence officially proved to have been false, like that on which the Government of this country acted in 1804, when vessels belonging to a state with which it was at peace were not only fired upon but captured. The capture of the Monte Video squadron in 1804 seems only explicable on the ground of the abnormal situation then existing all over Europe owing

¹ Cf. *Post*, Appendix I., and ss. 11, 12, 13, of the Report of the North Sea Commission, pp. 481, 489-491.

² Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 514, referring to De Martens' "Essai sur les Armateurs," s. 50.

³ Cf. s. 13, Report of the North Sea Commission, *post*, p. 490.

to the ambition of Napoleon. It must also be remembered that our naval policy was very different at the period under discussion. The right of search exercised by this country over the warships of states with which it was at peace, meets with unanimous condemnation by modern writers on public international law. It cannot be said that the intelligence on which the British Government acted on in 1804 received an *ex post facto* vindication by the Spanish declaration of war at the end of the year, as the seizure of the Monte Video squadron had in the mean time furnished the former country with a sufficient *casus belli*. It is difficult not to regard the Monte Video squadron incident of 1804 as far more serious an infraction of comity than the North Sea Incident of 1904. It would be difficult to imagine any circumstances, under which, if an international incident similar to that of 1804 were to occur, it would admit of reference to arbitration at the present day. The international wrong inflicted by this country on Spain in 1804 possibly accounts for the chivalrous attitude assumed by Mr. Canning towards that country some twenty years afterwards, both as regards Spain's struggle with her colonies, and the French intervention of 1823; and the fact that England freed Spain from the domination of Napoleon shortly afterwards may be regarded as an atonement. The facts, as detailed in James's "Naval History,"¹ were that towards the end of the summer of 1804, the British Government, believing in a false rumour that an armament was fitting out in Ferrol, that a considerable force was already collected there, and that French troops were near at hand, despatched a squadron off Cadiz to intercept and detain, by force or otherwise, the four Spanish frigates known to be bound to that port with an immense quantity of specie, which they were bringing from Monte Video. On October the four British frigates sighted the Spanish frigates, and immediately made sail in chase, and upon the refusal of the Spanish commanding officer to allow the squadron to be detained, an action was commenced, during which one of the Spanish ships blew up, and the other three were taken by, the British ships.

¹ Vol. iii. p. 280.

Their cargoes realized very little short of a million sterling. Many persons who concurred in the expedition doubted the right of detaining these ships, and many, again, to whom the legality of the act appeared clear, were of opinion that a more formidable force should have been sent to execute the service, in order to have justified the Spanish admiral in surrendering without an appeal to arms. On November 27, an order was issued to make reprisals on English property, and on December 12 war was declared against England by Spain. This affair was an instance of special reprisals levied by one state against another under a belief in false intelligence. The North Sea Incident was the case of an act of war perpetrated by the commander of the naval forces of a belligerent state on neutral vessels, induced by false intelligence of an expedition of the enemy state in the quarter of the globe where the act was done. No possible imputation can attach to the English naval commanders who attacked the Spanish squadron in 1804. If Admiral Rohzdestvensky's intelligence had been accurate, he would have been merely conducting ordinary belligerent operations at the time of the North Sea Incident. The Commissioners at Paris in 1905, by a majority, considered that Admiral Rohzdestvensky was responsible for the damage caused to the Hull trawlers by the starboard fire of the *Suvaroff*,¹ and that the fire opened on the port side was unjustifiable,² although they finally declared that their judgments did not impugn either the military value or the sentiments of humanity of Admiral Rohzdestvensky and the personnel of his squadron.³ The merits of the issue seem to depend on the reasonableness of the belief of Admiral Rohzdestvensky that he was being attacked by vessels of his enemy.

Lord Stowell held that a master of a merchant vessel might entertain a reasonable doubt whether an armed vessel he met was not a pirate, when it was sworn that reports had prevailed of pirates being at sea, and when the vessel he met was at a considerable distance from land, but "not in any place so remote from the scenes that Barbary pirates usually haunt, as

¹ North Sea Report, s. 11.

² Cf. s. 13.

³ Cf. s. 17.

Opinion of Sir W. Scott as to reasonableness of mistake in *St. Juan Baptista* and *La Purissima Concepcion*, (1803) 5 Christ. Rob. 33.

to carry a conviction that the ship could not be a pirate."¹ In this case, therefore, Lord Stowell held that the two Spanish vessels were justified in attempting to escape from, and resisting search by, a British privateer, since they believed the latter to be a pirate. At the time a state of war existed, but this was not known to the masters of the Spanish vessels, as they had sailed before the outbreak of hostilities. In this case, therefore, Lord Stowell considered that the reasonableness of the belief of the national character of a vessel, entertained by the master of a ship who meets it, depends on the proximity of the former to the base of its operations; a conclusion that cannot be said to be irrelevant to the North Sea Incident.

Chief Justice Story on the rights and duties of vessels navigating the ocean in time of peace.
The *Marianna Flora*, (1826) 11 Wheaton, p. 49.

A case decided by the great jurist of the United States, Chief Justice Story, explains even more fully the discretion that a naval commander ought to exercise when he meets a vessel as to whose character he may legitimately entertain a doubt. It is a more satisfactory decision than that of Lord Stowell, as the latter was given in the case of a privateer whose conduct was in other respects irregular.

The case before Chief Justice Story was that of a public war vessel of the United States Navy, and the facts were as follows: In November, 1821, the United States cruiser *Alligator* met a private armed vessel of Portuguese nationality in the Atlantic. The *Alligator* was on a cruise against pirates and slave-traders, under the instruction of the President. The Portuguese vessel, the *Marianna Flora*, was bound on a voyage from Bahia to Lisbon, with a valuable cargo. The evidence showed that what Chief Justice Story called "a combat on mutual misapprehension" of both commanders that the other was a pirate took place. The two vessels crossed each other's course, and the Portuguese vessel, suspecting the other from the first, shortened sail and hove to, the object being, as it appeared, to avoid delay in fighting with a pirate for fear of a night attack. Neither vessel had yet hoisted the national flag. The *Alligator* approached the *Marianna Flora*, which fired a cannon when the American vessel came within long-shot.

¹ *St. Juan Baptista* and *La Purissima Concepcion*, (1803) 5 Christ. Rob. 33, 34.

The American commander, Lieut. Stockton, then discerned that the Portuguese vessel was an armed vessel by her appearance and equipment. The *Marianna Flora*, after firing several more shots, was overpowered on the American coming to close quarters. No one was injured on the *Alligator*, and the *Marianna Flora* did not hoist her national flag till she ceased firing. The explanation tendered by the Portuguese master was that he took the *Alligator* to be a piratical cruiser. The commander of the American vessel, on the other hand, explained his action as mere resistance to what he considered piratical aggression. On those facts, Chief Justice Story decreed restitution of the vessel to the Portuguese claimant, but refused to condemn the United States commander in either costs or damages, holding that the action of the latter was entirely justifiable, because the first wrong was done by the Portuguese master in attacking the former's vessel. In this case, Chief Justice Story directly discussed the question, implicitly involved in the North Sea Incident, What are the rights and duties of armed and other ships navigating the ocean in time of peace? Chief Justice Story pointed out that such rights and duties differ from those that arise in a public war, and must not be confounded with them. But the context shows that the immediate aspect of the question he was referring to was of the rights of war as against enemies, not as against neutrals. The theoretically absolute right of a neutral vessel to pursue its ordinary route over the high seas is subject to a legal limitation in the Right of Visitation and Search and to the purely practical limitation arising from a natural desire to avoid being exposed to risks of battle. There was no question of the exercise of the right of search in the North Sea Incident, and therefore the legal limitation to the right of navigation of a neutral vessel in time of war does not arise. In the opinion of the majority of the Commissioners, there was no question of the Hull trawlers being exposed to any legitimate war risks, arising from the presence of the naval forces of both belligerents in the North Sea, and hence the practical limitation does not arise. The observations therefore of Story, J., are strictly relevant. The learned

judge observed: "Upon the ocean then, in time of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there. Every ship sails there with the unquestionable right of pursuing her own lawful business without interruption; but whatever may be that business, she is bound to pursue it in such a manner as not to violate the rights of others. The general maxim in such cases is *sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas*.

"It has been argued that no ship has a right to draw round her a line of jurisdiction, within which no other is at liberty to intrude—in short, that she may appropriate so much of the ocean as she may deem necessary for her protection, and prevent any nearer approach. This doctrine appears to us novel, and is not supported by any authority. It goes to establish upon the ocean a territorial jurisdiction, like that which is claimed by all nations within cannon-shot of their shores, in virtue of their general sovereignty. But the latter right is founded upon the principle of sovereign and permanent appropriation, and has never been successfully asserted beyond it. Every vessel, undoubtedly, has the right to the use of so much of the ocean as she occupies, and as is essential to her own movements. Beyond this, no exclusive right has ever yet been recognized, and we see no reason for admitting its existence. Merchant ships are in the constant habit of approaching each other on the ocean, either to relieve their own distress, to procure information, or to ascertain the character of strangers; and, hitherto, there has never been supposed in such conduct any breach of the customary observances, or of the strictest principles of the law of nations.¹ . . . No ship is, under such circumstances, bound to lie by, or wait the approach of any other ship. She is at full liberty to pursue her voyage in her own way . . . but she is not at liberty to inflict injuries upon other innocent parties, simply

¹ These observations of Chief Justice Story acquire great interest in connection with the statement in the Report of the North Sea Commission that Admiral Rohzdestvensky opened fire on a vessel, *inter alia*, because it seemed to be coming straight towards the *Suvaroff*. Cf. s. 11, p. 489.

because of conjectural dangers."¹ The mere fact of approach is no excuse for hostile attack.² Some concluding observations in this judgment of Story, J., are of additional interest in connection with the North Sea Incident. He observed that if the United States warship (the vessel attacked) had been seriously injured, or any of her crew had been killed, no doubt could exist that both redress and punishment would have become due.³

The rights and duties of neutral merchant vessels navigating the ocean in time of war were thus summarized by Professor Holland during the Russo-Japanese War:—

"It is beyond doubt that the theoretically absolute right of neutral ships, whether public or private, to pursue their ordinary routes over the high seas in time of war is limited by the right of the belligerent to fight on those seas a naval battle, the scene of which can be approached by such ships only at their proper risk and peril. In such a case the neutral has ample warning of the danger to which he would be exposed did he not alter his intended course."⁴ A final comment on the North Sea Incident is that it took place in the Narrow Seas over which Great Britain once laid claim to exclusive rights of property and jurisdiction.⁵ Albericus Gentilis, in one of his *Advocationes Hispanicæ*,⁶ supports these pretensions. Queen Elizabeth seized upon some Hanseatic vessels lying at anchor off Lisbon for having passed through the sea north of Scotland without her permission. Lord Stowell observed that the seas near the British coast are a station

¹ Cf. ss. 11, 12, 13 of the Report, where it appears that Admiral Rohzdestvensky directed fire on the Hull trawlers because he considered them "suspicious vessels."

² Cf. s. 11 of the Report of the North Sea Commission, and the judgment of Story, J., in the *Marianna Flora*, (1826) 11 Wheaton's "Reports," Am. p. 497, 502, 503.

³ Article 2 of the St. Petersburg Protocol recognized that one scope of the inquiry was to determine the degree of blame attaching to persons found responsible. It was stated both by Lord Lansdowne (*Times*, November 10, 1904), and by Mr. A. J. Balfour (*Times*, October 29, 1904) that the North Sea Commission was empowered to award punishment.

⁴ Cf. *Times*, May 25, 1904.

⁵ Cf. Wheaton's "History," part i. s. 18, p. 152.

⁶ Lib. i. c. viii.

Professor T.
E. Holland on
the rights and
duties of
neutral mer-
chant vessels
navigating the
ocean in time
of war, *Times*,
May 25, 1904.

Former claim
of Great
Britain to -
special juris-
diction and
property over
the North Sea.

over which the Crown of England has, from pretty remote antiquity, always asserted something of that special jurisdiction which the sovereigns of other countries have claimed and exercised over certain parts of the seas adjoining to their coasts.¹ In support of the claim of Great Britain, Selden wrote his celebrated "Mare Clausum."² One of his principal propositions was that the seas which washed the shores of Great Britain and Ireland were subject to her sovereignty even as far as the northern pole. As a matter of historical interest, the North Sea Incident occurred in waters over which from time immemorial down to the close of the seventeenth century, England had exercised a special property and jurisdiction.³

¹ *The Maria*, (1799) 1 Rob. Ad Rep. p. 352.

² Joh. Selden, "Mare Clausum, sive di Dominio Maris," lib. ii.

³ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. i. c. vi. ss. 579-587.

CHAPTER XV.

THE LAW OF BLOCKADE.

MR. W. E. HALL, who is followed by Sir H. S. Maine, defines Introductory
blockade as the interception by a belligerent of access to observations.
territory or to a place which is in possession of his enemy.¹ While the object of the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* is to cut off imports into an enemy's country, the object of the belligerent right of blockade is to cut off both imports and exports. The object of two of the greatest blockades of history, that of France by Great Britain during the Great War, and that of the Southern States of North America by the Federal Government, was partly, if not primarily, commercial. While blockades, whose object is simply to distress a population, are possibly falling into desuetude, modern experience cannot be said to confirm the view that blockade is tending to disappear as an act of war. The instances of the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese War suggest a contrary conclusion. Wars are tending to become more and more naval,² and land sieges, accompanied by maritime blockades, to constitute decisive features in modern war. Sir H. S. Maine³ surmised that improved means of communication would have the effect of causing blockade to fall into abeyance as an act of war. Mr. W. E. Hall and Historicus also indicated the view that there was some uncertainty about the occurrence of blockade in future wars, pointing out that blockade, as expounded

¹ "International Law," pt. iv. c. viii. p. 693; and Lectures, "International Law," p. 107.

² Sir H. S. Maine's Lecture, "International Law," p. 113.

³ Lecture, "International Law," p. 115.

by continental jurists, was wholly ineffective as an act of war.¹

But since these words were written, the experiences of Santiago da Cuba and Port Arthur have demonstrated that military blockades are not merely effective, but even decisive features of modern war. It is curious to note that a blockade of a fortified place like Gibraltar, separated from the mainland by an isthmus belonging in part to the State which possesses the fortress, would have all the effect of a blockade accompanied by a land siege.

In the view of Mr. W. E. Hall, the experience of the American Civil War proved that steam powerfully assists in the evasion of blockades.² But General Halleck equally considers that steam has enhanced their efficacy,³ and it seems, on the whole, impossible to deny that the improved nature of modern communications has done much to legitimize blockade, and has also rendered it more effective in practice.

A curious experience of the blockade of Port Arthur at once impairs both the conclusions of Mr. W. E. Hall and General Halleck. It was stated in the *Times*, December 9, 1904, that for months previous to that date, hundreds of Chinese junks, propelled by ten or twenty oarsmen, found their way into Port Arthur from Chifu, Teng-chan-fu, and Tientsin with tons of fresh provisions, which they landed on the low land at the remoter side of the western harbour. The fact that the Japanese intercepted most of these junks in the first instance, and then released them, after which they ran the blockade, cannot be taken as having impaired the legal validity of the blockade. While the validity of a blockade is impaired by allowing a great number of neutral vessels to pass through in the first instance, it is not impaired by the action of the commander of a blockade who, having made a number of captures, selects a certain number of flagrant cases, and dismisses the rest on the ground of particular circumstances, such as that he cannot afford prize crews to man his captures.⁴

¹ "International Law," 5th ed., p. 704; Letters, "International Law," p. 97.

² "International Law," p. 704.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 188.

⁴ *The Rolla* (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364, 374.

Wireless telegraphy, it may be admitted, has demonstrated itself to be a factor in impairing the validity of a blockade, while it is difficult to see how it could be of equal use to the besiegers. Owing to the Japanese protest, the installation at the Russian Consulate at Chifu was dismantled in August, 1904. It seems easy to multiply instances where a wireless telegraphy installation might be erected on neutral or belligerent territory, sufficiently near to the zone of military operations to defeat or baffle a blockading force. The destructive nature of the floating mine, so terribly vindicated in the case of the *Hatsuse* and *Petropavlosk*, renders it, again, very difficult for a blockading force to conduct its operations, as Hautefeuille contended was obligatory, entirely within the limits of marginal seas. This reason, no less than the increased range of modern cannon, may account for the fact that the Japanese squadron blockaded Port Arthur from a distance. According to all accounts, when Admiral Vitoff sallied forth from Port Arthur in August, 1904, he only sighted Admiral Togo's squadron after several hours' steaming. No doubt he proceeded with great caution at first, owing to the danger of mines. But, according to Admiral Togo's own account, he met the Russians twenty-five miles off the Liao-tung Peninsula.¹ The Japanese blockade of Port Arthur was, none the less, completely effective from a naval point of view; and was also in no small measure effective to prevent the access of neutrals, since twenty-three vessels were captured during 1904 attempting to run the blockade.² It can hardly be inferred, from the experiences of the Japanese before Port Arthur, that blockades are likely to be infrequent. The growth of naval power in different countries in modern times seems to point to a contrary conclusion. In point of fact, the experience of the last decade has reproduced every feature of the law of blockade, including the controversy as to the legitimacy of a Paper blockade, which Manning, much more than half a century ago,

¹ Admiral Togo thus seems to have adopted the blockade tactics of Lord Nelson, who always insisted that the blockading squadron ought never to be seen from the blockaded port. Cf. Clarke and M'Arthur's "Life of Nelson," vol. ii. p. 363; "Ann. Reg.," 1805, 233.

² *Times*, January 24, 1905.

considered a sealed chapter of the maritime law of belligerency.¹ Further, the latest development of blockade, the Pacific Blockade, has definitely been growing in esteem since 1827. It would, therefore, seem that the law of Blockade demands the attention of the student of politics, history, or international law as much as at any previous period of history. Nothing can more strongly confirm this view than the attitude observed by Dr. J. Westlake on the subject in giving his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War at the end of 1903. The late President of the Institute of International Law not only observed that the abolition of the whole doctrine of contraband of war by Great Britain would not prove detrimental to our national interests provided we asserted and maintained the law and right of blockade, but even that it was "quite possible" that a blockade of the whole coast of the British Isles might again be proclaimed.² This is clearly attributing the greatest possible importance to a study of the subject, for while the exercise of the right of blockade is regarded by Dr. Westlake as essential to the existence of this country, the abuse of the right by her enemies constitutes a not improbable contingency. In giving evidence, both Prof. J. E. Holland and Dr. Westlake concurred in the view that a blockade of the British Isles would necessarily be a mere paper blockade.³ Dr. Westlake pointed out that when a strong naval power is at war with a weak naval power, the former has just the same power over the mercantile marine of the latter under the law of blockade as under the law of the capture of private property of the enemy at sea. Under the law of blockade, which differs from the law of contraband, the penalty is levied as much on articles *Pacifici usus* as on those *bellici usus*.

The general
and safe defi-
nition of
blockade.

Sir R. Phillimore considers the general and safe definition of a blockade to be that given by Sir W. Scott, who observed that the usual and regular mode of enforcing blockades is, "by stationing a number of ships, and forming as it were

¹ Cf. Letter of Professor T. E. Holland, *Times*, May 25, 1904.

² Report of the Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War, "Parliamentary Papers," 2644, vol. ii. p. 242, 243.

³ Report, etc., *ibid. supra*, p. 244.

an arch of circumvallation round the mouth of the prohibited port. There, if the arch fails in any one part, the blockade itself fails altogether.”¹ This definition is, on the whole, complete and satisfactory. The most vexed point in the controversy between Hautefeuille and Historicus was whether the ships of the blockading squadron should be stationary or not, and in the above definition, Sir W. Scott seems to take the view of Hautefeuille. The definition, further, seems more exacting than that adopted by the Institut de Droit International, under which the ships of the blockading squadron are not required to be absolutely stationary.²

The existence of the belligerent right to maintain a blockade is part of the old law of nations which remains unaffected by the Declaration of Paris, 1856; and it may fairly claim to be an ultimate postulate of international law with even greater justice than the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* to his enemy. Sir W. Scott observed on this topic of the validity of blockade—
Incontrovertible nature
of belligerent
right to main-
tain blockade.

“There is no rule of the law of nations more established than this, that the breach of a blockade subjects the property so employed to confiscation. Among all the contradictory positions that have been advanced on the law of nations, this principle has never been disputed; it is to be found in all books of law, and in all treaties; every man knows it; the subjects of all States know it, as it is universally acknowledged by all Governments who possess any degree of civil knowledge.”³

The controversy that has raged around the law of blockade has been confined to the mode of its maintenance, and has never extended, as in the case of contraband, to the questioning of the validity of the penalty of confiscation. Sir R. Phillimore observes—

“Among the rights of belligerents there is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and necessary in its application, than that which gives rise to the law of blockade.”⁴

¹ The *Arthur* (1814), I Dods. 423-425.

² “Ann. de l’Institut,” 1883, p. 218; *Règlement des Prises Maritimes*.

³ The *Columbia* (1799), I Rob. 154.

⁴ “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 285, p. 382; referring to Kent’s Comm. vol. i, p. 145.

Historicus, in the note to his chapter on the Law and Practice of Blockade,¹ transcribes a long passage from Chitty's "Practical Treatise on the Law of Nations," where it is stated—

"It has been well observed that among the rights of belligerents, there is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and necessary as to its application, than that which gives rise to the law of blockade, as it has been ascertained, defined, and administered by the maritime tribunals of this country. The greater the research that shall be made into the principles of natural law, the more the details of the diplomatic and conventional history of Europe shall be studied, the more will it appear that this right had its origin in the purest sources of maritime jurisprudence, that it is sanctioned by the practice of the best times, and, above all, that it is so essentially connected with the vital interests of Great Britain, that the renunciation of it, under any circumstances, must be regarded as the renunciation of one of the firmest charters of our naval pre-eminence, and as the surrender of one of the surest bulwarks of our national independence."

In his first letter on blockade, Historicus observed—"Bynker-shoek declares that blockade 'is founded upon the principles of natural reason as well as the usage of nations.'" In a subsequent letter he also adopts the view that blockade is one of the bulwarks of our maritime power.

Mr. W. E. Hall commends the usage of blockade from the point of view of an advocate of international peace. If belligerents are deprived of their right to injure the enemy by the action of neutrals, this would lead to belligerent complaint of neutral action, and so enlarge the area of future wars.²

¹ Letters, "International Law," p. 115.

² "International Law," 5th ed., p. 699. It may, however, be remembered that Lord Nelson was averse to the system of blockade, and even considered it impaired our naval efficiency ("Ann. Reg.," 1805, 233). The high authority of Lord Nelson, therefore, cannot be cited in support of Chitty's view; *supra*. Professor T. E. Holland, in giving evidence before the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, November, 1903, observed that there was a great body of opinion, especially in naval circles, against any binding force existing in International Law. He illustrated this observation by calling attention to some utterances of Admiral Aube and Marshal Von Moltke. The former had stated that since war, in the language of Vattel, is that state in which we prosecute our right by force ("Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. i. s. 1.), it is a mere contradiction in terms to speak of the laws of war. Professor T. E. Holland also stated that Marshal Von Moltke, in a letter to Professor Bluntschli, who forwarded him a

It may serve a useful purpose here to distinguish the operation of the law of blockade from that of contraband. The Law of Blockade and the Law of Contraband distinguished.

Firstly.—Questions arising from the law of contraband occur immediately on the mere outbreak of hostilities, the belligerent right to intercept contraband *in transitu* being a general incident of a state of war. But a belligerent cannot enforce the penalties of violation of blockade without notification, and the allotment of a competent blockading force actually present in the blockaded spot.

Secondly.—In the case of contraband, the noxious articles, whose carriage by the neutral involves the penalty, are of a specified class. In the case of blockade the articles which are amenable to the operation of the belligerent right comprise ordinary goods which have no relation to war, as well as those that are peculiarly subservient to it.

Thirdly.—In the case of contraband the penalty, though it may extend to the ship, falls primarily on the cargo. In the case of blockade the usual incidence of the penalty is on the ship, though it may extend to the goods, even, in one case, to the exclusion of the ship.

Fourthly.—The object of contraband is to prohibit imports of a specific kind, while that of blockade is to cut off all imports and all exports.

Fifthly.—In the case of contraband the duration of the

certain code of the laws of war drawn up by the Institute of International Law, said that real kindness in war is to hit as hard as you can, not to observe any rules, but finish it (Report, Royal Comm. Ev., vol. ii. p. 235). The objection in naval and military circles to the rules of international law seems very explicable on the ground that they hamper and obstruct efficient belligerent action. Lord Nelson seems once to have complained of them in this sense. Yet, assuming this, it seems inconsistent that a distinguished admiral, Sir Gerard Noel, should have described the right of blockade as conferring on a belligerent merely the right to intercept vessels on the spot (Report, *supra*, p. 243). International law, as understood in this country and the United States, imposes no such restriction on the right to intercept a blockade runner. In his memorandum, Professor T. E. Holland observed that, "a neutral ship, sailing with intent to run a blockade, is, according to the view held by Great Britain and the United States, liable to capture at any stage of her outward voyage. According to the view held by France and the Continent generally, she does not become so liable till after actual warning endorsed by a ship of the blockading squadron on her papers (Report, *supra*, vol. iii. p. 256). According to the latter view, Sir Gerard Noel was, of course, indubitably correct, and it must be added that Dr. J. Westlake appears to concur in it.

penalty to which the neutral is amenable is limited to the outward voyage,¹ except where there are false papers, concealment, or fraud.²

In the case of violation of blockade, the duration of the penalty lasts as long as the blockade continues, and, therefore, may attach during the return voyage as well as the outward, unless the blockading squadron have given the vessel an implied permission to enter.³

Analogies
between Law
of Contraband
and Law of
Blockade.

On the other hand, the sphere of operation is the same either in the case of the belligerent right of intercepting contraband, or in the case of the belligerent right of seizure for violating blockade. Both rights, according to the usage of Great Britain and the United States, can be exercised on the high seas, and "on this point, the breach having been, in fact, committed, the French doctrine can be, and perhaps is, in unison with that of England."⁴ There is also an analogy between the rule that only applies the penalty in the case of contraband to the ship when it belongs to the owner of the cargo, and the rule restricting the penalty of violation of blockade to the ship, except where the cargo is owned by the ship-owner or is contraband. Again, the rule exempting the ship from liability for the carriage of contraband, except where the master of the vessel knows there is contraband on board, exhibits analogy to the rule that obtains, in cases of violation of blockade, by which the cargo is exempt from confiscation, unless it can be shown that its owner was apprised of the existence of the blockade before the goods were shipped, or that there was time to countermand the shipment.

Sir R. Phillimore observes—

Authoritative
writers on the
Right and
Law of
Blockade.

"There is no subject of maritime or international law upon which the jurists of all nations are so unanimous and precise in their opinions as upon the right and law of blockade. Authorities might easily be accumulated upon this point."⁵

¹ *Per* Sir W. Scott in the *Imina* (1800), 3 Rob. 167, 168.

² *The Naney* (1800), 3 Rob. 122; *the Rosalie and Betty* (1800), 2 Rob. 343.

³ *The Christiana Margaretha* (1805), 6 Rob. 62 and Halleck's "International Law," vol. ii. p. 207.

⁴ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 710.

⁵ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 299.

The author is speaking only of the authoritative writers on international law. There is, on the other hand, nothing more striking than the wide variance between the views of foreign jurists and those of Great Britain and the United States, for the last century and a quarter, on what constitutes an effective blockade and the requisite notification.¹

Grotius forbids the carrying anything to besieged or blockaded places—

“if it might impede the execution of the belligerent’s lawful designs, and if the carriers might have known of the siege or blockade; as in the case of a town actually invested, or a port closely blockaded, and when a surrender or peace is already expected to take place.”

Grotius upon
the Right and
Law of
Blockade,
I. iii. cap. i.
s. 5, art. 3.

If the neutral shall only have intended to inflict loss on the belligerent but shall not have actually inflicted it, the belligerent can compel the neutral to give security by retaining the thing. Further, in the case of a very unjust war, the neutral is not only civilly bound for the injury, but even criminally, like one who rescues a guilty person from a judge who is about to pronounce sentence, and it shall, therefore, be lawful to decree against him what suits his offence.

Bynkershoek, commenting on the above passage of Grotius, Bynkershoek on the Right and Law of Blockade, 2 J. P. I. i. c. iv.

“For the object, of course, of prohibiting commerce the States-General blockaded the harbours of Flanders with warships, and for this purpose, therefore, confiscated the vessels of all persons either going in or coming out thence, as by the reason of the thing and by the usage of nations it is neither lawful to bring anything to, nor to carry anything from, blockaded places. And thence the Admiralty said, as also the States-General decreed, that the law was the same in respect to vessels which had previously been captured from us and then had been sold, since, when ports are blockaded, it is even lawful to intercept the ships of friends. This is the case, if they are seized before the voyage is ended, while the captains are employed on an unlawful object; but the voyage is not considered to be accomplished, unless these vessels shall have arrived at the native port of the purchaser or a friendly port. It is certain that the States-General did not express anything

¹ Cf. *Historicus, Letters, “International Law,” “England and Paper Blockade,”* and Hall’s *“International Law,”* 5th ed., p. 703 and note.

less by that decree of June 26, 1630, from which circumstance you will lawfully have deduced to that issue, which I now dispute, whether in the year 1666, the States-General considered England, Scotland, and Ireland, and all those possessions which the English have in Asia, Africa, and America, blockaded by their squadrons. It has been stated that these very States-General in the year 1652 pronounced such a decree as far as the English are concerned, having equally prohibited all commerce with the English;¹ but by what right they declared it, I do not now inquire, being content to observe that these very States-General in the year 1663 refused this very right to the Spaniards, when the latter desired Portugal to be considered blockaded, which they had before claimed for themselves against the English, so it is related in the Annals."

Wheaton observes—

"Bynkershoek appears to have mistaken the true sense of the above-cited passage from Grotius, in supposing that the latter meant to require, as a necessary ingredient in a strict blockade, that there should be an expectation of peace or of a surrender, when, in fact, he merely mentions that as an example, by way of putting that as the strongest possible case. But that he concurred with Grotius in requiring a strict and actual siege or blockade, such as where a town is actually invested with troops, or a port closely blockaded by ships of war (*oppidum obsecsum portus clausos*), is evident from his subsequent remarks in the same chapter, upon the decrees of the States-General against those who should carry anything to the Spanish camp, the same not being then actually besieged. He holds the decrees to be perfectly justifiable, so far as they prohibited the carrying of contraband of war to the enemy's camp; "but as to other things, whether they were or were not lawfully prohibited, depends entirely upon the circumstance of the place being besieged or not." So also, in commenting upon the decree of the States-General of June 26, 1630, declaring the ports of Flanders in a state of blockade, he states that this decree was for some time not carried into execution by the actual presence of a sufficient naval force, during which period certain neutral vessels trading to those ports were captured by the Dutch cruisers; and that part of their cargoes only, which consisted of contraband articles, was condemned, while the residue was released with the vessels. "It has been asked," says he, "by what law the contraband goods were condemned under these circumstances, and there are those who deny the legality of their condemnation. It is evident,

¹ "Aitzema," l. xxxii. pp. 774, 777.

however, that whilst those coasts were guarded in a lax or remiss manner, the law of blockade, by which all neutral goods going to or coming from a blockaded port may be lawfully captured, might also have been relaxed; but not so the general law of war, by which contraband goods, when carried to an enemy's port, even though not blockaded, are liable to confiscation.”¹

Vattel observes—

“ Hitherto we have considered the commerce of neutral nations with the territories of the enemy in general. There is a particular case in which the rights of war extend still farther. All commerce with a besieged town is absolutely prohibited. If I lay siege to a place, or even simply blockade it, I have a right to hinder any one from entering, and to treat as an enemy whoever attempts to leave the place, or carry anything to the besieged without my leave; for he opposes my undertaking, and may contribute to the mis-carriage of it, and thus involve me in all the misfortunes of an unsuccessful war. King Demetrius hanged up the master and pilot of a vessel carrying provisions to Athens at a time when he was on the point of reducing that city by famine. In the long and bloody war carried on by the United Provinces against Spain for the recovery of their liberties, they would not suffer the English to carry goods to Dunkirk, before which the Dutch fleet lay.”

Vattel, in this passage, merely contemplates the blockade of a single port, and not of a coast or littoral. Bynkershoek adduces historical instances showing that, as far as usage is concerned, a blockade may extend to a coast. It is evident, further, that, in the domain of theory, Bynkershoek considered the blockade of a coast perfectly legitimate, since he observes that a blockade is virtually relaxed—“ Si segnius orae observatae fuerint.”² The question is discussed by Reddie, who, it is curious to note, does not seem to notice the implicit sanction Bynkershoek gives to the operation.

Reddie observes—

“ There does not appear to be any valid ground in law for holding that the blockade of a coast, or of a series of lines of ports situated near each other, is not an equally legitimate

Vattel on the
Law and
Right of
Blockade,
l. iii. c. vii.
s. 117.

Blockade of a
coast or line
of ports as
legitimate an
operation as
blockade of a
single port.

¹ Wheaton’s “ Hist. of Law of Nations,” pp. 138–143.

² *Juffrow Maria Schroeder*, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 147, 152.

military operation as the blockade of a single port, provided an adequate naval force be brought to bear upon the coast. If the ports be contiguous or near each other, the force directed against each will embrace and include the intervening coast. If the ports be distant from each other, the blockade will be a useless measure, in any point of view; in fact, because neutrals are not likely either to land and deliver, or to ship and load goods on an open coast, without a harbour; in law, as not being actual, or in reality the military operation correctly designated a blockade."¹

In the domain of usage, the two recent instances of the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War may be cited as indicating the validity of the blockade of either a coast or of a line of ports. The United States blockaded by proclamation the whole of the north coast of Cuba, and a portion of the south coast,² and the whole of the island of San Juan, and the rest of the south coast as far as Cabo Cruz on June 29. It was observed in the *Times* of that date that the great extent of the Cuban coast thus blockaded required but few ships to make the blockade effective, because the ports were few. On this latter ground, it is clear that the blockade of Cuba, instituted by the United States in 1898, must be regarded as invalid, if the views of Reddie, frequently cited by Halleck and Historicus, are accepted. It seems to have been admitted that, in fact, the blockade of the north coast of Cuba was a useless measure, as Reddie insisted a blockade carried out under similar conditions must be. The blockade originally instituted by the Japanese of Port Arthur and Dalny is of a different character. It demonstrated itself to be, as Reddie considered would necessarily be the case when ports near each other were blockaded, a blockade at once valid in law and decisive as a military operation.

Vattel on
Paper Block-
ades, I. iii. c.
7, s. 112.

Vattel, in another passage, notices an attempt made by England and Holland to institute what Historicus appears to admit was a paper blockade of the coasts of Spain. But Historicus complained that Hautefeuille did not add that, in

¹ "Researches in Maritime Law," etc., cited by Historicus, Letters, "International Law," p. 114.

² April 27, 1898.

deference to the representations of two Northern Powers, then neutral, this blockade was abandoned. It is, however, necessary to admit that, according to the statement in Vattel, England and Holland maintained this paper blockade of the coasts of Spain for four years. While *Historicus* was undoubtedly correct in citing Vattel to show the abandonment by England and Holland of the blockade of 1689, it is impossible to find any justification, in the chapter of Vattel that treats of the subject, for the abandonment by England of the blockade of 1756. The sections of Vattel relied on by Hall, Halleck, or Phillimore certainly do not contain any reference to this blockade. Hautefeuille, as far as Vattel is concerned, remains unanswered on this point.

In the rules which regulate the incidents of blockade, considerable divergence exists between the practice of England and the United States on the one hand, and that of the chief continental Powers on the other. Fortunately, some of these differences are merely historical, such as the controversy as to whether England or France first adopted the usage of paper or cabinet blockade. Manning observes : "No jurist, no statesman will ever again defend the legality of what was at one time called the Continental System."¹ Again, in the domain of theory, Mr. W. E. Hall points out that the suggested "Règlement des Prises Maritimes," adopted by the Institut de droit International,² would approach very nearly to the English practice as regards the elements of effective blockade, since it does not require that the blockading ships should be absolutely stationary, and considers that to be driven off by stress of weather does not involve an interruption of the blockade. Such rules are quite in accord with the decisions of Sir W. Scott on the subject. But the differences that exist are far greater in theory than in practice. French usage in cases of egress, after notification and subsequent entrance, is, perhaps, in unison with that of England and the United States, as regards the duration of the offence and the liability to penalty. But the view of even the

Difference
between
English,
American,
and conti-
nental view
of Law and
Right of
Blockade.

¹ Manning's "Commentaries on the Law of Nations," p. 333.

² "Ann. de l'Institut," 1883, p. 218.

carefully debated Règlement des Prises Maritimes of the Institut de Droit International is that capture can only be effected during an actual attempt at violation on the blockaded spot itself.¹

The proposed code, therefore, imposes a limitation on the duration of the penalty for violation of blockade which is entirely at variance with theory and usage, as far as Great Britain and the United States are concerned. Yet in another respect it approximates to English and American usage, as it admits special warning to be unnecessary when diplomatic notification has been given.

The usage of France, Italy, Sweden,² and Spain³ is always to require special notification to be given to the neutral by a vessel of the blockading squadron.

In the case of a *de facto* blockade, special notification is required by English and American usage, and takes the same form as the endorsement required by the French usage in all cases.⁴

Historicus on¹)
paper block-
ades, Letters,
“International
Law,” pp.
89-118.

The historical controversy as to the maintenance of paper blockades formed the topic of two letters of Historicus. The controversy was provoked partly by the writings of Hautefeuille, and partly by the blockade of the Confederate ports by the United States in 1861, a blockade extending over a coast-line of more than 3000 miles. The field of operation of the Atlantic blockading squadron extended over the whole coast from the E. line of Virginia to Cape Florida. This squadron was commanded by Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham. The field of operation of the Gulf squadron, under Flag Officer William Mervine, operated from Cape Florida westward to Rio Grande. There are certainly some grounds for supposing that, in its inception, the Federal blockade was, as Hautefeuille suggested, an ineffective, if not a paper

¹ “Ann. de l’Institut,” 1883, p. 218.

² “Rev. de Droit Int.,” x. 220, 441.

³ Negrin, 213.

⁴ Hall’s “International Law,” 5th ed., p. 697, referring to *Vrouw Judith*, i. Rob. 151; the *Neptunus*, ii. Rob. 114. “Admiralty Manual of Prize Law” (Holland), 1888, p. 34. A vessel may sail with the intention of inquiring whether a blockade *de facto* is continued or not (*Naylor v. Taylor*, iv.; *Manning and Ryland*, 531).

blockade.¹ It has, on the other hand, been equally recognized that the blockade became effective owing to the extraordinary efforts made by the Federals. Previous to the Civil War, it was stated on what seems credible authority² that the United States had only forty men-of-war in commission. But in President Johnson's message to Congress at the commencement of 1865, it was stated that the report of the secretary of the navy showed that the Federals had then in commission 530 vessels of all classes, armed with 3000 guns, and manned by 51,000 men.³ At this date, 1865, the English navy was manned by 69,750 men at an annual expenditure of £10,392,224.⁴ In an age in which the growth of naval power in time of peace is a leading feature, as the present, it may not be inopportune to recall the fact that, in the throes of Civil War, the United States built up a large navy in three years. It is further material to recollect that the Federal navy demonstrated itself to be highly efficient, and that its blockade of the south materially contributed to bring the Civil War to a conclusion. But the fact that "during the American Civil War the courts of the United States strained and denaturalized the principles of English blockade law to cover doctrines of unfortunate violence"⁵ seems in fact to reinforce the judgment of Hautefeuille, that the blockade of the Confederate littoral by the Federals was more a governmental than an effectual blockade. Sir W. Harcourt probably did the author of "*Les Droits et les Devoirs des Nations Neutres en temps du guerre maritime*" no injustice when he thus summarized the latter's argument in "*Quelques questions de Droit International Maritime*"—

"England has always held and practised the doctrine of paper blockade. Till the treaty of 1856, she always refused to acknowledge the principle that a blockade ought to be effective; and now, having nominally consented to admit the doctrine held by all other nations, she is seeking to evade

¹ Cf. Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1904, p. 692; and Sir H. S. Maine's Lectures, "International Law," p. 115.

² *Times*, January 3, 1863.

³ "Ann. Reg.," 1865, p. 298.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 709.

the obligation into which she has entered, by recognizing the ineffectual blockade of the American coast, and so assisting at the creation of a precedent which may hereafter be useful to her.”¹

The English writer met this thesis by showing that England by treaty in 1801 adhered to a satisfactory definition of an effective blockade with Russia. He also cited a decision of Lord Stowell in which ships and cargoes were released by the Court because of the ineffectual nature of the blockade.² He further pointed out that the British Orders in Council of November, 1807, were purely retaliatory against the Berlin decree of November, 1806, and the Milan decree of the following year. Sir R. Phillimore, the great protagonist of the view of Historicus that international law does not prohibit the sale of contraband on neutral territory, thus tersely describes the situation as regards the Orders in Council and the Berlin decree—“The truth is, that France was the first wrong-doer, Great Britain the second.”³ He concluded that both the decrees and orders violated international law, and were incapable of defence on the principle of retaliation,⁴ in which opinion Historicus seems to concur.⁵ But at the time the Orders in Council were considered by Lord Stowell, as purely retaliatory measures, to be justly “deemed in that character reconcilable with those rules of natural justice by which the international communication of independent States is usually governed.”⁶

In a second letter Historicus developed a farther position of Hautefeuille which he syllogized thus: “Blockades by cruising squadrons are ineffective blockades; England maintains the doctrine of blockade by cruising squadrons; therefore England maintains ineffective blockades.”⁷ Hautefeuille adopted the definition of a blockade found in the Convention of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, by which the blockading

¹ Letters, “International Law,” p. 90.

² The *Nancy*, Acton’s Reports, p. 58.

³ Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 167.

⁴ “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 321.

⁵ Letters, “International Law,” p. 94.

⁶ Edward’s “Admiralty Rep.” (1812), 381, 382.

⁷ Letters, etc., p. 99.

ships were required to be stationary (*arrêtés*) as well as adequate in force and sufficiently near (*suffisamment proches*). Further, the Convention required the notification *spéciale*, by which the neutral merchant ship, without any regard to the proclamation of blockade, is at liberty to sail to the blockaded port in order to ascertain for itself, on the spot, the fact of the sufficiency of the blockade, without thereby subjecting itself to any penalty. In answer to this, Historicus showed that, twenty years afterwards, Russia, by treaty with Great Britain, merely required, in order to render a blockade effective, that the vessels of the blockading squadron should be either stationary or sufficiently near the blockaded port, and dispensed entirely with the notification *spéciale*. It has been noticed that the "Règlement des Prises Maritimes of the Institut de Droit International" proposes to dispense with the notification *spéciale*, and thus is in complete accord with English usage, and involves no less a renunciation of the views of the Second Armed Neutrality. This signal instance of coincidence between the proposals of the Institute and English theory and usages is all the more remarkable in view of the general impression that the Prize Code promulgated at Turin embodied the continental as opposed to the English view of maritime law.

The merits of the controversy do not seem to lie so clearly with Historicus on the point whether, in order to render a blockade effective, the ships of the blockading squadron ought to remain absolutely stationary. Historicus refers to "the general and safe definition" of blockade given by Lord Stowell in the *Arthur*, 1 Dodson 425. It will be remembered that Lord Stowell speaks of a blockade as an arch of circumvallation formed by stationing ships, and adds if the arch falls in any one place, the blockade fails. It seems the most reasonable inference from these words of Lord Stowell that he considered that the ships maintaining a blockade should be absolutely stationary, though he allowed an exception in the case of ships being blown off by the wind.¹ The Prize Code of the Institute of International Law allows

¹ *Frederic Molke*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 86, 87.

the blockading vessels to momentarily absent themselves, and also allows absence in the case of stress of weather.¹ Therefore there seems to be perfect harmony between international law as enunciated in the decisions of Lord Stowell and in the articles of the Prize Code of the Institute of International Law in this respect.

In a subsequent note *Historicus* developed the English case on the charge that England, and not France, initiated the paper blockades of the Great War at the commencement of the nineteenth century. *Historicus* showed (1) that it was idle to pretend that the blockade proclaimed by Mr. Fox of the rivers Ems, Weser, Elbe, and Trave, in April, 1806, was a fictitious or paper blockade."² The blockade was indeed retaliatory against the seizure of Hanover by Prussia, and the exclusion of all English vessels from Prussian ports. Schoell observes that this blockade was almost immediately limited in its operation to the towns of Hamburg and Bremen by a partial revocation.

But it was thoroughly effective as a naval operation, and on this head cannot possibly be cited as a paper blockade that provoked Napoleon to retaliate by the Berlin Decree of November, 1806. Finally, the British Order in Council proclaiming this blockade was revoked by a Circular of September, 1806. The argument, therefore, that Napoleon's Berlin Decree, promulgated two months subsequently, was a retaliatory measure, seems quite untenable; (2) that the Berlin Decree, November, 1806, affords a typical instance of a paper or fictitious blockade. On this head it was stated in Parliament that—

"the French declared an imaginary blockade on the seas, and acted upon it in their condemnations on land, when they not only had not a single vessel to maintain it, and when their enemies were insulting them daily in their very harbours. Such a proceeding was as absurd as if England, without having a single soldier on the continent, was to declare Bergen-op-Zoom or Lille in a state of blockade, and

¹ "Ann. de l'Institut," 1883, p. 218.

² Schoell, "Traité de Paix," vol. ix. p. 44; Alison's "Hist.," vol. viii. p. 122; "Parliamentary Debates," vol. x. pp. 403, 666.

act upon this order by seizing all goods belonging to citizens of these towns wherever she could find them in neutral bottoms on high seas."¹

(3) That the British Orders of Blockade of January and November, 1807, imposing a total blockade of all ports from which the British flag was excluded, were merely retaliatory. Except in the character of retaliatory measures, it is quite impossible, Sir W. Scott admitted, to defend them.

It appears from the learned note of Wheaton's editors that there were no grounds for impeaching the validity of the Turkish blockade of the whole coasts of the Black Sea in 1878. The ground on which the effectiveness of this blockade was impeached was that neutrals who had violated the blockade were stopped in the Bosphorus after they had escaped the blockading squadron. This objection could only be sustained on the ground that capture cannot be effected except during an actual attempt at violation on the blockaded spot itself.² But the decisions of both English and American Prize Courts have established that capture for violation of blockade can be made without reference to the distance from the blockaded port.³ The usage of England and America was followed by the Turkish Prize Courts in the case of the blockade of 1878.

On October 20, 1884, Admiral Courbet proclaimed the Blockade of Formosa,⁴ 1884. of all ports and roads of the island of Formosa⁴ comprised between Cape Nan-Shah and the Bay of Soo-an. Great Britain protested, through her ambassador at Paris, alleging that the blockade was not effective.⁵ It appeared that at this date the French force consisted of some thirty-four vessels, of which, however, ten were transports, manned by some five or six thousand sailors. As the French abandoned the blockade, they must themselves be supposed to have admitted that the above was an insufficient force to

¹ Cf. passages quoted by Alison, vol. viii. p. 138.

² Cf. Bluntschli, s. 832; Heffter, s. 156; "Annuaire de l'Institut," 1883, p. 218.

³ Cf. the *Columbia*, 1 C. Rob. 156; the *Nereide*, 9 Cranch (Amer.), pp. 440, 446.

⁴ *London Gazette*, October 24, 1884.

⁵ "Ann. Register," 1884, p. 374.

maintain a blockade over a coast-line of less than 200 miles. They abandoned it until the arrival of six new cruisers as reinforcements.

The two most striking irregularities of this blockade will be hereafter noticed, and seem more exceptional than its fictitious character. The proclamation of Admiral Courbet was entirely silent about specially warning neutral vessels on the spot, and actually only gave neutral vessels three days to leave the blockaded places while, for this purpose "probably fifteen days should be looked upon as a minimum period."¹ As a consequence of China's complaints of the infraction of British neutrality by French war vessels at Hong-Kong, the English Government notified that "the French blockade of Formosa must be taken by the neutral Powers as a notification of a state of war."²

Blockade of
Hayti, 1888.

The blockade of insurgent Haytian ports, proclaimed by Hayti in November, 1888, having ceased to be effective in the July following, Lord Salisbury notified to the Haytian Government that it could no longer be respected, and that British vessels entering or leaving ports in the possession of the insurgents must not be molested by the government cruisers.

Allusion to
paper block-
ades by Prof.
T. E. Holland,
Times, May
25, 1904.

During the Russo-Japanese War, in a letter addressed to the *Times* on laying mines in the open sea, Professor T. E. Holland observed that—

"Strong disapproval was expressed of a design erroneously attributed to the United States a few years since of effecting the blockade of certain Cuban ports by torpedoes, instead of by a cruising squadron. These, it was pointed out, would superadd to the risk of capture and confiscation, to which a blockade runner is admittedly liable, the novel penalty of total destruction of the ship and all on board."³

If inventive science had progressed several decades faster, Napoleon might possibly have attempted to enforce his Berlin decree by the very operation unjustly attributed to the United States, since, Sir H. S. Maine points out, many efforts to

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 707.

² "Ann. Register," 1884, p. 375.

³ *Times*, May 25, 1904.

improve the earliest form of the torpedo were made at the date of Napoleon's threatened invasions of England.¹ There are two cases when a blockade may be conducted with such a minimum of naval power as to be nearly a paper blockade, and yet may be effective by reason of physical conditions. In the case of ports or seas separated from the ocean highway by a narrow isthmus, a single vessel may be as effectual as a large squadron. Thus during the Russian War in 1854 the blockade of Riga was maintained at a distance of 120 miles from the town by a ship in the Lyser Ort, a channel three miles wide, which forms the only navigable entrance to the gulf.² Buenos Ayres has been effectually blockaded by vessels stationed in the neighbourhood of Monte Video; and, as has been seen, the Turkish blockade of 1877-8 was effected by two cruisers stationed in the Bosphorus. General Halleck, again, points out that a blockade is not necessarily made by ships; it may equally well be made by land batteries commanding the sea.³ But when a blockade is thus made by land, it must be supported "by a naval force sufficient to warn off innocent, and capture offending vessels attempting to enter."⁴ These two cases constitute an exception to the rule that a blockade is fictitious and therefore illegal, unless maintained by a competent blockading squadron. They arise solely from the physical configuration of a port or sea, and do not affect the principle.

It seems a consequence of blockade being "la plus grave atteinte qui puisse être portée par la guerre au droit des neutres,"⁵ that "a declaration of blockade is a high act of sovereignty; and a commander of a king's ship is not to extend it."⁶ Lord Nelson seems to have felt in a peculiar degree the responsibility of the commander of a blockading squadron. When blockading Cadiz just before Trafalgar he anticipated, in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, that neutral

¹ Lectures, "International Law," p. 142.

² *Franciska*, x. Moore, 46.

³ "International Law," vol. ii. p. 189.

⁴ The *Circassian*, (1864) 2 Wall. 135, 149, *per* Chief Justice Chase.

⁵ Cauchy, t. ii. p. 196; Fiore, t. ii. p. 446; and cf. the observations of Sir W. Scott in the *Lisette*, (1807) 6 C. Rob. 387, 393.

⁶ *Per* Sir W. Scott in the *Hendrick and Maria*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 146, 148.

States would impute to this country sordid motives in blockading Cadiz.¹

The President of the United States, in time of war, has the power, by virtue of the constitutional authority conferred upon him as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to institute and declare a blockade.² During the Spanish-American War of 1898 President McKinley issued no less than three blockade proclamations. On April 27 the President declared a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, and at the end of June the blockade of the south coast and of San Juan was proclaimed. On neither occasion was Santiago blockaded by diplomatic notification, so it was presumably a *de facto* blockade. By the English and American practice, the most important difference between a blockade proclaimed by diplomatic notification and a *de facto* blockade is that special notification on the spot is always required in the latter case.

Sovereign may proclaim blockade by naval commander. But a blockade is an act of sovereignty which can be delegated. In the case of the *Rolla*, (1807) 6 Rob. 364, 366, Sir W. Scott said—

“A commander going out to a distant station may reasonably be supposed to carry with him such a portion of sovereign authority delegated to him as may be necessary to provide for the exigencies of the service on which he is employed. On stations in Europe, where Government is almost at hand to superintend and direct the course of operations, under which it may be expedient that particular hostilities should be carried on, it may be different.”

It seems clear that the blockade of Port Arthur was an instance of a blockade proclaimed under delegated authority.³ Sir R. Phillimore states that “It is the duty of a belligerent country, which has made the notification of blockade, to notify in the same way, and immediately the

¹ Clarke and M'Arthur's “Life of Nelson,” v. 2, p. 495.

² *The Tropic Wind*, 14 Law Rep., N.S., 144.

³ *London Gazette*, May 31, 1904, where it was stated that, “by command of the Imperial Japanese Government, Admiral Togo has declared that on the 26th inst. the entire coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, lying south of a straight line drawn between Pitsewo and Pulan-tien, was effectively blockaded by the Imperial naval forces, and that the blockade will continue to be maintained in an effective state.”

discontinuance of it."¹ This was done during the late war in the case of the blockade of Port Arthur. The limitation of the blockade rendered expedient by the Japanese successes just before the fall of the fortress was notified in the same way as the commencement of the blockade,² and the proclamation of complete discontinuance promulgated in the same form appeared a few days later.³

A valid exercise of delegated sovereign power requires to be carefully distinguished from the case where a blockade is extended by a subordinate officer acting *ultra vires*.

A notice not to proceed to any port is illegal. A notice which is bad for all ports cannot be good for any one. Therefore in a case where a Danish vessel was taken on a voyage from Norway to Amsterdam, it was held that notice of a general blockade of the coast of Holland, untrue in fact, was not available by limitation to a blockade of Amsterdam only, though that existed in fact. The same principle would seem to apply to the case where a subordinate officer restricts the operation of a regular notification of blockade.⁴

It is alike a conclusion from theory, treaties, unilateral acts, and the decisions of Prize Courts that, for the purposes of international law, blockade means effective blockade.

By treaty of 1742 between France and Denmark it was required that a blockaded port must be closed by two vessels at least, or by a battery. By a treaty of 1753 between Holland and the Two Sicilies it was required that a blockade should be maintained by at least six ships of war ranged at a distance of gunshot from land or by shore batteries. A treaty between Denmark and Genoa required blockade to be effective. In 1794 Great Britain and the United States concluded a treaty stipulating that blockades should be effective. The Convention of the First Armed Neutrality required a blockade to be maintained by stationing vessels sufficiently near the blockaded port to produce evident danger in entering. The Convention of the Armed Neutrality of 1800 decreed—

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 390.

² *London Gazette*, January 6, 1905.

³ *Ibid.*, January 13, 1905.

⁴ *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 Rob. 110.

"Que, pour determiner ce qui caractérise un port bloqué, on n'accorde cette dénomination qu'à celui où il y a, par la disposition de la puissance qui l'attaque avec des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment proches, un danger évident d'entrer. Et que tout bâtiment naviguant vers un port bloqué ne pourra être regardé d'avoir contrevenu à la présente convention, que lorqu'après avoir été averti par le commandant du blocus de l'état du port, il tâchera d'y pénétrer en employant la force ou la ruse."¹

In 1801 England concluded a treaty with Russia declaring that—

"Que, pour determiner ce qui caractérise un port bloqué, on n'accorde cette dénomination qu'à celui où il y a, par la disposition de la puissance qui l'attaque avec des vaisseaux arrêtés ou suffisamment proches, un danger évident d'entrer."²

Historicus observes that Sweden and Denmark subsequently, by separate conventions, adhered to the treaty as concluded by Russia, and that it was not necessary for America to accede specifically, for on that subject her courts have always held precisely the same doctrine as Great Britain. In 1818 Denmark and Prussia agreed by treaty that, in order to constitute a lawful blockade, it should be required that two vessels should be stationed before every blockaded port. It is necessary to recollect that treaties regulating the law and right of blockade, like treaties regulating the law and right of contraband, are not concluded in contemplation of either mutual alliance or mutual belligerency, but for the case where one of the contracting parties becomes a belligerent, the other remaining neutral.³ The same principle must apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to general treaties, such as those of the Armed Neutralities or the Treaty of Paris. It must be implied in such cases that the article regulating the law and right of blockade operates only as between the contracting parties who may stand in the relation of neutral and belligerent. It may be a consequence of this that there seems little more uniformity between treaties regulating the law of blockade than those regulating contraband. The undoubted advantage Historicus

¹ Martens, "Rec.," vol. vii. p. 176.

² Ibid., *supra*, p. 263.

³ Phillimore, "Internationa Law," vol. iii. s. 279.

gained by reminding Hautefeuille of the existence of the treaty of 1801, between Russia and England, operated even more significantly as a reminder of the inconsistency of the former Power. The advantage was much more than the sleight of a skilful controversialist, and the English writer was justified in deducing his conclusion that in 1801 Russia had virtually sanctioned blockades by cruiser squadrons. The abandonment by Russia of the neutral right to special notification was even more significant. But two or three treaties between individual Powers cannot constitute a general custom,¹ and it is perhaps difficult to follow Historicus in the wide inference he drew. The last word on the subject of the effectiveness of a blockade as declared by treaty is the fourth article of the Declaration of Paris, 1856: "Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy." Sir H. S. Maine observes that "the law of contraband of war and the law of blockade are not touched by the reform under the Declaration of Paris, except so far as a principle long contended for is applied to blockades."² The true rule of international law might well have been declared at a general treaty, like the Declaration of Paris. But in fact the opportunity was lost, the pronouncement of the declaration on blockade being nearly as much open to the charge of indefiniteness as the treatment of contraband. In view of Sir H. S. Maine's conclusion, that the Declaration of Paris cannot be considered a permanent solution of the vexed points of maritime law, the attitude of Japan towards the declaration is invested with great interest. The future of the declaration would be very uncertain if another powerful maritime State, like Japan, were to join the ranks of the dissentients, which have already included the United States. On this topic it is fortunately possible to appeal to a very recent and authoritative pronouncement. The issue was directly raised in a correspondence in the *Times*, and Professor

¹ Phillimore, "International Law," vol. iii. s. 236.

² Lect., "International Law," p. 105.

T. E. Holland observed that "the action of the Japanese is in full accordance with the letter and spirit of all four articles of the Declaration of Paris."¹ Baron Suyematsu afterwards rendered an express and authoritative support to the accuracy of this statement.² In the early months of the Russo-Japanese War it was stated that all appeals for the restitution of neutral cargoes on board captured Russian steamers had been dismissed by the Sasebo Prize Court.³ This may have been one of the circumstances inducing the conclusion that Japan has not joined the ranks of the signatories of the Declaration of Paris. But even as stated, this inference was not entirely justified, because the cargoes may have been contraband of war; and it is clear that it must be dismissed in view of the letters of Professor T. E. Holland and Baron Suyematsu. The indefiniteness of the Declaration of Paris cannot be remedied even by the addition of powerful maritime States to its list of signatories. As far as the usage of blockade is concerned, nothing that has happened during the Russo-Japanese War could justify the conclusion that Japan does not admit the necessity of the effectiveness of a blockade, which is the sole postulate of the Declaration of Paris on the subject.

Unilateral act requiring a blockade to be effective. At the commencement of the Crimean War in 1854 England and France declared their intention "to maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's ports, harbours, or coasts."

General Halleck observes that this declaration was a virtual condemnation of paper blockades, although it was in form a mere temporary order.

Decisions on subject of effectiveness of a blockade. The facts in the case of the *Mercurius*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 80, 82, were that a German vessel was seized at Yarmouth for an attempt to violate the blockade of Amsterdam, after having been notified of the blockade by a king's ship in the Texel. She had previously been seized, and, after having been restored, was arrested again at Yarmouth.

¹ *Times*, March 14, 1905.

² *Ibid.*, March 16, 1905.

³ *Ibid.*, May 27, 1904.

In this case Sir W. Scott observed it is necessary to inquire, in order to ascertain liability for an alleged breach of blockade, "Was there an actual blockade? Was it notified? Was it violated? If all these points can be established, confiscation must necessarily follow." On the question of effectiveness, Sir W. Scott observed—¹

"It is said that this passage² to the Zuyder Zee was not in a state of blockade. But the ship was seized immediately on entering it; and I know not what else is necessary to constitute blockade. The Powers who formed the armed neutrality in the last war understood blockade in this sense; and Russia, who was the principal party in that confederacy, described a place to be in a state of blockade when it is dangerous to enter into it."

In the case of the *Betsey*, (1798) 1 Rob. 92A, 93, Sir W. Scott observed that the evidence of a blockade should be clear and decisive; and the affidavit of a captor was considered inadequate in that case. A port may be said to be completely invested when a number of vessels are stationed round the entrance so as to cut off all communication. But to issue a proclamation declaring territories like Martinique, St. Lucie, and Guadaloupe to be put into a state of blockade at the same time is to entertain "a very loose notion of the true nature of a blockade." The Lords of Appeal had determined that the proclamation of a commander-in-chief, without actual investment, is not in itself sufficient to constitute a legal blockade. A blockade is not rendered effective because there is a danger of meeting cruisers in the region; and a port which is declared in "a state of siege" is not necessarily blockaded.³ This last conclusion of Sir W. Scott is capable of illustration in the Russo-Japanese War. It was announced on February 13, 1905, that the fortress of Vladivostock was declared to be in "a state of siege," and that the acting commander was invested with all the powers of commander-in-chief as regards the civil population. In the *Betsey*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 92A, 94, Sir W. Scott observed, with reference to the statement of the master

¹ *Ibid., supra*, p. 84.

² The Vlie passage.

³ The *Betsey*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 94.

in that case, that the expression “‘state of siege’ is a term of the new jargon of France, which is sometimes applied to domestic disturbances.”

While Vladivostock has been placed in a state of siege it does not seem to have been blockaded. There has certainly not been any notification of the blockade to neutral Powers. In view of the command of the sea maintained by the Japanese, and the fact that Japanese cruisers were patrolling the Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits, the maritime approaches to Vladivostock, a question may arise whether there is not a *de facto* blockade. But by the existing prize law of Japan, March 7, 1904, naval commanders are instructed to notify the fact of blockade as far as possible to the competent authorities and the consuls of the neutral Powers within the circumference of the blockade.¹ It seems that this has not been done, and it must be concluded that Vladivostock is not blockaded,² though the point cannot be established.

In the case of the *Circassian*, (1864) 2 Wall. 135, 149, Chief Justice Chase observed—

“The object of blockade is to destroy the commerce of the enemy, and cripple his resources by arresting the import of supplies and the export of products. It may be made effectual by batteries ashore as well as by ships afloat. In the case of an inland port the most effective blockade would be maintained by batteries commanding the river or inlet by which it may be approached, supported by a naval force sufficient to warn off innocent and capture offending vessels attempting to enter.”

This case decided that the occupation of a city by a blockading belligerent does not terminate a public blockade of it previously existing, the city itself being hostile, the opposing enemy in the neighbourhood and the occupation limited, recent, and subject to the vicissitudes of war. Still less does

¹ It was noticed in the case of the *Hoffnung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 112, that Lord Collingwood, when he blockaded Cadiz de Novo on June 8, 1805, after Sir John Ord had been driven off on April 10 by a superior force, addressed a letter to the foreign consuls at Cadiz, notifying them of the practical, though not legal, resumption of the blockade.

² *Times*, March 10, 1905.

it terminate a blockade proclaimed and maintained not only against that city, but against the port and district commercially dependent upon it and blockaded by its blockade. The facts in the case arose out of the siege and blockade of New Orleans. The city of New Orleans, and the forts commanding its approaches from the gulf, were captured during the last days of April, 1862, and military possession of the city was taken on May 1. On May 4 the British steamer *Circassian* was captured by the United States for an attempted violation of blockade, and was condemned. The principle of this decision has apparently determined some incidents of the Russo-Japanese War. Though Port Arthur was formally entered by the Japanese on January 8, 1905, the Japanese administration only declared the Liau river open on March 28, though it was stated that a large fleet of merchantmen had accumulated at Dalny, Taku, and Chifu. But it seems clear that the reason for delay was the danger of floating mines.

In the *Baigorry*, (1864) 2 Wallace 474, it was held that the fact that the master and mate saw no blockading ships off the port where their vessel was loaded, and from which she sailed, is not enough to show that a blockade, once established and notified, has been discontinued. In this case Chief Justice Chase considered that the fact that neither master nor mate saw any vessels when they entered Calcasieu Pass was counterbalanced by an admission of the master that he had seen blockading ships when going towards the coast of Louisiana four months previously.¹ This inference would go far to vindicate the contention of Hautefeuille, that the federal blockade of the Southern States was in principle a paper blockade. Such a dictum is not consistent with the decisions of Lord Stowell.

In the case of the *Hendrick and Maria*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 146, where a Danish vessel was captured for attempting to violate the blockade of Amsterdam, and the only other vessels in sight at the time were two Danish merchantmen, Sir W. Scott construed the facts in favour of the claimant, saying, "The sight of one vessel would not certainly be"

¹ *Ibid., supra*, 480.

sufficient notice of a blockade, and therefore it is necessary that it should be signified to me that there was a blockade *de facto*."¹ It, however, appears from another case that Sir W. Scott thought that two vessels were proof of a blockade *de facto*, when there were other blockading vessels operating nearer the port, "for surely it is not necessary that the whole blockading force should lie in the same tier."² It is quite sufficient when there are only two in the exterior line. In the case of the blockade of the port of Trinity, Martinique, the court held that one vessel was competent to maintain the blockade of one port and co-operate with other vessels at the same time in the blockade of another neighbouring port. The reason assigned was, that the question of the competency of the force was solely for the commander of the station, and as he considered the force adequate, there was nothing left to discuss.³

It is, perhaps, to be observed that this was not a decision of Lord Stowell's, and it certainly seems inconsistent with his dictum that mere liability to meet a cruiser does not constitute a blockade.⁴ However, in the case of the *Nancy* the court held that "the periodical appearance of a vessel of war in the offing could not be supposed a continuation of blockade."⁵ According to the decision of the court of the United States in the case of the *Braigorry*, (1864) 2 Wall. 474, the fact that the neutral master, while in the blockaded port, saw steamships at intervals, was considered sufficient indication to him that the port was blockaded.

In the case of the *Andromeda*, (1864) 2 Wall. 481, it was considered, though the fact did not constitute the basis of the decision, that a blockade was not ineffective, though continual entries in the log-book of the captured vessel showed that in clear weather no blockading vessels were to be seen off the port.

The least that can be said is that these decisions, arising out of the events of the American Civil War, tend to impair the harmony which Sir R. Phillimore, writing in 1857, declared

¹ *Ibid., supra*, 147.

² *The Neptunus*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 170, 172.

³ *The Nancy*, (1809) 1 Acton, 63, 64.

⁴ *Betsey*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 92A, 94.

⁵ *The Nancy*, (1809) 1 Acton, 57, 59.

to exist upon every point of blockade, between the decisions of the prize courts of this country and those of the United States.¹

In *Geipel v. Smith*, (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 404, it was held that a blockade is "a restraint of princes," and that, therefore, a shipowner is justified in throwing up a contract when the further performance of the contract within a reasonable time is prevented by blockade. In this case, on the subject of the effectiveness of a blockade, Cockburn, C.J., observed—

"In the eye of the law a blockade is effective if the ships are in such numbers and position as to render the running of the blockade a matter of danger, although some vessels may succeed in getting through."²

Mr. W. E. Hall observes that a large number of successful evasions may be insufficient to destroy the legal efficiency of a blockade.³ A blockade is taken off where, from motives of civility or other reasons, ships not privileged to enter or come out are allowed to do so by the commander of the blockading squadron.⁴ The reason is that blockade is a uniform universal exclusion of all vessels not privileged by law; and, therefore, if some are permitted to pass, others will have a right to infer that the blockade is raised. The object of blockade being to interdict the maritime access of all neutral commerce to the blockaded port, vessels "not privileged to enter or come out" are "neutral merchant vessels," and not the public vessels of neutral States,⁵ or vessels despatched by minister of neutral State resident in the country to which the blockaded port belongs for the purpose of carrying home distressed mariners of the minister's country.⁶

The following is a brief summary of the views of modern continental jurists on the subject of the effectiveness of a blockade. Mr. W. E. Hall, while admitting that their views

¹ Cf. Phillimore, "International Law," vol. iii. p. 387; and Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pp. 694, 698, 709.

² *Ibid.*, *supra*, p. 410.

³ "International Law," 701.

⁴ *The Rolla*, (1807) 6 Rob. 364, 372.

⁵ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 711.

⁶ *The Rose in Bloom*, (1815) 1 Dods., p. 58.

are supported by treaty previous to the Declaration of Paris, considers that they not only conflict with the Declaration, but also with authoritative usage.¹

First. The immediate entrance to a port must be guarded by stationary vessels.²

Second. The immediate entrance must be guarded so as to expose any ships running in to a cross-fire.³

Third. Any accidental circumstance which makes it temporarily possible to go in puts an end to the blockade, and justifies a vessel attempting to enter.⁴

Mr. W. E. Hall must be considered as referring exclusively to English and American usage when he says⁵ that the value of the above views of modern continental jurists are inconsistent with authoritative usage. The French Naval Instructions of 1870, issued when Admiral Bouet Willaumez blockaded the German ports in the North Sea and Baltic, provided that, in the very terms employed by Ortolan and Hautefeuille, "a blockade is raised by any interruption whatever." It was, however, additionally provided that it would be considered to constitute a breach of blockade for a neutral to take advantage of the absence of the blockading squadron, unless she had previously ascertained its absence elsewhere.⁶

¹ "International Law," p. 703.

² Heffter, s. 155; Ortolan, ii. 328; Calvo, s. 2567; Gessner, s. 179.

³ Hautefeuille, t. ix. c. ii. s. 1.

⁴ Ortolan, ii. 344; Hautefeuille, t. ix. c. ii. s. 1, art. 1.

⁵ W. E. Hall's "International Law," p. 703.

⁶ NOTE.—The entirely indecisive nature of the French blockade in 1870, especially when it is remembered that it was conducted in great force, seems the most apt historical instance of the conclusion of Sir H. S. Maine, that blockades of a European littoral, such as that maintained by this country during the great war, have become of no value owing to the railway system. The squadron of Admiral Bouet Willaumez consisted of fifteen ironclad ships and twelve other vessels. But the belligerent expediency of its operations was from the first recognized to depend entirely on the success of the French armies ("Ann. Reg.," 1870, p. 159); and owing to the early defeats of the French army, the fleet was withdrawn in October without having effected anything of moment. It is obvious, from the point of view of interception of neutral commerce, that the railway must have been as decisive a factor in defeating the actual blockade of the German ports in 1870 as it would be in the case hypothetically adduced by Sir H. S. Maine—the blockade of the coast of France. But, as has been pointed out, the signal experiences of 1898 and 1904 seem, no less conclusively, to accentuate the value of blockade in recent times, when it is accompanied by a siege.

The principle of the effectiveness of a blockade not being in controversy since the Declaration of Paris, 1856, art. 4, it is necessary to assume that, for purposes of international law, a blockade means an "effective blockade." But as blockade is a high act of sovereignty inflicting a universal obligation on neutral commerce, it is right that the subjects of neutrals should be notified, either diplomatically or individually, of its institution. This principle is as well established as the requisition of effectiveness, though the Declaration of Paris is silent on this head. Broadly speaking, there exists no controversy as to the necessity of notification either in theory or usage. But great variance exists, and has existed, since the Convention of the Second Armed Neutrality as to the form which the notification of blockade should take. While the English and American usage is always to give either diplomatic or special notification, and sometimes both,¹ the rule of the usage enforced by France, Italy, Sweden,² and Spain,³ is that the neutral is only amenable to the penalties of violation of blockade when he attempts to enter the blockaded port after having received special notification on the spot. Among the authoritative writers Grotius⁴ impliedly insists on the necessity of notification since he imposes the knowledge of the neutral as a condition of the exercise of the belligerent right. Bynkershoek and Vattel are silent on the subject of notification as an indispensable condition of the belligerent right. Both, indeed, allude to belligerent decrees or proclamations of blockade, but only do so to criticize their obligatory force on neutral States, when they are not enforced by the presence of a competent blockading squadron.

According, therefore, to the English and American usage, By English and American usage, blockades admit of division according to the nature of the notification by which the neutral master is affected with the knowledge of the blockade, rendering him amenable to the penalties of the law of nations for its violation.

¹ Cf. the blockade proclamation of President McKinley, April 27, 1898, declaring a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, in *Times*.

² Bulmerincq, "Rev. de Droit Int.", x. 220, 441.

³ Negrin, 213.

⁴ "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," I. iii. cap. i. s. 5, art. 3.

In order that a blockade may be valid it must be either (a) a public or governmental blockade diplomatically notified, or (b) a *de facto* blockade accompanied by notification on the spot given by a vessel of the blockading squadron.

According to the opposed foreign usage, though not according to the theory of foreign jurists, there is no such thing as a diplomatically notified blockade, and therefore the only valid form of blockade is the *de facto* blockade, with the "notification *spéciale*" dating from the | Second Armed Neutrality, 1800.¹

Modern
foreign
jurists
on what con-
stitutes nec-
essary evidence
of a blockade.

Special warning was, before 1800, always required by the Prize Tribunals of this country in the case of *de facto* blockades, but is confined to this instance,² except in the case where evidence is unnecessary because of the notoriety of the blockade. Ortolan (ii. 335-341) and Calvo (s. 2581) consider that special notification is essential. But Pistoye and Duverdy (i. 370) and Hautefeuille (t. ix. c. ii. s. ii.) consider that both diplomatic and special notification ought to be given. It is of some interest to recall Lord Stowell's remark, that the purpose of notification was "better obtained" by personally informing the neutral master than by public notification.³ But this cannot be construed as an admission by Lord Stowell that public notifications of blockade were inadequate. On the contrary, Lord Stowell, on another occasion, observed that it would be the most nugatory thing in the world if individuals were allowed to plead their ignorance of public notifications of blockade.⁴

The view of jurists laid down by the Institute of International Law seems to imply the necessity of a diplomatic notification, which "must not only define the limits in latitude and longitude, and the precise moments of its commencement, but also state the time granted to merchant vessels for unloading, relading, and leaving the port."⁵

The commander of the blockade must, moreover, give notice

¹ De Martens, "Rec." vii. 172.

² The *Mercurius*, (1798) I C. Rob. 80, 83.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 112.

⁵ "Règlement des Prises," 1852, 1883, and 1887, arts. 7 and 36.

of it to the authorities and consuls at the blockaded place. The same formalities are necessary after the re-establishment of a blockade which may have ceased to be effective, or when the blockade is extended to new places.¹

The subject of diplomatic notification is treated with great care by General Halleck.² In form, it is an official communication from the belligerent to the authorities of neutral states. Halleck on
diplomatic or
public notifi-
cation of a
blockade.

In substance, it is a notice that (1) a certain port will be blockaded on and after a certain date; or that (2) it is the intention of the belligerent to proceed to blockade certain ports or harbours.

A subsequent notice of the actual commencement of the blockade is given as matter of courtesy. In the case of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the diplomatic notification given was of the actual commencement of the blockade. But the proclamation, as has been already observed, provided that special notification should be given. This appears to be the American usage; the Federal proclamation of April 9, 1861, also provided that vessels would be individually warned, but it seems that this was only conceded in the case of vessels coming from a distance. General Halleck specifically states that, under this proclamation of 1861, special notification was not necessary when, at the time of capture, the neutral knew of the blockade.³

The distinction between a public or governmental and a *de facto* blockade is based on evidence. In the former case the *onus probandi* of proving that the blockade does not exist lies on the claimant, a notified blockade being presumed to exist till the notification is revoked. In the case of a *de facto* blockade there is no presumption as to continuance, and the captor must prove that it existed at the date of the seizure.

A notified blockade is regarded as valid by the English or American view, because notice to the neutral Government is

¹ Art. 37.

² "International Law," vol. ii. c. xxv. pp. 182-213.

³ *Hiawatha*, Blatchford, P. C. 1; *Circassian*, ii. Wall. 151; *Nereide*, ix. Cranch, 440.

regarded as constructive notice to all its subjects.¹ In a case arising out of the blockade of Havre in 1798, Sir W. Scott observed—

"The notification of the blockade of that port was made on February 23, 1798, and this transaction happened in November of that year; the effect of a notification to any foreign Government would clearly be to include all the inhabitants of that nation (it was the case of a Prussian ship); it would be the most nugatory thing in the world, if individuals were allowed to plead their ignorance of it; it is the duty of foreign Governments to communicate the information to their subjects, whose interests they are bound to protect. I shall hold, therefore, that a neutral master can never be heard to aver against a notification of blockade, that he is ignorant of it. If he is really ignorant of it, it may be a subject of representation to his own Government, and may raise a claim of compensation from them; but it can be no plea in the court of a belligerent. In the case of a blockade *de facto* only, it may be otherwise, but this is the case of a blockade by notification; another distinction between a notified blockade and a blockade existing *de facto* only is, that in the former the act of sailing to a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence."²

Blockade *de
facto*, and
notification on
the spot by
vessel of
blockading
squadron.

The requisition of the notification *spéciale* by the Second Armed Neutrality and by France suggests that there was substantial agreement between English and continental usage in the case of *de facto* blockade, but that such agreement is confined to this form of blockade. On the other hand, Admiral Courbet's proclamation of the blockade of Formosa in 1884 seems to show no less clearly that French usage no longer requires the notification *spéciale*. This would finally remove the difference between the usage of France and England. Both Powers would then consider notification to the neutral States as constructively notification to each of its subjects; while, of course, special warning would continue to be given in the case of a *de facto* blockade, according to the usage of both countries.

If a neutral vessel is specially warned by a vessel of the

¹ Kent, "Comm. on Am. Law," vol. vi. pp. 147, 148; Phillimore, "International Law," vol. iii. s. 290; Duer on "Ins." vol. i. p. 659; *Jonge Petronella*, 2 Rob. 131; *Spes and Irene*, 5 Rob. 79; the *Welvaart*, 2 Rob. 128.

² *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 112.

blockading squadron, a blockade *de facto* is proved to exist. Immediate arrest is proof of sufficient force to blockade.¹ A blockade *de facto* differs from a public or governmental blockade: (a) in the scope of the radius within which the belligerent may exercise his right of arrest for breach by ingress; (b) in the liability to be terminated by any interruption, there being no presumption as to continuance.

But it is only in the case of breach by ingress that the neutral must be specially warned before the penalty can be increased. After a blockade *de facto* has existed any length of time, according to a decision of Lord Stowell² it is impossible for those within to be ignorant of the forcible suspension of their commerce; the notoriety of the thing supersedes the necessity of particular notice to each ship. In a case of a blockade *de facto* and attempt by ingress, Sir W. Scott declined to consider the notoriety of the blockade sufficient evidence in the special case of a neutral vessel sailing from a port of a belligerent to the blockaded port of his ally.³ The court declined to press too rigidly the consequences arising from general inference in this case, because information may be supposed to travel with much uncertainty to a ship lying in belligerent ports. But it seems only reasonable to deduce from this case that in Sir W. Scott's view where the neutral, who attempts to enter a blockaded port, sails from a neutral port, general notoriety of a blockade may be sufficient evidence to him. In view of the improved effectiveness of modern communications, it is a little difficult to suppose that the principle of the decision of the *Tutela* would now be upheld. If Cadiz were blockaded at the present day, under circumstances of general notoriety, the fact would certainly be known at Bordeaux.

In the *Hare*, (1810) 1 Acton's Rep. 252, 261, which was the case of a breach by egress of a *de facto* blockade, Sir Wm. Grant, M.R., observed: "From the general notoriety of the circumstances attending it, the parties should have considered it as an actual blockade in full force and effect."⁴ In this

¹ *Vrouw Judith*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, 152.

² Ibid.

³ *Tutela*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 177.

⁴ Ibid., *supra*, p. 261.

case, therefore, ship and cargo were condemned on the ground of notoriety. Sir R. Phillimore observes that—

“the law of blockade underwent a minute examination in a judgment of the judicial committee during the present (*i.e.* Crimean) war, but no new principle appears to have been promulgated. The *Franciska* and the *Johanna Maria*, Reports of Cases in the Admiralty Prize Court and Court of Appeal, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 287.”¹

The *Franciska* was the case of a Danish vessel captured on May 22, 1854, off Lyser Ort, at the entrance of the Gulf of Riga, for a breach of the blockade of that port. The vessel was captured after notification of intention to blockade, but before notification of the fact. At the date of arrest, therefore, it was only a *de facto* blockade. The Right Hon. T. Pemberton observed in the Privy Council—

“If a blockade *de facto* be good in law without notification, and a wilful violation of a known legal blockade be punishable with confiscation—propositions which are free from doubt—the mode in which the knowledge has been acquired by the offender, if it be clearly proved to exist, cannot be of importance.”²

Mr. W. E. Hall considers that “capture on the ground of notoriety would be looked upon with disfavour.”³ It is a little difficult to adopt this conclusion. Notoriety was sufficient evidence of a blockade according to Lord Stowell; and the principle seems to be confirmed, rather than impaired, by improvement of communications. Dr. Lushington, whom Mr. W. E. Hall quotes as his authority, admitted that if the notoriety of a blockade were universal it was adequate to affect neutrals. The point has great interest in connection with the seizures of February, 1905, of vessels proceeding to Vladivostock. While no notification has been given, an impression, for which it cannot be said there is

¹ “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 320.

² The *Franciska*, (1855) 10 Moore, 37, 58; and cf. reference to Lord Stowell’s decision, *ibid.*, in the *Adelaide*, *Neptunus*, 2 C. Rob. 111; the *Hurtige Hane*, 3 Rob. 324; the *Rolla*, 6 Rob. 367.

³ “International Law,” 5th ed., p. 696 and note.

no justification, has prevailed that it is a case of *de facto* blockade.

The French usage has been to require special notification in all cases of ingress. The French official instructions given to Admiral Bouet Willaumez in 1870 were silent about egress; but it seems to be the view of Mr. W. E. Hall that Negrin (p. 213) is right in inferring that they did not require special notification in cases of vessels coming out of a blockaded port. Special notification is necessary in English practice when the neutral vessel sails before the date of the receipt of diplomatic notification by neutral Government, and is required, therefore, in one instance, even when it is not the case of a *de facto* blockade. Mr. W. E. Hall observes that when a special notification is given in English practice, it takes the same form as the French. This consists of an endorsement on the ship's papers of the fact, date, and place of notification. In the *Vrouw Judith*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, Sir W. Scott observed—

"It is certainly necessary that a blockade should be intimated to neutral merchants in some way or other. It may be notified in a public and solemn manner by declaration to foreign Governments; and this would always be most desirable, although it is sometimes omitted in practice: but it may commence also *de facto* by a blockading force giving notice on the spot to those who come from a distance, and who may, therefore, be ignorant of the fact."¹

It is submitted that the language of Sir W. Scott in this case is not really inconsistent with his observations in the *Mercurius* (1798), 1 C. Rob. 80, 82, where he equally observed that the purpose of public notifications being the information of individuals, that purpose was "better obtained" by personally informing individuals than by public declarations between Governments. The necessity of notification is at least as imperative from the view of the belligerent as it is from that of the neutral. In the *Neptunus*, he observed that a blockade—

"ought by some kind of communication to be made known, not only to foreign Governments, but to the King's subjects,

¹ *Vrouw Judith*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, 152.

and particularly to the King's cruisers, not only to those stationed at the blockaded port, but to others, and especially considerable fleets, that are stationed *in itinere*, to such a port from the different trading countries that may be supposed to have an intercourse with it.”¹

From the point of view of the belligerent, therefore, public notification of the blockade is by far the most desirable; and it is in this connection that it was probably commended by Sir W. Scott in the *Vrouw Judith*. His observations in the *Neptunus* are of considerable historical interest. They afford a complete explanation of the reason why this country, in most of her great wars, adopted diplomatic notification of blockade. The object was to rouse English squadrons to arrest blockade runners, and the extraordinary success of the operations of the British fleet in the Great War are to be attributed partly to the fact of diplomatic notification of blockade. On one occasion Lord Stowell had eight hundred cases in arrears,² a fact which attests the success of the navy in arresting blockade runners. As an instance of the favourable interpretation placed by English Prize Courts on diplomatic notification, it may be mentioned that it was held in the case of the *Adelaide*, (1801) 3 C. Rob. 281, 285, that diplomatic notification may in a reasonable time bind neighbouring States. It is observed by Sir H. S. Maine on this subject—

“Under modern circumstances, where information is conveyed over the civilized world by newspapers and the electric telegraph, it certainly seems that the English practice is sufficient. It is hardly possible that there should be an ignorance nowadays of the existence of an established blockade.”³

There are many indications that the practice of diplomatic notification has grown in esteem since Hautefeuille denounced it during the American Civil War. Not only is its necessity insisted on by the Institute of International Law, but Bluntschli (s. 832) and Heffter (s. 156) consider that special notification is unnecessary. The recent increase of naval

¹ *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 114, 115.

² *Per* Dr. Stephen Lushington in the *Leucade*, (1855) 2 Spinks, 228, 238.

³ Sir H. S. Maine's Lect., “International Law,” pp. 108, 109; cf. also Mr. W. E. Hall's “International Law,” 698.

power among the nations of the world seems likely to promote the adoption of diplomatic notification, owing to its possessing, as Sir W. Scott observed, many advantages from the point of view of a naval belligerent.

On the former French view, neutral subjects were not presumed to know of a blockade merely because a belligerent had transmitted a diplomatic notification to the neutral Government. The neutral who attempted to enter a blockaded port was not liable to the penalties imposed for violation of blockade, unless he had received special notification, and made a subsequent attempt to enter. France adopted this practice in blockading the Mexican ports in 1838 and the Argentine Republic. She has also adopted in treaties the view that special notification is necessary.¹ But the fact that all these treaties have been concluded with the States of South America, previous to the laying of the Trans-Atlantic cable, and none subsequently, seems rather to indicate that, even on the French view, diplomatic notification is sufficient in consequence of the improvement of communication that has taken place in modern times. Above all, in the 1884 blockade of Formosa, she resorted to an official notification of blockade, and entirely abandoned her historic self-imposed obligation to give the notification *spéciale* she has so frequently insisted on by treaty. The French usage of the requisition of special notification has been adopted by treaty between other States. But the dates and parties are as significant in the one case as the other.² It is, at least, of historical interest to observe that while it was Russia who, according to Professor de Martens, introduced the usage of notification *spéciale* by the Convention of the Second Armed Neutrality of 1800, she has not affirmed the usage in any treaty concluded since that date.³

¹ With Brazil, 1828 (De Martens, "Nouv. Rec.", viii. 60); Venezuela, 1843 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.", v. 172); Ecuador, 1843 (*ibid.*, 411); New Grenada, 1844 (*ibid.*, vii. 621); with Guatemala, 1848 (*ibid.*, xii. 11); with Chile, 1846 (*ibid.*, xvi. i. 10); with Honduras, 1856 (*ibid.*, ii. 154); with Nicaragua, 1849 (*ibid.*, 191).

² United States and Sweden, 1816 (De Martens, "Nouv. Rec.", iv. 258); Hanseatic Towns and Mexico, 1828 (*ibid.*, "Nouv. Suppl.", i. 687); United States and Sardinia, 1838 (*ibid.*, xvi. 266); Austria and Mexico, 1842 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.", iii. 448); Argentine Republic and Peru (*ibid.*, 2^e Sér. xii. 448); Italy and Uruguay (*ibid.*, xii. 664).

³ Cf. Mr. W. E. Hall's "International Law," p. 696, for list of treaties.

General Halleck treats official publications of blockade in the newspapers as a third alternative to diplomatic and special notification.

England, in the Great War, relaxed the rule, in the case of a notified blockade, that the act of sailing to a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence¹ when the vessels came from America. This makes it all the more singular that Calvo (s. 2589) should consider that treaties concluded by the United States, stipulating that vessels may sail for a blockaded port notwithstanding the existence of a blockade, have the effect of proving that the United States have acceded to the French usage.² This fact is pointed out by Mr. W. E. Hall, who does not, however, seem to notice the support given to Calvo's view by the two treaties which he elsewhere expressly states the United States concluded, adopting the French rule that an attempt to enter a blockaded port only incurs the penalty for violation of blockade after special notification on the spot. Sir R. Phillimore in 1857 observed that the justice of the relaxation in favour of vessels coming from a distance was becoming impaired in view of increased rapidity in transit.³ But since 1857 steam has diminished the duration of voyages by one-half. Except in the case of sailing vessels, doubtless an exception of material importance, it is impossible to see any sufficient reason for introducing an exception to the principle that the act of sailing to a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence.

The conditions precedent to the institution of a valid blockade are, therefore, notification and effectiveness. But it is equally necessary that a blockade should be continued effectively.⁴

¹ The *Betsey*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 233.

² Treaty U.S. with England, 1806 (De Martens, "Rec.," viii. 585); with Sweden, 1816 (*ibid.*, "Rec.," iv. 258); with Brazil (*ibid.*, ix. 62); with Venezuela, 1836 (*ibid.*, xiii. 560); with Bolivia, 1836 (*ibid.*, xv. 113); with Ecuador, 1839 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.," iv. 316); with Italy, 1871 ("Archives de Droit Int.," 1874, p. 134).

³ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 303.

⁴ The blockade of Cadiz, Jan.-Oct., 1805, instances the importance of this principle. In January, 1805, Sir John Orde, with a small squadron, instituted a *de facto* blockade of Cadiz. At the time there was a slightly superior Spanish squadron in the harbour, but the bulk of the enemy's fleets were at Brest and

The removal of the blockading force for a different service operates as a legal discontinuance of the blockade, even if only a portion of the force is ordered away, unless the portion left is competent to enforce the blockade. When a prize is pursued so far from the blockading station that a neutral ship may think the blockade is abandoned, the blockade ceases. There was a diversion of this kind during the blockade of Charleston, May, 1861, and the harbour was opened for five days. Lord Lyons took for granted that an interruption had occurred, but the Government of the United States refused to admit any cessation. But it does not operate as a legal discontinuance of the blockade that some of the passes are left unguarded and open by the temporary absence of a portion of the blockading squadron in chastising suspicious vessels which have approached the blockaded port.¹

Carthagena. In April, Villeneuve came with a large fleet, entered Cadiz, but immediately put to sea again with the other French and Spanish vessels in the harbour on April 10. On April 25 the British Government declared the blockade of Cadiz, a fortnight after Villeneuve had driven off the small squadron of Sir John Orde ("Ann. Reg." 1805; and observations of Sir W. Scott in the *Triheteren*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 65, 67). Then, on June 8, Lord Collingwood arrived off Cadiz with, however, only a small force. On August 21 Villeneuve returned, and again drove off the small British squadron. He was then blockaded by the joint fleets of Collingwood and Nelson, and the battle of Trafalgar followed. A great number of cases arose from the above state of things. Sir W. Scott observed that it was manifest that Lord Collingwood connected his blockade with that of Sir John Orde, but he could not support this interpretation (*Hoffnung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 112, 121). It was held that Villeneuve had raised the blockade on April 10, and a seizure made in May was therefore invalidated, in spite of the fact that the blockade had not been taken off since the notification of April 25. In the Court of Appeal it was held that Lord Collingwood's blockade was a blockade *de novo* and *de facto* (the *Hare*, (1810) 1 Acton's Rep. 252). The decisions of Lord Stowell in the *Triheteren* and *Hoffnung* show a scrupulous avoidance of observing a paper blockade. The case of the *Hoffnung* was very complicated, as it affords an instance where notification of blockade is due, not merely from a belligerent to neutral States, but also to the enemy State. The Spanish Government were the implicit owners of some Swedish vessels on which the French Government had laid an embargo. Spain, as the ally of France, had in some manner acquired power over these vessels, and utilized them to carry provisions to Spain, where a famine prevailed. The British Government issued an order, from motives of humanity, permitting cargoes of corn to be carried to Spain, with the exception of blockaded ports, without exception as to the property. A notification of the blockade of Cadiz was, under these circumstances, due to the Spanish Government. As it appears that it could not possibly have been made in time, Sir W. Scott decreed restitution of the cargo to the Spanish Government.

¹ *Triheteren*, (1805) 6 Rob. 65; the *Hoffnung*, (1805) ibid., p. 112; the *Rolla*, (1807) ibid., 372; the *Fox*, 1 Edwards, 321; *Williams v. Smith*, 2 N. Y. R. p. 1; the *Eagle*, 1 Act. R. 65.

The engagement between the *Alabama* and *Hatteras* raised circumstances of the above character. When the *Alabama* approached Galveston, February, 1863, the port was being blockaded by a steam sloop of war and several smaller vessels. The anxiety of the Federal commander to maintain the blockade led to his merely dispatching the *Hatteras*, a vessel of altogether inferior force, against the *Alabama*; which therefore escaped, afterwards to commit such depredations on Federal commerce. The victory of the *Alabama* over the *Hatteras* created great dismay in Federal circles, and it was even said that, single-handed, she could have then done much to impair the validity of the entire Federal blockade. But even at the height of her depredations the North attributed far more importance to the maintenance of the blockade than the capture of the *Alabama*. This circumstance was reproduced, on an infinitely more important naval scale, during the Russo-Japanese War. Even when the Vladivostock squadron was in the immediate vicinity of Yokohama and Tokio, Admiral Togo did not desist from his vigilance before Port Arthur. When it is remembered that in 1863 it was even anticipated the *Alabama* might throw some shells into New York, there seems a certain aptness in the parallel. Again, the Vladivostock squadron was ultimately met, like the *Alabama*, by a force specially detailed for the purpose. Such incidents demonstrate the importance of maintaining a blockade.

There is a great difference between a publicly notified blockade and a *de facto* blockade as regards the presumption of its continuance. In the case of the *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 113, Sir W. Scott said—

“It is to be presumed that the notification will be formally revoked; till that is done the port is to be considered as closed up, and from the moment of quitting port on such a destination, the offence of violating the blockade is complete, and the property engaged in it is subject to confiscation; it may be different in a blockade existing *de facto* only; there no presumption arises as to its continuance, and the ignorance of the party may be admitted as an excuse, for sailing in a doubtful and provisional destination.”

But such a presumption is only a *presumptio juris*, not a *præsumptio juris et de jure*, for that would involve all the evils of fictitious blockade. In the case of a diplomatic blockade, it is incumbent on the claimants to prove that the blockade did not exist at the time of capture. In the case of a *de facto* blockade, it is incumbent on the captors to prove the existence of blockade.¹ It is clear that even in the case of a *de facto* blockade an arrest may be made at a distance from the blockaded port. It has been shown that the English and American usage as regards *de facto* blockades appears quite indistinguishable from the French usage of blockade generally, which only recognizes one species of valid blockade. By the French rule an attempt to enter a blockaded port after special notification constitutes a breach of blockade, though at a distance from the blockaded port. The distance alluded to must be supposed to mean no great distance. Ortolan,² Hautefeuille,³ and Bluntschli⁴ refuse to admit the right to seize elsewhere than within the blockaded spot, even when a vessel attempts to enter after having received special notification. But Mr. W. E. Hall considers that, after a vessel has received special notification, and then attempts to enter, the duration of her liability to seizure is the same both in French and English practice. Therefore, if after having received special notification she actually enters and comes out without being arrested, she remains liable, either by the French or English usage, to the penalty of violation of blockade till she reaches the end of the voyage.⁵

The Japanese proclamation of the blockade of Port Arthur does not give the slightest ground for suggesting that the Japanese adhere to the doctrine of the "notification *spéciale*." It must therefore be supposed that Japan is in agreement with the United States and England as regards the usage of a public or governmental blockade with merely official or diplomatic notification.

¹ Phillimore, ii. 290; *Neptunus*, 1 C. Rob. 171; *Circassian*, ii. Wallace, 150; the *Baigorry*, *ibid.*

² "Dip. de la Mer," ii. 354.

³ tit. xiii. c. ii. s. 1, art. 3.

⁴ s. 836.]

⁵ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 710.

One of the most noticeable features of the later phases of the war is the great number of seizures effected by the Japanese of vessels going to Vladivostock with coal. On February 10, 1905, it was stated that ten seizures had been made in three weeks, and a great number were subsequently effected. In this respect the naval experience of the Japanese has repeated itself; as in the Chino-Japanese War, prize affairs multiplied everywhere in the later phases of the war. If guilty knowledge could be inferred in an individual from general notoriety in the case of a *de facto* blockade, as the Privy Council held in the case of the *Franciska*, (1855) x. Moore, 37, 57, there can be no doubt that the confiscation of vessels carrying coal to Vladivostock in the spring of that year could be justified on the ground of notoriety and *de facto* blockade. It is quite certain there has been no diplomatic notification; and there is no ground for supposing that vessels were individually warned. There are further material reasons for supposing that an effective blockade exists; it was suggested in a case in the Admiralty Court by a leading counsel, with whose opinion the court seemed to concur. If no other explanation were forthcoming, the Vladivostock captures, with every appearance of sufficient reason, might be ascribed to so many attempts to run a *de facto* blockade, the evidence of whose existence was general notoriety. But it seems that the Japanese prize courts condemned the vessels on the ground that they carried coal (conditional contraband under the Japanese declarations) to a military port. A more defensible conclusion can hardly be conceived. It was held by Sir W. Scott, in the *Jonge Margaretha* (1799), 1 C. Rob. 188, that provisions, though only conditionally contraband, may be confiscated when they are carried to a great port of military or naval equipment, such as Brest, and that the ship is also liable to be confiscated in such circumstances if the master can be proved to know of military and naval preparations transpiring at the port. During the late war, Vladivostock, for material purposes, seems to be in *pari materia* with a place like Brest during the great war. Vladivostock, like Brest, is a military, not a commercial, port, and

evidence of general notoriety can be evidence of nothing if it is not true that great military preparations are going on there. The decision of the Japanese prize courts seem thus to be in complete harmony with probably the best-known decision of Lord Stowell on contraband.

A *de facto* blockade necessarily ceases directly the fact How blockade is terminated. ceases; and, therefore, captures made after the date of the cessation will be released in a prize court. A blockade by notification is to be presumed *primâ facie* to continue till the notification is revoked. But it is only a *primâ facie* continuance, and "the government of the United States was undoubtedly in the wrong in holding the opinion put forward by it in 1861, that a blockade established by notification continues in effect until notice of its relinquishment is given by proclamation."¹ A vessel bound for a blockaded port is not liable to seizure in the interval which may elapse between the first absence of the blockading squadron and the public notification of the discontinuance of the blockade. The removal of the blockading squadron, therefore, operates, according to English and American usage, as the termination of a blockade, whether it is a diplomatic or a *de facto* blockade.

But the decisions of the courts of the United States and the prize courts of this country are in perfect harmony as to a very definite exception to the above rule. In the case of the *Hoffnung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 112, 116, 117, Sir W. Scott observed that "when a blockading squadron is driven off by adverse winds, they (*i.e.* neutrals) are bound to presume it will return, and that there is no discontinuance of the blockade."² The exception arising from the blockading squadron being blown off by adverse winds applies equally to a blockade *de facto* as to a blockade by diplomatic notification.³

The absence of the blockading squadron operates as a

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., 705; referring to letter of Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, May 27, 1861; ap. Bernard, 238.

² Cf. also the dicta of Sir W. Scott in the *Columbia*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 154, 156; in the *Neptunus*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 170, 171; *Juffrow Mariu Schroeder*, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 147, 155.

³ Per Sir W. Scott in the *Neptunus*, ibid.

discontinuance of the blockade when it is due to a rebuff by a superior force of the enemy. When a squadron is driven off by a superior force, "the neutral merchant is not bound to foresee or conjecture that the blockade will be resumed; and, therefore, if it is to be renewed, it must proceed *de novo*, by the usual course, and without reference to the former state of facts, which has been so effectually interrupted."¹ In the *Triheten*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 65, 67, a case of a blockade of Cadiz by notification, Sir W. Scott observed that the court would require the fact to be proved that the blockade of Cadiz continued an effective blockade—"because it certainly is notorious that the British squadron was driven off fifteen days previously. It must be shown the actual blockade was resumed." A blockade also terminates when the vessels constituting the blockading squadron are diverted for other duty,² or if the blockade is irregularly maintained, but not because licences are granted to particular individuals. The mere arrest of vessels attempting to break the blockade is enough to prove the blockade is effective, though they are afterwards released without being brought in for adjudication.

On this topic, as on so many others of the law and right of blockade, there is a wide variance between the Continental and the English and American view. The Armed Neutralities provided nothing on this subject of the termination of blockade, and it never seems to have been regulated by treaty. But the instructions given to naval officers by the French Government in 1870 provided that the neutral recovered his right of entering the blockaded port if the French squadrons were obliged, by any cause whatever, to absent themselves from the blockaded port. Heffter (s. 155) does not hold that temporary absence entails cessation of a blockade. Orlan (ii. 344) considers that a neutral vessel can enter the blockaded port without incurring the penalties of violation of blockade, if weather has caused the temporary absence of the blockading squadron.

¹ The *Hoffnung*, (1805) 112, 117, *per* Sir W. Scott.

² Gen. Halleck's "International Law," vol. ii. p. 191, and cases collected in note, *ibid.*

Hautefeuille holds (t. ix. c. ii. s. 1, art. 1) that interruption from any cause terminates the blockade. But the effect of the suggested rules of the proposed Règlement des Prises Maritimes, adopted by the Institut de Droit International, is that the vessels of the blockading squadron need not be anchored, and that the fact that they have been driven off by bad weather does not operate as a discontinuance of the blockade.¹

In the case of the *Hoffnung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 112, the case arose of a blockade by notification discontinued owing to the blockading squadron having been driven off by a superior force of the enemy. Sir W. Scott observed on the subject of resumption of blockade, after pointing out that the raising of a former blockade by a superior force acted as a total defeasance of that blockade and its operations, that—
Resumption of
blockade after
discontinuance
or abandon-
ment.

“It should be again renewed by notification before foreign nations could be affected with an obligation of observing it as a blockade of that species still existing. Under this view I have already intimated my opinion that the mere appearance of another squadron would not restore it, but that the same measures would be necessary for the recommencement that had been required for the original imposition of the blockade, and the foreign merchants were not bound to act on any presumption that it would be *de facto* resumed.”

It was therefore held that a Swedish vessel which had sailed after the squadron of Sir John Orde had been driven off Cadiz, and after Lord Collingwood had resumed the blockade, should be restored on payment of captors’ expenses, because there had been no notification of the blockade on its resumption.

In a case in the Court of Appeal arising out of this same blockade, Sir W. Grant held that the blockade instituted by Lord Collingwood after Sir John Orde had been driven off was a blockade *de novo*, and that though not a blockade recommenced, it was to be considered an actual blockade in full force and effect from the general notoriety of the circumstances attending it.² The case therefore shows that though

¹ “Ann. de l’Institut,” 1883, p. 218.

² The *Hare* (1810), Acton’s Rep. 252, 261.

a public or governmental blockade cannot be resumed after total defeasance by a *de facto* blockade technically, a *de facto* blockade may be instituted *de novo* after a very short interval, which is legally valid. The French instructions of 1870 prove that "tout blocus levé ou interrompu doit être rétabli et notifié de nouveau dans le formes prescrites." As it "has lately become customary for the French Government at the commencement of a blockade to notify the fact of its existence to foreign Governments as a matter of courtesy, though their subjects are not considered to be affected by notice through them,"¹ French usage has become harmonious with English and American usage on the subject of resumption of a blockade. They now issue a diplomatic notification of blockade, and though they do not attach the same consequences to it as the English, they apparently consider, judging from the instructions of 1870, that a notified blockade, once discontinued, can only be resumed by notification, as Lord Stowell decided in the *Hoffnung*. The *Règlement des Prises*, arts. 35 and 38, of the Institut de Droit International provides—

"If the blockading squadron depart from their station for any motive other than exigencies of weather, the blockade may be considered as having ceased, and must then be declared and notified anew."

It is also provided by art. 37 that the same formalities are necessary after the re-establishment of a blockade which may have ceased to be effective. The articles of the Prize Code of the Institute of International Law seem, therefore, in harmony with the principles of English Prize Law as laid down by Lord Stowell.

In the case of the *Betsey*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 92A, Sir W. Scott observed that—

"On the question of blockade three things must be proved: (1) the existence of an actual blockade; (2) the knowledge of the party; and (3) some act of violation, either by going in or by coming out with a cargo laden after the commencement

What acts
constitute a
breach of
blockade.

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., 695.

of blockade. The time of shipment would on this last point be very material; for although it might be hard to refuse a neutral liberty to retire with a cargo already laden, and by that act already become neutral property, yet after the commencement of a blockade a neutral cannot, I conceive, be allowed to interpose in any way to assist the exportation of the property of the enemy."

A neutral may violate a blockade either by force or fraud.¹
Sir H. S. Maine observes—

"It is the act of secretly evading a force on the whole Sir H. S.
adequate which constitutes the offence that subjects a neutral Maine on
ship to capture—what is called 'running the blockade.'"² blockade
running.

Ignorance of law is no excuse for violating a blockade.³ In the *Hurtige Hane*, (1801) 3 C. Rob. 324, where the cargo belonged to Barbary merchants, and the blockade broken was that of Amsterdam, notified June, 1798, Sir W. Scott considered that even persons to whose transactions the law of nations was not generally applied in its full vigour could not be supposed to be ignorant of a point like the breach of blockade—"one of the most universal and simple operations of war." The first and most elementary principle of blockade, that persons are not to carry into the blockaded port supplies of any kind, is not a new operation of war, it is almost as old and as general as war itself.⁴

Ignorance of fact can be successfully pleaded either where Ignorance of
a sufficient time has not elapsed between the notification of a fact when
public blockade and the seizure of the neutral for the pre- valid excuse.
sumption of knowledge to arise,⁵ or where the blockade is public, and the neutral is not seized on attempting to enter,⁶ but allowed to go in through remissness.

Even in the case of a *de facto* blockade, the notoriety of the thing may supersede the necessity of particular notice to each ship, and no notice is necessary after the blockade has existed

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., 708.

² "International Law," p. 109.

³ Per Sir W. Scott in the *Adelaide*, (1801) 3 C. Rob. 281, 285.

⁴ *Hurtige Hane*, ibid., p. 327.

⁵ *Jonge Petronella*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 131; the *Adelaide*, (1801) 3 C. Rob. 281.

⁶ *Juffrouw Maria Schroeder*, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 147.

de facto for any length of time.¹ Where the master and consignees have actual knowledge of the blockade no notice is necessary. This is the case even where a treaty subsists between the States of the claimant and captor respectively, stipulating for a previous warning, when the parties can be affected with a knowledge of the fact.²

Ignorance of the continuance of a notified blockade is no excuse in the case of a neutral coming out of the blockaded port,³ though ignorance of a *de facto* blockade may be pleaded by a neutral vessel sailing between different ports of the belligerent who is blockaded.⁴

The offence of breach by ingress depends materially upon the evidence of the blockade,⁵ but a ship coming out of a blockaded port is in the first instance liable to seizure in all cases; and to obtain release, the claimant will be required to give very satisfactory proof of the innocency of his intention.⁶

In the case of a notified blockade the act of sailing to a blockaded place, with the intention of evading the blockade, is an overt act constituting the offence.⁷ It may be different in a blockade existing *de facto* only; in that case no presumption arises as to the continuance, and the ignorance of the party may be admitted as an excuse for sailing on "a provisional or doubtful destination."⁸ Therefore, in the case of attempts to enter a blockaded port, the doctrine of continuous voyages is applicable where the blockade is diplomatically notified, but not where it is a *de facto* blockade. It would be "a most absurd application" of the principle that a neutral vessel is not at liberty to come out a blockaded port with cargo, if a vessel were to be considered exempt, after egress with cargo, because she has escaped the interior circumvallation of the blockading squadron, and has advanced some way on her

¹ The *Vrouw Judith*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, 152.

² The *Columbia*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 154, 156.

³ *Wevaart van Pillaw*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 128.

⁴ *Tutela*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 177.

⁵ The *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 114.

⁶ The *Frederic Molle*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 86, 88.

⁷ The *Columbia*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 154, 156; the *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 113.

⁸ *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110.

voyage.¹ In such a case there is no other natural termination of the offence but the end of that voyage. But the neutral is not liable to confiscation for breach of blockade when the blockade is remiss, and not known to the belligerent who arrests her.² This case is quoted by Sir R. Phillimore,³ but it was the case of a privateer, and it seems very doubtful from the observations of Sir W. Scott in that case whether a privateer was a proper vessel to effect an arrest for violation of blockade.⁴

The principle of continued voyage was applied by Lord Stowell to the law of blockade in a case where it was sought to bring out a cargo through the mouth of a blockaded river in lighters, and then to ship them on the neutral vessel at an interposed port, the vessel having previously come out of the blockaded port in ballast.⁵ If such a cargo had been brought by canal navigation from the blockaded port to an interposed neutral port, the principle of continued voyage would not afterwards apply to the vessel on which it was shipped,⁶ because the legal consequences of blockade depend on the means of blockade, and a blockading force can only be applied externally.

In the memorandum Professor Holland contributed to the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food in Time of War, he appears to consider that the doctrine of continued voyage is applicable to violation of blockade. Thus he states that the result of the establishment of a blockade is to penalize the voyage of a neutral ship, even with innocent cargo, perhaps for a neutral port, with intent that her cargo shall thence be forwarded even overland, to the enemy's territory (*Peterhoff, Springbok*).⁷

In giving his evidence before the Royal Commission, Dr. J. Westlake, on the other hand, categorically considered that

¹ *Welvaart van Pillaw*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 128, 129.

Dr. J. Westlake on the application of the doctrine of continued voyage to violation of blockade.

² *Christina Margaretha*, (1805) 6 Rob. p. 63.

the doctrine of continued voyage to violation of blockade.

³ "International Law," vol. iii. p. 404.

blockade.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64. But cf. Orders in Council, January 7, 1807; text in *Phillimore, International Law*, vol. iii. p. 412.

⁵ *The Maria*, 6 C. Rob. 201; the *Charlotte Sophia*, *ibid.*, p. 204; and the *Lisette*, *ibid.*, p. 394.

⁶ *The Stert*, (1801) 4 C. Rob. 65; the *Ocean*, (1801) 3 C. Rob. 297.

⁷ Report, Royal Commission, Supply of Food in Time of War, vol. iii. Parl. Papers, 1905, 2645, p. 256.

Great Britain could not apply the doctrine of continuous voyages to blockade.¹

American decisions,
applying
doctrines of
continued
voyage to law
of contraband.

In the case of the *Circassian*, (1864) 2 Wall. 135, vessel and cargo were condemned as lawful prize for violating the blockade of New Orleans, the arrest being made about eight miles from the north coast of Cuba, while the vessel was proceeding to Havana, the interposed neutral port. Chief Justice Chase observed—

“The destination to Havana was merely colourable. It proves nothing beyond a mere purpose to touch at that port.... It is quite possible that Havana, under the circumstances, would have turned out to be, as was insisted in argument a *locus paenitentiae* . . . but future possibilities cannot change present conditions.”²

Criticism of
Mr. W. E.
Hall on the
decision in the
case of the
Circassian,
(1864) 2 Wall.
135.

Mr. W. E. Hall strongly condemns the decision in the case of the *Circassian*, saying that—

“A vessel sailing from Bordeaux to Havana, with an ulterior destination to New Orleans, or, in case that port was inaccessible, to such other place as might be indicated at Havana, was condemned on the inference that her owner intended to violate the blockade if possible, notwithstanding that the design might have been abandoned on the information received at the neutral port.”³

But it may be remembered that inquiry at an interposed port is only a plea in excuse if the existence of the blockade is not known at the inception of the voyage, or its discontinuance is expected. Neither of these facts was found by the court in the case of the *Circassian*. But unless such facts exist, the act of sailing to a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence. Further, in the case of the *Circassian* the intention was clearly proved. There was spoliation of papers at the moment of capture. A memorandum of affreightment was found by which the agent of the shippers engaged to force the blockade, and undertook that the goods should not be disembarked except at New Orleans.⁴

¹ Report, etc., *supra*, vol. ii. No. 2644, p. 242.

² *Ibid.*, *supra*.

³ “International Law,” 5th ed., 710.

⁴ The *Circassian*, (1864) 2 Wall. 135, 152.

The court decreed confiscation of vessel and cargo on the ground that it was "not at all certain" that the master would have abandoned his purpose to break the blockade after arrival at the interposed neutral port of Havana. The vessel was therefore condemned because it was not proved she might have been innocent. This doubtless conflicts with the principles of the criminal law, if they are deemed applicable, but, as will be seen, it does not at all conflict with Prize Law as declared by Lord Stowell in some well-known cases.

One ground for the condemnation of the *Circassian*, considered by the court to be conclusive in itself, was the spoliation of papers at the moment of capture. But such an act, in cases of contraband, was admitted by Lord Stowell to be very material, though he declined to give it the effect of the American court in the case of the *Circassian*. By the law of France and some other countries, spoliation of papers at the time of capture involves condemnation.

According to Lord Stowell, violation of blockade was a criminal act,¹ even "a highly criminal act."²

As has been seen, the decision in the case of the *Circassian* was to the effect that confiscation must take place even where the innocence of the intention of the neutral master is a possible hypothesis. But, in the following cases, Lord Stowell confiscated vessel and cargo for breach of blockade, though he admitted the possibility of the innocence of the intention of the neutral master. At a time when there was a blockade of the Seine, the master, on the alleged explanation of taking a pilot, approached to within a mile of Cape la Heve. The court considered that he must have been intending to break the blockade. Sir W. Scott observed—

"It is a possible thing that his intention was innocent, but the court is under the necessity of acting on the presumption which arises from conduct, and of inferring a criminal intention."³

¹ The *Frederic Molke*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 86, 88.

² The *Hurtige Hane*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 124.

³ *Charlotte Christine*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 101, 104.

According to Lord Stowell, violation of blockade a crime by international law.

But where presumptions operate in criminal law in this country, they do not alter the rule as to the weight of the evidence. Therefore, though Sir W. Scott considered violation of blockade a crime, he could not have considered it a crime by the municipal law of this country. But he must have considered it an offence, *ex vi terminorum*, by international law.

Violation of blockade not considered a crime according to present view of international law.

Another of Sir W. Scott's decisions shows that the principles of English criminal law are not applicable to the violation of blockade, for in the case of the *Shepherdess*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 262, he held drunkenness was not pleadable to a charge of violation of blockade. But international law, Sir W. Scott considered,¹ is founded on the civil law, and by the civil law drunkenness is no excuse for crime. As Lord Stowell always alluded to violation of blockade as a crime, and considered the conveyance of contraband as fraud, it must be considered that he regarded both acts as a crime against international law. The clear tendency in international law to minimise neutral obligation, to which various causes have contributed, has caused neither the violation of blockade nor the carriage of contraband to be considered a crime according to the present view of international law.²

In the case of the *Bermuda*, (1865) 3 Wall. 514, the doctrines of continued voyage and of blockade were jointly applied where a vessel sailed from Liverpool, and, after touching at St. George's, Bermuda, was captured a few days afterwards off the coast of Great Abaco Island, an English colony, but not within territorial waters. It was admitted she was not steering to Charleston, but to Nassau.

Chief Justice Chase observed—

"It makes no difference whether the destination to the rebel was ulterior or direct; nor could the question of destination be affected by transhipments at Nassau, if transhipment was intended, for that could not break the continuity of transportation of the cargo. The interposition of a neutral port between neutral departure and belligerent destination has

¹ The *Maria*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 340, 363.

² Cf. Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1905, p. 689; and letter of Professor T. E. Holland, *Times*, Nov. 29, 1904.

always been a favourite resort of contraband carriers and blockade runners. But it never avails them when the ultimate destination is ascertained. A transportation from one point to another remains continuous, so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter what stoppages or transhipments intervene."¹

Mr. W. E. Hall considers that these two decisions of the courts of the United States during the American Civil War "strained and denaturalized the principles of English blockade law to cover doctrines of unfortunate violence."² In the case of the *Bermuda* he apparently thinks that the intention to tranship was not in controversy, and that on this ground the confiscation of vessel and cargo was unjustifiable.

But the decision in the case of the *Bermuda* seems to have proceeded on the ground that the vessel was an enemy vessel. The court considered it established that the *Bermuda* was under the authority and control of the Confederate agents in Liverpool, who were also consignees of the entire cargo, a portion of which consisted of contraband in the strictest sense of the word. The hirers of the vessel were also known to have been in close communication with the leaders of the Confederacy. Moreover, the case presented "an unusual aggravation of spoliation of papers." Chief Justice Chase considered that the British ownership of the *Bermuda* was mere pretence, and that the Pennsylvanian District Court had rightly condemned the vessel as enemy property.³ If, however, the *Bermuda* was not an enemy ship, the confiscation of vessel and cargo might yet have been justified on the ground of carriage of contraband. Viewed in this light, it was an aggravated case, since the entire cargo belonged to the hirers of the vessel, part of it consisted of cannon and rifles, and there was spoliation of papers. The fact that the hirers of the *Bermuda* were the political agents of the Confederacy in this country seems practically conclusive as to the intention with which the vessel sailed.

¹ Cf. Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1905, p. 553.

² "International Law," 5th ed., 709.

³ The *Bermuda*, (1865) 3 Wall. 514, 551, p. 551.

It may be questioned whether transhipment was intended in the case of the *Bermuda*.¹ Even assuming it to be so, according to three well-known decisions of Lord Stowell, an actual, much less an intended, transhipment has not the effect of evading the consequences of a violation of blockade.

Transhipment of cargo has not the effect of a successful evasion of the law of blockade.

In the case of the *Maria*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 201, 202, 203, the facts shown in evidence were that, when the Weser was blockaded, a cargo was sent in lighters from Bremen to the Jade, and there transhipped on a vessel which had gone from the Weser to the Jade in ballast. The vessel was afterwards captured in the North Sea. Restitution was decreed in this instance because of special relaxations granted by the English Government. Sir W. Scott observed—

“That they (*i.e.* the goods) were brought through the mouth of the blockaded river for the purpose of being shipped for exportation would subject them to be considered as taken on a continuous voyage, and as liable to all the same principles that are applied to a direct voyage, of which the terminus *a quo* and the terminus *ad quem* are precisely the same as those of the more circuitous destination.”

In the *Lisette*, (1807) 6 C. Rob. 387, the vessel sailed from the Elbe under a charter-party to take on board a cargo of goods, which were to be sent from the Elbe in lighters. The goods were accordingly so shipped, and sailed on September 6, and were captured on the 26th, after the blockade of the Elbe had been notified to be withdrawn. On the latter ground the vessel was discharged. But if the blockade had not been withdrawn, Lord Stowell clearly indicated both ships and cargo would have been confiscated, saying—

“I have been compelled in principle to hold that when goods are brought down from the blockaded port to a neighbouring port, on purpose to be shipped for the enemy’s country, an adventure so conducted is nevertheless a breach of blockade.”²

There are cases where egress is as much a violation of blockade as ingress under the same circumstances, and it

¹ Cf. the judgment of Chief Justice Chase, in the *Bermuda*, (1865) 3 Wall. 514, 558.

² Cf. also case of *Charlotte Sophia*, 6 C. Rob. 204.

does not seem material that in the case of the *Bermuda* the transhipment was to take place on ingress, while in the cases adduced from Lord Stowell's decisions the transhipment was to take place on egress. But assuming this, transhipment cannot be considered a ground for impugning the decision in the case of the *Bermuda*.

Mr. W. E. Hall observes that during the American Civil War the courts of the United States conceded that trade to Matamoras, on the Mexican shore of the Rio Grande, was perfectly lawful; but the Supreme Court laid down the rule that it was a duty incumbent on vessels with the neutral destination to keep south of the dividing line between the Mexican and Texan territory; and in the case of vessels captured for being north of that line, refused, while restoring them, to allow their costs and expenses.¹ It is to be hoped, Mr. W. E. Hall adds, "that a rule so little consistent with the rights of neutrals to uninterrupted commerce will not be drawn into a precedent." In the *Peterhoff*, (1866) 5 Wall. 28, 52, Chief Justice Chase considered the case in point was the decision of Sir W. Scott in the *Frau Ilsabe*, (1799) 4 C. Rob. 63, so far as there was any question of violation of blockade. In that case the notified blockade of Holland was held not to be violated by a destination to Antwerp, and the Scheldt was treated as a conterminous river, not within Dutch territory. As this case was expressly followed in the case of the *Peterhoff*, it was there held, also, that there had been no violation of blockade, Chief Justice Chase observing that: "What has been said sufficiently indicates our opinion that the ship and cargo are free from liability to violation of blockade."² But the vessel carried contraband in the strictest sense of the term, and therefore restitution was only decreed on payment of costs and expenses. All that the court, therefore, decided was, that there was a *prima facie* ground for seizure. It is a little difficult, under these

Rule of
Supreme
Court of the
United States
during Civil
War as regards
blockade of
river partly
in neutral
territory.

¹ Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 738, referring to the *Peterhoff*, 5 Wallace, 54; the *Dashing Wave*, ibid., 170; the *Volant*, ibid., 178; the *Science*, ii. 179.

² The *Peterhoff*, (1866) 5 Wall. 28, 57.

circumstances, to understand Mr. W. E. Hall's grave censure of the decision in the case of the *Peterhoff*.

In the other three cases adduced by the same writer, the neutral vessel voluntarily placed itself near the blockaded coast; and this was the ground on which the court refused costs and expenses, considering that the circumstances fully warranted sending in for adjudication.¹

Chief Justice Chase observed—

"We think it was the plain duty of a neutral claiming to be engaged in trade with Matamoras, under circumstances which warranted close observation by the blockading squadron, to keep his vessel, while discharging or receiving cargo, so clearly on the neutral side of the boundary line as to repel, as far as position could repel, all imputation of intent to break the blockade. He had no right to take, voluntarily, a position in the immediate presence of the blockading fleet, from which merchandise might easily be introduced into the blockaded region."²

It cannot be said that any of the three decisions conflicts with the law of blockade as enunciated by Lord Stowell, unless, indeed, they involve a too mild construction of it. All three vessels were anchored close to the Texan shore within cannon shot. But these are circumstances which Lord Stowell construed as certain evidence of intention to break a blockade. He declared that *fuge litus* was the duty of the neutral with regard to a blockaded spot, and that if he is found there, he must account for his being in such a situation most satisfactorily, otherwise, if approach to an interdicted spot was allowed, the whole purpose of blockade would be rendered nugatory.³ In the case of the *Teresita*, (1865) 5 Wall, 182, the United States court appeared to have followed the decision of Lord Stowell in the *Arthur*, (1810) Edw. 202. The *Teresita* was restored, the captors paying costs and expenses because she had drifted

¹ *Dashing Wave*, (1866) 5 Wall. 170; *Science*, ibid., 179; *Volant*, 180.

² The *Dashing Wave*, p. 176.

³ *Charlotte Christine*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 101; the *Gute Erwartung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 182; *Neutralitet*, ibid., 30; the *Arthur*, (1810) Edw. 202.

involuntarily into Texan waters. Professor T. E. Holland appears to approve of these decisions.¹

On the point of the effectiveness of a blockade, the decisions of the courts of the United States during the Civil War seem to contravene the principles of the law of blockade as enunciated by Lord Stowell. A neutral owner is not entitled to give the master of his vessel speculative instructions as to the greater or less probability of the termination of the blockade, and to send his vessel to the very mouth of a blockaded river, and say, if you do not meet with the blockading force, enter—if you do, ask a warning, and proceed elsewhere. The true rule is, that after the knowledge of an existing blockade, you are not to go to the very station of blockade under pretence of inquiry. This is the rule, even where the Consuls of the State to which the neutral vessel belongs have informed the master that the blockade would be raised before the vessel arrived.² Whether In order to incur penalty or not an intention to break a blockade be regarded as of law of criminal, there can be no liability to confiscation without the intention to violate the blockade. Where there is no intention to violate the blockade, but merely to sail to a blockaded port, the penalty of violation of blockade will not be incurred.³

Knowledge of the existence of the blockade and an intention to violate it are indispensable. Knowledge and intention are distinct; sometimes one will be presumed, while the other will require to be proved. Knowledge of the existence of a blockade, according to English and American usage, is necessarily presumed in the case of a governmental blockade diplomatically notified,⁴ and the intention in such a case is presumed from the mere act of starting for the prohibited port.⁵ General Halleck points out that the offence of violation of blockade consists in the attempt to enter, and by no means need extend to actual entrance into the prohibited port. In

In order to incur penalty
of law of nations for violation of blockade,
there must be intention on part of neutral.
Knowledge of fact of blockade and intention to violate it, distinct.
Knowledge and intention may be presumed in the case of a diplomatically notified blockade.
Attempt to enter blockaded port incur penalty without actual entrance.

¹ *Times*, July 13, 1904.

² *The Spes and Irene*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 76.

³ *Medeiros v. Hill*, (1832) 8 Bing. 231; *Naylor v. Taylor* (1829), 4 Mann. and Ry. Rep. 526; 9 S. C. B. and C. 718.

⁴ *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 112.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

a case where an American vessel was taken on the voyage to the blockaded port, Sir W. Scott said—

“It is said that the vessel had not arrived; that the offence was not actually committed, but vested in intention only. On this point I am clearly of opinion that the sailing with an intention to violate the blockade of the Texel, was a beginning to execute that intention, and is to be taken as an overt act constituting the offence. From that moment the blockade is fraudulently evaded.”¹

Actual entrance is not necessary to constitute the offence even when seizure can only be made on the spot, as in the case of a *de facto* blockade. A mere attempt after warning is sufficient in this case. In the case of a notified blockade an attempt may take place hundreds of miles from the prohibited port, since “the act of sailing to a blockaded place is sufficient to constitute the offence.”²

Only two exceptions to rule that attempt to enter prohibited port constitutes violation of blockade.

Particular licence.

Physical necessity.

The exceptions to the rule that it is a breach of blockade for a neutral to attempt to enter a blockaded port are only two in number—(a) when the neutral has a licence from the Government of the blockading State to enter the blockaded port,³ and (b) where the neutral has the excuse of physical necessity because he requires water or provisions. A Spanish vessel, in distress, on her way from New York to Havannah, by leave of the admiral commanding the squadron, put into Port Royal, S.C. (then in rebellion and blockaded by a fleet of the United States), and was there seized and made use of by the Government of the United States. She was afterwards condemned as a prize. The Supreme Court decided that she was not a lawful prize or subject to capture, and that her owners were entitled to a fair indemnity, though it might well be doubted whether the case was not more properly a subject for diplomatic adjustment.⁴ The case is quoted in Halleck’s “International Law” (ii. 205 and note), as

¹ The *Columbia*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 154, 156.

² Per Sir W. Scott in the *Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 114; and cf. Sir R. Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 308, referring to decision of Chief Justice Story in the *Nereide*, 9 Cranch (Amer.), pp. 440, 446.

³ The *Forest King*, Blatchf. P. C. 45.

⁴ The *Nuestra Señora de Regla*, 17 Wall. 29.

showing that physical necessity creates an exception to the rule that it constitutes a breach of blockade for a neutral vessel to enter a blockaded port. In its other developments it affords an instance of the Droit d'Angarie, and a legitimate exercise of that right, unlike the action of the Germans in 1871, when British colliers were sunk in the Seine. In the case of the *Charlotta*, (1810) 1 Edw. 252, the excuse of alleged distress was admitted after the delivery of an opinion of the Trinity Masters that the state of the wind and other circumstances made it impossible for the vessel to proceed to any other port than the blockaded one—the Texel. Sir W. Scott observed in this case that the legal presumption that a vessel going into a blockaded port goes there for the purposes of trade, is not ousted by the fact of her being taken coming out without having delivered her cargo. The delinquency of fraudulent intention is consummated, and the vessel becomes subject to confiscation if she goes in with the intention of disposing of the cargo, and only refrains from doing so owing to prohibitory decrees or the state of the market.

Sir W. Scott used only to admit the want of water and provisions as an excuse for entering a blockaded port by a neutral where "great necessity" or "the clearest necessity" could be satisfactorily explained to exist. It would be a case of great necessity justifying the entrance of a blockaded port by a neutral when there was no other port except the blockaded port into which the neutral could go when he was in want of provisions. In the *Hurtige Hane*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 124, a Danish vessel alleged the want of water and provisions as an excuse for going into Amsterdam, a blockaded port, and Sir W. Scott refused to admit the excuse, observing that—

"It is usual to set up the want of water and provisions as an excuse, and if I were to admit pretences of this sort, a blockade would be nothing more than an idle ceremony."

When the master of a neutral is in difficulty as to where he should go, the neighbourhood of a blockaded port cannot be considered as the fit *locus deliberandi* of his future plans. The rights of blockade could no longer exist to any purpose Master of neutral vessel ought not to deliberate as to his course in the vicinage of a blockaded port.

if a master could lie to in such a vicinage; he would stay, in all cases, until an opportunity offered itself of slipping into the interdicted port.¹ But an intention to enter a blockaded port is not a breach of blockade—there must be an attempt to enter, knowing the fact of blockade.² Particular licences do not vitiate a blockade, and on this ground both egress with cargo and ingress may be made without any liability to penalty.³ But a licence expressed in general terms to authorize a ship to sail from any port with a cargo will not authorize her in sailing from a blockaded port with a cargo taken in there. To exempt a blockaded port from the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, it must be specially designated with such an exemption in the licence, otherwise a blockaded port will be taken as an exception to the general description in the licence.⁴ It is no excuse for violation of blockade that the neutral master is compelled by the authorities of the blockaded place to sell his cargo there, as this would empower the State whose port is blockaded to mitigate the effect of a blockade. In the case of the *Charlotte Christine*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 101, the mouth of the Seine being interdicted, a Danish vessel made for Cape la Heve with the object of taking a pilot for Caen, but stood within one mile of the shore after the master perceived a pilot boat to be coming out to him, and on this ground the court confiscated both vessel and cargo. Sir William Scott observed in this case—

“Whatever the equivocal cause of such a situation may be, a person cannot be allowed to approach so near to a blockaded port so as to place himself almost within the effectual protection of the shore, and with no necessity existing. To allow such an approach would render the whole purpose of blockade nugatory.”⁵

A neutral vessel may not sail to the mouth of a blockaded port to inquire whether a blockade, of which the owner has

¹ *Apollo*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 286, 290.

² *Fitzsimmons v. The Newport Insurance Company*, (1808) 4 Cranch, 185.

³ *The Fox*, (1811) 1 Edw., 320.

⁴ *The Byefield*, (1809) 1 Edwards, 190.

⁵ *The Byefield*, (1809) 1 Edwards, 103.

A particular
licence only
excuses
entrance into
blockaded port
when the port
is specially
indicated in it.

received previous formal notice, is still in existence or not.¹ But such inquiry, in the case of vessels coming from a distance, may be made in the ports that lie in the way, and which can furnish information without furnishing opportunities of fraud.²

In a later case, the *Posten Hyll*, August 8, 1799, a Danish ship from Drontheim to Amsterdam, taken off the Texel, was proceeded against for a breach of the blockade of Amsterdam. The same excuse was made, that they expected to receive information on the spot. The court said, "Ships must call somewhere to obtain information, for the court will not allow the information to be obtained at the mouth of the blockaded port." It must be remembered that the court only introduced the relaxation in the case of American ships, because America was then two months' voyage off. The principle of these decisions possibly remains, but it must obviously be modified in view of the improvement in modern means of communication.

A case in which the circumstances are very peculiar may justify inquiries being made at the mouth of the blockaded port.³ Thus, in a case arising out of the paper blockade of Holland instituted by Great Britain, retaliatory to the Berlin decree, restitution of the vessel and cargo was decreed when there were definite instructions issued to the master of an American ship to inquire of certain British cruisers lying off Heligoland, and not forming part of the blockading squadron, if the blockade of the Elbe was subsisting.⁴ The evidence shows that the instructions to the master in this case were to make inquiry at the Eyder, which is twenty miles from the Elbe, the blockaded river, though on the way thither. It also appeared that vessels always proceeded first to Heligoland, in order to get pilots, treating it as the entrance of the Elbe or Eyder. The case was further complicated by the relaxations introduced, as far as inquiry was concerned, in favour of American vessels.

When inquiry
may be made
at the mouth
of blockaded
port.

In the case of
conterminous
blockaded and
non-blockaded
rivers.

¹ The *Spes and Irene*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 76, 81.

² The *Betsy*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 332.

³ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 204; referring to *Little William* (1809) 1 Acton, 141.

⁴ The *Little William*, (1809) 1 Acton, 141.

Neutral master may not deviate into "the roads" of a blockaded port. A ship and cargo were condemned for breach of blockade in a case where the vessel deviated, under an alleged necessity which was not supported by evidence, into "roads" forming part of a blockaded port, for the purpose of procuring a pilot.¹

A neutral vessel cannot be permitted so far to interfere with the exercise of a blockade as to expose the force maintaining it to the annoyance of the enemy's guns. Therefore, even in a case where the vessel was twenty miles off the blockaded port when seized, ship and cargo were confiscated, because the master admitted that he was steering when seized in the direction of the blockaded port and would have gone close under the land in its immediate vicinity.² A vessel may not proceed up a blockaded river for the purpose of procuring a pilot to proceed up a non-blockaded river on the same coast. It is not permissible for a neutral vessel to go up to a blockading squadron to inquire for a pilot.³

Breach of blockade by egress.

A valid excuse for egress is not necessarily a valid excuse for ingress, though it may be, as in the case of particular licences.

It is altogether unlawful to enter in ballast,⁴ but a ship that has entered previously to the blockade may retire in ballast.⁵ A vessel may retire with cargo put on board before a blockade.⁶ But the time of shipment is material,⁷ and the goods must have been either actually shipped or put on lighters before the date of the blockade, and not merely have been warehoused.⁸ A neutral ship may retire from a blockaded port with a cargo of goods which have been found unsaleable, or are otherwise *bonâ fide* withdrawn.⁹

In cases of egress the ship and not the cargo is confiscated when the regulations of the State whose port is blockaded do

¹ *Neutralitet*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 30.

² *Gute Erwartung*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 182.

³ *The Arthur*, 1 Edw. Rep. 202.

⁴ *The Comet*, (1808) 1 Edw. R. 32; the *Charlotte Christine*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 103; the *Charlotte*, (1810) 1 Edw. R. 252.

⁵ *The Juno*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 119.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The Betsey*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 93.

⁸ *The Rolla*, (1807) 6 C. Rob. 371.

⁹ *Vrouw Judith*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 152; *Neptunus*, *ibid.*, 171; the *Juno*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 119.

not permit a departure in ballast, and the neutral ship comes out in consequence of a rumour that hostilities are likely to break out between the belligerent and the country to which the vessel belongs.¹ Egress is lawful when the vessel is acquired by one neutral subject from another, and the acquisition has nothing to do with the commerce of the port, and the vessel comes out in ballast.² Egress even in ballast is unlawful when the vessel has been purchased by the neutral vendor from the enemy since the outbreak of hostilities.³

On principle, egress always constitutes a violation of blockade when the ingress was unlawful, as the offence, unlike that of the carriage of contraband, is not deposited with the cargo.⁴

The duration of the penalty of violation of blockade is French usage, semble, agrees with English usage, as to duration of penalty, when neutral attempts to enter, after having received special notification.

The same, according to the French doctrine, as it is according to the doctrine of Great Britain and the United States.⁵ Therefore, even by the French doctrine, if the neutral vessel, after having received a regular notification of the blockade by one of the blockading squadron, actually enters the port, she is liable, after egress, to be taken *in delicto* till she reaches her port of origin. The point cannot be considered quite settled, as may be gathered from the cautious language employed by Mr. W. E. Hall. This circumstance shows the wide variance that exists between the right of blockade as exercised by Great Britain and the United States, and the right as exercised by France. Sir W. Scott observed that it would be "the most absurd application of the principle" to concede that a neutral vessel had in some degree made her escape from the penalties of violation of blockade, because she had escaped the interior circumvallation of the blockading squadron.⁶

Finally, it may be remembered that, according to the English theory, as fully as by that adopted in France, the

¹ *Drie Vrienden*, (1813) 1 Dods. Rep. 269.

² The *Potsdam*, (1801) 4 C. Rob. 89; the *Vigilantia*, 6 C. Rob. 124.

³ The *Vigilantia*, (1805) 6 C. Rob. 124.

⁴ The *Frederic Molke*, (1798) 1 C. Rob. 86, 87.

⁵ Hall, "International Law," 5th ed., 710.

⁶ The *Welvaart Van Pillaw*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 128, 129.

limitations imposed on neutral commerce by the right of blockade depend for their validity solely upon the fact that a blockade really exists at any given moment.¹

Penalty for
breach of
blockade.

In the *Welvaart van Pillaw*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 128, 130, Lord Stowell said—

“ It is unnecessary for me to observe, if a ship that has broken a blockade is taken in any part of the same voyage, she is taken *in delicto*, and subject to confiscation. The offence is not terminated till she reaches the end of the voyage.”²

The cargo may be condemned when the vessel is released,³ in the somewhat exceptional case where the neutral vessel is permitted to enter the blockaded port owing to the remissness of the blockading squadron. An implied permission to enter, arising from remissness, protects the egress of the vessel, but not the cargo brought out, if the blockade actually existed at the time the cargo was shipped.⁴ If the blockade is raised during the voyage, the liability to capture comes to an end, the existence of the offence being dependent on the existence of the state of things which gave rise to it.⁵

Penalty of
breach of
blockade as to
the cargo.

There are more highly penal consequences for violation of blockade than for carriage of contraband,⁶ and, therefore, the general rule is that, in the former case, both ship and cargo are confiscated.⁷ This general rule applies (1) when the owners of the cargo are identical with the owners of the ship; (2) where the consignees have entire dominion over ship and cargo, so that the act of the master binds them;⁸ (3) where

¹ Hall's “International Law,” 5th ed., 705.

² 1 Keat's Comm., p. 152; the *Mercurius*, 1 C. Rob. 83; the *Juffrow Maria Schroeder*, 3 Rob. p. 147.

³ *Juffrow Maria Schroeder*, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 147, 160.

⁴ Cf. also Halleck's “International Law,” vol. ii. p. 207.

⁵ The *Lisette*, 6 C. Rob. 378; Ortolan, “Diplomatie de la Mer,” ii. 354.

⁶ Letters of Historicus, “International Law,” p. 145.

⁷ The *Comet*, Edwards' Admiralty Reports, 32.

⁸ The *Columbia*, 1 C. Rob. p. 154; the *Vrouw Judith*, ibid., p. 150; the *Imina*, 3 C. Rob. 169; the *Rosalie and Betty*, 2 C. Rob. pp. 343, 351. It is curious to note that in the case of the *Bermuda*, (1865) 3 Wall. 514, the agents of the Confederate States in this country were the consignees of the entire cargo. As has been seen, this decision was severely criticized by Mr. W. E. Hall (“International Law,” p. 710). But this fact explains that portion of the judgment in the case of the *Bermuda* which related to the cargo.

the master makes a criminal deviation into a blockaded port, and assigns a frivolous pretence as an excuse, and does not assert that he deviated under particular instructions which only applied to a part of the cargo.¹ The inference from the master's action may lead to a condemnation of the cargo. Thus, if, after having been warned by a vessel of the blockading squadron, the neutral is afterwards caught steering into the bay of the blockaded port, both vessel and cargo will be condemned, even if a mistake is alleged. In such a case there is a presumption leading to the confiscation of the cargo, because it is considered that he had no inducement to act as he did without the instructions and intention of the owner of the cargo.²

But the owners of the cargo are not, in general cases, held to be affected by the act of the master, unless he is specially appointed their agent;³ and the master is not the representative of the owner of the cargo to the same extent, and in the same direct manner, as he is the representative of the owner of the ship.⁴

In a case in which Lord Stowell reviewed and confirmed the principles of law applicable to this subject of the complicity of the owner of the cargo with the master of the ship, he held that the only two exceptions to the general rule that ship and cargo are both confiscated for breach of blockade are : (1) where orders are given for goods prior to the existence of a blockade, and there was not time for countermanding the shipment afterwards ; (2) where there is no knowledge of the blockade till the ship sails and the master, after receiving the information, obstinately persists in going to the port of his original destination.⁵

When cargo is
exempt from
confiscation
for breach of
blockade.

"In case of a war between foreign States, our courts recognize the rights of British subjects and other neutrals to carry on their trade with a belligerent (subject to the other belligerent's Marine insurance and violation of blockade).

¹ The *Alexander*, (1801) 4 C. Rob. 93.

² The *Adonis*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 256.

³ The *Alexander*, *supra*, p. 94.

⁴ The *Adonis*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 256, 261.

⁵ The *Exchange*, Edwards' Admiralty Reports, pp. 42, 43.

right of capture). Consequently the carriage of contraband goods, or voyages in breach of blockade, are not considered illegal,¹ and it necessarily follows that insurances on such voyages are not illegal. Duer maintains (i. 755) that an insurance effected in a neutral country on a voyage to a blockaded port is illegal, and relies on *Harratt v. Wise*, (1829) 9 B. & C. 712; *Naylor v. Taylor*, (1829) 715; and *Medeiros v. Hill*, (1832) 8 Bing. These cases are, however, inconclusive, and cannot prevail against the later authorities.”²

Historicus, writing before the date of the case cited in Arnould on Insurance, doubted whether the inference deduced by Duer from the cases he cited was not unduly extended.³ Duer’s position cannot now be entertained, and it was further inadmissible for the purpose for which it was advanced. The argument from the prohibition by municipal law to prohibition by international law is invalid. This is an aspect of the question which Historicus did not argue. It may almost be said that, assuming (what cannot now be done) the truth of the argument in Duer on insurance, he seemed to concur in the inference.

But Mr. W. E. Hall observes: “It is generally unsafe to use municipal laws to define the view of international duty taken by a nation.”⁴

Sir R. Phillimore observes—

“With respect to the bearing of municipal law upon international law, the language of M. Portalis, no mean authority, is applicable: ‘Le droit ne naît pas des réglemens, mais les réglemens doivent naître du droit.’ Case of *La Statira*, cited Merlin, Rep., t. xiii. p. 108 (‘Prise Maritime’).”⁵

Municipal
law cannot be
the source of
international
law.

The fact that infringement of blockade is regarded as an offence by municipal law, as it is in some countries, could never give rise to a rule of international law. It seems, on the

¹ *Ex parte Chavasse, In re Grazebrook, per Lord Westbury*, (1865) 34 L. J. Bank. 17; the *Helen*, (1865) L. R. 1 A. and E. 1; *Santissima Trinidad*, (1822) 7 Wheaton, 283; and *Richardson v. Maine Ins. Co.*, (1809) 6 Mass. 102.

² Arnould on “Marine Insurance,” vol. ii. pt. ii. c. v. s. 760, p. 853 and note, *ibid.*

³ Letters, “International Law,” p. 144.

⁴ “International Law,” p. 612 and note.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. iii. s. 233, p. 324.

other hand, reasonable to assume that the modern tendency to minimize the duties of neutrals has prevented men from treating violation of blockade as an offence by municipal law, or, at least, as an act *contra bonos mores*, so as not to be capable of being insured against.

While Burlamaqui, Heinneccius, and G. F. Martens may be quoted as authorities for the position that the act of an individual may implicate the State, neither the carriage of contraband nor the violation of blockade is such an act. It is only when such acts are done by the neutral State, and not merely by the neutral subject, that there is any infraction of international obligation.

The maritime codes of various countries provide regulations to be observed by their subjects when a friendly State has blockaded the ports or harbours of another.

By the Spanish Code, art. 640, a blockade of a port of destination justifies a seaman in abandoning his voyage. By art. 677 the contract of affreightment remains in force if, whilst the captain is without instructions from the shipper, a declaration of war or of blockade should be made during the voyage. In such a case the captain must make for the nearest neutral and safe port, and await orders from the shipper, and the expenses and wages during the detention will be settled as general average. By art. 690, s. (2), a blockade annuls a charter-party when it happens before the vessel sails. By art. 692 the charter-party is partially rescinded when it happens in the course of the voyage.

The Maritime Code of Portugal provides by art. 547 that a charter-party is rescinded when the sailing of a ship for its port of destination is delayed by a blockade.

By the Mercantile Marine Code of Italy, art. 616, blockade and other war risks are not on the insurer unless so expressly agreed. By arts. 551-553 seamen are entitled to wages in proportion to the term which they have served in cases of voyages made in violation of blockade and then abandoned.

By the Maritime Code of Holland, art. 370, if the port to which a ship is bound is under a blockade, a commander, unless he has other orders, must make for a neighbouring open port

Carriage of
contraband
and violation
of blockade
only offences
against interna-
tional law
when effected
by neutral
State itself,
and not by its
subject.

Maritime
commercial
codes and
violation of
blockade.

Spanish Code.

Portuguese
Code.

Italian Code.

of the same State. By art. 504 the outward freight only is payable when a ship has to return with cargo in consequence of blockade.

Belgian Code. By the Maritime Code of Belgium, art. 178, insurers may take risks of war including blockade.

Commercial Code of German Empire. Finally, by the Commercial Code of the German Empire, art. 848, an insurer takes war risks unless the contract is concluded with a clause free from molestation of war. And as blockade is a war risk, an insurer is not liable for blockade risks when he takes all other risks than risks of war.

Pacific blockade, its origin and nature.

Mr. W. E. Hall observes that—

"Much of what appears in the older and even in some modern books upon the subject of reprisals has become antiquated. Special reprisals, or reprisals in which letters of marque are issued to the persons who have suffered at the hands of the Foreign State, are no longer made; all reprisals that are now made may be said to be general reprisals carried out solely through the ordinary authorized agents of the State, letters of marque being no longer issued."¹

In the above passage Mr. W. E. Hall seems to consider that general reprisals are a measure of constraint short of war. Sir R. Phillimore, on the other hand, considers that general reprisals and open war are, by the practice of nations, synonymous.²

The last instance of special reprisals, in Sir R. Phillimore's sense, is that made by England against Greece in 1850,³ which Mr. W. E. Hall⁴ and M. Alphonse Rivier⁵ treat as a pacific blockade. Hall⁶ and Phillimore consider that the last instance of belligerent embargo was the seizure by Great Britain of Dutch vessels in 1803 at the Cape of Good Hope,⁷ and also in the ports of this country. Special reprisals, so far as they involve issuing letters of marque, have necessarily

¹ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., 371.

² "International Law," vol. iii. s. x.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 372.

⁵ "Principes de Droit des Gens," 1896, vol. ii. p. 198.

⁶ "International Law," p. 369.

⁷ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 26.

fallen into desuetude since the Declaration of Paris, 1856, and the abolition of privateering.

It seems clear, on principle, that pacific blockade is a modern mode of retorsion and reprisal by which international comity and right may be vindicated. Rivier considers that, under modern limitations, pacific blockade is merely a particular instance of special reprisals, like embargo. Halleck considers that pacific blockades are nothing but special reprisals.¹ The older forms of constraint short of war were resorted to on the failure of negotiation and arbitration,² and their disappearance coincides with the rise of international arbitration. Reprisals were resorted to by most of the Great Powers of Europe against each other. But pacific blockades, without any exception, have been instituted by powerful States against weak States.³ But this fact, in turn, does not at all distinguish them in principle, and according to the fifth article of the French Ordonnance of 1681, ships and goods taken at sea under letters of reprisals were to be adjudicated upon, like prizes taken in open war, in the Courts of Admiralty. But in 1884 the French, during their pacific blockade of Formosa, constituted prize tribunals which purported to validate the seizure of neutral vessels.⁴ While this fact has been justly construed as impeaching the status of a "pacific blockade," it equally shows that it is a mere modern survival, at least on the French view, of the special reprisal. It is submitted that pacific blockade offers even more affinity to what Sir R. Phillimore calls belligerent as opposed to civil, embargo. Special reprisals could be exercised on the high seas, while embargo, like pacific blockade, is a measure of restraint directed against a coast or harbour. According to the exercise by Great Britain of the right of belligerent embargo in 1803, it is difficult to draw any distinction between belligerent embargo and pacific blockade. In that instance, there being peace between the two countries,

Analogy of
Pacific block-
ade to special
reprisals or
embargo.

¹ "International Law," 1893, c. xiv. p. 474.

² Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 7.

³ Despaget's "Cours de Droit International Public," p. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Great Britain forcibly detained Dutch ships in a Dutch harbour. It is very difficult, in view of the Order in Council of May, 1806, not to regard the blockade proclaimed by the English Government in April as a pacific blockade. The restrictions imposed on the blockade of the ports of North Germany by the subsequent order show that it was not to apply to neutrals, and therefore it complies with the more desirable form of pacific blockade. As far as Prussia was concerned, this blockade seems in all respects to have been a mere pacific blockade.¹ It is usual, however, to assign a far later date to the first instance of the usage.²

Pacific blockade, definition of, by Prof. T. E. Holland, *Times*, March 8, 1897.

The following is the definition of pacific blockade given by Professor T. E. Holland in a letter written shortly before the notification by the Six Powers of the pacific blockade of Crete:—

"A pacific blockade is one of the various methods—generically described as 'reprisals,' such as 'embargo,' or seizure of ships on the high seas—by which, without resort to war, pressure, topographically or otherwise limited in extent, may be put upon an offending State."

In the domain of theory the subject of pacific blockade has lent itself to controversial treatment almost as discursive as the form of blockade called a paper or fictitious blockade. In the letter before mentioned, Professor T. E. Holland considered that the one controversy has become as much a dead letter as the other, since it became the practice to enforce a pacific blockade only against vessels belonging to the quasi-enemy, without involving confiscation even in this case.

Views of jurists on the legality of pacific blockade.

The views of the jurists of different countries on the subject are summarized by Mr. W. E. Hall.³ Pistoye and Duverdy⁴ and Woolsey (s. 119) deny the existence of a right to enforce pacific blockade, but their minds were fixed upon its earlier form, when it was directed against ships under all flags, and

¹ Cf. Letters of Historicus, pp. 109, 110, referring to Schoell's "Traités De la Paix," vol. ix. p. 44.

² Cf. M. Alphonse Rivier's "Principes de Droit des Gens," 1896, vol. ii. p. 198, and letter of Professor T. E. Holland to the *Times*, March 8, 1897.

³ "International Law," 5th ed., p. 375.

⁴ "Traité des Prises Maritimes," ii. 376-8.

vessels arrested for a breach of pacific blockade were at one time confiscated, as they would be in a state of war.¹

Heffter (s. 111), Calvo (s. 1591), and Cauchy (ii. 428) pronounce in favour of it. Bluntschli (ss. 506, 507) approves of the practice on condition that the blockade shall not be so conducted as to touch third States. Von Bulmerincq² unwillingly admits it as being at any rate a less evil than war. Mr. Lawrence considers that the history of the two pacific blockades of 1884 and 1886 points unmistakably to the conclusion that pacific blockade is lawful provided it is enforced against none but vessels of the Power which is to be coerced by it.³ M. Rivier, while he seems to allow the aptitude of theoretical objections, observes that policy is a question of action, and it is hardly possible at this day to withhold from pacific blockade the character of an institution of international law.⁴ General Halleck observes—

"Some writers have imagined a state of things which they term 'pacific blockade'; that is to say, that one State may

¹ During the blockade of Mexico by France in 1838, not only were Mexican ships liable to capture, but vessels belonging to third Powers were seized and brought in for condemnation. The French also proposed to confiscate neutral vessels in 1884, when they "pacifically blockaded" Formosa. Lord Granville informed M. Waddington in November, 1884 (Parl. Papers, "France," No. 1, 1885), that the contention of the French Government that "a pacific blockade" confers on the blockading Power the right to capture and condemn the ships of third nations for a breach of blockade is in conflict with well-established principles of international law. It is of great interest to note that this contention of France in the case of pacific blockade cannot claim the sanction of the famous *Ordonnance de la Marine* of Louis XIV. Letters of reprisal are clearly *in pari materia* with a proclamation of pacific blockade, and by the *Ordonnance*, art. iii., permission was only given to those to whom the letters of marque were issued to arrest and seize the goods of the subjects of the State offending (cf. Phill., "International Law," vol. iii. s. 15). The influence of the *Ordonnance*, on the other hand, is perhaps discernible in the constitution of prize courts by the French at their "pacific blockade" of Formosa (cf. art. 6, *Ordonn. de la Marine*). On the ground that pacific blockade has in fact involved the institution of prize courts, M. Frantz Despagnet objects to the usage. A prize court necessarily implies that a state of war exists (cf. Phill., "International Law," vol. iii. s. 20; and Sir W. Scott's observation in the *Hendrick and Maria*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 146, 156, that, in cases of prize, the claimant is subject to "no other rights than those of war, and is amenable to no jurisdiction but such as belongs to those who possess the rights of war against him").

² Holtzendorff's Handbuch, 1889, vol. iv. s. 127.

³ "Principles of International Law," pt. iii. c. i. p. 290, ed. 1896.

⁴ "Principes de Droit des Gens."

blockade the coasts of another State, and that at the same time declare that a state of peace is maintained. The weight of authority, however, is against such an anomaly. While a blockade, as a war measure, will be internationally respected, this will not be the case with a blockade instituted as a system of pacific pressure. Such blockades cannot affect neutral States, they are virtually nothing but special reprisals."¹

Dr. T. Walker observes—

"At present (1895), in view of the paucity of instances, the divergence in the character of the actual operations, and the disputes which arose thereon, we must be content to say that the title (of a pacific blockade) is not yet practically established."²

M. Frantz Despagnet, the newly-elected member of the Institute of International Law, considers the usage of "pacific blockade" as entirely indefensible. He argues that, both by treaty and by unilateral acts, blockade has been exclusively confined to a state of war; *ex. gr.*, the French governmental regulations of July 26, 1778, art. 1, the great treaties on neutrality in 1778 and 1800, and the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Other objections of M. Despagnet are, that pacific blockade (1) has been exclusively employed by powerful States against weak States; (2) places a prohibition on neutral commerce, while it leaves the subjects of the blockading State free to trade with those of the blockaded State—this he considers an inversion of the legitimate operation of blockade; (3) does not possess the effect claimed for it of preventing war; *ex. gr.*, the case of Turkey in 1827, that of Mexico in 1838, that of 1885 with China. To these instances must now be added the case of Crete in 1897.³

Proposals of
the Institute
of Interna-
tional Law to
regulate
pacific
blockade.

It remains to notice the proposals of the Institute of International Law. During its session at Heidelberg in 1887, the following resolutions were voted:—

(1) Vessels under a foreign flag may freely enter in spite of a pacific blockade.

¹ "International Law," 1893, c. xiv. p. 474.

² "Manual of Public International Law," 1895, p. 97.

³ "Cours de Droit International Public," p. 519.

(2) A pacific blockade must be officially declared and notified, and must be maintained by a sufficient force.

(3) Vessels of the blockaded Power which do not respect such a blockade may be sequestered. The blockade having ceased, they must be returned to their owners, but without compensation of any kind.

The following history of the usage is given in Rivier:—

History of the
usage of
pacific
blockade.

"One may cite as the first pacific blockade that of 1827; the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia blockaded the Turkish coasts. In 1831 France blockaded several points of the Portuguese coast. In 1833 France and England blockaded the ports of Holland. New Granada was blockaded by England in 1836, Mexico by France in 1838, and La Plata from 1838 to 1846 by France; and from 1845 to 1848 it was blockaded by both France and England. In 1850 England blockaded, as a measure of reprisal, the Piraeus and the other ports of Greece.¹ Sardinia blockaded Messina and Gaeta in 1860. England blockaded Rio Janeiro in 1862. The Great Powers threatened to blockade the Turkish coast in 1880 by anchoring their fleet in Dulcigno. France blockaded the ports and roadsteads of Formosa in 1884. The Great Powers, with the exception of France, blockaded in 1886 the coasts of Greece, but only detained Greek vessels. In November, 1888, Germany and Great Britain, in order to put an end to the treaty and to the violence and depredations of the slave dealers, blockaded Zanzibar; but this blockade was not even directed against Zanzibar—it had rather the character of a measure of maritime police directed against the slave traffic."²

In 1895 Rear-Admiral Stephenson maintained, for some

¹ A full account of this last blockade is given in Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 23. Sir R. Phillimore does not, however, treat the Don Pacifico incident as involving a pacific blockade, but discusses it as an instance of special reprisal. He considers that the international jurist is bound to say that the evidence at present produced does not appear to be of that overwhelming character which alone could warrant an exception from the well-known and valuable rule of international law that recourse should not be had to reprisals until the subject of the offended State has exhausted those legal remedies which it must be presumed are afforded by the ordinary legal tribunals of every civilized State. It was an admitted fact that M. Pacifico had not applied to the Greek Courts of Law for redress. Sir R. Phillimore's judgment seems wholly unfavourable to the action of the British Government, and he seems to quote with some commendation the protest of Russia, couched in terms of menace that it is difficult not to attribute significance to in connection with the outbreak of the Crimean War four years later. The Don Pacifico incident is treated by Mr. W. E. Hall, as well as M. Rivier, as a case of pacific blockade ("International Law," 5th ed., 372).

² "Principes des Droits des Gens," 1896, vol. ii. p. 198.

weeks, a pacific blockade against the port of Corinto, Nicaragua. In 1897 the Concert of Europe, represented by fleets of Great Britain, Austria, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, blockaded the Island of Crete, where an armed insurrection was raging, and where a detachment of Greek regular troops had landed. By the blockade notification¹ the blockade was only declared general for ships under the Greek flag. But it cannot be said that this blockade was directly only against the ships of the quasi-enemy, as it appears from the notification that the vessels of neutral Powers were liable to be visited and, apparently, detained under certain circumstances. The notification did not provide any time for ships to leave; but Greek war vessels were given forty-eight hours. The blockade lasted till December 1, 1898, when Prince George of Greece was appointed High Commissioner. It may be worth while to add that in February, 1897, Germany originally proposed to blockade specifically the Greek ports, but England and Italy objected. In April, 1898, Germany and Austria withdrew from the pacific blockade of Crete. The application of the term "pacific" to this blockade is an entire misnomer. The region round Canea was continually bombarded by the fleets of the Powers,² and Admiral Noel bombarded Candia in September, 1898.³

During the Graeco-Turkish War of 1897 the Greek Government notified a belligerent blockade of the coast of Epirus and a portion of the littoral of the Gulf of Salonica. It claimed as far as the last^{is} concerned that the blockade should extend to five miles from the coast. No time was fixed for the departure

¹ *London Gazette*, March 19, 1897.

² "Ann. Reg.," 1897, p. 319.

³ The present recrudescence (April, 1905) of the demand of Crete for federation with Greece seems of considerable interest at this moment, and was clearly the exciting cause of the blockade of 1897-8. In 1901 the Cretan assembly passed a resolution in favour of union with Greece. The four protecting Powers issued an "identic declaration," stating that they did not consider this advisable ("Ann. Reg.," 1901, 305). Crete occupies the truly abnormal position of a mi-Souverain State, which is under "the protection" of four Powers, and the suzerainty of a fifth. The only analogy appears to have been the status of Cracow and Luxembourg. The international status of Crete is, however, far more complex owing to the suzerainty of the Sultan. A Protectorate is generally recognized as contrasting with a State under suzerainty.

of any neutral vessel in any port. This blockade was extended to the Gulf of Volo a few days later. It appears from the notification that the Greek Government held that capture could only be effected on the spot itself.¹ On the other hand, there was no stipulation as to the notification *spéciale*, and therefore the Greek usage apparently conforms to English and American usage.²

In 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy specifically blockaded Venezuelan ports.³ But this so-called pacific blockade was certainly not confined to the interception of the vessels of the quasi-enemy, as the notification merely stated that "vessels which attempt to violate the blockade will render themselves liable to all measures authorized by the law of nations and the respective treaties," etc.

Germany and Italy issued separate notifications, but it is equally clear that in both cases the vessels of neutral Powers were amenable to the operation of blockade.⁴ This blockade equally involved a conflict of warships, and therefore is mis-called pacific. The seizure of Venezuelan gunboats by British and German cruisers, the German commander later sinking one of them, caused a ferment in the United States.⁵ In the case of a belligerent blockade by notification, "it is to be presumed that the notification would be formally revoked, and that due notice will be given of it; till that is done, the port is to be considered as closed up."⁶ At the close of 1898 a notification was issued declaring the blockade of Crete raised, and in 1903 Italy, England, and Germany issued separate notifications declaring the blockade of the Venezuelan ports raised. In

¹ This is the limitation adopted by the proposed Règlement des Prises Maritimes of the Inst. de Droit Int., ss. 35-44.

² *London Gazette*, 1897, 2751.

³ In view of the fact that this blockade involved a distinct reversion to what is universally considered the older and objectionable form of pacific blockade, it is clearly necessary to remember that three Powers concurred in enforcing it. In the "Annual Register," and the last edition of Mr. W. E. Hall's "International Law," no mention is made of Italy as one of the blockading Powers. But for the Italian notification, cf. *London Gazette*, December 23, 1902, p. 8839; and *q.v.* *Times*, December 22, for the active part played by the Italian cruiser *Giovanni Bausan* in enforcing the blockade.

⁴ *London Gazette*, December 23, 1902.

⁵ "Ann. Reg." 436.

⁶ *Per Sir W. Scott in the Neptunus*, (1799) 2 C. Rob. 110, 114.

this respect the usage of the last two pacific blockades has conformed to the belligerent usage. Though the blockade was made applicable to all nationalities, there does not appear to have been any seizure of vessels not flying the Venezuelan flag. The blockade of 1902 was also rendered effective from the day of publication (December 20), but fifteen days of grace were allowed for vessels "lying in ports now declared to be blockaded," and varying periods were granted to steamers and sailing vessels which had left harbour prior to notification.

The usage of
pacific
blockade has
changed for
the worse
since 1897.

It is therefore necessary to conclude that from 1897 the practice of pacific blockade has again changed for the worse, as it has once more reverted to the imposition of obligation upon neutrals, even to the extent of confiscating their vessels for violation of the blockade. It has, therefore, again become open to all the objections that were originally aimed against it. As practised in 1897 and 1902, the usage cannot derive any support from the limited approval conceded by Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. T. J. Lawrence. Both in 1897 and 1902 pacific blockade involved belligerent operations, and these, in some instances, seem to have exceeded the due exercise of belligerent rights in the conduct of blockade as an operation of war. The sinking of a Greek merchant vessel, alleged to be carrying provisions and stores to the insurgents, by the Austria cruiser *Sebenico* may be instanced during the blockade of 1897. Perhaps this may be dismissed as an episode, however regrettable, which was not, strictly speaking, an incident of the blockade, as it occurred before the proclamation. Moreover, the insurgents seem to have first fired on the *Sebenico*. But after the proclamation an English cruiser sank two caiques, carrying munitions of war to the insurgents.

Policy of
France to
assimilate
pacific
blockades to
the belligerent
right.

Great Britain
seems to have
acceded to
this view since
1902.

France has always leaned to an assimilation of pacific blockades to those practised by belligerents, and, judging from the usage as exercised in 1902, England has finally acceded to this view. The only possible difference between the French usage of belligerent and pacific blockade is presumably that vessels cannot be seized on the high seas for attempted violation of pacific blockade. But this does not seem very certain.

The fact that two great maritime nations have asserted the right of instituting a blockade, with all the incidents of war in time of peace, suggests possibilities of future conflict. It cannot be supposed that the strict usage of pacific blockade will be persisted in. Neutral nations cannot be expected lightly to endure, in time of peace, an operation which has always been described as the most onerous that can be inflicted on neutrals in time of war.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the occasion of pacific blockade would not disappear with its abandonment. An offence against the comity of nations may take the form of a purely commercial difficulty, as that between Great Britain and the Two Sicilies in 1840. In the present state of the world it cannot be said there is no possibility of conflict on questions of international commerce and finance. There will always remain the possibility that occasions may arise when nations will proceed to retortion or reprisal. But in the present state of the usage pacific blockade appears as two-handed a weapon as the abolished form of reprisal, privateering.

Controversial future of pacific blockade.
Possibility of offences against international comity would not be abolished by abolition of pacific blockade.
Tendency of international disputes to take a commercial form in modern times.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE RETURN OF PEACE AND THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH.

In what manner peace may return.

Return of peace by reciprocal intermission of hostilities.

WAR, which according to Grotius, may break out in three ways, may likewise be terminated in three ways—either by the cessation of hostilities, by conquest, or by treaty of peace.

The most commonly cited instance of a return of peace effected by a reciprocal intermission of hostilities is in the case of war between Charles XII. of Sweden and Frederic Augustus, King of Poland, at the commencement of the eighteenth century. This struggle presented many exceptional features, as after the victories of Charles XII. at Cracow and Warsaw in 1702, Frederic Augustus abdicated the throne of Poland. Stanislas, a nominee of Charles XII., became King of Poland, but was deposed in turn at the defeat of Charles XII. at Pultowa in 1709. The internal situation of Poland involving interneccine as well as foreign war, presented so many abnormal features that it would seem very difficult to derive any certain inferences from it. The hostilities between Sweden and Poland apparently ended with the rout of Charles XII., but Sir R. Phillimore, following Heffter, considers that there was no cessation of hostilities till 1716.¹ Since Frederic Augustus declared war against Charles XII. in direct opposition to the loudly expressed wishes of the Polish Diet,² there seems some theoretic doubt whether the war could be considered *bellum de jure*. Again, this war was finally concluded by the promulgation of a Treaty of Peace between Poland and Sweden in 1729. This treaty of peace was of a highly exceptional character.

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. part xii. c. i. s. 511, p. 640; referring to Heffter, p. 311, s. 176.

² Dunham's "History of Poland," p. 219.

It affords the one example in modern history where a peace was concluded by two letters; the reason being that there were no difficulties to do away with, owing to the territorial distribution of the two powers.¹

The war between Spain and her South American Colonies affords the clearest instance of the termination of war by the mutual intermission of hostilities, since the period that elapsed before the declaration of peace was far greater than the corresponding period in the case of Sweden and Poland. The war of South American Independence began in 1810. Bolivar liberated Venezuela at the battle of Carabolo in 1820. Ecuador was freed at the battle of Pichincha in 1822. Peru was freed at the battle of Junin. The last belligerent operations of this war, the victory of Sucre over Canterac at Ayacucho, and the siege of the castles of Callao in Peru, were all concluded by 1825, though the mother country may subsequently have made some abortive attempts to fit out further expeditions. Spain did not recognize the independence of Ecuador till 1840, when, by royal decree, commercial vessels of the republic of Ecuador were admitted into Spanish ports. Chile was formally acknowledged to be independent in 1843. Venezuela, which was first liberated by Bolivar, was not recognized till 1850, thirty years after she had gained her independence at Carabolo. A treaty between Venezuela and Spain, by which the independence of the former was formally acknowledged, was signed in 1845, but for some reason, ratification was delayed till 1850.²

There are, alike in the pages of classical history and in very modern times, instances of the unconditional submission (*deditio*) of one belligerent to another. In ancient times there were the conquests of the Romans,³ in modern times the

¹ G. F. Marten's "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. p. 345 and note; referring to De Steck, "Essai sur diverses sujets de politique, Essai Montgon, Mémoires," vol. vii.; Supplément modéé utdrag, 1729.

² "Ann. Reg." 1845, p. 264, and W. E. Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., p. 565. Mr. Hall dates the formal acknowledgment of Venezuela's independence by Spain from 1850. A treaty to that effect had undoubtedly been signed five years previously, but a treaty is not binding on the signatory States till it has been ratified.

³ Cæsar, "De Bello Civilis," I. iii. ss. 97, 98.

conquest of England and France in Africa, and of England and Russia in Asia. A war undertaken for aggression need not necessarily terminate in the complete absorption of the conquered State, however much it may tend to do so. Of this the successive wars for the partition of Poland afford instances. The spoliation of Poland involved three wars before it was ultimately affected.¹ The extinction or incorporation of one State by another need not necessarily be the result of a war of conquest, an observation illustrated by the Acts of Union between England and Scotland and Ireland. Sir R. Phillimore seems to consider that instances of the termination of war by conquest are more rare in modern than in ancient times, but the course of modern history has perhaps tended to invalidate this statement. Since 1857, Russia has conquered and incorporated Circassia, and the vast territories that belonged to the conquered Khanates of Central Asia.²

In Central Asia, Russia has long since advanced in one direction beyond the limits of the conquests of Alexander the Great, and in this direction her conquests possess all the signs of permanence. The annexations of England in Africa were essentially cases of war terminating by conquest, involving the disappearance of the South African Republic. To these may be added the accessions involved in the enormous growth of the Indian Empire. Termination of war by conquest seems to have occurred far more frequently in the last half-century than in any other recorded epoch, and the conquests of modern times are on a larger scale than the classical instances, and appear to exhibit greater features of permanence. They differ however, even in the most indefensible instances, such as that of the spoliation of Poland, from the unconditional surrender exacted by the ancient conqueror. Some attempt was made, both by France and Great Britain, to alleviate the fate of Poland at the Treaty of Vienna.³ Though no Powers interposed on behalf of the South African Republics, England

¹ Cf. Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. i. s. 392, p. 437.

² Cf. Lord Curzon's "Russia in Central Asia," p. 259.

³ Klüber, "Acten des Wiener Congr.," band ix. 40-51; Wheaton's "History," pp. 425-435.

concluded a convention with the representatives of the two Republics at Vereeniging, which has been scrupulously observed, and afforded the basis of an equitable termination of the war.

A Treaty of Peace is, in the language of the books, a public real treaty; for if its duration were limited to the life of the sovereign, it would be a mere truce, and not a treaty of peace. Treaties of peace resemble other public real treaties in so far as they are subject to the same rules of interpretation,¹ some of which, however, are more particularly adapted to the former.² Thus the interpretation of a treaty of peace is to be against the superior party. He who prescribes the terms of the treaty must blame himself if he has neglected to express his demands clearly; and vague or ambiguous terms must not be made so many snares to entrap the weaker party to the contract. The names of countries ceded by treaty must be understood according to the usage prevailing at the time among skilful and intelligent men. It seems an indubitable inference from this passage of Vattel that a treaty of peace ought at least to name specifically the countries ceded by it. But by the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, between Japan and Russia, certain islands adjacent to the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin were merely alluded to in general terms; a point possibly of little importance, as it may be presumed that Russia merely cedes to Japan islands south of the 50th degree of northern latitude, which is adopted by the Treaty of Portsmouth as the northern boundary line of the Japanese frontier in the island of Sakhalin.³ By articles which are annexed to the Treaty, a commission of delimitation is to be appointed whose duty it is (*inter alia*) to prepare a list of the ceded islands. Professor F. De Martens, writing immediately after the Portsmouth Peace Conference, observed that, when the Japanese landed in Sakhalin, they even sought to change the name of the island. It is doubtless within the competence of

Return of
peace by
treaty.

Ceded terri-
tory must be
named.

Exception in
the Treaty of
Portsmouth.
1905, Art. IX.

¹ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. i. c. 17.

² Ibid., I. iv. c. iii. s. 32-34.

³ Cf. text of the Treaty of Portsmouth in *Times*, October 17, Article IX.

a victor to do this.¹ But the fact that the southern portion of the island was ceded "in perpetuity and full sovereignty" by Russia to Japan in its Russian name of Sakhalin, recalls the distinction between "occupatio bellica" and "cession" of territory.

The principle is that, by treaty of peace, the victorious belligerent acquires territory, not by retaining what he is already in possession of, but because the subdued State cedes it. It is clear, therefore, that such territory must be ceded in the name by which it was known to the ceding State who had the right of "Transcendental Propriety" or Eminent Domain over such land.² The language of treaties which concern the acquisition of conquered territory is that the subdued State yields or concedes (*cédera*) a certain territory to another. The language of the Treaty of Portsmouth, a treaty which Professor F. De Martens considers is destined to create "a completely new state of things in the Far East," is exactly similar to that of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, in the use of the term "*céder*" to denote the public act of acquisition of territory.³ According to the English text of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Article IX., "the Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial

¹ Wheaton observes that firm military occupation transfers all the rights of the displaced sovereignty to the victor ("International Law, part iv. c. ii. §. 346 b, p. 483). The descent of the Japanese on Sakhalin was one uninterrupted career of conquest from their landing in July, 1905, to the action at Naibuti, in the western region of the island, which was fought on August 30, the day after the critical sitting of the Portsmouth Conference (cf. Professor F. De Marten's article in the *North American Review*, November, 1905, p. 644).

² Cf. Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 526, p. 652, referring to pp. 388-91, tit. Tercero, Sección Cuesta; s.c. lix. of the "Elementos del Derecho Internacional obra postuma," de Don José María de Pando, Ministro de Estado que fué en 1823. . . . De Rayneval points out that the usage of nations, as instanced by treaty, differs from the Roman law in distinguishing between conquest confirmed by treaty and military occupation of territory (ii. pp. 156, 157, note 35). But it has always been recognized that the law of nations, as regards treaty, is not derived from the Roman law.

³ E.g. In the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, between Louis XIV. and Frederic William of Prussia, it is said (Article 7), "que la partie du quartier de Guildres que possède et occupe le Roi de Prusse lui est cédée à la perpetuité." In the preliminaries of the Peace of 1783 between France and England, it is said, respecting the Isle of Tobago (Article 7), "que le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne cédera à la France l'Île du Tobago." This island was, at the time of the treaty, occupied under the title of conquest by the French, and therefore its cession exhibits some resemblance to that of Sakhalin.

Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin and all islands adjacent thereto and public works and properties thereon" (*Times*, October 17, 1905). By Article XV. of the Treaty of Portsmouth it is provided that "the present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but, in cases of discrepancy in interpretation, the French text shall prevail." The Japanese plenipotentiaries signed the English version, the Russian plenipotentiaries signed the French version. The Portsmouth Peace Conference and Treaty inaugurate the introduction of the English language as a language of diplomacy. After the revival of letters, the Latin tongue became the universal one as to the public writings between the Powers of Europe, particularly between those who spoke different languages; and many States preserved it as their State language; for instance, the Empire, Denmark, Great Britain, the Pope, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Provinces. These States made use of it as well in their letters of ceremony, as in those they sent to other States. But France, Russia, and Turkey employed their native language as their State language. Translations were, however, annexed to the writings they sent, and Russia generally sent her letters of council in French.¹

¹ Cf. G. F. Von Marten's "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. vi. s. 4, p. 191, referring to F. C. De Moser, "Von den Europäischen Hof-und-Staats Sprachen nach deren Gebrauch im Reden und schreiben," Frankfort, 1758. After the Peace of Nimeguen the French language became general among the foreign powers in their conferences and treaties (cf. Comte de Rivarol, "Dissertation sur l'universalité de la langue Française," Berlin, 1784, p. 32). The Princes of Germany began to make use of the French language in their treaties with each other at the peace of Breslau, 1742 (C. Moser, "Teschner Friedenschluss mit Anmerkungen," p. 48, and the following). Mr. D. Real relates (vol. v. c. iii. p. 558) that the Turks do not regard those treaties as obligatory which are not in their language, and this obliges those who treat with them to draw up their treaties in the two languages (cf. G. F. Marten's "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. p. 349). St. Didier speaks of the universality of the use of the French language at Nimeguen. The two Danish ambassadors used it at that Congress, as Count Oldeburg only knew German besides French ("Histoire des Negociations de Nimègue," i. 25). The following facts on this subject are collected in Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iii. p. 153: The Venetian envoy, Giustinian, at an audience granted to him by Francis I., addressed the king in Latin. Ambassadors addressed Henry VIII. in Latin. The Spanish embassy, sent to conclude a treaty of peace with James I. in 1603, used sometimes Latin, and sometimes French (Ellis's "Orig. Letters," see series iii. 207). Sir R. Fanshawe, at his

Interpretation of treaty of peace. Another rule of interpretation particularly adapted to the case of treaties of peace is that a signatory State cannot stipulate that its subjects whom it has abandoned to the other belligerent in the course of the war should give themselves up. A treaty of peace naturally and of itself only relates to the war which it terminates; and unless there was military compulsion in the above case, it is not considered an incident of war.¹ A treaty of peace differs from other treaties in its effect. It restores the two enemies to their natural state, and necessarily involves their reconciliation and the cessation of hostilities.²

Whether prior treaties are abrogated by war. A further question of great interest, is whether the commencement of war abrogates all prior treaties between the belligerents. It seems certain that, assuming the general maxim to be that war *ipso facto* abrogates treaties between the belligerents, there is an exception in the case of treaties which expressly provide for the contingency of the breaking out of war between the contracting parties. For example, the 10th article of the Treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, stipulated that "neither the debts due from individuals of one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys, which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any court of war, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated." In the controversy which arose between Great Britain and

first audience in Madrid, delivered his message first in English, then in Spanish. At Ryswick, where this country mediated, the proceedings of the conference were opened in French, and answered in Latin. Estrades and Colbert excused themselves for speaking French on the plea that they had forgotten their Latin. At Nimeguen, the French compelled the Danes to yield the point that all diplomatic intercourse should be French on their side, Latin on the side of the Danes; the latter having pleaded either for Latin, or the right to treat in Danish. Professor Mountague Bernard concludes that "French seems to have established itself as a common language for politics and society during the latter half of the seventeenth century." This was doubtless true at the time it was written. But the inference from the mediation of President Roosevelt in May, 1905, the active part assumed by the United States as a power of the first rank, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, is that the English language is now a serious rival of the French as the language of diplomacy. The Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, constitutes the first great pacificatory settlement drawn up in the English language, apart from treaties concluded between Great Britain and the United States.

¹ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," l. iv. c. iv. s. 42.

² Ibid., l. iv. c. i. s. 8.

the United States in 1814, respecting rights of fishery conceded to the subjects of the latter State under the Treaty of Paris, 1783, it was contended, in Earl Bathurst's note, that there is no exception to the rule that treaties are put and end to by a subsequent war between the same parties. But it was also conceded that it was by no means unusual to meet recognitions and acknowledgments of title in treaties which are in the nature of perpetual obligation, such as the recognition of American independence in the Treaty of 1783.¹ From the point of view of usage, an incident which arose in the international discussion of the Spanish marriages of Louis Philippe in 1846, seems to show that an exception to the rule that war annuls treaties may be admitted in the case of recognitions and acknowledgments of title. At that occasion, M. Guizot, Lord Palmerston, and the Spanish Minister, Xavier de Isturiz, admitted the validity of the renunciation by the Duke of Orleans, for himself and his successors, of any title to the throne of Spain contained in the Treaty of Utrecht. This clearly establishes the exception, in view of the two wars between France and Spain in 1807 and 1823. If war annulled treaties, the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 was annulled in 1846, as regards France and Spain. Sir R. Phillimore, who considers that both the theory and usage of international law support the maxim that war *ipso facto* abrogates treaties between belligerents, admits the validity of the exception as regards permanent arrangements of national and international rights, like those relating to the balance of power and the renunciation by the Duke of Orleans contained in the Treaty of Utrecht.² In the debates in the House of Lords at the period of the Peace of Amiens (1803), every speaker who had any pretensions to be considered a jurist affirmed the doctrine that treaties were abrogated by the breaking out of war.³ Lord Grenville

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," 4th ed., pt. ii. c. ii. s. 272, referring to note of Earl Bathurst to Mr. J. Q. Adams, October 30, 1815; American State Papers, fol. ed. 1834, vol. iv. p. 354.

² Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pt. xii. c. ii. s. 537.

³ Debate on the Treaty of Amiens (1802), Hansard's "Parliamentary History," vol. xxxvi. (1801-3), p. 164 *et seq.*

observed that the basis of every negotiation must be either the *status quo ante bellum* or the *uti possidetis*, and further, complained that the Treaty of Amiens did not stipulate for the renewal of all or most of the treaties subsisting between the States recently belligerent. This masterly summary of the situation created by the Peace of Amiens has a certain relevance to the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Conference of Portsmouth, in the judgment of Professor F. De Martens, has created "a completely new state of things in the Far East,"¹ and therefore affords an instance of a peace on the basis of *uti possidetis*. The rationale of the principle that the basis of a treaty of peace must either be the *status quo ante bellum* or the *uti possidetis* is that in neither case does such a course involve any confession from either belligerent that he is wrong.² In the debates in the House of Commons on the Treaty of Amiens, Mr. Pitt admitted, expressly or by implication, the doctrine that treaties are abrogated by war. Sir R. Phillimore observes that till the Declaration of Paris, 1856, England in her treaties of peace was invariably silent upon questions of maritime international law. It seems, on the other hand, indubitable that the current of authority in this country has always been that treaties are extinguished by war. Lord Stowell speaks of treaties being extinguished by war.³ For this there seem to be two reasons. The tendency of wars to become naval being relatively modern, no general settlement of the questions of the law of maritime belligerency was called for till the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Sir R. Phillimore distinguished a declaration from a treaty. Again, one reason for the abstinence of Great Britain from treaties declaratory of maritime law is that war at least suspends, if it does not annul, treaties. Treaties declaring points of maritime law necessarily effect neutrals; and it would therefore involve the risk of controversy with neutrals every time war was declared. The Treaty of Portsmouth did not, however, rely

¹ *North American Review*, No. 598, November, 1905, p. 641.

² "Ea sumenda est in pactis interpretatio]quæ [partes quoad belli justitiam quam maxim aequet" (Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," I. iii. c. xx. s. 11, par. 2).

³ The *Frau Neabe*, (1801) 4 C. Rob. 64.

upon the general rule of law that prior treaties are abrogated by war. By Article XII. it is expressly declared that the treaty of commerce and navigation between the two States that existed before 1904 had been annulled by the war.

Grotius is not a direct authority on the question of the abrogation of treaties by war.¹ It may, however, be inferred that this was his opinion, as he rejects the argument by analogy to the contrary conclusion, derived from the rule of private international law, that contracts between individual subjects of belligerent States are necessarily suspended during war between those States, but are not annulled.² It is the State and not the individual who wages war.

Sir R. Phillimore considers that the view that pre-existing treaties between belligerent States revive on declaration of peace is to be partly ascribed to a misapprehension of Vattel.³ In this passage Vattel only contemplates the case where parties have agreed to adopt the *status quo ante bellum*. A specific renewal of prior treaties is necessary where the war has been waged on the account of the violation of some positive convention.⁴

Vattel observes that when a treaty of peace “mentions and confirms other treaties of prior date, these constitute a part of the new one, no less than if they were literally transcribed and included in it.”⁵

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's “International Law,” vol. iii. pt. xii. c. ii. s. 531.

² “De Jure Belli ac Pacis,” l. iii. c. xx. s. 16.

³ “Droit des Gens,” l. iv. s. 42.

⁴ An instance of a treaty which renewed and confirmed a great number of prior treaties occurs in the definitive treaty of peace, 1763, between England, France, and Spain. By Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris the following treaties were renewed and confirmed: Treaty of Westphalia, 1648; Treaty of Madrid, 1667, and 1670 (England and Spain); Treaty of Nimeguen, 1678 and 1679; Treaty of Ryswick, 1697; Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Utrecht, 1713; Treaty of Baden, 1714; Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Hague, 1717; Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, 1718; Treaty of Vienna, 1738; Definitive Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle of 1748; Treaty of Madrid (England and Spain), 1750; Treaties of 1668, 1713, 1715, and 1761 (Spain and Portugal); Treaty of 1713 (France and Portugal).

⁵ “Droit des Gens,” l. iv. c. ii. s. 23. Sir R. Phillimore does not refer to this passage of Vattel in his chapter on the effect of war upon previously existing treaties (“International Law,” vol. iii. pt. xii. c. ii. s. 529). Yet it seems to confirm his conclusion that war abrogates treaties, since it implies that prior treaties stand in need of confirmation. As far, therefore, as Vattel's authority (probably

Authoritative writers on the abrogation of prior treaties by subsequent war.

While there are no doubt utterances by high authorities to the effect that prior treaties revive on the return of peace,¹ the usage of nations as instanced in the recent and conspicuous case of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905, tends to confirm the opinion of Lord Stowell, that treaties are extinguished by war. It should be noticed, however, that there is a very recent treaty which directly contravenes the above principle. By Article I. of the Anglo-French Agreement, 1904, signed at London, France "renounces the privileges established to her advantage by Article XIII. of the Treaty of Utrecht, and confirmed or modified by subsequent provisions."

At the close of the War of American Independence, the Treaty of Utrecht was confirmed in two treaties of peace, to both of which Great Britain was a party, with France and Spain.² But the Treaty of Paris, 1783, seems the last treaty

the highest) is concerned, we are forced to conclude that there is considerable ground for doubt on the question whether treaties are capable of being tacitly revived on declaration of peace. Vattel devotes a whole chapter to the dissolution of treaties, and nowhere says that pre-existing treaties are dissolved by war and do not revive on declaration of peace unless mentioned and confirmed in the treaty of peace ("Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xiii.). It is, however, necessary to allow that several passages in this chapter induces the conclusion that in his view war abrogates existing treaties. Thus, he lays it down that the tacit renewal of a treaty is not to be presumed on slight grounds, but can only be inferred from an act of such a nature as to admit of no doubt that it was done in pursuance of a treaty. Again, there must be express consent to the renewal of a treaty. It is common ground that war suspends treaties between the parties, and therefore prior treaties clearly require renewal. The violation of one treaty does not necessarily involve the cancellation of others, but may do so at the option of the offended party. The violation of one article in a treaty may cancel the whole. This is a position common to both Grotius (I. ii. c. xv. s. 15) and Vattel ("Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xiii. s. 202). This position, it is curious to note, constitutes a complete vindication of the American position in the fishery dispute of 1814. But the able arguments of Mr. J. Q. Adams do not contain any appeal to the above-cited authorities, though, as far as authority is concerned, the reference would have been decisive in favour of the United States. Grotius very properly observes, says Vattel, that "every article of a treaty carries with it a condition, by the non-performance of which the treaty is wholly cancelled." The English contention that the abrogation of the third article of the Treaty of Paris, 1783, was consistent with the observation of the article declaring the independence of the United States, seems logically untenable.

¹ *The Society, etc. v. New Haven*, 5 Curtis's (Amer.) "Reports," p. 493; G. F. Von Marten's "Ueber die Erneuerung der Verträge in den Friedenschlüssen der Europäischen Mächte," Gottingen, 1797, s. 8; Möser, "Vermischte Abhandlungen aus dem Europ. Völkerrecht," s. 3, n. (f); Wildman, vol. i. p. 176.

² "Ann. Reg.," 1783, State Docs., 323, 333.

which renewed the Treaty of Utrecht; which was not renewed either at the Peace of Amiens, 1802, or by the Treaty of Vienna, 1815. Assuming, therefore, that treaties are annulled by war, the Treaty of Utrecht must have been annulled for nearly a century.¹ The recognition of the Treaty of Utrecht, involved by the declaration of Article I. of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, constitutes an undoubted vindication of those writers who contend, like Von Martens, that treaties are merely suspended by war. The Supreme Court of the United States has equally held that it may be against every principle of just interpretation to hold that a treaty is extinguished by war.²

After overtures by one of the belligerents, or a tender and acceptance of neutral offices, the normal sequence of events involves the appointment of plenipotentiaries who sign the treaty, and its subsequent ratification by the Sovereigns of the belligerents. It is not usual to publish the treaty even to subjects till the ratifications have been exchanged. Each of these stages possesses material significance, though less than formerly, for modern diplomacy has removed such unnecessary ceremonial as retarded negotiation at Osnabrück and Münster at the close of the Thirty Years' War and at the Peace of Ryswick.³ The title of plenipotentiary dates from about the time of Vattel, though an allusion is made to it by a later writer as being quite modern. It was devised in order to avoid the disputes which arose with respect to ceremonial and precedence between ambassadors.⁴ At the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697, precedence was considered to depend upon the number of steps backwards or forwards made by an ambassador.

At the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, the rule observed as to precedence of signatures was that, in the copies of the treaty intended for each power, that power appeared first in order, the others following alphabetically, according to the names

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1802, State Docs., 608; "Ann. Reg." 1814, State Docs., 408; "Ann. Reg." 1815, State Docs., 410.

² *Society, etc. v. New Haven* (1823), 5 Curtis, Rep. 493, per Washington, J.

³ Cf. Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture i. p. 20; and Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 516, and p. 644.

⁴ G. F. Marten's "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. p. 344.

of each country. Thus, in her own copy, Germany was placed first, and second in all the others, the word "Allemagne" taking precedence. England, appearing as "Grande-Bretagne," necessarily came fourth, except in her own copy, where she was first. Six copies of the treaty, written on paper, in addition to the bound one, were to be sent to each power for exchange after ratification. Seven copies of the Treaty, printed on parchment and bound in red morocco leather,¹ were then placed upon the table and signed by the plenipotentiaries, their seals having been previously affixed by the secretaries.² The very recent Treaty of Algeciras was "done in one sole copy," which was deposited in the archives of the Spanish Government.³ Certified copies were to be handed by diplomatic channels to the signatory powers.

Plenipotentiaries and
envoys extraordinary at
Portsmouth Conference,
August—September, 1905.

In the introduction of the Treaty of Portsmouth^{notwithstanding} the two principal negotiators, Count Witte or Baron Komura, was specifically described as plenipotentiary, but a detailed notice was given of the honours each had respectively gained. M. Takahira was described, on the other hand, as "Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;" and Baron Rosen as "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary."⁴ G. F. Martens observes that ministers (plenipotentiaries) exchange their full powers, or else they put them into the hands of the mediator. This is called the verification of full powers. At the Treaty of Westphalia the verification of full powers occupied seven months. The exchange of full powers (*pleins-pouvoirs*) at a modern treaty occupies only one sitting. The process was as expeditious at the Portsmouth Peace Conference of 1905 as it was at the Treaty of Paris, 1856.⁴ The proceedings at Portsmouth have been designated as a Conference by Professor F. De Martens in *The North American Review*, November, 1905, p. 641. Professor Mountague Bernard observes of the word "Conference" that "it is applicable to any meeting for discussion, but also that it has during the last thirty or

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1878, p. 84.

² Cf. text of Treaty in *Times*, April 9, 1906, Article 123.

³ Cf. *Times*, October 17, 1905.

⁴ Cf. *Times*, August 11, 1905; and Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture i., p. 20.

forty years been used, probably as more flexible and unostentatious, to designate meetings which would formerly have been called "Congresses." The latter term will probably be reserved in future, if employed at all, for assemblages extraordinarily numerous, or of extraordinary importance."¹ These sentences anticipated the language of diplomacy as regards the great pacificatory settlement at Berlin in 1878. It is to a certain extent consistent with Professor Mountague Bernard's construction of the term "Conference" that it should have been applied to the proceedings at Portsmouth. Though those negotiations were of extraordinary importance, they did not involve the assemblage of the plenipotentiaries of a great number of States. But the highly important negotiations at Algeciras, where the plenipotentiaries of the thirteen States attended, suggest that the term "Conference" has taken the place of "Congress." While the Portsmouth Conference sat for only three weeks, the Algeciras Conference lasted from January 6 to April 7, 1906.² Vattel defines "Congresses" as "assemblies of plenipotentiaries appointed to find out means of conciliation, and to discuss and adjust the reciprocal pretensions of the contending parties."³ Vattel does not appear to distinguish in any essential respect between a conference and a congress. G. F. Von Martens considers a conference merely a sitting of a congress.⁴

It has been observed of Algeciras Conference that "the abdication by Morocco of the practical exercise of sovereignty in her eight principal seaports entails several curious consequences. Can these ports be the subject of hostile action directed against Morocco? Who will support the police against an insurrection or a raid? What law will the police enforce, and who will be its judicial interpreters? An endless series of difficulties may arise from the anomalous situation which is the outcome of the Algeciras debates. Harmonious co-operation can hardly be expected from the

¹ "Lectures on Diplomacy," i., 28.

² Cf. the *Times*, April 9, 1906, for the General Act of the Algeciras Conference.

³ "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xviii. s. 330.

⁴ "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. s. 3, p. 344.

multiple control to be exercised by the Conference Powers over the finance of Morocco. Its complicated provisions seem designed to promote uncertainty and conflict. An important clause, however, is that by which Morocco undertakes to allow aliens to purchase land and buildings.”¹

Whether ratification is necessary to the validity of a treaty.

The question whether ratification is necessary to the validity of a treaty has been long the subject of a controversy rather theoretical than practical. Bynkershoek discusses the question whether a sovereign is bound to ratify the act of a plenipotentiary who has exceeded his secret instructions in signing a treaty, but has done so in accordance with his public full powers, the hypothesis being that the secret instructions contradict the general letter of credence. He seems, however, to consider that the question is of little practical importance. According to Bynkershoek, the usage of nations, at the time when he wrote, required a ratification by the sovereign to give validity to treaties concluded by his minister, in every instance, except in the very rare case where the entire instructions were contained in the full power.² According to Grotius, the sovereign is bound by the acts of his ambassador, within the limits of his patent power, although the latter may have transcended or violated his secret instructions.³ To inquire whether a sovereign is bound to ratify a treaty signed by a plenipotentiary, and whether ratification is necessary to the validity of a treaty, is clearly only to put the same question in two different ways. Pufendorf raises the question—Whether the agent shall oblige his principal, if he exceed his private and secret orders, yet so as to keep within his open commission? The great Swedish authority on international law concludes: “I am still tied to perform to the third person what was then granted in my name. For otherwise there could be no manner of safety in treating by commissioners, it being ever to be feared lest their secret directions should differ from their open powers; neither could there be a more specious pretence to be made

¹ Cf. *Law Magazine and Review*, May, 1906, p. 344. This last provision is not completely satisfactory, in view of the sequence of events from which the Japanese house-tax case arose.

² Bynkershoek, “*Quæst. Jur. Pub.*,” l. ii. c. vii.

³ Grotius, “*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*,” lib. ii. c. xi. s. 12.

use of to overthrow all affairs transacted by mediation, and to deceive and abuse men with vain treaties.”¹

This opinion of the earlier public jurists, founded upon the analogies of the Roman law respecting the contract of mandate or commission, has been contested by more recent writers. The position of Grotius seems susceptible of elucidation on historical grounds, since the “*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*” was published more than twenty years before the Peace of Westphalia, 1648—the first great era in the diplomatic history of Europe, which was chosen as a point of departure by Koch in his “*Histoire de Traité’s de Paix*,” and by Wheaton in his “*Histoire des Progrès du Droit des Gens*.² Recent historical research has tended to induce doubts whether the analogy drawn by the earlier public jurists between a public treaty between two States and the Roman law contract of mandate or commission can be maintained, since Justinian is known to have ratified treaties. Both the preliminaries and the definitive treaty, concluded, in 561 A.D., by the Roman Emperor Justinian, with Chosroes, King of Persia, were not merely signed by the respective plenipotentiaries, but subsequently ratified by the two monarchs, and the ratifications formerly exchanged.³ As the age of Justinian was not an age of innovation, it has been inferred from this historical fact that at the date of the treaty of 561 A.D., ratification must have been deemed necessary by the general usage of nations to give validity to treaties concluded under full powers.⁴

Vattel observes: “Sovereigns treat with each other through the medium of agents or proxies who are invested with sufficient powers for the purpose; and are commonly called plenipotentiaries. To their office we may apply all the rules of natural law which respect things done by commission. The rights of proxy are determined by the instructions that are given him: he must not deviate from them; but every

¹ *Vide* “*Mémoires touchant les Ambassadeurs*,” pp. 582, 583, 588, referred by Pufendorf, “*De Jure Naturæ et Gent.*,” I. iii. c. ix. s. 2.

² Cf. Professor Mountague Bernard’s “*Lectures on Diplomacy*,” lecture i. p. 5; and Wheaton’s “*International Law*,” pt. iii. c. ii. s. 276.

³ Barbeyrac, “*Histoire des Anciens Traité’s*,” partie ii. p. 295.

⁴ Wurm, “*Die Ratification von Staatsverträgen*, Deutsche Viertdjahsschrift,” nr. 20.

promise which he makes in the terms of his commission, and within the extent of his powers, is binding on his constituent."

"At present, in order to avoid all danger and difficulty, princes reserve to themselves the power of ratifying what has been concluded upon in the name of their ministers. The plenipotentiary commission is but a *procuration cum libera*. If this commission were to have its full effect, they could not be too circumspect in giving it. But as princes cannot otherwise than by force of arms be compelled to fulfil their engagements, it is customary to place no confidence in their treaties till they have agreed to and ratified them. Thus, as every agreement made by the minister remains invalid till sanctioned by the prince's ratification, there is less danger in vesting him with unlimited powers. But before a prince can honourably refuse to ratify a compact made in virtue of such plenipotentiary commission, he should be able to allege strong and substantial reasons, and, in particular, to prove that his minister has deviated from his instructions."¹

In *The Eliza Anne*, (1813) 1 Dods. 244, 248-9, Lord Stowell held that a treaty of peace is binding on the contracting States from the date of exchange of ratifications, and not from the date of the signature of the treaty; and therefore that enemy vessels seized in the interval were good prize. In *The Eliza Anne*, *supra*, the validity of a treaty of peace between Sweden and Great Britain was in question. The treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries on July 18, 1813, and was ratified by the Prince Regent of Great Britain on August 4th, and by the King of Sweden on the 17th of the same month. The vessels were American, and therefore, at the time, enemy vessels. They were seized by a British ship of war in Hanoe Bay on August 11, 1812.

Lord Stowell observed that "the question, therefore, comes to this: whether a ratification is or is not necessary to give effect and validity to a treaty signed by plenipotentiaries. Upon abstract principles we know that, either in public or private transactions, the acts of those who are vested with a plenary power are binding upon the principal. But, as this

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xii. s. 156.

rule was attended with inconvenience in many cases, the later usage of States has been to require ratification, although the treaty may have been signed by plenipotentiaries. According to the practice now prevailing, a subsequent ratification is essentially necessary; and a strong confirmation of the truth of this position is, that there is hardly a modern treaty in which it is not expressly so stipulated; and, therefore, it is now to be presumed that the powers of plenipotentiaries are limited by the condition of a subsequent ratification. The ratification may be a form, but it is an essential form; for the instrument, in point of legal efficacy, is imperfect without it. I need not add, that a ratification by one power alone is insufficient; that, if necessary at all, it must be mutual; and that the treaty is incomplete till it has been reciprocally ratified." The decision in this case is all the more significant as there were certain words in the treaty of 1813 between Great Britain and Sweden from which it might be inferred that ratification was intended to have a retroactive effect, so as to render invalid acts of war done in the interval between signature and ratification. A previous decision of Lord Stowell contains a dictum that "in matters of treaty, the act of ratification may be said to operate with retrospective effect, to confirm the terms of the definitive treaty from the date of the preliminary articles."¹ It therefore becomes rather difficult to understand the ruling of Lord Stowell in the later case. If ratification has a retrospective effect so complete as to confirm the definitive treaty from the date of the preliminary articles, *a fortiori* ratification ought to have a retroactive effect as regards acts of war done in the much shorter interval between the signature of the definitive treaty of peace and its ratification by both belligerents. At the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, there was an interval of six years between the date of the signature of the preliminary articles of peace and the signature of the definitive treaty. In the case of the war of the Spanish succession, two years ago elapsed between the date of the signature of the preliminaries of peace and that of the definitive treaty of Utrecht. In the case of the Franco-German war,

¹ The *Elzebe*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 174, 190.

nearly three months elapsed between the two dates. There is, no doubt, a tendency for the interval between preliminaries of peace and the definitive treaty to become shorter, but this was not so marked in Lord Stowell's time as it is now. In the negotiations which led up to the Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia there were no preliminary articles of peace signed. In any case, Lord Stowell clearly maintained the view that ratification is the point from which the treaty must take effect.

In modern times, Sir R. Phillimore¹ and Klüber² have reverted to the opinion of Grotius and Wicquefort that ratification of a treaty is not necessary.

Under the convention of July 15, 1840, between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, the treaty was not only held binding from the date of its signature by plenipotentiaries, but its execution was actually commenced before the date assigned for the exchange of ratifications. But in this case mutual ratification was dispensed with under secret instructions.³

Professor Mountague Bernard, writing of the rule that the full force of a treaty dates only from the exchange of ratifications, observes: "It is a settled rule, with the advantage, which a settled rule possesses, of being a thing ascertained and indisputable. It is an extra precaution, an artificial safeguard, against improvident or ill-considered engagements, exactly analogous to those rules of private law which require for certain private contracts a specified form of words, a notarial act, a payment of earnest, or a signature. That it is salutary and convenient, is an opinion—sound, I have no doubt, but which may be disputed like any other opinion; that it is a settled rule is a fact which may be proved by evidence like any other fact."⁴

If the clear and precise view of Bynkershoek is adopted, that the usage of nations is the law of nations, it would be

¹ "International Law," vol. ii. s. 52, p. 65.

² "Droit des Gens," Moderne de l'Europe, s. 142.

³ Wheaton's "International Law," pt. iii. c. ii. s. 264.

⁴ Four Lectures on Diplomacy, No. IV. p. 173.

difficult to deny that mutual ratification is essential to give full force to a treaty. The great advance historical research has made in modern times invalidates Vattel's suggestion that the necessity of mutual ratification by the sovereign power was first appreciated in 1758. Finally, the treaty of Portsmouth has conformed to invariable usage in this respect.¹ By Article XIV. of the treaty it is provided : "The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such ratification shall, with as little delay as possible, and in any case not later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the Treaty, be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister in Tokio, and the Ambassador of the United States in St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full force, The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place in Washington as soon as possible."

It is noteworthy that this article of the Treaty of Portsmouth bears great resemblance to the eleventh article of the Treaty of Ghent, concluded at the termination of the war between Great Britain and the United States in 1814.² The war of 1812-4 between the United States and this country affords a striking analogy to the Russo-Japanese War in respect of the circumstance that belligerent operations were proceeding while peace negotiations were being conducted at a spot on neutral territory.

In an article written immediately after the Peace of Portsmouth, Professor F. De Martens observed : "If one runs over the history of these diplomatic negotiations whose purpose it was to conclude a peace between two warring nations, it will be found that almost never have belligerent governments begun negotiations until military operations were first suspended.

¹ The essential dates in this case are, signature of treaty, September 5; ratification, September 21; exchange of ratifications, October 17, 1905.

² The Treaty of Ghent was signed December 24, 1814, and the ratifications were exchanged February 18, 1815. The eleventh article runs: "This treaty when the same shall have been ratified on both sides without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this date, or sooner if practicable."

It might even be proclaimed as a recognized principle of international law that a suspension of arms or an armistice should always precede peace negotiations. Thus, if we examine the peace treaties since the beginning of the last century, we find that a truce was invariably declared before the diplomats came together.¹

Whether conclusion of an armistice always precedes negotiation.

There are, however, several conspicuous exceptions to what Professor F. De Martens contends is a rule of international law. At the last phase of the Thirty Years' War, "the negotiations (at Münster and Osnabrück) fluctuated from day to day with the vicissitudes of the war,"² and this condition of affairs continued for four years as far as the definitive treaty is concerned, and for twelve from the date of the mediation of Pope Urban VI.³ The Austrians and Dutch fought for eighteen months after signature of the preliminaries of peace leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. The English commander, Ormonde, acting under the instructions of Bolingbroke, concluded an armistice.⁴ Again, Russia, Austria, France, Sweden, and Poland conducted negotiations for peace at Augsburg during the greater part of a year, in 1761, with Great Britain and Prussia, without concluding an armistice.⁵ These negotiations proved entirely abortive. Finally, the statement of Professor F. De Martens that there is no single instance in the history of the last century where belligerents were negotiating to conclude peace without first making an armistice, is decisively refuted by the sequence of events leading up to the Treaty of Ghent. In that case, belligerent operations were being conducted, not merely up to the date of the signature of the treaty, but to within a few days of the date of exchange of ratifications. Fort Mobile capitulated to Admiral Cochrane on February 11, 1815, and President Madison proclaimed peace on February 18; the treaty having been signed on December 24, 1814. In this war, as in the

¹ *North American Review*, No. 598, November, 1905; Article: The Portsmouth Peace Conference, p. 643.

² Bougeant, ii. 98.

³ Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture i., p. 16.

⁴ Lecky's "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," vol. i. c. i. p. 107.

⁵ "Ann. Reg." 1761, p. 3.

Russo-Japanese War, we find an instance of a peace being concluded in a town of inconsiderable size and character on neutral territory.¹ It is curious, further, to recall that Russia is incidentally connected with the war of 1812-4, since her mediation was sought by the United States at the commencement of 1814. Lord Castlereagh, however, rejected the proposed mediation on behalf of Great Britain.

Without doubt, to use the language of Professor Mountague Bernard, the first necessary step is the conclusion of an armistice. At Paris, in 1856, this convenient and humane arrangement was made.²

In 1814, when the Allied Powers had entered France and had subdued the last embers of Napoleon's resistance, a convention for the suspension of hostilities was concluded on April 17, 1814. The Treaty of Paris was signed on May 30; and the ratifications were exchanged and peace proclaimed in June. Next year, when the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher arrived before Paris after Waterloo, they concluded a military convention with Prince Eckmuhl at St. Cloud on July 3, conditional on ratification. The definitive Treaty of Paris was not signed till November 20, 1815. In the case of the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, no armistice seems to have been concluded; the treaty having expressly provided that its full force should operate only on exchange of ratifications. In the case of the Treaty of Ghent, therefore, the treaty operated of itself, without any armistice being invoked. Sir R. Phillimore considers that unless a particular day is specified, all hostilities must cease on ratification.³ While an armistice ought always to precede negotiation, where a valid treaty of peace is concluded, peace cannot possibly be delayed after ratifications have been exchanged. These remarks serve to show that while the armistice concluded in 1905 by the commanders of the armies in Manchuria a few days after the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth was one, the commencement of which

¹ Cf. Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pt. xii. p. 644.

² "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture i., p. 21.

³ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 517. De Rayneval observes, "Au surplus les engagements datent communément du jour de l'échange de ratifications, à moins d'une stipulation contraire" (ii. p. 113).

was unduly postponed, it was by no means supererogatory. If an armistice had not been concluded, the vast armies of the belligerents would have been contending, as was the case in the Anglo-American War of 1812-15, up to the date of the exchange of ratifications, more than a month later. Nothing was said about an armistice in the Treaty of Portsmouth itself.¹

¹ The arrangement of the armistice between the armies of Field-Marshal Oyama and General Linievitch in Manchuria was made in the following way: The first overtures came from the Japanese. General Fukushima was appointed the Japanese plenipotentiary, and met the Russian outposts with a parlementaire, a white flag, and an escort of fifty soldiers. A letter from Field-Marshal Oyama was then handed to Russian officers at Godsiadan. The next day a reply came, and the proposals of the Japanese for an armistice were accepted. Its terms were agreed upon after a lengthy discussion at a point midway between the hostile lines, called Sha-ho-tsu, about a rifle-range from either encampment. The protocol of the armistice was signed on September 13. It provided that hostilities should be discontinued throughout Manchuria. A neutral zone of four kilometres in width was established, which was not to be entered by either army. All the army corps were notified that the armistice was to become effective not later than noon on September 16. Special naval envoys were to meet in a bay near Vladivostock, one ship of each nation conveying them, to establish an armistice and to fix a neutral zone on sea. An armistice was to be concluded on the Tumen river, on the borders of Korea, by the local commanders on the spot. The Russian plenipotentiary was Major-General Oranovsky, Quartermaster-General of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, General Linievitch. Consistently with the Japanese conduct throughout the war, General Fukushima reserved a conspicuous place at his conference with Major-General Oranovsky for Professors of International Law, Ariga and Sozzi (Cf. *Times*, September 6, 11, 14, etc., 1905). Vattel observes that it is essential to stop hostilities where there is any delay in the publication of peace; which he observes may easily be done by means of the generals who direct the operations, or by proclaiming an armistice at the head of the armies ("Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. iii. s. 25). One of the most sacred laws of war is that which ensures perfect security to persons who bring messages or proposals from an enemy (*Ibid., supra*, c. vii. s. 86). Not only the plenipotentiaries, but even trumpeters and drummers, when messengers of proposals of peace are sacred and inviolable. Vattel, who, as Sir H. S. Maine observes, is "a severe judge of the standard of gentleness proper to be followed in war" (Maine's "Int. Law," lect. i., p. 24), reserves that crushing censure he occasionally exhibits for Alva's execution of a trumpeter belonging to the Prince of Orange. Alva excused himself on the ground that it was a civil war; but it appears that on another occasion, when the Spanish armies were also contending against belligerents, whom they accounted rebels, Alva caused the governor of Cascais to be hanged for having given orders to fire on a trumpeter sent to demand the surrender of a town ("Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. vii. s. 88, referring to Wicquefort, bk. i.). It is satisfactory to record that the Russo-Japanese War, a contest involving, in the language of Professor F. De Martens, gigantic operations and battles almost unexampled as regards the number of troops engaged and the intensity of artillery fire, was concluded by an armistice marked by the most correct and studious observance of military law.

We may at once admit that most modern instances tend to vindicate Professor F. De Marten's conclusions on the correct sequence of peace arrangements. At the Conference of London in May, 1864, when Great Britain sought unsuccessfully to mediate between Denmark and Austria and Prussia, the belligerents agreed to a suspension of hostilities from May 12 to June 12, thus reversing the process adopted at the Conference at Augsburg in 1761.¹

In 1859, in the midst of the triumphant successes of the French arms, after Solferino, the Emperors of France and Austria met at Villafranca, and agreed upon an armistice. In pursuance of this an armistice was signed on July 8 at Villafranca by Marshal Vaillant on the part of France and Baron Hess on the part of Austria, which was to last until August 15. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Villafranca on July 11, and the definitive treaty of peace at Zurich on November 11, 1859.²

Professor F. De Martens observes that, in 1866, Austria and Prussia agreed to put an end to the war that had broken out between them in Bohemia. Fighting was accordingly stopped while the pourparlers were in operation at Nikolsburg. When, in February, 1871, Thiers and Jules Favre went to Ferrières to consult with Count Bismarck on the prospects of peace negotiations, an armistice was the preliminary condition for the meeting of the negotiators, who later drew up the preliminary treaty of peace at Versailles.³

The events which led up to the termination of the Boer war in 1902 by the surrender at Vereeniging did not include an armistice, though the terms of the surrender occupied more than two months' negotiation, and the members of the Transvaal Government applied for an armistice. The only understanding was that the British columns should not interfere with the meetings of the delegates. An armistice of one day was granted to enable representative Boers to meet the members of the Government of the late South African Republics on May 15.

¹ Cf. "Ann. Reg." 1864, p. 227.

² Ibid., 1859, pp. 250, 254.

³ Article: "Portsmouth Peace Conference," by Professor F. De Martens, in *North American Review*, No. 588, November, 1905, pp. 643, 644.

The convention of Vereeniging was signed on May 31, 1902, by Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner and ten Boer delegates. Throughout that month there were frequent conflicts between the British forces and Delarey's commando.¹ It may be recalled that, although in the negotiations the "nœud de la paix" was the abrogation of the independence of the South African Republics, an English Foreign Secretary once contended, in a famous State document, that when a State declares war against another, that very act involves the recognition of the independence of the latter by the State declaring war.² Further, whatever questions may arise from the suzerainty of this country over the former Transvaal Republic, it is beyond question that it was recognized as a belligerent by the British Government, as much as the Orange Free State, which was, of course, independent. It becomes necessary, therefore, to allow that the South African War furnishes an instance of what Professor F. De Martens contended has not occurred once in the last century, namely, the simultaneous conduct of belligerent operations and peace negotiations.

Professor F. De Martens considers that "the same rule" of concluding an armistice before the diplomats came together was observed by Russia and Turkey in 1878. But it is surely only in a most qualified manner that this statement can be accepted. The Russian Government rejected the overtures for an armistice to be founded on preliminary conditions of peace made by Turkey on January 14, 1878. Though Russia demanded separate peace arrangements, she did not entirely reject the Turkish overtures, which, indeed, she formally accepted a fortnight later. But, in this interval, there was no armistice, and while the Turkish plenipotentiaries were negotiating with the Grand Duke Nicholas at Kezanlik, General Gourko drove Suleiman Pasha over the Despoto Dagh and down to Kavola. It was not till after Russian arms had obtained another success that the armistice and preliminaries of peace were signed at Adrianople, January 31, 1878.³

¹ "Ann. Reg.," 1902, p. 405.

² Wheaton's "International Law," pt. iii. c. ii. s. 272, p. 384.

³ "Ann. Reg.," 1878, pp. 325, 326.

The theory of international law that an armistice must be concluded before commencing negotiations has not received universal assent. Vattel considers that all hostilities must cease when the treaty of peace becomes obligatory.¹ In a subsequent passage he alludes to the necessity of proclaiming an armistice, but only when the proclamation of peace is deferred, as was the case in the war of 1735 between Austria and France. In that war an armistice was proclaimed during the interval between signature of the treaty and the exchange of ratifications, as at the Treaty of Portsmouth.² But in another passage Vattel speaks of a treaty of peace being concluded "when the belligerents have agreed to lay down their arms."³ Professor Mountague Bernard's view has been cited that the first step is the conclusion of an armistice,⁴ and Professor F. De Martens has recently observed that "it might even be proclaimed as a recognized principle of international law that a suspension of arms or an armistice should always precede peace negotiations."⁵ But it is expressly provided by the Hague Convention that unless there be an agreement to the contrary, "if mediation occurs after the commencement of hostilities, it causes no interruption to the military operations in progress."⁶ As the mediation of President Roosevelt was based on the Hague Convention,⁷ its text seems to furnish a complete explanation of the sequence of events lending up to the recent peace in the Far East.

It may be admitted that, with the exception of the South African War of 1899–1902, modern instances, as well as the majority of those drawn from the last century, tend to show the existence, by usage, at any rate, of some such rule as that indicated by Professor F. De Martens.

The Chino-Japanese War of 1894–5 terminated by Chinese

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. iii. s. 24.

² Ibid., I. iv. c. iii. s. 25.

³ Ibid., I. iv. c. ii. s. 9.

⁴ "Lectures on Diplomacy," No. 1, p. 21.

⁵ *North American Review*, November, 1905, p. 643.

⁶ Cf. Article 7 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague, July 29, 1899; given extenso in Wheaton's "International Law," Appendix F, p. 798.

⁷ Title II., "On Good Offices and Mediation."

overtures for peace, and the despatch of the Viceroy, Li Hung Chang, with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. On the latter's arrival at Shimonoseki, March 19, 1905, the Mikado ordered an armistice, applying only to Fung-thien, Pe-chi-li, and Shan-tung; arrested the movement of troops, and prohibited the transport of contraband of war by sea. The treaty of peace was signed on April 16.¹ It is difficult at this date, after the seizure of Port Arthur by Russia in 1898, and the great siege of 1904-5, by which the stronghold was finally lost to that power, not to recall the fact that by the supplementary treaty of November 3, it was decided that the Liao-Tung Peninsula should not be occupied by Russia, France, or Germany, or surrendered to any other power.²

In 1898, Spain appealed to France to mediate, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at Washington, received instructions to become the intermediary of an armistice. This was concluded, and preliminaries of peace adopted, on August 12. But in this case, as in 1866, belligerent operations actually took place when the armistice came into operation, as Manila only surrendered to Admiral Dewey after the bombardment of August 13. It may be recalled that during the armistice of January 29, which terminated the Franco-Prussian War, Belfort capitulated to the Prussians on February 16, 1871. The history of the last century, with the significant exceptions mentioned, has on the whole tended to reconcile both theory and usage on the point that when overtures of peace are entered upon, the first step is the conclusion of an armistice.

Professor F. De Martens, in an interesting passage in an article already referred to, observed that if either of the belligerents had won a decisive battle while the Portsmouth Conference was proceeding, that fact would inevitably have influenced the course of the negotiations. But for the physical and climatic conditions prevalent in Manchuria, he considers it inevitable that such an action would have occurred. This view suggests that a belligerent, especially a defeated belligerent, may have a motive for negotiating for peace without

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1895, 343.

² Ibid., 1895, 345.

concluding an armistice. Peace, and the conditions of peace, may be left to be determined by a decisive battle. This is a question discussed by Pufendorf¹ with great acumen and learning. He considers that such a course is clearly justified by the external law of nations, and that it has the merit of preventing a greater effusion of blood, and of reducing the miseries and calamities of war. To risk the issue of a campaign on a single decisive battle, Pufendorf considers, is generally bad strategy for a beaten party, which can hope more from prolonging war by guerilla tactics and avoiding stricken fields than by joining decisive issue. But when the prospects of a guerilla war are unfavourable, when the Commonwealth has no hopes of making a good end of a war, Pufendorf considers that a worsted belligerent may do well to put the issue of an entire campaign to the test of a single decisive contest. Victory, Pufendorf considers, is determined by losses when equal numbers contest on each side. Neither the plunder of the field, the burying of the slain, the lodging upon the place of action, the offering battle a second time, nor even the flight of the enemy, are proofs of victory.² The validity of a treaty of peace, as a public real treaty, requires "nothing more than a sufficient power in the contracting parties, and their mutual consent sufficiently declared."³

Vattel defines a treaty of peace as follows: "When the

Vattel's definition of a treaty of peace.

¹ "De Jure Nat. et Gent.," I. viii. c. viii. s. 5.

² Ibid. The Russo-Japanese War illustrates these observations of Pufendorf. The vast armies in Manchuria were doubtless not numerically equal, and, under modern conditions, the set combats between picked bands, such as took place in the dispute between the Lacedæmonians and Argives, from which Pufendorf derived his conclusions, cannot be reproduced. But nothing can be more noticeable than the increasing scale of the Russian losses as compared with those of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. At Liao-Yang, pronounced by the *Times* to be as great a conflict as Wagram or Leipzig, as Koniggrätz or Gravelot, the Japanese losses seem to have exceeded the Russian, the former being estimated at twenty, the latter at ten thousand (*Times*, September 6, 1904). But in the two far more terrible battles that followed, the Japanese losses formed a mere fraction of the Russian. At the battle of the Shaho, fought in the middle of October, the Japanese losses were twelve or thirteen thousand, as against sixty thousand casualties in the Russian army. Finally, at Mukden, fought February and March, 1905, the official statement of the Japanese losses was 41,222, to 116,500 Russian (*Times*, March 13, 1905).

³ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xii. s. 157.

belligerent powers have agreed to lay down their arms, the agreement or contract in which they stipulate the conditions of peace, and regulate the manner in which it is to be restored and supported, is called the treaty of peace.”¹ The same power which has the right of making war, of determining on it, of declaring it, and of directing its operations, has naturally that of making and concluding the treaty of peace. But this conclusion, Vattel observes, is subject to many limitations. The power of a prince to grant or accept whatever conditions of peace he pleases may be limited by fundamental laws. Thus, Francis the First, King of France, had the absolute disposal of war and peace; yet the assembly of Cognac declared that he had no authority to alienate any part of the kingdom by a treaty of peace. When the states-general fell into desuetude in 1614, the king became the sole organ of the State with respect to the power of dismembering the kingdom. The kings of England are authorized to conclude treaties of peace and alliance; but they cannot, by those treaties, alienate any of the possessions of the Crown without the consent of Parliament. Neither can they, without the concurrence of that body, raise any money in the kingdom; wherefore, whenever they conclude any subsidiary treaty, it is their constant rule to lay it before Parliament, in order that they may be certain of the concurrence of that assembly to enable them to make good their engagements. These observations of Vattel admit of an illustration in very recent times. The cession of Heligoland in August, 1890, was made by treaty “subject to the consent of the British Parliament,”²

In Vattel’s day, the princes and free cities of Germany, though dependent on the emperor and the empire, had the right of forming alliances with foreign powers. The constitutions of the empire gave them, in this as in many other respects, the rights of sovereignty.³ But such alliances might not be directed against the security of the Confederation, or the individual States of which it was composed. No State could make war upon another member of the Union, but all the

¹ “Droit des Gens,” I. iv. c. ii. s. 9.

² “Ann. Reg.” 1890, 233.

³ “Droit des Gens,” I. ii. c. xii. s. 154.

States were bound to submit their 'differences to the decision of the Diet. When war was declared by the Confederation, no State could negotiate separately with the enemy, nor conclude peace or an armistice, without the consent of the rest.¹ The Germanic Confederation previous to the war of 1866 was what German public jurists call a "Staatenbund," even the external sovereignty of the several States composing the Germanic Confederation remaining unimpaired. This seems to have virtually remained true of the period after 1866, when the North German Confederation replaced the Germanic Confederation. But, since 1871, Germany has become a composite State.² The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor, and who represents the empire internationally, declares war, makes peace, enters into treaties, and receives ambassadors. The consent of the Council is necessary for declaring war, unless the territory of the empire is actually attacked. The Imperial Diet is elected by universal and direct election, and its proceedings are public. The army and navy of the whole empire are single forces under the command of the emperor.³

In Vattel's day (1758), some cities of Switzerland, though subject to a prince, made alliances with the cantons; the permission or toleration of the sovereign gave birth to such treaties, and long custom established the right to contract them. The Swiss Constitution remained a confederacy, but has undergone successive changes in 1815, 1830, 1848, and 1874. The effect of these has been to render Switzerland a composite State.⁴ Since 1815, the power of making war and of concluding treaties of peace with foreign States has been exclusively vested in the Federal Diet.⁵

In the United States the treaty-making power is vested exclusively in the Senate. The American Constitution vests

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," pt. i. c. ii. s. 47.

² *Bundestaat*, or supreme Federal Government.

³ Wheaton's "International Law," pt. i. c. ii. s. 51, pp. 76, 77, referring to the Constitution of the German Empire, Articles ii., v., vi., xi., xx., xxii., liii., lxiii.

⁴ *Bundestaat*.

⁵ "Wheaton's "International Law," pt. i. c. ii. s. 59 (a), p. 85.

the power of declaring war in the two houses of Congress, with the assent of the President. By the forms of the Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of making treaties of peace, which, when ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate, become the supreme law of the land, and have the effect of repealing the declaration of war and all other laws of Congress, and of the several States which stand in the way of their stipulations. But the Congress may at any time compel the President to make peace, by refusing the means of carrying on war. In the United Kingdom, a treaty has no effect on private rights; if the Crown concludes a treaty which is intended to modify, or divest private rights, an Act of Parliament must be obtained to give it that operation.¹

A treaty of peace cannot be an equal treaty, but must be a compromise.

Treaties of peace differ materially from all other treaties, in that they cannot be treaties which render the condition of the parties equal. Any other treaty except a treaty of peace may, Vattel, observes, be an equal treaty.² A treaty of peace is necessarily "a contract of fortune,"³ but it would be impossible ever to make peace so that each party should receive precisely everything to which he has a just title. Therefore a treaty of peace can be no more than a compromise.⁴ The Treaty of Portsmouth shows the great weight of this conclusion of Vattel. According to Professor F. De Martens, the great obstacles to the conclusion of peace were the two Japanese demands that Russia should both cede Sakhalin and pay a war indemnity. These two conditions Russia categorically rejected, and the failure of the Conference seemed inevitable. President Roosevelt, basing his action on the principles of the Hague Convention, intervened, and it is to his sagacity in detecting the elements of a true compromise in such a diplomatic *impasse* that the Portsmouth Conference owes its success. At his suggestion, as mediator, not as arbitrator, Japan desisted from her claim to an indemnity, and Russia ceded the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan. A

¹ The *Law Quarterly Review*, January, 1906, p. 15. Article: "Is International Law a Part of the Law of England?" By J. Westlake.

² "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xii. s. 172.

³ Pufendorf, "De Jure Nat. et Gent.," bk. viii. c. i. s. 8.

⁴ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. ii. s. 18.

previous suggestion of President Roosevelt, that a commission, composed of neutrals, should fix the amount of the sum that Russia should pay to Japan, was rejected by the former power; according to Professor De Martens, because of its "evidently impracticable nature," although the decision of the commission was not to be binding. Mediation has always been distinguished from arbitration,¹ but as the sum to be designated by the commission suggested by President Roosevelt was subject to Russia's right to reject, it was not a case of a reference to arbitration strictly so called. Upon the subject of indemnity, Professor Mountague Bernard observes: "Indemnity or satisfaction there may be none, if the conqueror's moderation or his prudence dissuade him from demanding any, or if the balance of strength has been too nearly equal even to render such a demand practicable."² The basis on which a war indemnity is to be estimated, is the loss and expense incurred in war by the party demanding; it ought not to take the form of penalty.³ Vattel insists that it is impossible to determine the nature and to precisely regulate the degree of the penalty that may be exacted from the author of an unjust war, however much strict justice might demand it.⁴ But it is impossible to deny that an indemnity or satisfaction exacted by the stronger belligerent for the injury sustained and for the cost of the war is an even usual head of a treaty of peace since the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648.⁵ Professor Mountague Bernard observes

A treaty of
peace from the
point of view
of diplomacy.

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pt. xii. s. 514, p. 643.

² "Lectures on Diplomacy," i., p. 38.

³ Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," i. iii. c. xx. s. 1.

⁴ "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. ii. s. 18.

⁵ By the Treaty of Westphalia, signed at Münster, October 24, 1648, Sweden was granted five million crowns, besides territorial concessions (Russell, "Hist. Mod. Eur.," ii. 195; Dumont, "Corps Diplomat.," tom. vi.; Pfeffel, "Abrégé Chronol."). By Article 4 of the definitive treaty between France and England, signed at Paris, November 20, 1815, the former power agreed to pay the Allied Powers the sum of 700,000,000 francs (£28,000,000). The mode, periods, and guarantees were regulated by a special convention ("Ann. Reg.," 1815, State Papers, p. 412, 415). In 1859, France and Italy exacted no indemnity from Austria, either at Villafranca or Zurich. In 1864, the Allied Powers of Austria and Prussia exacted no indemnity from Denmark, but the repayment of their war expenses was undertaken by the ceded Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg ("Ann. Reg.," 1864, p. 236). By Article 11 of the Treaty of Prague, Austria agreed to pay an indemnity "to defray

that "a treaty of peace, if you dissect it, commonly divides itself into several distinct parts. First, there are what diplomatists have called the 'general articles,' a declaration that peace is restored, and a clause or clauses of 'amnesty'; the latter phrase, when used in this connection, embracing, beside what we commonly understand by it, the restitution of such conquests as are not intended to be retained and of rights

a portion of the expenses incurred by Prussia on account of the war." This indemnity amounted to 40,000,000 Prussian dollars, but was subject to deductions for the costs of the war of 1864, which Austria claimed from the ceded duchies, and a further deduction for the costs of the Prussian army of occupation in that war. The indemnity of 1866 therefore merely amounted to 20,000,000 Prussian dollars ("Ann. Reg.," 1866, p. 238). In 1871, by the Treaty of Frankfurt, France agreed to pay an indemnity of five milliards of francs, or £200,000,000. One milliard was to be paid in 1871, the remaining four milliards by instalments extending over three years ("Ann. Reg.," 1871, pp. 170, 235). At the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia demanded a war indemnity of 1410 million roubles, but consented to take 1110 million roubles in cessions of territory. Therefore the cash payment merely amounted to £50,000,000, and the territorial cessions Russia had insisted on at San Stefano as equivalent to cash payment were reduced by the Treaty of Berlin (*Times*, March 22, 1878, for text of Treaty of San Stefano; and "Ann. Reg.," 1878, Appendix, State Papers, p. 221, for text of Treaty of Berlin). The naval indemnity paid by China to Japan by the Treaty of Shimoneseki, April 16, 1895, and by the supplementary treaty, by which Japan procured an additional indemnity of about £4,000,000 as compensation for the retrocession of Port Arthur, amounted to about £29,000,000, or 230,000,000 taels ("Ann. Reg.," 1895, p. 343). The Treaty of San Stefano seems to establish that the payment of a pecuniary indemnity is, at least in the Russian view of public law and diplomacy, merely the equivalent of a cession of territory. This being conceded, it is a little difficult to understand the attitude of Russia at the Portsmouth Peace Conference as described by Professor F. De Martens. There seems an inconsistency in a power making the non-payment of any indemnity what the Jesuit historian, Bougéant, calls the "nœud de la paix," in a treaty by which she actually ceded territory; after a previous declaration in a treaty of peace that cession of territory was to be considered as a mere equivalent to a payment of indemnity. Previous to the Portsmouth Peace Conference, the payment of a money indemnity never seems to have been considered impermissible on principle. The cession of a fortress has, on the other hand, often been considered the "nœud de la paix" on the one hand, and impossible of concession on the other, as in the case of Brisach at the close of the Thirty Years' War. The Spanish American War of 1898 furnishes an instance of a money indemnity being paid by the conqueror. The fact that the United States, by the Treaty of Paris, 1898, paid Spain twenty million dollars for the Philippines reinforces the view that there is nothing in principle to distinguish payment of a money indemnity from a cession of territory.

In 1861 the United States went to war with Mexico with the avowed object of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future. But as Mexico could offer no other indemnity, it was determined, from the beginning, to seize upon and retain a portion of her territory (Halleck's "International Law," vol. i. c. xvi. p. 504).

which the war has suspended or interrupted, and the release of prisoners on both sides.¹

"Secondly, there are the provisions judged necessary to remove the causes out of which the war arose, redress the grievances complained of, and prevent the recurrence of them. This is the one essential thing which negotiators have to do, and the pacification is hollow and imperfect if they fail to do it clearly and effectually."² G. F. Martens points out that the general articles following the introduction relate, *inter alia*, to the cessation of contributions. The progress of science bringing about rapidity of communication tends to render more and more unnecessary a stipulation, which formerly gave rise to frequent disputes, that belligerent

¹ The learned Samuel Coccaeus speaks of "paci clausula generalis amnes tiae adjicuit" (Grotius, "Illustratus," *vide* p. 502 (ed. Hale, 1748)). By Article V. of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, the Queen of England, the Emperors of France and Russia, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, granted "a full and entire amnesty to those of their subjects who may have been compromised by any participation whatsoever in the events of the war in favour of the cause of the enemy. It is expressly understood that such amnesty shall extend to the subjects of each of the belligerent parties who may have continued, during the war, to be employed in the service of one of the other belligerents." The next article, an amnesty clause in the diplomatic and legal, though not in the technical sense, provided that prisoners of war were to be immediately given up on either side. The amnesty clause in the Treaty of Paris seems to have been more peculiarly aimed in favour of the Crimean Tartars, who had shown themselves favourably disposed to the allied forces (*Times*, Debate in the House of Commons, March 14, 1856). In the case of a civil war, amnesty may be secured by municipal law, as the Act of Indemnity passed in 1660 on the Restoration. By the preliminaries of peace, signed at Villafranca between France, Austria, and Italy, which were substantially incorporated in the definitive Treaty of Zurich, a full and complete amnesty was granted on both sides to compromised persons. By Article 17 of the Treaty of San Stefano, the Sultan granted such an amnesty to all Ottoman subjects who had compromised themselves (*Times*, March 22, 1878). An exceedingly liberal amnesty was granted by the British Government at the close of the South African War ("Ann. Reg.", 1902, p. 405). The amnesty clause of the Treaty of Portsmouth is very elaborate as regards the restoration of prisoners of war, but there is no amnesty clause in the popular sense of the word. Each State appointed a special commissioner to receive returned prisoners in specified numbers and at specified places. Each State engaged to make a statement of the direct expenditure it had incurred on prisoners of war; and Russia engaged to repay Japan the difference arising from the far greater number of prisoners of war taken by the Japanese as compared with Japanese prisoners in Russia (cf. text of the Portsmouth Treaty, *Times*, October 17, 1905, Article XIII.).

² "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture i., p. 37. Professor Mountague Bernard then mentions a third head, that is, indemnity, which has already been discussed, and which may or may not occur in a treaty of peace.

operations were to cease within a limited time in distant regions. This was especially done in the case of maritime wars.¹

According to this writer, the principal particular articles of a treaty of peace usually specify and renew the treaties which are to serve as a basis of the peace.² Professor Mountague Bernard, however, shows that there is a modern tendency to caution in contracting international engagements. International contracts tend to diminish rather than to increase in number and variety, while contracts among private men tend to increase continually. No treaty of the last century can compare, for instance, with the Treaty of Paris, 1763, in the number of pre-existing treaties that the latter confirmed and renewed. It is clearly a matter for congratulation that treaties in force show a tendency to diminish rather than to increase in number. The number of treaties that were formerly in force were due to conditions that were essentially unwholesome, to disputed rights of succession, to the imposts levied by feudal chieftains on foreign merchants, and to the rights of wreck.³

The Treaty of Portsmouth illustrates the above observations, since it did not renew a single treaty. Compared with a treaty of the eighteenth century, almost the only familiar point in the particulars is the requisition as to the time and place of ratification. The Treaty of Portsmouth, by the fourteenth article, required ratification to be made within fifty days at the latest. Ratification by Russia was to be announced

¹ By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, Belleisle was to be evacuated six weeks from exchange of ratification. Guadaloupe, Desirade, Maria Galante, Martinico, St. Lucia, were to be restored by England to France three months after that date. France undertook to restore Fort Mobile, on the Mississippi, within three months. Goree and Minorca were to be evacuated by Great Britain and Spain respectively within three months. Great Britain undertook to restore Havanna and the conquest of Cuba within three months. Colonies in the East Indies were to be restored within six months from the exchange of ratifications (cf. Article 24 of the Treaty of Paris, 1763, "Ann. Reg.", 1762, p. 233). While such stipulations as these were at one time very necessary, they would be absurd in a modern treaty of peace. The fact that their absence gave rise to dispute in former treaties, shows that in this, as in so many other respects, modern improvements in communications tends to facilitate the cause of peace.

² "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. s. 6, p. 347.

³ Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iv. p. 194.

to Japan by the French Minister in Tokio, which ratification by Japan was to be announced to the Russian Government by the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg. The formal exchange of ratifications was required to take place at Washington. Treaties of peace do not always specify the place where the ratifications are to be exchanged.¹ It is curious to observe, in view of the expeditious nature of the negotiations at Portsmouth (the negotiations began August 10, and the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905; cf. Professor F. De Marten's article in the *North American Review*, November, 1905) that the interval elapsing between signature of peace and the exchange of ratifications was longer than in some treaties of the eighteenth century. By Article 33 of the Treaty of Paris, 1814, by which peace was concluded between the Allied Powers and France, the ratifications were required to be exchanged within a fortnight, or sooner, if possible.² The ratifications at the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, were required to be exchanged within four months; while the ratifications of the treaty between the Allied Powers and Napoleon, providing for the emperor's residence at Elba, were required to be exchanged within two days, or sooner, if possible.³

Grotius observes that, at the conclusion of a war, land and rights adhering to the soil and consecrated places, which may have been in the possession of a victorious belligerent, return by *postliminium* to the former owners. Marcion compares the right of *postliminium* to that by which, when a house tumbles down, the soil is restored to the shore.

Moveables do not return by *postliminium*, but become prize; a purchaser of objects of traffic acquires a good title during war. Things found among neutrals or brought home cannot be claimed by the old owner, unless they are munitions of war. Arms and clothing have their use in war, but had not the privilege of *postliminium*, because they who lost them were little favoured—indeed, were disgraced. And so a horse is

¹ G. F. Marten's "Law of Nations" (1802), bk. viii. s. 6, p. 348.

² "Ann. Reg." 1814, State Documents, 416.

³ *Ibid.*, 400-2.

different in this respect from arms; for the horse may be lost without the fault of the rider. Boëthius is stated by Grotius to imply that the distinction held up to his time, among the Goths. Subsequently it became abolished, and the rule established with exception that moveables are not susceptible of *postliminium*. But this rule does not apply to moveables not brought *infra præsidia*, which do not require *postliminium* to be restored.¹

Vattel observes: "The effect of the treaty of peace is to put an end to the war, and to abolish the subject of it. It leaves the contracting parties no right to commit any acts of hostility on account either of the subject itself which had given rise to the war, or of anything that was done during its continuance; wherefore they cannot lawfully take up arms again for the same subject. Accordingly, in such treaties, the contracting parties reciprocally engage to preserve perpetual peace; which is not to be understood as if they promised never to make war on each other for any cause whatever. The peace in question relates to the war which it terminates, and it is in reality perpetual, inasmuch as it does not allow them to revive the same war by taking up arms again for the same subject which had originally given birth to it."²

All damages caused during the war are likewise buried in oblivion; and no action can be brought except in cases where the treaty expressly enjoins that reparation shall be made. They are considered as having never happened.³ Pufendorf considers that the losses of private subjects upon pacification ought to be made good by the State, though the native-born subject has no civil-law right to enforce reparation. But foreigners acquire good title under such circumstances through the Act of the Princes, since there are presumptions that

¹ "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," I. iii. c. ix. ss. 12, 13, 14.

² "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. ii. s. 19. The engagement to preserve "perpetual peace" does not occur in the general articles of the Treaty of Portsmouth, by the first article of which it is declared that "there shall thenceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and between their respective States and Governments." The expression "perpetual peace" is found in the first article of the Treaty of Paris. The first treaty in which it does not occur is the Treaty of Amiens, 1802.

³ Vattel, *ibid.*, *supra*, s. 21.

attend the acts of princes.¹ Halleck observes that a treaty of peace does not extinguish ransom bills, contracts made by prisoners of war for subsistence, trade carried on under licence, debts contracted, or injuries committed during war by belligerent subjects in a neutral country.² These observations acquire some interest in connection with the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth. On this subject one may cite Professor F. De Martens, speaking, to employ a phrase of Lord Stowell, as a witness to fact. "Thus, though for eighteen months a bitter and mighty conflict was waged between two great military nations, though battles, almost unexampled as regards the number of troops engaged and the intensity of artillery fire, were fought—yet all these bloody encounters and these gigantic operations were carried on, not on the territories of the belligerent States, but within the boundaries of a neutral power! Furthermore, it should be noted that Chinese neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed at the opening of the campaign by both of the belligerents, as well as by the great neutral powers. Never before, in the history of the civilized world, has a war been conducted under such conditions. These peculiarities are reflected in the treaty of peace."

"Of the fifteen articles of that document, more than half have to do with the rights of territorial possession and the sovereignty of Corea and China—that is to say, of two States which were in no way belligerents, but formally and legally neutral. . . . It would be hard to find a similar example in the peace transactions concluded up to the present time by civilized nations."³

The Russo-Japanese War has in its flagrant infraction of the territoriality of sovereignty, witnessed a recrudescence in its worst form of the great evils of foreign enlistment, the right of continued passage, and the shameless pretext of invasion that characterized the history of Europe in the eighteenth century. The seizure of Port Arthur by Russia can only be

¹ "De Jure Nat. et Gent.," bk. viii. c. viii. s. 3.

² Halleck's "International Law," vol. i. c. ix. p. 314.

³ Professor F. De Martens, in the *North American Review*, No. 598, November, 1905, p. 648.

compared to the attempted seizure of the fortress of Casalé by Louis XIV. in 1679, under a secret treaty; or to the shameless pretext on which Frederic the Great invaded Saxony in 1756; or to the Empress Catherine's invasion of Poland in 1795.¹ It is impossible to doubt that the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia in 1898 under threat of war was the elemental cause of the outbreak of the war of 1904-5, and of all the infractions of international law that followed in its train. The great difficulties which Professor F. De Martens indicates would clearly not exist if both Corea and China had been made parties to the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Treaty of Berlin affords an instance, and many others could be found, of a number of States uniting in a great pacificatory settlement, which was in effect virtually a treaty of peace between only two of the contracting parties. In the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, both England and France ineffectually mediated on behalf of Poland, and that State had not, formally at least, been involved in the great war. The two cases are, however, to be distinguished, as Poland was an extinct State in 1815, though both the King of Prussia and the Czar made acknowledgments of a previous independence in their addresses to their Polish subjects. Professor F. De Martens observes that, up to the date of the Japanese descent on Sakhalin, not a foot of Russian soil was in the possession of the Japanese armies. But assuming this, the question inevitably arises as to the Russian tenure of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. According to Professor De Martens, Port Arthur was not Russian territory; and yet it was formally transferred at the treaty of peace.² It is beyond the wit of man to discern how the Treaty of Portsmouth can have the general effect of all treaties of peace in abolishing the subject of the war, when that result is sought to be arrived at by one party to the contract transferring what, on his own showing, does not belong to him.

¹ Cf. Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 516, for the invasion of Saxony; for conquest of Poland, *ibid.*, vol. i. s. 392.

² Cf. article, *North American Review*, p. 614; and Article V. of the Treaty of Portsmouth, *Times*, October 17, 1905.

In the *Eliza Anne*, (1813) 1 Dods. 244, 249, Lord Stowell observed that "a treaty of peace is an agreement to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights of the parties, and to bury in oblivion all the original causes of the war. It is an explanation of the nature of that peace and good understanding which is to take place between the two countries, whenever that event shall be happily accomplished." These observations furnish a singular commentary on the article of Professor De Martens and the Portsmouth Treaty. While the unique peculiarity of the treaty is descanted upon, no explanation whatever is offered. In this respect the recent paper of Professor De Martens offers a great contrast to the other great documents of international law, to Lord Mansfield's reply to the Prussian *Exposition des Motifs* on the occasion of the Silesian loan, or to the epigrammatic powers and dexterous learning of *Historicus*.

Nothing is better established than that the treaty of peace does not affect private rights acquired antecedently to the war, or private injuries unconnected with the causes which produced the war.¹ "The case is the same with debts contracted during the war, but for causes which have no relation to it; or with injuries done during its continuance, but which have no connection with the state of warfare. Debts contracted with individuals, or injuries which they may have received from any other quarter, without relation to the war, are likewise not abolished by the compromise and amnesty, as these solely relate to their particular object—that is to say, to the war, its causes and effects. Thus, if two subjects of the belligerent powers make a contract in a neutral country, or if the one there receives an injury from the other, the performance of the contract, or the reparation of the injury and damage, may be prosecuted after the conclusion of the war."² The Statute of Limitations does not apply to prize-court proceedings, and therefore a neutral owner may appear as claimant in the prize court of a State that was recently a belligerent; but damages will not be decreed by a prize court, according to Lord Stowell,

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," pt. iv. c. iv. s. 544.

² Vattel's "Droit des Gens," l. iv. c. ii. s. 22.

even against the actual wrong-doer, after a lapse of a great length of time.¹

By whom
overtures of
peace may be
made.

Overtures of peace may be made by either belligerent or neutral "acting as the common friend of both litigants;" or by the statutes of an auxiliary² as distinguished from an ally.

The obligation on a belligerent to conclude peace when the invaded right has been obtained, when injury has been redressed, when danger has been averted, forms the somewhat academic topic of some well-known passages in Grotius.³ Good faith, he argues, preserves the hope of peace. The greater Society, of which nations are the members, is kept together by Faith. It is atrocious to break that faith which holds life together—the holiest good of the human heart. In war and after war, good faith and peace ought to be preserved.

In the time of Vattel (1758), mediation was a mode of conciliation much used. That writer even goes so far as to observe: "Does any dispute arise? The friendly powers, those who are afraid of seeing the flames of war kindled, offer their mediation, and make overtures of peace and accommodation."⁴

"Mediation," Vattel observes, "in which a common friend interposes his good offices, frequently proves efficacious in engaging the contending parties to meet each other halfway—to come to a good understanding—to enter into an agreement or compromise respecting their rights, and, if the question relates to an injury, to offer and accept a reasonable satisfaction. The office of mediator requires as great a degree of integrity, as of prudence and address. He ought to observe a strict impartiality; he should soften the reproaches of the disputants, calm their resentments, and dispose their minds to a reconciliation. His duty is to favour well-founded claims,

¹ The *Mentor*, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 179.

² De Martens, "Essai sur les Armateurs," s. 50.

³ "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," l. iii. c. xxv. ss. 2, 3, referring to St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, xii. The interest of this portion of the "De Jure Belli ac Pacis" has been perceived by writers on international law in all ages (cf. Pufendorf, "De Jure Nat. et Gent.," where a tribute is paid to the exhaustive treatment Grotius bestows on this aspect of his subject; and Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. pt. xii. p. 638, who renders a learned tribute to the eloquence, learning, and piety of "the ever-illustrious Grotius").

⁴ "Droit des Gens," l. ii. c. xviii. s. 328.

and to effect the restoration, to each party, of what belongs to him; but he ought not too scrupulously to insist on rigid justice. He is a conciliator, and not a judge: his business is to procure peace; and he ought to induce him who has right on his side to relax something of his pretensions, if necessary, with a view to so great a blessing."¹

In view of the fact that Vattel defines mediation as the interposition of good offices, it becomes a little difficult to understand the distinction insisted on by some writers between mediation and the interposition of good offices. G. F. Von Martens observes that "mediation supposes the consent of the two parties, and this only can give a right of assisting at the conferences."² The good offices of a neutral power may, then, be accepted, and its mediation refused, as was done by Russia with respect to France in the war with Sweden, 1742.³

Sir R. Phillimore considers that there is a marked difference between good offices and mediation.⁴ At a period prior to the French intervention in the affairs of Spain in 1823, the French Government declined the "formal mediation" of Great Britain, but accepted his Majesty's "good offices" with Spain for that object. These proved abortive, but Mr. Canning renewed his offer of "the interposition of good offices" in 1823, after the French army had entered Spain.⁵

Towards the close of 1855, "the good offices" of Austria were being actively exerted through Count Esterhazy to bring about a cessation of the Crimean War.⁶ In 1866 the Emperor of

¹ "Droit des Gens," l. ii. c. xviii. p. 328, and *ibid.*, l. iv. c. ii. s. 17, where Vattel aptly describes the function and true occasion of mediation as occurring when "two nations, though equally tired of the war, do nevertheless continue it merely from a fear of making the first advances to an accommodation, as these might be imputed to weakness; or they persist in it from animosity, and contrary to their real interests."

² The article of Professor F. De Martens to which reference has been made, shows that, as well technically as in substance, President Roosevelt's action in May, 1905, was an instance of mediation, since he not only assisted at the conference of Portsmouth, but by his personal exertions prevented an abortive sequel.

³ Cf. G. F. Von Marten's "Law of Nations," bk. viii. c. vii. s. 2, referring to Gen. Bidefeld, "Institutions Politiques," vol. ii. c. viii. s. 17; and to Treuer "De prudentia circa officium pacificationis inter gentes."

⁴ "International Law," vol. iii. pt. xii. s. 514.

⁵ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. appendix iv. pp. 764, 765.

⁶ "Ann. Reg." 1856, p. 210.

Austria, in an address to his people, stated that he had addressed himself to the Emperor of the French, requesting his good offices for bringing about an armistice, and added that not only had the Emperor of the French acceded to his request, but that he had also offered to mediate.¹ The Hague Convention² does not expressly distinguish between good offices and mediation, but it cannot perhaps be concluded that the two terms are there convertible. Under the Hague Convention both good offices and mediation bear the same character of advice without binding force. Good offices, by the convention, are not otherwise defined; the term "mediator" is defined.³ Quite independently of the Hague Conference, the approved usage of nations authorizes the proposal by one State of its good offices or mediation for the settlement of the intestine dissensions of another.⁴ The Congress of Verona, 1822, and the interference of France in Spain in the following year, illustrate the source of mediation. At the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, France and Sweden gave a guaranty of the Germanic Constitution. France was a party to a treaty of guaranty and mediation to secure the tranquillity of the Swiss Republic in 1738, and again in 1782. The constitution of the United States of America guarantees to each State of the Federal Union a republican form of government, and engages to protect each of them against invasion, and, on the application of the local authorities, against domestic violence.⁵ In 1862 a proposition was made by France to England and Russia that the three countries should offer their friendly mediation to the contending parties in the American Civil War. The moment was deemed inopportune by Russia and England, who declined to accede to the proposal. "According to the information we possess," wrote Prince Gortchakov to M. d'Oubril, Russian *chargé d'affaires* in Paris, on October 27, 1862, "we are led to believe that a combined movement of France, England, and Russia, however conciliatory it might be, and with whatsoever precautions it

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1866, p. 233.

² Title II., "On Good Offices and Mediation."

³ Title II., Articles 4, 5.

⁴ Wheaton's "International Law," pt. ii. c. i. s. 73.

⁵ Constitution of the United States, Article 3.

might be surrounded, if it came with an official and collective character, would incur the risk of bringing about a result opposed to the pacificatory end which the three Courts desire.”¹ Wheaton’s editor observes that the proposal would have been declined if it had been made. It was thought in the Northern States that the policy of France was hostile to the Union, and that the proposed mediation was only a preliminary step to the acquisition by France of those parts of the dismembered Union which had previously belonged to her.²

The principle of mediation instituted under the Hague Convention is the prevention of war between separate and independent States, not between contending political parties in the same State. There are, of course, many instances of the former kind before the Hague Convention. At the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697, England acted as mediator.³

It was stipulated at the Treaty of Paris, 1856, that “if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signing powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of such powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by the means of their mediation.”⁴ At a conference of the powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, their plenipotentiaries, in a protocol dated April 14, 1856, expressed “in the name of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise, should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly power. The plenipotentiaries hope that the Governments not represented at the congress will unite in the sentiment, which has inspired the wish recorded in the present protocol.”⁵ This protocol was invoked to prevent

¹ “U.S. Dipl. Corr.” 1863, vol. ii. p. 769.

² Wheaton’s “International Law,” pt. ii. c. i. s. 73A, referring to Draper, “History of American Civil War,” v. iii. p. 439.

³ Professor Mountague Bernard, “Lectures on Diplomacy,” lecture iii. p. 155.

⁴ Article viii.; cf. Hertslet, “Map of Europe,” vol. ii. p. 1255.

⁵ Ibid., p. 1279.

the Dano-German War of 1864, and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, but without effect. England appealed to both France and Prussia in 1870, when war was imminent between those two countries, to refer the difference to a friendly power before having recourse to arms, agreeably to the twenty-third protocol of the Treaty of Paris, 1856. France replied that she appreciated the utility of the rule, but reminded Great Britain of the reserve made on the subject, and recorded in the same protocol, viz. "Que le volu ex primé par le Congrès ne saurait en aucun cas opposer des limites à la liberté d'appréciation qu'aucune Puissance ne pent aliéner dans les questions qui touchent à sa dignité." She further explained that, much as she might be inclined to accept the good offices of a friendly power, the refusal of the King of Prussia to give the guarantee which she was obliged to ask for, in order to prevent dynastic combinations dangerous to her safety and the care of her dignity, prevented her from taking any other course than that which she had adopted.¹ It is to be observed that, although the protocol of Paris does not contain any binding stipulations, it affords to powers who are willing to appeal to it, an honourable and dignified means of avoiding war.² The fact that an attempt was made, in every great European war which followed up to the date of the Hague Conference, to avert war by the exertion of good offices under the twenty-third protocol of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, deprives the severe criticism to which the settlement of 1856 has been subjected of some gravamen. The Treaty of Paris, by the introduction of conciliation and good offices, founded an epoch of mediation which was happily reproduced by the Hague Conference of 1899 and the termination of the Russo-Japanese War. The conference which met at Constantinople in 1876 attempted to settle the dispute between Russia and Turkey in a peaceable manner, but it failed to bring about such a result. The essential clause of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at the Hague, runs: "The Signatory Powers (twenty-four in number) recommend that one or more Powers,

¹ Parl. Pap., 1870.

² Cf. Halleck's "International Law," vol. i. c. xiv. p. 466 and note.

strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiation, and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at variance. Powers, strangers to the dispute, have the right to offer good offices or mediation, even during the course of hostilities. The exercise of this right can never be regarded by one or the other of the parties as an unfriendly act.”¹ This article of the Hague Convention differs from the corresponding article of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, in essentially limiting the consequences of mediation as far as the mediating State is concerned. A hundred and twenty years before the date of the Hague Conference, Galiani indicated that the danger to the mediator of compromising his neutrality rendered mediation itself a peril rather than an opportunity.² This apparently insuperable objection is overcome by the express terms of the convention that “the exercise of this right can never be regarded by one or the other of the parties in conflict as an unfriendly act.” Still, much depends, even after the promulgation of the Hague Convention, “upon the position and authority of the State which renders its good offices.”³ The position and authority of a State involves considerations of public policy and the balance of power rather than questions of public law. Vattel declared that England held the balance of Europe.⁴ The termination of the Russo-Japanese War reminds us that the great Anglo-Saxon republic of the West, a State non-existent when Vattel wrote, wields the balance of power in friendly rivalry with this country.

A further and essential difference between the right to mediate as described in the Treaty of Paris and the Hague Convention is the difference in the occasion. Under the Hague Convention the right to mediate exists even where honour and vital interests are concerned. One effect of this may be to prevent an unjust war.

In view of the fact that Vattel, a writer who detests

¹ Cf. Article 3 of the Hague Convention, 1899.

² “De Doveri dei Principi Neutr.,” c. ix, p. 162.

³ Sir R. Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. iii. s. 4.

⁴ “Droit des Gens.,” l. i. c. viii. s. 85.

repetition,¹ devotes more than one powerful passage to the subject of mediation,² one may perhaps presume to question the conclusion of Hall, that mediation is "obviously outside law," and cannot therefore be consistently treated by a writer on International Law.³ This view is not shared either by Hubner,⁴ or by Sir R. Phillimore, who refers with approval to Hubner's opinion that mediation is a duty.⁵ From the point of view of usage, the first and last great chapters of International Law treat of mediation, that of Pope Urban VI. and Venice at the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, at the close of the Thirty Years' War, and that of President Roosevelt at the Peace of Portsmouth, terminating what the greatest living publicist has called "a bitter, mighty, and almost unexampled conflict."⁶

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iv. c. iii. s. 32.

² Ibid., I. iv. c. ii. s. 17; and I. ii. s. 328.

³ Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pt. ii. c. xi. p. 362.

⁴ "De la Saisie des Bâtiments Neutres," t. i. pt. i. c. ii. s. 11.

⁵ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 4.

⁶ Professor F. De Martens, *'North American Review*, November, 1905, p. 648.

The appeal addressed by President Roosevelt to the two belligerents, runs:—

"The President feels that the time has come when, in the interest of all mankind, he must endeavour to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict which is now being waged. With both Russia and Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and goodwill. He hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and feels that the progress of the world is being set back by the war between these two great nations. The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments, not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace with one another."

"The President suggests that these peace negotiations should be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents; in other words, that there may be meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates, without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for those representatives of the two Powers to agree to terms of peace. The President earnestly asks that the Russian and Japanese Governments do now agree to such a meeting."

"While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is entirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two Powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of the meeting. But if these preliminaries can be arranged directly between the two Powers or in any other way, the President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace" (*Times*, June 12, 1905).

President Roosevelt twice disclaimed any right of mediation, from which we may infer that he considered himself merely to be interposing friendly offices (G. F. Von Marten's "Law of Nations," (1802), bk. viii. c. vii. s. 2, note). But the intervention afterwards became mediation, and it was due to a specific

There is scarcely any topic of international law which exhibits more unfortunate antinomy than the effect of conquest. Thus, even so accomplished a pupil of Vattel as Lord Stowell, at a time when Heligoland was in the possession of this country by conquest, but before that conquest had been confirmed by cession under the Treaty of Kiel, 1814, considered that there was a mere formal distinction between the two territories, and that Heligoland belonged to the Crown as much as the Isle of Wight. Further, Lord Stowell declared that a conquering State could alienate to a third State domains of which it had merely the belligerent possession; and that the right of the defeated belligerent to such domains, though he had not ceded them by treaty, was "a shadowy right." No point, he observed, is more clearly settled than that a conquered country immediately forms a part of the King's dominions.¹ Yet Vattel very definitely considers that the acquisition of immoveable possessions, lands, towns, and provinces is only completed, and the property in them only becomes stable and perfect, by the entire submission and extinction of the State to which the immoveables belonged, or by treaty of peace. Vattel directly condemns a transfer like that of Guadaloupe by this country, and instances the principle by usage. Thus, the King of Prussia became a party with the enemies of Sweden, by receiving Stettin from the hands of the King of Poland and the Czar, under the title of sequestration, by the treaty of Schwedt, October 6, 1713.² Again, Mr. W. E. Hall, in his very learned discussion of the well-known case of Hesse-Cassel, which was the instance he chose for the purpose of his argument, of the confiscation of moveable property by the right of a conqueror, contended that conquest must be consolidated by lapse of time.³ Yet Vattel observes that the property of moveable effects is vested in the

suggestion of President Roosevelt that the Conference did not prove abortive. The precedent of 1866 affords a further instance where a Sovereign who consented to exert his good offices afterwards became a mediator.

¹ *Campbell v. Hall*, Cowper's Rep. 208. *Per* Lord Stowell in the *Foltina*, (1814), 4 Dods. Rep. 450, 451.

² Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. xiii. ss. 197, 198.

³ "International Law," pt. iii. c. ix. p. 569.

enemy from the moment they are actually and truly in the enemy's power, and carried to a place of safety. Further, Vattel observes, it is an institution of the law of nations established by agreement or custom, and even by civil law in some States, that moveable property is considered to be actually and truly in the enemy's power after it has been twenty-four hours in his hands.¹ But Mr. Hall seems to contend that the possession of a conqueror must be consolidated by a lapse of several years.² The case of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel reproduces some of the features of a case very recently decided in the King's Bench.³ By far the best account of the Hesse-Cassel case is given by Sir R. Phillimore.⁴ In that case Napoleon, after he had expelled the Elector of Hesse from his electorate, acquired possession of a mortgage debt, the private property of the Elector, and due to him from a foreigner, a certain Count von Hahn. The requisite formalities for the payment of the mortgage to Napoleon were complied with; and, in this, as in other instances, in order to induce payment, a considerable portion of the debt was remitted, but a discharge was given for the whole. After the battle of Leipzig, the Elector was restored, the affairs of Count von Hahn became embarrassed, and after his death the Elector of Hesse-Cassel claimed his property as one of his creditors. The question of the validity of Napoleon's discharge came before the Courts of Justice, and was ultimately remitted to the arbitrament of certain German Universities. The ultimate tribunal declared the real issue was whether Napoleon had, or had not, become the true creditor of the Hesse-Cassel funds.⁵ It was held that Napoleon rightly acquired the money on mortgage, because he did so by a Public Act of State which enabled him to possess himself of the private property of the Elector. Napoleon, it was considered, did not acquire the

¹ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. xiii. s. 196.

² But cf. Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," I. iii. c. vi. s. vii., who, like Vattel, insists that only a space of twenty-four hours is necessary.

³ *West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Rez*, L. R. 2 K. B. 391 (1905).

⁴ "International Law," vol. iii. ss. 572, 573, 574.

⁵ Schweikart's "Napoleon un die Churhessischen Capital-schuldner," Konigsberg, 1833, p. 14.

money by his private act, as a mere transient conqueror. The University, after noticing a great number of arguments, decided that the debt of Count von Hahn, for which discharge in full had been given by Napoleon, was validly and effectively paid to him. The decision was apparently grounded on the fact that, in the interval from 1806 to 1813, Hesse-Cassel had become politically extinct; and that the Elector had been constantly in arms against the new government under Napoleon and Jerome. By the laws of all countries, the property of a person, "qui sub publico hoste egit" against the State, was liable to confiscation. The difficulty of the case seems therefore obviated, although the fund in question was the private property of the Prince, and not the public property of the State. Vattel observes that "war gives us the same rights over any sums of money due by neutral nations to our enemy, as it can give over his other property." If the Hesse-Cassel funds had been the public property of the State, the action of Napoleon would have been justified by the ancient law of nations. But Vattel, in the above instance, proceeds to admit that this ancient law is not to be applied with rigour, as the State does not so much as touch the sums which it owes to the enemy; money lent to the public is everywhere exempt from confiscation and seizure in time of war.¹ It is curious to note that the award of the University tribunal in the Hesse-Cassel case referred to a classical parallel, which is hardly consistent with their considered conclusion that the money owed by Count von Hahn was a private debt due to the Elector of Hesse, not a public debt due to the electorate. The tribunal was reminded that when Alexander, by conquest, became absolute master of Thebes, he remitted to the Thessalians a hundred talents which they owed the Thebans.² But in this last instance the money in question was the public property of the State; and therefore the case was not analogous to the case of Count von Hahn's debt. It is submitted that the claim of the restored

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. v. s. 77.

² Cf. Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. v. s. 77; and Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 572, referring to Schweikart, pp. 58, 61.

Prince of Hesse-Cassel to the right of *postliminium* was just, though he may have misconstrued that right.¹ The principle of the ancient law of nations, that war gives a victorious belligerent a right to all the rights, claims, and debts of his enemy, whether he is entirely subdued, or as regards ceded territory, has been exemplified in very modern history. Thus in 1866 the debt of Denmark was divided between that country and Schleswig-Holstein,² and in the same year, Italy by convention with France, took upon itself so much of the Papal debt as was proportionate to the revenues of Papal provinces which it had appropriated.³ It may be doubted, Mr. Hall observes, whether any other such cases have occurred. After the war of 1898, the United States refused to assume any part of the Cuban debt or give up the Government funds in the Cuban State banks.⁴

In the *West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Rex*, L. R. 2 K. B. (1905) 391, Lord Alverstone examined at considerable length the contention that all contractual obligations incurred by a conquered State pass upon annexation to the conqueror, no matter what their nature, character, origin, or history may be. It is a question, he observed, of policy in the broadest and widest sense of the word. There must have been, in all times, contracts made by States before conquest such as no conqueror would ever think of carrying out.⁵

¹ Vattel, "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. xiv. s. 213, and Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 573. Vattel observes that "when a nation, a people, a state, have been entirely subdued, it is asked whether a revolution can entitle them to the right of *postliminium*. In order to justly answer this question, there must again be a distinction of cases. If that conquered state has not yet acquiesced in her new subjection, has not voluntarily submitted, and has only ceased to resist from inability—if her victor has not laid aside the sword of conquest, and taken up the sceptre of peace and equity—such a people are not really subdued; they are only defeated and oppressed, and, on being delivered by the arms of an ally, they doubtless return to their former situation." No one can doubt that Hesse-Cassel was, from 1806 to 1813, in such a state. Cf. Hall, "International Law," 5th ed., p. 569.

² De Martens, "Nouv. Rec. Gén.," xvii. ii. 477.

³ Lawrence, "Commentaries sur les Éléments, etc., de Wheaton, 1214."

⁴ "Ann. Reg.," 1898, p. 366.

⁵ In this case moneys were seized two days before outbreak of hostilities, to carry on war with the conquering State. It seems doubtful, however, whether it was an act of State or an act of violence. It may be inferred from a passage in Pufendorf that the right of particular subjects, to recover goods taken from

The Russo-Japanese War raised no question of this kind, as regards the assumption by a victorious belligerent of liabilities attaching to ceded territory. Though the island of Sakhalin is of considerable size, the use to which it was put by Russia renders it *prima facie* unlikely that that power had contracted any public debt in connection with it.

The cession of the Liao-Tung Peninsula acquired considerable interest in view of the fact that it affords the first instance of the assignment of a usufruct or lease. The word "cede" is not employed in the case of an assignment of a lease of territory.¹ The consent of the grant or of a territorial lease is requisite, when the grantee transfers it to a third party by treaty.

In the case of the *Elsebe*, (1804) 5 C. Rob. 174, 190-1, Lord Stowell observed that "it is a frequent practice to stipulate in the preliminary articles of peace for a cessation of hostilities at certain times, in different latitudes, and for the restitution of property taken afterwards; and this as well within, as beyond, the period assigned for the ratification. The same provision is afterwards inserted in the definition treaty." In treaties of the eighteenth century an interval of several months was fixed for cessation of hostilities in distant regions. The Treaty of Amiens, 1802, fixed a period of five months for the cessation of hostilities in the Indian seas. A capture made within this period, but without knowledge of the peace on the part of the captor derived from his own Government, was held valid, and the captured vessel was held good prize.² In the case of the *Swineherd*, in which a French privateer captured

them on the pretext of the necessities of the State and public interest, either in contemplation of war or during its occurrence, is virtually unenforceable ("Do Juro Nat. et Gent.," bk. viii. c. viii. s. 3). If the independence of the South African Republic had survived the war, it does not seem at all certain that that State would have admitted liability, on a recurrence to first principles.

¹ Cf. Article V. of the Treaty of Portsmouth, by which the Imperial Russian Government "transfers and assigns" the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lion, etc., to the Imperial Japanese Government, with the consent of the Chinese Government.

² Kent, "Comment," i. 171; Wheaton, "Elem." pt. iv. ch. iv. s. 5; Heffter, s. 183; La Bellone contra le Porcher, "Pistoye et Duverdy," i. 149; Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 521, referring to Merlin, "Rep." tome xxv. (xiii.) tit. "Prise Maritime," s. 5, p. 115: "En quel temps peut être exercé le droit de Prise Maritime."

Captures made
at sea after
signature of
treaty of peace,
but without
knowledge of
peace on the
part of the
captor.

an unarmed British privateer, the captor had actual knowledge of the peace, though it was not derived from his own Government. Emerigon observes that, since constructive knowledge, after the expiration of the period limited for the cessation of hostilities, renders the capture void, *à fortiori* actual knowledge ought to produce the same effect.¹ Sir R. Phillimore² and Chancellor Kent³ adopt the opinion of Emerigon. Abren, on the other hand, considers that until the commission of the captor is directly or by clear implication revoked, it is his right and duty to act under it; and this writer denies the retroactive effect of the ultimate conclusion of peace.⁴ Coccaius⁵ and Grotius⁶ consider that a capture made after completion of peace must, *vi paci*, be restored, though made by persons ignorant of such completion, since the effect of peace, once contracted, is to render unlawful every act of force or violence between States. Where the conclusion of peace is brought to the captor's knowledge beyond all possibility of doubt, Mr. Hall points out that the rule validating seizures made within a limited period, unless the captor's commission has been revoked, operates with extreme harshness.⁷ If a captain, acting under the orders of the admiral, be the seizor, he, and not the admiral, must be called to adjudication, as the immediate wrong-doer.⁸ Both Chancellor Kent and Sir R. Phillimore, following the opinion of Lord Stowell in that case, consider that individuals who continue hostilities after their cessation has been agreed upon, in ignorance of that cessation, are civilly, but not criminally, responsible before the tribunals of international law.⁹

The Treaty of Portsmouth did not contain any stipulation that hostilities should cease at a date fixed subsequent to its

¹ "Traité des Assurances," c. xii. s. 19, 455.

² "International Law," vol. iii. s. 520.

³ "Comment," i. p. 172.

⁴ Abren, c. xxii.

⁵ Vol. v. 502, l. vii. c. vii. s. 864.

⁶ l. iii. c. xx. s. 20.

⁷ Hall's "International Law," pt. iii. c. ix. p. 561.

⁸ The *Mentor*, 1 C. Rob. p. 171.

⁹ 1 Kent, "Comment," p. 170; and Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 519.

signature; though, as has been seen, the armistice put a stop to all hostilities, at least, on land, after September 16, 1905. It must be supposed that the armistice at sea, proclaiming a neutral zone, did not come into effect till a short time after that date; and, therefore, captures effected between the date of the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, and some date after September 16, 1905, would have been strictly *in pari materia* with captures made at sea before the date fixed for the cessation of hostilities. But the Mikado, with scrupulous regard for the true spirit of international law and the rights of neutrals, proclaimed the unconditional release of all ships and cargoes seized after September 5, 1905. This affected three German vessels, two American, and one Norwegian vessel.¹

“If,” says Vattel, “a conquered town or province fully and perfectly constituted a part of the domain of a nation or sovereign, it passes on the same footing into the power of the conqueror. Thenceforward united with the new State to which it belongs—if it be a loser by the change, that is a misfortune which it must wholly impute to the chance of war. Thus, if a town which makes part of a republic or limited monarchy, and enjoyed a right of sending deputies to the supreme council or the general assembly of the States, be justly conquered by an absolute monarch, she must never more think of such privileges; they are what the constitution of the new State to which she is annexed does not permit.”² It is curious to observe that the above passages of Vattel, while they apply to the successive partitions of Poland, do not apply to cessions of territory in modern times. In the conquests of ancient times, observes Vattel, even individuals lost their lands because the State then possessed very little, and the quarrel was in reality the common cause of all the citizens. But at present war is less disastrous in its consequences to the subject; matters are conducted with more humanity; one sovereign makes war against another sovereign, and not against the unarmed citizens. The conqueror seizes on the possessions

Conditions on
which a con-
quered town or
province is
acquired.

¹ *Times*, November 3, 1905.

² “*Droit des Gens*,” I. iii. c. xiii. p. 387.

of the State, the public property, while private individuals are permitted to retain theirs. They suffer but indirectly by the war; and the conquest only subjects them to a new master. After the Congress of Vienna an exception seems to have arisen in the case of some Westphalian landed proprietors who were driven out by military force, though they had purchased their lands with every formality of law from a *de facto* sovereign.¹ The proprietary right cannot be transferred by the conqueror to a third party, so as to entitle him to claim against the former owner on the restoration of the territory to the original sovereign. If, on the other hand, the conquered territory is ceded by the peace to the conqueror, such an intermediate transfer is thereby confirmed, and the title of the purchaser becomes valid and complete.² By Article X. of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905, Japan has a full liberty to deport from Sakhalin any inhabitants who labour under any political or administrative disability; but she undertakes to respect the proprietary rights of such inhabitants. This is a very singular provision. Its explanation is presumably to be found in the existence of a convict station in the island. Mr. Hall observes: "It has been usual in modern treaties to insert a clause securing liberty to inhabitants of a ceded territory to keep their nationality of origin."³ But he argues that the right of the inhabitants of a

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 573.

² Wheaton's "International Law," pt. iv. c. iv. s. 546.

³ The Treaties of Vienna in 1809 (*De Martens*, "Nouv. Rec.," i. 214), of Paris in 1814 (*ibid.*, ii. 9), and of Vienna in 1864 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.," xvii. ii. 482), gave six years, that of Frederickshamn in 1809 gave three years ("Nouv. Rec.," i. 125), and those of Zurich in 1859 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.," xvi. ii. 520), of Turin in 1860 (*ibid.*, 540), and of Vienna in 1866 (*ibid.*, xviii. 409), afforded one year. The Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 conceded liberty of emigration until October 1, 1872 ("Nouv. Rec. Gén.," xix. 689). It is a very remarkable feature of the Treaty of Portsmouth (*Times*, October 17, 1905) that Article X. concedes an entirely unrestricted right to emigrate. But Russian subjects in Sakhalin, who avail themselves of this right, are required to sell their property, and therefore in this respect the Treaty of Portsmouth is less liberal than the Treaty of Frankfurt. The Treaty of Portsmouth, Article X., is peculiar in allowing the inhabitants of the ceded territory a right "to retire to their country," not to emigrate where they please. The peculiar character of the population of Sakhalin may have something to do with this restriction. It is clear that the circumstances of Sakhalin being a convict settlement gives a different aspect to the right of deportation for which Japan stipulated. Mr. Hall, who considers that the inhabitants of ceded territory have no right to keep their old allegiance, adds that the state of origin has no reason for rejecting them or for refusing them the rights of subjects. The

ceded territory to keep their nationality of origin is a treaty right only; and where there is no such stipulation in a treaty of peace, persons cannot without permission adhere to their former State. In the *United States v. De Repentigny*, the court considered that the inhabitants of a ceded territory who adhere without permission to their former state, deprive themselves of the right to have their property protected. Mr. Hall observes that the Hesse-Cassel case proves that persons cannot withdraw themselves from an allegiance imposed by cession.¹ But Halleck (ii. 486-7) and Calvo (s. 2164) think that inhabitants of a ceded country, even where there is no treaty stipulation, have a right of keeping their old allegiance. Vattel considers the same question. His view differs from that taken by Mr. Hall and the Supreme Court of the United States in *United States v. Repentigny*, 5 Wallace, 260. He observes that "a people, when abandoned by their sovereign, become free, and may provide for their safety in whatever manner they think most advisable."² Neither the victorious belligerent to whom the territory has been ceded, nor the state of origin, has any claim to the allegiance of such persons, who may go where they please. After the Napoleonic Wars, the French monarchy, being unwilling to add to the Napoleonic element, treated persons who emigrated from the restored provinces into France as aliens.³ But as such persons were expressly allowed to emigrate by treaty, it seems possible that Russia might subject the emigration of undesirables from the ceded territory in Sakhalin to some similar restriction. But at present Russia is one of the States of Europe which has no restriction on the immigration or continued residence of aliens. Without fresh legislation, therefore, Russia could not adopt the course of treating persons emigrating from her ceded territories as aliens, as the French Government did after 1815.

present case, perhaps, supplies such an instance, for a nation cannot be supposed to welcome the immigration of undesirables, especially in a State where transportation is a legal punishment.

¹ "International Law," pt. iii. c. ix. p. 572.

² "Droit des Gens," l. i. s. 202; and l. iv. c. ii. s. 34.

³ Cogordan, "La Nationalité," 2^e red. 333.

Securities
formerly given
for the
observance of
treaties.

Vattel devotes an entire chapter¹ to securities given for the observance of treaties, some of which have fallen into desuetude, though the solemn preface at the head of some of the greatest treaties of modern times is a survival of the ancient and pious formula which clothed treaties in mediæval times with the solemnities of religion.² These artificial securities for the performance of treaties are guaranty, the pledging of a town or province, the giving of hostages, and the oath. As regards the security called guaranty, Vattel observes that, "convinced by unhappy experience that the faith of treaties, sacred and inviolable as it ought to be, does not always afford a sufficient assurance that they shall be punctually observed, mankind have sought for securities against perfidy—for methods whose efficacy shall not depend on the good faith of the contracting parties. A guaranty is one of these means. When those who make a treaty of peace, or any other treaty, are not perfectly easy with respect to its observance, they require the guaranty of a powerful sovereign. The guarantee promises to maintain the conditions of this treaty, and to be observed." In a strict sense, guaranty, as a security given for the observance of treaties, has fallen into desuetude. But Vattel admits that guaranty was often taken by way of treaties of alliance for the purpose of maintaining a rule of succession, or of supporting the possessions of a sovereign. The Monroe doctrine appears in principle as apt an instance of guaranty as the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction of Charles VI. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1878, by which Great Britain, in return for the cession of Cyprus, undertook to join the Sultan in defending by force of arms his territories in Asia, if Russia made any further attempt to take possession of them, constitutes what can only be considered a guaranty in the strictest sense of the word as employed by Vattel.³ The territories which this country undertook to defend were those fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, a circumstance that seems decisive as to whether or not the undertaking of this country

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xvi.

² Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iv. p. 192.

³ "Ann. Reg.," 1872, "State Papers and Documents," p. 251.

was a security for the observance of a treaty. Vattel observes that it is of great importance to recall that the guarantor is not the principal in the contract, and therefore he has no right to interfere unasked in the execution of the treaty. If a guarantor could interfere unasked, it would be tantamount to rendering himself the arbiter of the affairs of his neighbours, and giving them law.¹ This passage explains the resentment often excited by well-intentioned attempts at arbitration and mediation. It also serves to explain specific provisos inserted in articles of treaties recommending mediation. It is quite impossible to regard the subject of guaranty as obsolete, like other artificial securities for the observance of treaties, such as that of giving sureties, pledges, or hostages, or the taking of an oath. Guaranty in the sphere of international law seems to take the place of insurance in municipal law. It is, at least, possible to explain the Hague Convention as a guaranty of States who make proposals of mediation. Many recent recognitions of independence and territorial integrity in the Far East seem more adequately capable of explanation on the ground of guaranty than in any other way. The same may even more justly be said of treaties like the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1905, and that between Japan and Corea in the same year. We may recall Vattel's statement that a guarantor is only bound to give assistance where the party to whom he has granted his guaranty is of himself unable to obtain justice. Lord Lansdowne, during the debates on the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1902, observed that while Japan could well defend herself in a conflict against a single power, she would be in imminent danger if attacked by a coalition, and against that contingency Great Britain could and meant to defend her.²

Again, Vattel observes that a guarantor cannot engage to support injustice, and is not necessarily bound to support the pretensions of him who claims his guarantee. He cannot be obliged immediately to assist the latter; he is to examine and to search for the true sense of the treaty.³ Vattel also

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xvi. s. 236.

² "Ann. Reg.," 1902, p. 60.

³ Cf. reference to Lord Cranborne's speech in the House of Commons in the "Annual Register," 1902, p. 61.

observes that a guarantor is not bound to procure the performance of injustice, and therefore may renounce a guaranty if the guaranteed treaty proves derogatory to the rights of third parties. France renounced her guaranty of the famous pragmatic sanction of Charles VI., and declared for the house of Bavaria, in opposition to the heiress of the emperor, on the ground that the pragmatic sanction of 1713 impaired the rights of third parties. The pragmatic sanction is the only instance of a guaranteed treaty cited by Vattel. Treaties of guaranty may be limited or not in their duration, like any other treaties. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1878 was an undertaking in the nature of a perpetual obligation, while, by Article VIII. of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905, its operation is limited to ten years. The guarantees of territorial integrity, which have been so frequent for the last decade, are not perhaps guaranty in the sense of Vattel; a famous State document of 1815 contained the dictum that the independence of a country, and therefore, it would seem, its territorial integrity, could not be created, though it might be acknowledged, by a treaty. But Professor F. De Martens, in an article frequently referred to, observed that not only the two belligerents in the Russo-Japanese War, but also the great neutral powers, had, previous to the war, "solemnly guaranteed" Chinese and Korean territorial integrity. But assuming this, the entirely abnormal feature of the Russo-Japanese War, the conduct of belligerent operations on neutral territory, has arisen from an improper application of the principle of guaranty as enunciated by Vattel. Guaranty has been given for national independence in these recent cases, and not for the performance of treaty obligation, and therefore has been unduly extended. A nation is not obliged to do anything for another which that other is herself capable of doing.¹ Vattel's view sufficiently explains why the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1902 was only framed to meet the contingency of a coalition against Japan; as regards the undertakings in respect of Chinese territorial integrity, it seems only possible to explain them on the ground of the helplessness of China.

¹ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xvi. s. 237.

Vattel observes that a nation may pledge or pawn its possessions. Moveable possessions only admit of being pledged, while towns and provinces may be given in pawn. Poland formerly pledged a crown and other jewels to the sovereigns of Prussia. When an immoveable is pledged, it may be in the form of either mortgage, pledge, or antichresis. In the first case the town or province is pledged by a deed which assigns them as a security for a debt; in the second case it is put in the hands of the creditor; in the third case the revenues of the town or province are ceded to the creditor nation as a security for the debt. Some incidents in the history of the Far East in recent years admit of a complete explanation on the principle that a town or province may be given in pledge by one nation to another for the payment of a debt. Thus, in 1896, Russia lent 7,000,000 roubles to Korea, guaranteed by Russia's holding the two northern provinces.¹ Vattel points out that this is a chapter of international law which is only too likely to be disregarded.² His judgment would cover both the Empress Catherine's invasion of Poland,³ or the seizure of Port Arthur in 1898. One might search history in vain for a more flagitious instance of the seizure of an important place, on what Vattel calls quibble or pretence, than that on which Port Arthur was seized. The port was occupied on the ground of compensation for the Anglo-German loan. Therefore, in effect Russia seized a town as a pledge for a debt which had never

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1896, "Foreign History," p. 351.

² "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xvi. s. 243:—"But to those who have no law but their avarice, or their ambition—who, like Achilles, place all their right in the point of the sword—a tempting allurement now presents itself: they have recourse to a thousand quibbles, a thousand pretences, to retain an important place, or a country which is conveniently situated for their purposes. The subject is too odious for us to allege examples: they are well known enough, and sufficiently numerous to convince every sensible nation that it is very imprudent to make over such securities." The allusion of Vattel is probably to Frederic the Great's invasion of Saxony, which had just occurred (Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 526).

³ At the last war of Polish Independence in 1795, the Russian Government issued a declaration asserting a right and an obligation, on the part of Russia, to take part in whatever related to the government and affairs of Poland. This declaration (*inter alia*) charged the Polish Diet with countenancing approbrious language respecting the conduct and intentions of the empress ("Ann. Reg." 1795, p. 7).

been contracted, and claimed the rights of a creditor because she was not allowed to become one.¹

The giving of
hostages as
security for
treaty.

The giving of hostages as security for the performance of a treaty is now entirely a dead letter in international law. In the "Perpetual Peace" concluded between Francis I. and Henry VIII. in 1527, two archbishops, eleven bishops, twenty-eight nobles, and thirteen borough towns were given as sureties on the English side.² Vattel observes: "It is pleasing to behold the European nations in the present age content themselves with the bare parole of their hostages. The English noblemen who were sent to France in that character, in pursuance of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, to stay till the restitution of Cape Breton, were solely bound by their word of honour, and lived at court and at Paris rather as ministers of their nation than as hostages."³ Professor Mountague Bernard observes that hostages have not been given since this occasion.

Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, artificial securities for the observance of treaties were prodigiously multiplied. Besides the oath, the sovereign had to swear that he would neither obtain, accept, nor profit by, a papal dispensation from his oath:⁴ he must submit himself expressly to the censures of the Church, "to excommunication, to aggravation, re-aggravation, interdict, anathematization, and all other heavier censures and fulminations whatsoever;" and for this purpose must undertake to appoint, within a fixed period, proctors authorized to appear and receive his submission before the pope, or some other ecclesiastical judge in due form of law. If, like the French kings, he had the privilege of not being excommunicated, except after certain formalities, he must renounce the privilege. He must, in case he should perjure himself, release his vassals from their allegiance, and must "pledge and hypothecate" his lands and goods, besides giving hostages to do the same.⁵

¹ "Ann. Reg." 1898, "Foreign History," p. 277.

² Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iv. p. 91.

³ "Droit des Gens," l. ii. c. xvi. s. 246.

⁴ *Ibid.*, l. ii. c. xv. s. 225.

⁵ Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iv. pp. 190, 191.

The oath in treaties, Vattel observes, constitutes an additional obligation, which is, strictly speaking, supererogatory.¹ According to Professor Mountague Bernard, the rendering of an oath to secure the performance of a treaty has fallen into desuetude, not because it is or was unnecessary, but because it was useless. This authority has fully traced the history of the occurrence of an oath prefacing a treaty. The league between Charles the Bald and Louis the German at Strasbourg, 842 A.D., began, "For the love of God and the Christian faith, and for our common safety."² To the earliest extant treaty of mediæval Europe, negotiated in the sixth century, and recorded by Gregory of Tours, the parties swore, "By the name of God Almighty, by the Indivisible Trinity, by all the Divine things, and by the dreadful day of the last judgment."³ After the sixteenth century the oath is chiefly found in Spanish treaties. The oath used in Spanish treaties of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is: "On the Cross, on the Four Gospels, on the Canon of the Mass, and on my honour." The latest instance of the occurrence of the formal and complete oath in a treaty is that prefacing the Convention made in 1778 between France and the Swiss cantons in the cathedral of Soleure.⁴ However, it must be admitted that the solemn preface to all the great treaties of modern times is a direct survival of the formal oath which began treaties in earlier times.⁵

¹ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xvi. s. 246.

² Romance and Teudesque versions; Nithard's Hist. Pertz and Dumont.

³ "His itaque omnibus definitis jurant partes per Dei omnipotentis nomen et inseparabilem Trinitatem vel divina omnia ac tremendum diem judicii se omnia quæ superius scripta sunt absque ullo malo vel fraudis ingenio inviolabiliter servaturos . . . Lectis igitur pactionibus ait rex Judicio Dei feriar si de his quiequam transcendero quæ hic continentur" ("Hist. Rer. Gallic," lib. ix.).

⁴ Professor Mountague Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iv. p. 188.

⁵ The preface of the great treaties of Paris and Vienna in 1814 and 1815, ran: "In the name of the most Holy and undivided Trinity" ("Ann. Reg.," 1814, 488; *Ibid.*, 1815, 410). The form in the treaty of Alliance, 1814, is slightly different, and there was no solemn preface to the Treaty of Ghent, between Great Britain and the United States, concluded the same year. The same solemn expression occurs both at the head of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, and the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, the words being, "In the name of Almighty God."

A final comment on Professor F. De Marten's article on the Portsmouth Peace Conference arises on his observation that "it teaches the necessity for Governments instantly to take part in an international meeting to settle beforehand the various points, especially in peace conferences."¹ No one knew, says Professor F. De Martens, what the Japanese conditions of peace were, adding that even England, the ally of Japan,² did not know the terms. The consequence was that the intentions of one of the parties were quite unknown. This observation recalls one of the most celebrated of the sayings of Talleyrand: "On a voulu confondre la réserve avec la ruse. La bonne foi n'autorise jamais la ruse, mais elle admet la réserve."³ In the opinion of the greatest of diplomatists, reticence is perfectly consistent with sincerity. The remarks of Professor De Martens on this topic further seem inadequate, since he does not comment on the remarkable fact that—at least in the sense in which they have been understood since the eighteenth century—there were no preliminaries of peace preceding a definitive treaty at the Portsmouth Peace Conference. At the Peace of Westphalia, where the preliminaries of peace took six years to negotiate, the term was applied to *pacta de contrahendo*, relating to the time, place, and form of the negotiations which were to follow.⁴ In this sense, of course, there must always be preliminaries of peace. But at the Treaty of Westphalia, these preliminaries took the form of an agreement which passed through all the forms of a treaty from signature to exchange of ratifications—a practice which has since been maintained. Professor Mountague Bernard observes that while preliminaries of peace, in the character of mere formal conventions, have been dispensed with in later times, the rule has become, as Lord Chatham insisted, that they should in substance approach as closely as possible to

¹ "The Portsmouth Peace Conference," by Professor F. De Martens, *North American Review*, November, 1905, p. 645.

² According to a distinction of Sir R. Phillimore in the late war, England was an auxiliary State, or passive ally of Japan, not an active ally. France clearly stood in the same position towards Russia.

³ Cf. Bernard's "Lectures on Diplomacy," lecture iii. p. 129 and note.

⁴ *Ibid.*, lecture i., p. 17.

a definitive treaty. The most exceptional feature of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the entire absence of preliminaries of peace as they have been understood since the Treaty of Utrecht, is not noticed by Professor F. De Martens, though their absence furnishes a nearly complete explanation of the remarkable feature he comments on—the obscurity that constantly surrounded the proceedings at Portsmouth. G. F. Martens, who is quite silent on the obligation to conclude an armistice before entering on peace negotiations, observes that preliminary treaties of peace are generally formed. He observes that while they may differ in their form, in general, when signed and ratified, they are obligatory, even before the definitive treaty is concluded, and remain so if the definitive treaty should not be concluded, unless it has been otherwise agreed upon. He adds that preliminaries, at least, settle some points between the parties, and therefore their effect must clearly be to give one party an idea of the wishes and demands of the other.¹ While, as has been seen, there are at least three cases in the last century where there has been no armistice till after signature or even exchange of ratifications, it is believed that usage for the last century affords no single instance of a definitive treaty being concluded without reference to any preliminary treaty of peace. The highly exceptional struggle between Spain and her colonies may possibly afford an instance to the contrary, but all the great European wars unquestionably witnessed their termination by preliminaries of peace before the definitive treaty was concluded. Mr. Hall considers that preliminaries of peace are an agreement intended to put an end to hostilities at an earlier moment than that at which the terms of a definitive treaty can be settled.² If this view be accepted it goes far to explain the fact that negotiations were proceeding concurrently with belligerent operations in the Russo-Japanese War. The continuation of hostilities would then be explained on the ground that there were no preliminaries of peace. But Mr. Hall considers that preliminaries are, in principle, equivalent

¹ "Law of Nations," (1802) bk. viii. c. vii. s. 5.

² "International Law," 4th ed., pt. iii. c. ix. p. 581.

to an armistice. If this were so, there would be no necessity for including an armistice. This conclusion cannot be derived from usage. In 1878, on January 14, the Turks applied for an armistice, accompanied by the signature of preliminaries of peace. But Russia desired separate peace negotiations, and this had the effect of postponing the armistice.

APPENDIX A.

*Professor T. E. Holland's Letter to the "Times,"
November 29, 1904, on the British Proclama-
tion of Neutrality.*

IN a letter of general interest which Professor T. E. Holland recently addressed to the *Times*,¹ he expressed the same approval that Historicus bestowed in 1863 on the language of the British Declaration of Neutrality promulgated in 1861, declaring that every person engaging in the carriage of contraband "will be justly liable to hostile capture and to the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf, and will in no wise obtain protection from us against such capture or such penalties." But Historicus² drew an opposed inference, at all events on one occasion, from this language to that recently derived from it by Professor T. E. Holland. Historicus concluded that, in the very terms of Bynkershoek, "Non recte vehamus, sine fraude vendimus," the Declaration of Neutrality issued in 1861, of which that issued in 1904 is a literal transcript, prohibited as unlawful the transport of contraband, while it obviously left untouched the traffic in contraband on the neutral territory. But Professor Holland observed in the letter referred to, that he was especially desirous "of emphasizing the proposition that carriage of contraband is no offence, either against international law or against the law of England."

In *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1883) 2 H. & C. 431, 540, Lord Bramwell (then Bramwell, B.) observed that, "There is no international law forbidding the supply of contraband of war."

While Professor T. E. Holland considers that international law neither prohibits the conveyance of contraband nor, *à fortiori*, the sale of contraband on neutral territory, Vattel and Historicus appear indecisive, and Sir R. Phillimore and foreign jurists, not all of whom are advocates of the Armed Neutrality, consider that both the transport and traffic are prohibited by international

Carrage of
contraband not
an offence by
international
law : Prof. T.
E. Holland.
Lord Bram-
well to same
effect.

Indecisive
nature of ap-
peal to autho-
rity on point.

¹ November 29, 1904.

² Letters, "International Law," p. 132.

law as illegal. An American writer, Duer, who, as *Historicus* conceded, was no more open to the imputation of having derived his view on international law from speculation, like Galiani and Hautefeuille, than Sir R. Phillimore, clearly considers that the carriage of contraband is prohibited by, and is therefore illegal by, international law. Duer¹ seems to arrive at the conclusion that the carriage of contraband is unlawful by international law in the light of his sustained criticism of Vattel.

Vattel's position, analysis of, by Duer.

Vattel implicitly² and explicitly derives the right of the belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu*, the ultimate postulate of the whole topic, from "the care of his own safety," from "the necessity of self-defence." Duer infers from the account Vattel gives of the belligerent right that the carriage of contraband must be an act of positive, though indirect, hostility, and therefore an infraction of neutrality, necessitating a conclusion to its prohibition by international law. Vattel defines contraband in the following terms:—

Vattel's definition of contraband.

"Commodities particularly useful in war, and the importation of which to an enemy is prohibited, are called contraband goods. Such are arms, ammunition, timber for shipbuilding, every kind of naval stores, horses—and even provisions, in certain junctures, when we have hopes of reducing the enemy by famine."³

Carriage of contraband an offence against international law.

In this definition of contraband, Vattel clearly considers the carriage of contraband illegal by international law, since he speaks of it as prohibited.

But in a previous passage in Vattel, which was relied on by Mr. Justice Story, in the *Santissima Trinidad*, 7 Wheaton's Reports, p. 340, and by *Historicus*—though with some hesitation—the great Swiss authority on the law of nations seems no less decisively to take the view that the carriage of contraband is not prohibited by international law. Vattel there says—

Vattel's language indecisive on point.

"When I have notified to them my declaration against such or such a nation, if they will afterwards expose themselves to risk in supplying her with things which serve to carry on war, they will have no reason to complain if their goods fall into my possession; and I, on the other hand, do not declare war against them for having attempted to convey such goods. They suffer, indeed, by a war in which they have no concern; but they suffer accidentally. I do not oppose their right: I only exert my own; and if our rights clash with and reciprocally injure each other, that circumstance is the effect of absolute necessity. Such collisions daily happen in war. When, in pursuance of my rights,

¹ "Marine Insurance," vol. i. p. 750.

² "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. vii. s. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, I. iii. c. vii. s. 112.

I exhaust a country from which you derive your subsistence; when I besiege a city with which you carried on a profitable trade I doubtless injure;—I subject you to losses and inconveniences, but it is without any design of hurting you. I only make use of my own rights, and consequently do you no injustice. But that limits may be set to these inconveniences, and that the commerce of neutral nations may subsist in as great a degree of freedom as is consistent with the laws of war, there are certain rules to be observed on which Europe seems generally to be agreed.”¹

He then draws the fundamental distinction between ordinary goods and contraband goods. Duer criticizes Vattel’s explanation of belligerent jurisdiction over contraband as a conflict of rights in the light of an observation of Lord Stowell, that there are no conflicting rights between nations at peace. Vattel’s hypothesis, Duer contends, is completely refuted by this dictum of Lord Stowell. It is in fact difficult to deny that the account Vattel gives of the subject is inconsistent and self-contradictory. The theory of a conflict of rights cannot coexist with the assumption—explicitly taken by the Swiss author—that the carriage of contraband is prohibited by international law.

It is therefore clear that the exercise of the belligerent right to intercept contraband *in transitu* derives its origin from a mutual compromise—the neutral State abandons its subject who conveys contraband to the penalties of the law of nations in return for forbearance by the belligerent State to make the act of the neutral subject a *casus belli*. Professor T. E. Holland observes—

Reconciliation
of conflicting
views by Prof.
T. E. Holland.

“The rule of international law upon the subject may, I think, be expressed as follows: ‘A belligerent is entitled to capture a neutral ship engaged in carrying contraband of war to his enemy, to confiscate the contraband cargo, and, indeed, in some cases, to confiscate the ship also without thereby giving to the Power to whose subjects the property in question belongs any ground for complaint.’ Or, to vary the phrase, ‘A neutral Power is bound to acquiesce in losses inflicted by a belligerent upon such of its subjects as are engaged in adding to the military resources of the enemy of that belligerent.’ This is the rule to which the nations have consented, as a compromise between the rights of the neutral State, that its subjects should carry on their trade without interruption, and the right of the belligerent State to prevent that trade from bringing an accession of strength to his enemy. International law here, as always, deals with relations between States, and has nothing to do with the contraband trader, except in so far as it deprives him of the protection of his Government. If authority were needed for what is here advanced, it might be found in Mr. Justice Story’s judgment in the *Santissima Trinidad*,

¹ “Droit des Gens,” I. iii. c. vii. s. 111.

in President Pierce's message of 1854, and in the statement by the French Government in 1898, with reference to the case of the *Fram*, 'That the neutral State is not required to prevent the sending of arms and ammunitions by its subjects.'¹

"Neither," proceeds Professor T. E. Holland, "is the carriage of contraband any offence against the law of England, as may be learned by any one who is in doubt as to the statement from the lucid language of Lord Westbury in *ex parte Chavasse*."²

After pointing out that the conveyance of contraband was not prohibited by international law, and quoting a passage from Mr. Justice Story's judgment in the *Santissima Trinidad*, Lord Westbury said—

Lord Westbury considered conveyance of contraband neither an offence by international law nor by law of England.

"I take this passage to be a very correct representation of the present state of the law of England also. For if a British ship-builder builds a vessel of war in an English port, and arms or equips her for war *bond fide* on his own account, as an article of merchandise, and not under or by virtue of any agreement, understanding, or concert with a belligerent Power, he may lawfully, if acting *bond fide*, send the ship, so armed and equipped, for sale as merchandise in a belligerent country, and will not in so doing violate the provisions or incur the penalties of the Foreign Enlistment Act. It is true that under the provisions of the Act of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, her Majesty has power by proclamation or Order in Council to prohibit the exportation of certain goods, including arms, ammunition, gunpowder, naval and military stores, but no Order in Council or proclamation was made in the terms or under the special authority of this statute."³

Sir R. Phillimore considered conveyance of contraband an offence by international law.

In a case arising out of the events of the Franco-Prussian War, Sir R. Phillimore observed—

"The carrier of contraband may violate the proclamation of the neutral State of which he is a member, and deprive himself of the right to protection from her, but the punishment of his offence is, by the general law of nations, left to the belligerent who has the right of capture. The offence is not cognizable by the municipal law of this country."⁴

Sir R. Phillimore, therefore, considered the conveyance of contraband to be an offence by international law. The Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, s. 150, to which Lord Westbury referred in *Ex parte Chavasse*, was repealed by the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876; cf. schedule. But by the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879,⁵ pt. 1, s. 8, the following goods

¹ *Times*, November 29, 1904.

² 34 L. J. Bk. 17.

³ *Ex parte Chavasse*, *In re Grazebrooke*, (1865) 34 L. J. N. S. 17, 20.

⁴ *The International*, (1871) 3 A. & E. 321, 336.

⁵ Stat. 42 & 43 Vict. c. 21.

may by proclamation or Order in Council be prohibited either to be exported or carried coastwise: "Arms, ammunition, and gunpowder, military and naval stores, and any articles which her Majesty shall judge capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the quantity of military or naval stores, provisions, or any sort of victual which may be used as food for man; and if any goods so prohibited shall be exported or brought to any quay or other place to be shipped for exportation from the United Kingdom or carried coastwise, or be waterborne to be so exported or carried, they shall be forfeited, and the exporter or his agent, or the shipper of any such goods, shall be liable to the penalty of one hundred pounds."

Exportation of
either absolute
or conditional
contraband
may be pro-
hibited by
Order in
Council under
Customs and
Revenue Act,
1879.

Although, therefore, the carriage of contraband is not normally prohibited by municipal law in this country, the power to issue a prohibition, not merely against the carriage of articles which are absolutely contraband, but even against the conveyance of provisions and other articles *ancipitis usus*, is conferred by the above provision. When this power is exercised by virtue of a statutory provision, or otherwise, the municipal law of this country will take cognizance of the conveyance of contraband. But it appears from the remarks of Lord Westbury, in the case above referred to, that the proclamation which is required to set the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879, pt. 1, s. 8, in operation is not the regular and normal Declaration of Neutrality issued by the British Government at the commencement of a war between foreign States. A perusal of the several letters Historicus wrote on the subject of contraband of war seems, on the whole, to justify the conclusion that he cannot be included among those writers who, like Professor T. E. Holland, affirm that the carriage of contraband is not an offence against international law. The indecisive attitude which he assumed on the point was in the main due to the fact that in 1863 the validity or invalidity of insurance on a contraband voyage had never been specifically decided in an English court of justice. It is now, however, clear that the point has been decided in the affirmative.¹ The action of *Ruys v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation* was brought to recover for a total loss of the steamship *Doeljuk* by capture on a valued policy covering war

Question
whether His-
toricus can be
cited as con-
cluding car-
riage of con-
traband is not
an offence.

By law of Eng-
land policy on
a contraband
venture now
valid.

¹ The following may give some idea of the difference between the view that was formerly entertained and the present view on this subject. Sir James Allan Park considered insurances upon contraband transactions necessarily void (Park on "Mar. Ins." (1842), 531, 548). Mr. Justice Story held underwriters were not liable unless object of voyage disclosed. Arnould observes that "the carriage of contraband goods, or voyages in breach of blockade, are not considered illegal (by municipal law), and it necessarily follows that insurances on such goods or voyages are not illegal" ("Marine Ins.", vol. ii. s. 760, ed. 1901).

risks. The steamer, which was carrying a cargo of arms and ammunition destined for the King of Abyssinia, who was then at war with the Italian Government, was captured by an Italian cruiser on August 8, 1896. After the commencement of the action the vessel was condemned by a prize court at Rome, but she was restored before trial in April next year on the ground that the war was over. The court held the defendants liable on the ground that the rights of the parties are ascertained in the actions as at the date of the writ.¹ It is curious to note that a perusal of the long line of authorities cited by Collins, M.R. (then Collins, J.), fully warrants the conclusion of Historicus, that no case had decided the validity of a policy of insurance in contraband goods in this country. But the important and very learned decision of the Master of the Rolls in *Ruys v. Royal Exchange*, etc., has finally set the question at rest, and has established the validity of a policy of insurance on a contraband transaction. Another and no less important consequence of the affair of the *Doejuk* is that it has permanently grafted on the law of contraband the doctrine of continuous voyage. It has, however, been seen, from the remarks of Sir W. Grant, M.R., in the case of the *William*, (1806) 5 Rob. 385, 405, referring to the case of the *Eagle*, that there exists some ground for supposing that the doctrine of continuous voyage was never considered inapplicable to the law of contraband, in spite of the statements in Hall² and Boyd's Wheaton³ to the contrary.

Mr. W. E. Hall indecisive on the topic. From the point of view of international law it is material to recollect that the late Mr. W. E. Hall, differing from Professor T. E. Holland, speaks of "the offence of transporting contraband goods."⁴

But Mr. W. E. Hall also employs an argument which suggests the other view. He twice insists on the doctrine that contraband goods are seized by a belligerent because of their noxious qualities, because of their nature, and not from the fact of transport or the act of the person carrying them. But this is to conclude in so many words that the carriage of contraband is not an offence by international law. An offence implies the commission of an act by an intelligent person. Inanimate commodities cannot commit offences or incur penalties. Again, since Mr. W. E. Hall considers that contraband goods are not seized because of the act of the person conveying them, it is clear that the latter does not incur a penalty because he is doing any wrong.

Mr. Hall also speaks of the right of the belligerent to intercept

¹ *Times*, June 1, 1897.

² "International Law," 4th ed., pp. 694, 695 and note.

³ *Ibid.*, 4th ed., p. 685. ⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th ed., pt. iv. c. v. p. 694; 5th ed., p. 668.

contraband as "a privilege." It is hardly consonant with the normal use of language to describe the right of an injured person to exact reparation as a privilege. If the belligerent's right to intercept is a privilege, the conveyance of contraband cannot be considered as an offence by international law. The criticism passed by Professor T. E. Holland on the language of the Proclamation of Neutrality, that persons engaging in contraband trade incur the high displeasure of the sovereign, recalls a criticism passed in the House of Lords in the seventeenth century on the definition of a pirate as *hostis humani generis*. The question was whether ships, to which James II., after his expulsion both from England and Ireland, had granted letters of marque, were pirates or privateers. Some lawyers with Jacobite sympathies, having argued that such vessels could not be pirates, because a pirate was *hostis humani generis*, it was objected to by one of the lords, who had sent for the civilians, that, if that were so, no one could ever have been a pirate. In the same way it might be asked, if a subject who conveys contraband to a belligerent is one who incurs "the high displeasure" of the neutral sovereign, whether, in fact, such a penalty had ever been incurred.

As far as the municipal law of this country is concerned, the offence of conveying contraband is unknown. But it is quite another thing to assert that the conveyance of contraband is no offence by international law. This conclusion seems to differ little, if at all, from that of Hübner, who considered that nothing could be contraband if the neutral State supplied both belligerents impartially. But Professor Despagnet of Bordeaux holds as clearly as Professor T. E. Holland that the carriage of contraband is not an offence against international law. The former observes, "La saisie de la contrebande de guerre étant une mesure de protection de la part des Etats belligérants et non la punition d'un delit."¹

In connection with Professor T. E. Holland's expression that the phrases of the Proclamation of Neutrality are of the nature of "misleading rhetoric,"² it is interesting to recall Historicus' observation that if international law prohibited the sale of contraband on neutral territory, the Queen's proclamation was "a most mischievous fraud on her Majesty's subjects," because it merely stated that the conveyance of contraband was prohibited by international law.³ But as Historicus totally differed from Hautefeuille and Sir R. P. Hillmore on this point, he clearly did

Historicus
and Prof. T. E.
Holland on
language of
Proclamation
of Neutrality.

¹ Cf. "Cours de Droit International Public," 2^e red., p. 713.

² *Times*, November 29, 1904.

³ Letters, "International Law," "On Neutral Trade in Contraband of War," p. 131.

not consider the Neutrality Proclamation a most mischievous fraud. On the contrary, in this passage Historicus spoke of the language of the Proclamation of Neutrality in terms of commendation, all the more remarkable as the identical phrases have incurred the disapprobation of Professor T. E. Holland. Sir W. V. Harcourt observed—

“The men who drew up this document knew what the law of nations was. Who does not see at a glance that the doctrine of the duty of neutrals and the responsibility of neutral governments is precisely that which is laid down in the authorities to which I have referred? What her Majesty’s subjects are warned against is the carrying of contraband to the belligerent, not the trade in contraband within their own territory. It is precisely the definition of Bynkershoek, ‘*Non recte vehamus, sine fraude vendimus.*’ It is the transportation and not the traffic which is unlawful. The nature of the penalty is pointed out with equal clearness and correctness, viz. the withdrawal of the Queen’s protection from the contraband on its road to the enemy, and an abandonment of the subject to the operation of belligerent rights.”¹

¹ Letters, “International Law,” “On Neutral Trade in Contraband of War,” p. 132.

APPENDIX B.

The Case of the "Caroline," the "Alabama," "Florida" (or "Oreto"), "Alexandra," and the "Caroline" (1837).

It is here proposed to make some reference to the departure of the confederate cruisers from the Mersey derived from a contemporary account in the *Times*, and to the case of the *Caroline* (1837).

Sir R. Phillimore thus briefly describes the earlier case of the *Caroline* (1837)—

"During the disturbances in Upper Canada, in the winter of 1837, a steamboat called the *Caroline*, belonging to an American owner, had been actively engaged in conveying arms and stores from the American side of the river to the Canadian rebels, who were in possession of Navy Island, and had been boarded in the night-time by a party of Canadian loyalists while she was lying within the jurisdiction of the territory of New York, set on fire, sent down the stream, precipitated over the Falls of Niagara, and dashed to pieces."¹

Other developments of this case have been discussed. The destruction of the *Caroline* exhibits a very close parallel to the destruction of the *Florida* in Bahia harbours by the Federal warship *Wachusett*. Further, the well-known circumstance that the *Florida* and *Alabama* were called pirates finds a precedent in the language of Mr. Fox, the British Ambassador at Washington in 1837, who described the *Caroline* to the American Minister of Foreign Affairs as a piratical vessel. Both in the case of the *Caroline* of 1837, and the *Florida* in 1864, a vessel engaged in operations of rebels was destroyed in the territorial waters of a neutral State. But Sir R. Phillimore shows that the United States were considerably in fault in the case of the *Caroline*. The British Ambassador complained that not only were the authorities at New York unable to maintain jurisdiction at the point where

¹ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 38, p. 50.

the *Caroline* was attacked, but even that they had allowed her crew to carry off cannon belonging to the State, with the object of employing it against the forces of the Queen in Canada. Although at the time the Neutrality Act of 1818 was in force in the United States, a piece of legislation panegyrized by Mr. Canning, no proceedings under it appear to have been instituted against those who dispatched and fitted out the vessel. There can be no doubt that the circumstances attending it constituted a gross infraction of neutrality, only to be rivalled by the Jameson Raid of 1895-96. Sir R. Phillimore deduces from the affair of the *Caroline* the rather startling conclusion that States organized under the Federal system are incompetent to discharge international obligations.

The circumstances attending the despatch of the famous *Alabama* are as follows. In a speech delivered by the late Earl of Selborne when Solicitor-General in the House of Commons he stated—

“On the 1st of July the Commissioners of Customs made their report to Lord Russell [about the *Alabama*]. They said it was evident that the ship was a ship of war. It was believed, and not denied, that she was built for a foreign Government; but the builders would give no information about her destination, and the Commissioners had no other reliable source of information on that point.”¹

Inasmuch as the seizure of the *Oreto* was due to the representations of the American Ambassador, it is interesting to recall the fact that one Granatelli was tried on the 5th of July, 1849, at the Central Criminal Court, before Coltman, J., for fitting out in this country ships of war to be employed against the Government of the King of Naples in Sicily. The defendant was acquitted. The case is not reported, but was mentioned by Pollock, C.B., during the voluminous and lengthy argument in *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 464.

The *Alexandra*, the vessel in question in the latter case, which came before the courts during the American Civil War, was released after having been seized by an officer of Customs in Liverpool at the Toxteth Dock on the 5th of April. Sir J. F. Stephen observes of this trial that a mass of international law supposed to be connected with the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, was discussed at it. The ground of the release of this vessel was that an incomplete equipment did not come within the Act. It seems, further, to have been considered that an unarmed vessel was merely contraband, and nothing more, and that as there was no international law prohibiting the supply of contraband, there was no infraction of neutrality committed in building the vessel.

¹ Hansard's “Parliamentary Debates,” vol. clxx. p. 50.

The commander of her Majesty's ship *Majestic*, stationed at Liverpool, stated that the *Alexandra* was certainly not intended for mercantile purposes; that she might be used as a yacht, and was easily convertible into a man-of-war.

Even after the revolution that has taken place in shipbuilding during the last forty years, the same doubt may exist whether a vessel under construction is intended for warlike or pleasure purposes. Warships disguised as yachts appear to afford the only instance where an article can be *ancipitis usus*, the alternative use to the belligerent use being luxury. As a general rule articles of pleasure are universally excepted from the taint of contraband, this being one of the few certain data in the question of contraband. But a yacht, easily convertible into a man-of-war, which was forty years ago regarded as merely contraband, may now be treated, in the light of the Geneva Award and legislation on the subject of Foreign Enlistment, as an article whose construction or despatch gives rise to international consequences in time of war. It is interesting to recall as an instance of Mr. Canning's prescience, that he extended the doctrine prohibiting the despatch or equipment of vessels in neutral ports intended for belligerent use to steam yachts and vessels which might be afterwards converted into men-of-war.¹ It is not usual to cite as an instance of Mr. Canning's statesmanship an anticipation of the grave consequences to this country which arose out of the troubled events of the American Civil War by the depredations of confederate cruisers. Yet as they were all vessels answering the description of steam yachts, his views on this subject may fairly be said to rival in foresight his confidence in the future of the Union.

It is further of interest to note the signal efficacy of the presumption as to evidence in the case of an illegal ship introduced by section 9 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870. In 1863, when no such onus was incumbent on the shipbuilder, the executive could obtain no information as to the destination of a ship under construction. This is made conclusive by the excerpts from the Parliamentary Papers given in the report of *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 466, 467. The Commissioners of Customs in Liverpool had no information either in the case of the *Alabama*, *Florida*, or *Alexandra* to give to Lord Russell which might throw any light on the destination of the vessels. How totally different a state of affairs now exists can be inferred from the leading article in the *Times* on the letter of Messrs. Yarrow that appeared in its columns,

¹ Cf. *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 466, and note referring to Mr. Huskisson's speeches, vol. iii. . 559.

December 3, 1904. Apparently the executive were notified on no less than four separate dates of all the circumstances attending the sale and despatch of the *Caroline*. (*Ibid.*) It is satisfactory to conclude that the effect of the enhanced stringency of legislation on the subject of Foreign Enlistment is indirectly to relieve the shipbuilder, whose trade is embarrassed, of any liability to either forfeiture or other proceedings under the Act of 1870. By giving notice he rids himself of liability.

APPENDIX C.

The Case of the "Caroline," International Law, the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, and the "Alabama."

WITH reference to the alleged purchase of a British torpedo boat, disguised as a yacht, from a shipbuilding yard in the Thames, the following contemporary account of the despatch of the *Alabama* in July, 1862, from the Mersey, may be of some interest. The account appeared in the *Liverpool Daily Post*, and was transcribed in the *Times*, January 15, 1863 :—

"On the 29th of July last the '290' (as the *Alabama* was at first called), with a party of ladies and gentlemen on board, left her anchorage, and spent the day, till 3 p.m., in cruising about the bay of Liverpool, when the passengers were put on board the tender, and the vessel proceeded to Moelfra Bay, close to where the *Royal Charter* was lost, where she anchored about 8 p.m. The next day she spent in securing everything for sea. A tug arrived at 5 p.m. with a lot of men to complete the crew, and from that time till 2.30 a.m. of Thursday (July 31) was occupied in shipping the crew. As soon as this was completed the '290' steamed off, at the rate of fourteen knots an hour, round the north coast of Ireland, arriving at her destination, Porto Praya Bay, Terceira, on Sunday, August 10, making a voyage of ten days. The commander of the '290' was Captain Mathew J. Butcher, R.N.R., who was the only person who appeared in any of the ship's business to others than the builders. Again, it is said the '290' had a set of English papers and other presumptive proofs of her neutrality, in the face of which it might have been difficult for a captor to have acted. So far is this from being a fact, the '290' had no papers whatever, having left without the formality of clearing at the Customs. . . . This celebrated vessel will give a good account of herself if she is overhauled by any of the United States ships of war. She has proved herself, whether under sail or steam, a marvel of marine architecture; but that is only what one would expect to find from the fame so justly achieved by her builders. One of the pluckiest things ever done was the removal of the *Ariel's* valve, thus rendering the ship entirely at the mercy of her captor. We may state that the

Ariel was built by Commodore Vanderbilt as a yacht, and in her he came over to England, and subsequently visited Russia. She is a sister ship to the *Vanderbilt*, and the two were considered the fastest steamers in the United States mercantile marine. The ruse with which the *Ariel* was overhauled shows that the *Alabama* is a splendid craft. We ought to state that the officers and crew of this famous warship are not, as has been represented, the scum of the earth. The officers are, many of them, accomplished gentlemen, and from previous experience well up to their work as naval officers, while the crew consist for the most part of old man-of-war's men and men who have served in the Royal Naval Reserve. The *Alabama* is supplied with coal by a regular relay of ships, which take out under inspection the very best Welsh coal."

Many of the circumstances attending the departure of the *Alabama* reproduced themselves recently, assuming the accuracy of the account in the *Times*, November 22, 26, 1904. The *Caroline* left the Thames, as the *Alabama* left the Mersey, disguised as a pleasure-boat, and presumably, like the *Alabama*, without papers. The circumstance that at noon, October 6, the *Caroline* started down the Thames at twenty-two knots, followed forty minutes later by a river police boat, may be compared to an incident occurring at the departure of the famous *Florida* from the Mersey in March, 1862. Mr. Adams made representations, at a private interview with Lord Russell, March 22, 1862, the very day the *Florida* sailed, which might have led to her detention in the Mersey if she had not already cleared. Again, the *Caroline*, like the *Alabama*, was unarmed when she departed from the shores of this country, and had neither received her fighting crew nor commission.

Even if the facts are correctly stated by the *Times*, it is far from clear that there has been any offence against international law. Mr. W. E. Hall, after pointing out that the usage on the subject is only in course of growth, observes—

"That in the meantime a ship of war may be built and armed to the order of a belligerent, and delivered to him outside neutral territory ready to receive a fighting crew; or it may be delivered to him within such territory, and may issue as belligerent property, if it is neither commissioned nor so manned as to be able to commit immediate hostilities, and if there is not good reason to believe that an intention exists of making such fraudulent use of the neutral territory as has been before indicated."¹

The case of *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, decided that an unarmed vessel was not within the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819. In spite of the acquittal of one defendant in *R. v. Sandoval*, (1887) 56 L. T. 526, it cannot be said that this

¹ Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 639.]

is an inference from the later Act of 1870, which has made it a crime to build a ship.

The circumstance above stated that the *Alabama* was supplied with regular relays of the best Welsh coal recalls the fact that Lord Lansdowne has recently addressed a letter to the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, to the Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, and to other associations, warning them that British vessels supplying the Russian fleet with coal might render those concerned to liability under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, ss. (3) (4). It is an inference from the decision in the case of the *International*, (1871) 3 H. & E. 321, that a ship employed in the service of a foreign belligerent State to lay down a submarine cable, the main object of which is, and is known to be, the subserving of the military operations of the belligerent State, is employed in the military or naval service of that State within the meaning of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870. But to supply the squadrons of a belligerent at sea with coal would appear to constitute a more obvious interposition in the war by a neutral than to assist in laying a submarine cable to subserve military operations.

APPENDIX D.

The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, and Coaling the Baltic Fleet with Welsh Coal.

The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, prohibited, semble, a British ship acting as tender to a war vessel of a belligerent Power.

A QUESTION of great interest arises in connection with the fact, that a large fleet of German vessels is engaged in supplying Welsh coals to the Russian fleet. As will be seen, such an act was prohibited even by the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819,¹ which was far less stringent than the Act of 1870. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 applies to foreigners, whether in the United Kingdom or the Queen's dominions.² A German steamer, the *Captain W. Menzell*, has accordingly been detained at Cardiff.

The status of a German vessel, following the Baltic Fleet to supply it with coal, seems peculiarly open to question in view of the fact that German vessels, throughout the war, have been continually sold to the Russian Government to be converted into auxiliary cruisers. In *Burton v. Pinkerton*, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, 343, 344, when a British vessel, before and during the war between Peru and Spain, acted under the directions of two Peruvian rams, Kelly, C.B., observed that such a vessel was almost exactly in the same position as one of the Peruvian war vessels she accompanied, and was doing much more than merely carrying contraband of war.

The case of the *Tuscaloosa*.

A German vessel, therefore, which follows the Baltic Fleet to supply it with coal, seems to become a tender—in other words, a ship of war. In 1863 the United States merchant-ship *Conrad* was captured by the *Alabama*. Her name was changed to the *Tuscaloosa*, and an officer and ten men, with two rifle twelve-pounder guns, were put on board, but her cargo of wool was not unshipped. She was then taken to the Cape of Good Hope, and the captain of the *Alabama* requested that she should be admitted into Simon's Bay as a tender of his vessel; in other words, as a ship of war. The Attorney-General of the colony gave it as his

¹ *Burton v. Pinkerton*, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340.

² Cf. "the general rules of construction," laid down by Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J., in *R. v. Jameson*, (1896) 2 Q. B. 425, 430.

opinion that she had been sufficiently set forth as a vessel of war to justify the local authorities in admitting her as such, and that her real character could only be determined in the courts of the captor's country. She was allowed, therefore, to enter the port and obtain provisions. On the 26th of December, 1863, the *Tuscaloosa* again put into Simon's Bay, and was this time seized by the local authorities. This, however, was considered unjustifiable by the Home Government. Whatever the character of the ship might have been during her first visit, she was treated as a ship of war, and was therefore entitled to expect the same treatment again, unless she received warning that a different course would be pursued. Accordingly, orders were sent out to release and deliver her up to some Confederate officer; but, as a matter of fact, she was never delivered up to that Government.¹

The Tribunal of Arbitration held at Geneva, September 14, 1872, decided with regard to the tenders of the *Alabama* and *Florida*—

"And so far as relates to the vessel called the *Tuscaloosa* (tender to the *Alabama*), the *Clarence*, the *Tacony*, and the *Archer*, such tenders or auxiliary vessels, being properly regarded as accessories, must necessarily follow the lot of their principals, and be submitted to the same decision which applies to them respectively."

The German vessels supplying the Baltic Fleet are auxiliary vessels, and it does not seem at all conclusive, from the case of the *Tuscaloosa*, that such vessels may not commit an infraction of neutrality, irrespective of the action of the ships to which they are attached.

In the highly exceptional circumstances of the late war, where neutral vessels were acting as tenders or auxiliary vessels to a belligerent fleet, an irritating incident might have arisen, not between either of the belligerents and a neutral State, but between neutral States. At the first blush it does not appear that we have anything but ourselves to blame for the severity of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The moral of the situation is summed up in the language of Mr. W. E. Hall, that "it is unwise for a people to enact or retain neutrality laws more severe than it believes the measure of its duty to compel."² If this view were entirely the correct one, we could not fairly blame the Germans. We should, on the contrary, only have ourselves to blame for having, by our domestic legislation, abandoned a profitable branch of maritime enterprise to another nation in time of peace, just as, in the eighteenth century, a mother-country, in time of war, voluntarily abandoned its colonial

According to Geneva Award, German vessels supplying Baltic Fleet with coal seem auxiliary vessels.

Action of German vessels has given rise to incident between neutrals.

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1904, p. 590.

² Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 637 and note.

Inconsistency
of action of
Germany.

commerce to the ships of a neutral State. The truth, however, is that there are grounds both for exception to the action of the Germans in supplying the Russian fleet with Welsh coal, and for complaining of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, by subsections of the section under which supplying coal to a belligerent fleet is prohibited, creates a new crime and embarrasses an important branch of British industry. It is instructive to observe the dereliction Germany has committed against the standard of neutral obligation which she sought, when belligerent in 1870, to impose upon this country.

Sir R. Phillimore observes, in a spirit of learned irony, that every one of the Powers composing the league known as the Armed Neutrality, for the maintenance of international justice upon the principles of the Russian edict, departed from the obligation which they had contracted as neutrals as soon as they became belligerents, and returned without shame or hesitation to the practice of the ancient law.¹

The observation of Junius that the character of the reputed ancestors of some men has made it possible for their descendants to be vicious in the extreme without being degenerate, has a certain bearing on international policy, since good faith may always be insisted on, Vattel observes, even between belligerent powers. It cannot be said, since Prussia joined the first Armed Neutrality,² that her late action, in supplying tenders to the Russian Baltic Fleet, was retrograde. But this plea is not good to defend, or even excuse, an infraction of neutral obligation.

In 1870 Germany made an extravagant claim that the English Government should prohibit the export of coal to France. This country declined to accede to the request, and merely prohibited vessels from sailing with supplies directly consigned to the French Fleet in the North Sea.³ In 1904 Germany, now a neutral State, permits a large portion of her mercantile marine to engage in the worst form of the identical trade she sought in 1870, when belligerent, to prohibit the subjects of a neutral State from engaging in, even in an innocuous form. *Pollitus meliora, tendis?* The weakness of a State affords some excuse for inconsistent policy; and Korea, which at the present time maintains diplomatic relations with one belligerent, although after the commencement of hostilities it ratified a treaty by which it became a mere dependency of the other belligerent, affords a typical instance of the difficulty of the position of a weak neutral. But the flagrant infraction of neutrality

¹ Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 191, p. 276.

² Ibid., vol. iii. p. 275.

³ Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 686.

connived at by the German Government is rendered more grave by her strength and influence.

Municipal legislation on the subject of neutrality does not International law and govern questions between countries whose duties are solely municipal law occupy regulated by international law. Sir J. F. Stephen points out that the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, had nothing to do with the *Alabama* affair, regarded as an international incident. The American complaint was equally well or ill founded, whether the Foreign Enlistment Act did or did not enable the Government to prevent British harbours from being turned into naval stations for the Confederates.¹ Sir Alexander Cockburn, in his reasons for dissenting from the Geneva Award (Parl. Papers, "N. America" (1783) (No. 2), p. 29), observed that municipal laws on the subject of neutrality, which any particular State may be pleased to enact, do not constitute the standard of that nation's neutral obligation. The international obligations of a neutral State are clearly to be measured by an absolute, and not by a relative, standard.

"Municipal law, if not co-extensive with the international law, will afford no excuse to the neutral, so neither on the other hand, if in excess of what international obligations exact, will it afford any right to the belligerent which international law would fail to give him."

But it cannot be doubted that an international obligation exists prohibiting neutral vessels from acting as coal tenders to a belligerent fleet, and German municipal legislation on the subject, reflecting faithfully such an obligation, might well be invoked by Japan. Less than half a century ago the Prussian Government incorporated in its Code of Municipal Law an article prohibiting the carriage by its subjects to any other nation of contraband, consisting of munitions of war, or of articles forbidden by treaties of the nations to whom it is carried.²

It has been shown in another part of this work that coal is a subject of very limited usage, since the development of steam power at sea is later than the American Civil War. In view of the course she adopted in 1870, Germany cannot plead that she has not recognized any usage on the subject of the supply of coal to a belligerent fleet. The limited nature of the international usage with regard to coal, of course, accounts for the fact that in 1857 it was not in the category of the contraband articles which Prussian subjects were prohibited at that date from exporting.

¹ "Hist. Crim. Law," vol. iii. c. xxxi. p. 261.

² Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 283, p. 381, referring to *Preußisches Landrecht*, bk. ii. s. 2034, p. 416.

Coal merely
subject of a
limited usage,

But Germany
has already
acceded to it.

Germany has never indicated she accedes to principles of Geneva Conference, 1872.

It must be added that Mr. W. E. Hall does not enumerate Germany in the category of the States which have acceded to the international usage prohibiting the construction and outfit of vessels intended for the naval or military use of a belligerent in neutral harbours. This is sufficiently obvious from the fact that German subjects, if not the German Government itself, sold, during the late war, powerful auxiliary cruisers directly to the Russian Government. The disregard of neutral obligation exhibited by the German Government in 1904, in permitting German vessels to supply coals to a belligerent, after her belligerent pretensions in 1870, constitutes nothing less than an international fraud, as Lord Stowell treated all flagrant cases of contraband, on the injured belligerent Japan.

The following letter has, by direction of the Marquis of Lansdowe, been addressed to the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, to the Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, and to certain other associations:—

“Foreign Office, November 25, 1904.

Communiqué
of British
Foreign Office,
November 25,
1904

“SIR,—On the 25th ultimo a letter was received by the Foreign Office from Messrs. Woods, Tyler, and Brown, asking whether it was permissible ‘for British shipowners to charter their boats for such purposes as following the Russian fleet with coal supplies;’ and, by the Marquess of Lansdowne’s directions, they were informed that ‘it is not permissible for British owners to charter their vessels for such a purpose.’

“In view of the numerous inquiries which have been addressed to his Majesty’s Government on this subject, I am instructed to explain that action of the kind described in Messrs. Wood’s letter might render those concerned liable to proceedings under subsections 3 and 4 of the 8th section of ‘The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.’¹ This section, so far as is material, runs as follows:—

“(8) If any person within her Majesty’s dominions, without the licence of her Majesty, does any of the following acts; that is to say—

“(3) Equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State; or,

“(4) Dispatches, or causes or allows to be dispatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State:

“Such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue:—

“(1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court

¹ 33 & 34 Vict. c. 90.

before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

"(2) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed, and her equipment, shall be forfeited to her Majesty.

"The interpretation clause, section 30, defines 'naval service' and 'equipping' as follows :—

"'Naval service' shall, as respects a person, include service as a marine, employment as a marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course of a ship of war or other ship, when such ship of war or other ship is being used in any military or naval operation, and any employment whatever on board a ship of war, transport store-ship, privateer, or ship under letters of marque ; and as respects a ship, include any user of a ship as a transport, store-ship, privateer, or ship under letters of marque.

"'Equipping' in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing of a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or for naval service, and all words relating to equipping shall be construed accordingly.

"'Ship and equipment' shall include a ship and everything in or belonging to a ship."

A similar question arose in 1870 during the Franco-German War, and on the 1st of August of that year a question on the subject was put to and answered by Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister. The Foreign Enlistment Act then in force was that of 1819,¹ containing provisions similar, upon this point, to those of the Act of 1870, which was about to replace it, and which received the Royal assent on the 9th of August. The question and answer were as follows :—

"Mr. Stapleton asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether his attention had been called to the report that the French Fleet in the Baltic is to be supplied with coal direct from this country ; whether it would be consistent with neutrality to allow any vessels, either French, English, or others, to carry coal direct from this country to a belligerent fleet at sea ; and whether English vessels so engaged would be entitled to the protection of their country if the other belligerent should treat them as enemies, considering them part of the armament to which they were acting as tenders ?

"Mr. Gladstone replied : 'Sir, the House has already been apprised, on more than one occasion, that there is nothing in a general way to prevent the exportation of coal from this country. If either of the belligerents capture those vessels supplying coal, the question whether it is contraband of war will be a question for the consideration of the court of the captors. But the honourable gentleman has called attention to a particular case ; and although the exportation of coal is not generally prohibited,

¹ 59 Geo. III. cap. 69.

exporters being warned that if it be supplied to either of the belligerents they run the risk of capture, yet of course the case reported, which I can neither affirm nor deny, as I have no more knowledge of it than he has—that is to say, the knowledge derived from general rumour—presents itself under a somewhat different aspect, and in that form the question has been referred to the Law Officers of the Crown. They have given their opinion, which we have adopted, that if colliers are chartered for the purpose of attending the fleet of a belligerent, and supplying that fleet with coal for the purpose of enabling it to pursue its hostile operations, such colliers would, to all practical intents and purposes, become store-ships to that fleet, and if that fact were established they would be liable, if within reach, to the operation of the English law under the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. It will be the duty of the Government, and they will act upon that duty when such reports arise, to institute searching inquiries into the existence of any such cases.

"Although therefore neutral traders may carry on trade even in contraband with belligerent subjects to the risk of capture of their goods, it is necessary that such traders should bear in mind the condition of the law of this country as set forth in the foregoing enactments, which, moreover, have been applied recently by Orders in Council in British Protectorates, and also in countries where the King exercises extra-territorial jurisdiction over his own subjects.

"I am, etc.,
"(Signed)

F. A. CAMPBELL."

From the *Times*, November 28, 1904:—

"There have been two cases where proceedings have been taken in the Admiralty Court under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, against a vessel which was alleged to have been an illegal ship under the eighth section.

"In the case of the *International*, (1871) 3 A. & E. 321, the vessel was seized by officers of her Majesty's Customs when lying in the Thames, December 21, 1870, under the power conferred on the Secretary of State by the s. 23 of the Act. Sir J. F. Stephen points out that 'extensive powers to seize suspected ships were given under the Act of 1870 (see sections 19–20), whereas the Act of 1819 dealt with the subject slightly, and in a manner shown by experience to be inadequate.' " (See s. 7, end.)¹

Under the Act of 1870 it is not necessary to institute criminal proceedings when proceedings in admiralty have been instituted against the ship (s. 20), and the Secretary of State can detain the ship without instituting proceedings against the ship.² In the case of the *International*, the ship was merely detained, without

¹ "Hist. Crim. Law," vol. iii. p. 262.

² S. 23, and cf. observations of Sir R. Phillimore in the *International*, (1871) 3 A. & E. 321, 333.

any proceedings being instituted for its forfeiture, and the owners made an application in pursuance of the 23rd section of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, for the release of the ship and cargo. The head-note to the case states that at a time when there was war between France and Germany, an English company entered into a contract with the French Government to lay down in the sea a series of telegraph cables between certain places on the French coast. The places on the coast between which the cables were to be laid were so situated that, by means of short telegraph lines carried over land, the series of cables could be united in one line, and be made to afford complete telegraphic communication between Dunkerque and Verdun. The company having shipped the telegraph cables on board a steamship belonging to them, specially fitted for the purpose of laying submarine cables, were, during the continuance of the war, about to dispatch the steamship from the port of London to lay down the cables according to the contract, when the steamship was, by order of one of her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, detained upon the ground that it was about to be dispatched contrary to the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870. On a motion for the release of the ship it was proved, to the satisfaction of the court, that the undertaking in which the ship was about to be engaged was of a commercial character; that the object of the contract was to furnish ordinary postal telegraphy, and that the company were not parties, directly or indirectly to any project for adapting the line of cable to military purposes. It was held that the company were entitled to have the ship released. Although the court considered it probable that the line, when completed, would be partially used for effecting communication between the armies of France, it held that such probability was not sufficient to divest the line of its primary commercial character, or to clothe the service to be rendered by the ship with the character of a "military or naval service" within the meaning of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.

It appears from the judgment of Sir R. Phillimore that if any criminal or admiralty proceedings had been instituted in the *International*, subsection 4 of section 8, one of the subsections mentioned in the *communiqué* of the Foreign Office, November, 1904, would have been regarded as relevant. That subsection, it will be remembered, prohibits the dispatch of a vessel with the intention, etc., that it will be employed in the military or naval service of a foreign State at war with a friendly State. It is regarded as an implicit inference from this case by the learned reporter that the *International* would not have been released if the postal telegraphic line, for which telegraph cables were shipped on board the *International*, had borne a primary and paramount military character. No order was made as to costs and damages.

The case of
the *Gauntlet*,
(1872) 4
Privy Council
Cases, 184.

Another case, tried under the same subsection prohibiting the dispatching of a ship, etc., also arose out of the events of the Franco-German War. The facts given in evidence in the case of the *Gauntlet*, (1872) 4 Privy Council Cases, 184, were that a French ship of war captured in the English Channel a Prussian ship as prize of war. A prize crew under a French naval officer was put on board. The prize ship being driven by stress of weather into the Downs, anchored within British waters, and after lying there two days the French Consul at Dover engaged an English steam-tug, then lying in the Downs, to tow the captured ship from British waters to a port of the captors, and under such agreement the tug towed the prize to Dunkirk Roads. In a suit instituted on behalf of the Crown for condemnation of the tug for violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, s. 8, the judge of the Court of Admiralty held that no offence had been committed under that statute, as the steam-tug was not employed in the military or naval service of France, as declared by the 8th section of the Act, and dismissed the suit, condemning the Crown in costs. On appeal it was held by the Judicial Committee (reversing such decree) that the engagement by the owners of the tug for the express purpose of towing the detached prize crew, its prisoners and prize vessel, speedily and safely to French waters, where the prisoners and prize would be taken charge of by the French authorities, and the prize crew set free, was dispatching a ship, within the meaning of s. 8 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, for the purpose of taking part in the naval service of a belligerent, and condemned the tug as a forfeiture to the Crown.

This case further seems to establish that the Court of Admiralty has no power, under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 23, to condemn the Crown in costs. The Act says that—

“If the court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and probable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appear in the course of the proceedings, the court shall have power to declare that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the court, and any amount so assessed shall be payable by the commissioners of the treasury out of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose.”

In the case of the *Gauntlet*, the Solicitor-General¹ argued that this provision did not empower the Court of Admiralty to condemn the Crown in costs. It is a rule that where there is no statutory enactment applicable, the Crown cannot be condemned in costs. Under the ordinary jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, costs

¹ Sir George Jessel.

cannot be given against the Crown unless the Attorney-General is a party. James, L.J., however, declined to decide the point whether the Court of Admiralty has power to condemn the Crown in costs under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, as he had not the assistance of the arguments on the other side.¹ The expression in the Act (s. 23) that the owner of the vessel, where there was no probable cause for the detention, shall be awarded compensation out "of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose," seems hardly capable of being construed as a provision expressly empowering the Court of Admiralty to condemn the Crown in costs.

Although there was no provision in the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, corresponding to the above, and it might be inferred there was no power conferred on the Admiralty Court under that Act to condemn the Crown in costs, Lord Palmerston, speaking presumably on the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown, declared that he entertained great doubts whether the Crown would not have been liable to considerable damages if the *Alabama* had been seized.² In *R. v. Sandoval, Baird, & Call*, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411, 419, A. & L. Smith, M.R.,³ alluded to "the very able argument of Mr. Finlay" on sects. 8, 11, of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870. It may be observed that in his address to the jury for Sir W. Call, Sir R. B. Finlay, A.G. (then Finlay, K.C.), frequently alluded to cases occurring under the previous Act of 1819. A case which seems to afford a singularly close analogy in its facts to that of British shipowners chartering their boats for the purpose of following the Russian fleet with coal supplies was that of *Burton v. Pinkerton*, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340. The case was not tried under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, a circumstance, however, which does not affect the weight of the decided opinion expressed in that case. It is further of importance as establishing that where the contract with a seaman is to employ him free from any other perils than those which are incidental to an ordinary voyage for commercial purposes, but he is, in fact, employed as a seaman on a tender to the war vessels of a belligerent, the master or captain commits a breach of contract in exposing the seaman to extraordinary and unforeseen dangers. The evidence of the plaintiff, which was uncontroverted, was stated by Kelly, C.B., to be as follows :—

"At the time when the vessel quitted England, war had not

¹ *The Gauntlet*, (1872) 4 Privy Council Cases, 184, 194.

² "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates," vol. clxx. p. 91, referred to in *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) Q. H. & C. 431, 467.

³ Then A. L. Smith, J.

actually broken out between Peru and Spain, but on the 25th of February, 1866, war was declared, and was notified in the *Gazette*, and on the 13th of March the Queen's Proclamation enjoining strict neutrality was also published in the *Gazette*. It appears upon the evidence alike of the plaintiff and defendant that the ship took in a cargo of coals and provisions, together with 130 casks of ammunition, and two launches, one of them a steam launch, before she left the river. After touching at some places on the English coasts he came into the harbour of Brest, and was then joined by the *Independencia*, one of the two rams belonging to the Peruvian Government. She then went to Madeira, where she was joined by the *Independencia* and the other ram, called the *Huasca*, and there put 150 tons of coal on board the *Independencia*. She then left Madeira in company with the two rams, and rockets for signals were put on board the rams. The vessels next reached St. Vincent, signals passing between the rams and the *Thames*—the vessel in question. At St. Vincent the second launch was put over the ship's side into the *Independencia*, and two boats belonging to the *Huasca* were taken on board the *Thames*. From thence the *Thames* went to Pedro Bay, twelve miles south-west of St. Vincent, the two rams arriving shortly after her, and there she put on board one of the rams the 130 cases of ammunition. Thence she proceeded to Rio, where she arrived on the 31st of March, the two rams arriving there on the following day. Two days afterwards one of the rams sailed out of Rio, and captured and brought in as prize a Spanish brig, which was afterwards taken out and burnt. The admissions of the master or commander of the vessel showed that by charter-party it was intended that the vessel should be employed by the Peruvian Government, although she was nominally chartered for all lawful services and employments for twelve months. The charter-party contemplated that the vessel might be damaged or burnt by any enemy of Peru, in which case the charterers were to pay the company to which the vessel belonged £45,000. The master further admitted in evidence that several members of the crew, on arrival at Rio, insisted that the voyage was illegal, and desired to be put on shore. He also admitted that he told the consul that his destination was Callao, but that it was understood he was to act in all respects under the directions of the rams belonging to the Peruvian Government. The plaintiff left the ship at Rio, and was imprisoned as a Peruvian deserter for ten days. When he came out of prison the ship had gone, carrying some of his clothes on board of her. The jury awarded damages both for the imprisonment and the loss of clothes. There were two branches of the decision—(1) On the breach of contract; (2) on damages for imprisonment and loss of clothes."

On the first branch it was held *per* Kelly, C.B., Martin, and Piggott, B.B. (Bramwell, B., doubting), that the defendant must be taken to have engaged the plaintiff for an ordinary voyage, and that the plaintiff was entitled to treat as a breach of contract the defendant's employment of him on a voyage which would

expose him to greater danger than he originally had reason to anticipate. Kelly, C.B., observed "that if it were necessary to decide the question, I should hold that to serve on board a vessel used as a store-ship in aid of a belligerent, the fitting out of which to be so used is an offence within the seventh section, is 'serving on board a vessel for a warlike purpose in aid of a foreign state' within the second section."¹

On the second branch of the decision it was held *per Martin, Bramwell, and Channell, BB.* (Kelly, C.B., dissenting), that the damages for the imprisonment at Rio and loss of clothes were too remote to be recoverable. This case is instructive in several ways. It seems, in the first place, difficult to conceive a case more like that of a British ship, at the present time, following the Russian fleet to supply it with coal than that of the vessel in *Burton v. Pinkerton*, which acted in all respects under the direction of the rams belonging to the Peruvian Government during the war between Peru and Spain in 1866. The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, like the Act of 1870 now in force, contained sections which exclusively relate to a state of war. In *Burton v. Pinkerton (supra)* the ship was fitted out before the declaration of war, and this circumstance rendered the offence against the seventh section of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 incomplete. This consideration would clearly not apply to the case of a British or German vessel supplying Welsh coal to the Baltic Fleet.

A similar question arose in the case of the *Justitia*, the vessel in question in *R. v. Sandoval, Baird, & Call*, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411, a case tried, but dismissed under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, ss. (3). Eighteen out of twenty counts of a joint indictment formulated upon s. 8 came to an end on Sir R. B. Finlay, A.G. (then Finlay, K.C.), having pointed out that that section only applies when there is a foreign State at war with a friendly State. The eighth section refers and applies to a contemporaneous state of belligerency, and not to a subsequent one.² In his famous summing-up in *R. v. Jameson*, Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J., observed that the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, are divisible into those that deal with a state of war, this country being at peace, and those that deal with a state of peace. The eighth section—the illegal ship-building section—falls under the former category; the eleventh section—the section relating to illegal expeditions—falls under the latter. In *R. v. Sandoval*, a defendant who was acquitted under the eighth was convicted under the eleventh section.

¹ *Burton v. Pinkerton*, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, 348.

² *R. v. Sandoval, Baird, & Call*, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411, 414, 416.

R. v. Sandoval, Baird, & Call, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411, as regards the offence of preparing an illegal expedition.

The facts in *R. v. Sandoval* were that the defendant, who was a foreigner, while residing in England purchased at Sheffield two Krupp guns, and at Birmingham a quantity of ammunition, and then caused the guns and ammunition to be shipped on board a trading ship for Antwerp, where they arrived, and where at the same time arrived the *Justitia*, which had been purchased also in England by another person in the name of that other's valet. The *Justitia* was then loaded at Antwerp with guns and ammunition. She took on board a number of generals and Sandoval, who asserted himself to be the commander, and sailed with "machinery for mines" and papers for Trinidad. Not being permitted to enter port at Trinidad, she sailed towards Grenada, and then the valet executed a transfer of the ship to one of the generals, whereupon the British flag was hauled down and the Venezuelan flag hoisted; the guns were mounted, the boats swung out-board, and boats full of armed men taken in tow. The *Justitia*—renamed the *Liberata*—proceeded along the Venezuelan coast, had an engagement with a Venezuelan war-vessel, fired at some forts and a custom-house, and finally went to St. Domingo, where she was seized by the authorities.¹ On these facts, as has been mentioned, the defendant Sandoval was convicted of preparing an illegal expedition, and was sentenced to one month's imprisonment and a fine of £500.

Burton v. Pinkerton, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, 348,

In *Burton v. Pinkerton, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, 348*, Kelly, C.B., concluded that even if the continued user of the *Thames* as a store-ship after the declaration did not bring the ship within the seventh section of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, he was of opinion that so to employ the vessel was a breach of a contract to employ a seaman upon an ordinary commercial voyage. The fact that a vessel may be so employed as to constitute a breach of contract with the members of the crew without the committing of an offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act, seems of great interest at this moment. A seaman who, fully conscious of the nature of his employment, engaged in a British vessel chartered to follow the Russian fleet with coal supplies, would clearly be liable to criminal proceedings. But if engaged under a contract which, like that in *Burton v. Pinkerton, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, 348*, admitted of being construed as a contract for employment free from any other perils than such as were incidental to a voyage for ordinary commercial purposes, it is implicit from that decision that a member of the crew could obtain damages as for breach of contract if employed on a British vessel chartered to follow the Russian Fleet with coal supplies.

Section 19 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 (33 & 34

¹ Wheaton's "International Law," ed. 1904, p. 610.

Vict. c. 90), provides that the Court of Admiralty shall, in addition to any power given to the court by the Act, have, in respect of any ship or other matter brought before it in pursuance of the Act, all powers which it has in the case of a ship or matter brought before it in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. Where a cause is instituted, therefore, under the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, against a ship in respect of which an offence is alleged to have been committed, the court may, with the consent of the Crown, order the ship to be released on bail. Accordingly, the release of the ship on bail was ordered in the case of the *Gauntlet*, (1871) 3 A. & E. 319. Sir R. Phillimore observed that—

"I incline to the opinion that I have power to order this vessel to be released on bail without any consent on the part of the Crown; but I entertain no doubt that I have power to do so with the consent of the Crown; and, as the Crown has given its consent, I shall order the vessel to be released on bail being given for the full value of the vessel and her equipment" (p. 320).

The application of the Crown for bail for costs was refused. The vessel was the same as that which, as has been seen, was subsequently condemned for towing the prize of a French ship of war from the Downs to Dunkirk Roads.

The only other case of an indictment under the eighth section of *R. v. Sandoval*, the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, *R. v. Sandoval, Baird, & Call*, etc., *supra*, as regards the offence of dispatching an illegal ship. (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411, is also of importance as showing that under the subsection of the Act prohibiting the equipment of a vessel the cardinal point is the intention of the belligerent or neutral trader, and not the character of the vessel. The vendor of the vessel, in giving his evidence, said he would have been very sorry to have purchased the *Justitia* for warlike purposes. In the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, where it was held the vessel became an illegal expedition under s. 11, Wills, J., observed that "the expedition was not of a character to seriously affect our relations with a foreign Power."¹ The late Mr. W. E. Hall, speaking of the international usage prohibiting the construction and outfit of vessels intended for belligerent use in neutral ports, observes that jurists plant the foundation of the doctrine upon the intent of the belligerent agent or of the neutral trader, and not upon the character of the vessel.²

In *Attorney-General v. Sillem*, (1863) 2 H. & C. 431, 531, Lord Bramwell (then Bramwell, B.) declined to treat the Foreign

¹ *R. v. Sandoval*, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 436, 438.

² "International Law," 4th ed., pt. iv. c. iii. p. 640.

Enlistment Act, 1819, as "a mere enforcement of international law." This was in reference to the seventh section of the Act of 1819, forbidding the equipment of vessels intended for belligerent use, when this country was at peace. Even after the adverse award of the Geneva Conference, it remains true that the illegal ship-building section of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, cannot be regarded as an enforcement of international law. But as far as the ship-building section is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that it is an enforcement in terms of an inchoate international usage, prohibiting the construction and outfit of vessels intended for belligerent use in neutral ports.

Mr. W. E. Hall points out that this usage is only in course of growth, and is not yet old enough or quite wide enough to bind countries who have not acceded to it. Still, in 1888 it was adopted by the most important maritime Powers. But since then Germany has joined the ranks of important maritime Powers, and there is not the slightest evidence that she had voluntarily acceded to the usage which, therefore, cannot be supposed to bind her.

Lord Bramwell considered that the Act of 1819 permitted some things which are, and prohibited some things which are not, prohibited by international law. The ship-building section of the Act of 1870, now in force, falls under the category of a prohibition not existing by international law. On the other hand, both the Act of 1819 and that of 1870, in their sections treating of illegal expeditions, constitute mere enforcements of international law. Lord Russell, in the trial at bar of Dr. Jameson and his officers, observed that, according to the territoriality of sovereignty, the fundamental principle of international law, it meant war if, two nations being at peace, one permits its territory to be made the basis of a hostile military expedition into the territories of the other. The illegal expedition sections of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, according to any construction of international obligation, merely prohibit what international law prohibits.

It is, further, of great importance that, according to "the general rules" laid down by Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J., in his rulings on the Area of the Operation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, the Act applies to all the persons in the United Kingdom or in the dominions of the Crown, including foreigners who, during their residence there, owe temporary allegiance to the sovereign.¹ There seems therefore to be no doubt that the case of German vessels shipping coal at Cardiff to supply the Russian Baltic Fleet comes within the operation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, ss. (3) (4). For this there are clearly three irrefragable reasons—

¹ Cf. *The Queen v. Jameson and others*, (1896) vol. ii. Q. B. 425, 430.

(1) It has been seen that even under the previous Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, admittedly less stringent than the present Act, the act of supplying coal to the warships of a belligerent was an offence when the vessel followed the warships, and the master and crew were British sailors.¹

(2) There is a state of war existing between the two foreign countries, and therefore the facts of the present case do not cause the exception to arise from a state of war not existing at the date of the despatch of the vessel that was raised both in *Burton v. Pinkerton*, (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 340, and *R. v. Sandoval*, (1887) 3 T. L. R. 411.

(3) The German colliers are engaged in shipping coal at a well-known port in the United Kingdom, and therefore Lord Russell of Killowen's "general rules of construction" apply, by which the operation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, extends to foreigners in the United Kingdom or the dominions of the Crown, who, during their residence here, owe a temporary allegiance to the sovereign, in respect to acts done by them in the United Kingdom or the Queen's dominions.

In *R. v. Sandoval* the defendant, an alien, was convicted and sentenced, as has been noticed, although it was expressly admitted by Day, J., in the Court of Crown Cases Reserved that he was not guilty of having infringed the Act in this country.² But the defendant, after having bought both guns and ammunition in England, superintended the loading of them on a British ship at Antwerp. Further, shortly after leaving Antwerp the defendant, on the high seas, asserted himself to be the leader of the expedition against Venezuela. When these acts were done the *Justitia* had the regular papers of a British ship and was owned by a British subject. In *R. v. Sandoval*, therefore, the Act operated on the doctrine of the territoriality of the merchant vessel. Historicus, who severely criticized the doctrine,³ expressly admitted that a merchant vessel on the high seas in time of peace was like territory; and, as has been noticed, there was not a state of war existing at the date of the despatch of the *Justitia*, and therefore the vessel was not an illegal ship under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, ss. (3), though she was ultimately seized as a pirate at San Domingo and detained there for some time.

¹ *Burton v. Pinkerton, supra.*

² *R. v. Sandoval*, (1887) 56 L. T. Rep. 526, 528.

³ Letters, "International Law," 201, 204.

APPENDIX E.

The Case of the "Calchas" and the Case of the "Cheltenham."

THE facts in the case of the *Calchas* were as follow: The vessel, on a voyage from Paget Sound, bound to ports in Japan and China, was, on July 25, seized by the Vladivostock squadron on the ground that she carried contraband of war, and was taken to Vladivostock. Her cargo consisted of flour, cotton, and hewn beams. The prize court decided that the flour which she had on board for Japan was contraband, and that the same should be confiscated, and the steamer released and allowed to carry the balance of her cargo to Hong-Kong. The Russian Crown Advocate gave notice that he would appeal against the decision of their own prize court, and Messrs. Alfred Holt and Co., Liverpool, the managers of the line, now learn that this appeal was made on the ground that among the mail matter by the *Calchas* from America to Japan was information addressed by the Japanese officials containing financial news of especial value to the enemy. Messrs. Holt and Co. caused this information to be telegraphed to their agents at Tacoma, with instructions to give the United States Post Office notice that as a consequence they refused to carry in their steamers any United States mail for Japan. The *Calchas* was detained at Vladivostock, and, according to current information, still remains there. Meanwhile the port has become closed by ice.¹

The hardship of this decision is shown by cursory reference to the principles of the law of contraband. The case of the *Calchas* is the case of a mail steamer, a class of vessel as to which Mr. W. E. Hall observed in 1888 that "much tenderness would no doubt now be shown in a naval war to them and their contents,"² substantially confiscated for the carriage of provisions, and this although the belligerent who captured the vessel, two months afterwards, declared that provisions were merely conditionally contraband. As Vladivostock is now an ice-bound port, the vessel

¹ *Times*, October 11, 1904.

² Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 703.

would have been confiscated for several months, even if the Admiralty Court at St. Petersburg had decided to release her. In case of salvage, it has always been considered that one element in computing the amount of a salvage award due to a vessel belonging to a well-known line is the dislocation of the service of the line which the salvage service rendered by the vessel involves. If ever captors were guilty "of wilful misconduct and vexation," to employ the language of Lord Stowell, it is in the case of the *Calchas*. The loss occasioned by the dislocation of the service of a line like the Holt line to Japan, by withdrawing a large steamer for the greater part of a year, cannot fail to be enormous.

The full consideration of the case of the *Calchas* touches two much-vexed questions of the law of contraband. The first question raised is whether provisions are absolute or unconditional contraband. At the time of the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court, Russia swept into the class of absolute contraband even provisions. It has been seen that, among authorities, Loccenius is the only writer who treats provisions as generally contraband, though Vattel may be considered to have laid himself open to the suspicion of having done so. This subject has been fully discussed, and it has also been shown that, in consequence of the British protest of August 2, Russia receded from the untenable position she occupied in classing provisions as absolute contraband. It was observed in the *Times* that, in regard to the question of contraband, the present position of Russia on the one side and Great Britain and the United States on the other is this—food stuffs alone have been formally declared to be conditional contraband. Russia has notified Great Britain that she has no intention of departing from her original view that coal is contraband.¹ What right Russia has to claim that, according to her original view, coal is contraband can best be inferred from the circumstance, already mentioned, that during the West African Conference of 1884 she took occasion vigorously to dissent from the inclusion of coal amongst articles contraband of war, and declared that she would categorically refuse her consent to any articles in any treaty, convocation, or instrument whatever which would imply its recognition as such.² This is placing rather too high a reliance on the maxim of Grotius, "Distinguendus erit belli status." It was further observed in the *Times* that Count Lamsdorff is prepared to give, if he has not actually given, the British Government the assurance of Russia's desire to apply the

¹ *Times*, September 26, 1904.

² Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 636, referring to Parliamentary Papers, "Africa," No. iv., 1885, 132.

rule—of classing coal and other articles *ancipiū usus* which are not provisions as absolute contraband—with the greatest leniency. New instructions to prize courts and naval commanders are capable of a very wide and liberal interpretation as regards other articles besides provisions, and that it is the intention of the Russian Government that they should be interpreted in that way.

The leading case in our Reports on despatches being contraband of war is the *Atalanta*, (1808) 6 Rob. 440.¹ The judgment of Lord Stowell in this case is a storehouse of learning, eloquence, and lucid exposition, and may be fairly claimed as one of his greatest judgments. After having pointed out that it was proved that there were public despatches on board, that the fact was known to the master and supercargoes, who had endeavoured to conceal it, Lord Stowell proceeded—

“The question then is, What are the legal consequences attaching to such a criminal act? For that it is criminal and most noxious is scarcely denied. What might be the consequences of a simple transmission of despatches, I am not called upon by the necessities of the present case to decide, because I have already pronounced this to be a fraudulent case. That the simple carrying of despatches, between the colonies and the mother-country of the enemy, is a service highly injurious to the belligerent, is most obvious. In the present state of the world, in the hostilities of the European Powers, it is an object of great importance to preserve the connection between the mother-country and the colonies, and to interrupt that connection, on the part of the other belligerent, is one of the most energetic operations of war. The importance of keeping up that connection, for the concentration of troops, and for various military purposes, is manifest, and, I may add, for the supply of civil assistance also, and support, because the infliction of civil distress, for the purpose of compelling a surrender, forms no inconsiderable part of the operations of war. It is not to be argued, therefore, that the importance of these despatches might relate only to the civil wants of the colony, and that it is necessary to show a military tendency, because the object of compelling a surrender being a measure of war, whatever is conducive to that event must also be considered, in the contemplation of law, as an object of hostility, although not produced by operations strictly military. How is this intercourse with the mother-country kept up in time of peace? By ships of war, or by packets in the service of the State. If a war intervenes, and the other belligerent prevails to interrupt that communication, is any person stepping in to lend himself to the same purpose, under the privilege of an ostensible neutral character? Nor let it be supposed that it is an act of light and casual importance. The consequence of such a service is indefinite, indefinitely beyond the effect of any contraband that can be

¹ The *Atalanta*, (1808) 6 Rob. 440, 454.

conveyed. The carrying of two or three cargoes of stores is necessarily an assistance of a limited nature; but in the transmission of despatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the projects of the other belligerent in that quarter of the world. It is true, as it has been said, that one ball might take off a Charles XII., and might produce the most disastrous effect in a campaign, but that is a consequence so remote and accidental that, in the contemplation of human events, it is a sort of evanescent quantity of which no account is taken, and the practice has been, accordingly, that it is in considerable quantities only that the offence of contraband is contemplated. The case of despatches is very different, it is impossible to limit a letter to so small a size as not to be capable of producing the most important consequences in the operations of an enemy. It is a service, therefore, which, in whatever degree it exists, can only be considered in one character, as an act of a most noxious and hostile character."

In this case Lord Stowell condemned not only the cargo, but also the ship, for the carriage of despatches. But it appears, both from the judgment and the facts, how different the *Atalanta* was from that of the *Calchas*, where, as has been seen, an appeal has been successfully made by the captors on the ground that the *Calchas* was carrying despatches. The *Atalanta* was an American vessel engaged in the colonial trade of Holland, then at war with England. The despatches were given to the first supercargo, in the presence of the master, by the commander of Fort Bourbon, Île de France, from the military governor of the island. The vessel was actually detained several days in order that she might carry the despatch. The despatch was openly addressed to the Minister of Marine at Paris, and the vessel carried a French officer, Colonel Richmond, who was second in command at the Isle of France. Colonel Richmond was disguised as a planter, and the commandant who gave the despatch to the first supercargo told him that in the event of chase or capture he was to give the despatch to Colonel Richmond. The *Atalanta*, on leaving the Île de France, was first chased by the *Piedmontese* frigate, and then captured by an English privateer and taken to St. Helena. There she was apparently given up to an English man-of-war, the *Sir Edward Hughes*. The packet with the despatches had previously passed into Colonel Richmond's possession. Owing to apprehension of a rescue, some of the prisoners were placed on board the man-of-war, among them the second supercargo. When he was being conveyed there Colonel Richmond persuaded him to take care of a chest of tea, at the bottom of which the despatches were found. It was, however, amply shown that the second supercargo knew that the chest contained noxious correspondence. It is difficult to understand, conceding the

principle that the carriage of despatches is an aggravated instance of the conveyance of contraband, how the decision in the case of the *Atalanta*, where Lord Stowell condemned both cargo and ship, could have been otherwise. Lord Stowell treated the case as one where no doubt could exist, especially as the despatches were shown to contain many particulars of a purely military character, though it also appears that they dealt with distress then prevailing at the Île de France.

The *Atalanta* was the case of a vessel engaged in the colonial trade of a belligerent then prohibited by international law, on board of which despatches were received from a military officer of a belligerent, with the privity of the master and supercargoes. Further, the vessel was detained several days in order to receive the despatches, and she carried, as a passenger, a high military officer of a belligerent. The absurdity of comparing such a case with that of the *Calchas* is plain to demonstration.

The *Calchas* did not sail from one belligerent port to the other, and being the packet of a regular mail line ought to be exempted from penalty as a matter of course.¹ Further, the letters on which the successful appeal of the captors was founded in the case of the *Calchas* could not possibly have been delivered to her by the military officer of a belligerent State, as in the case of the *Atalanta*. Japan can only have diplomatic representatives at Tacoma, and it is a well-recognized principle that the despatches of an enemy's ambassador, or consul, resident in a neutral State, when delivered for conveyance to a neutral ship, are not liable to seizure, on the ground that the neutral State is *prima facie* as much interested in such despatches as the belligerent State.² It seems at least possible to assume, from the character of the despatches found on the *Calchas*, which are described as containing valuable financial information, that they must be consular despatches, which are, *ipso facto*, not contraband. The successful appeal of the captors of the *Calchas* therefore seems to infringe two well-established principles—(1) that immunity is conceded as a general rule to mail-bags; (2) that despatches sent from accredited diplomatic or consular agents residing in a neutral country to their Government at home, being presumably not written with a belligerent object, are distinctly marked as not liable to seizure.

It is clear, not only from Lord Stowell's decisions, but from modern international law as expounded by Mr. W. E. Hall, that the rationale of the seizure of despatches as contraband is that

¹ Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 703.

² The *Caroline*, (1808) 6 C. Rob. 461; Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 699; and Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. ss. 273, 274, pp. 370, 371.

it is considered a lawful object of war to interrupt the connection between a mother-country and its colonies. This is a most legitimate survival of the Rule of the War of 1756. But it has no real connection with the alleged carrying of despatches by a steamer which, like the *Calchas*, had its port of departure in a neutral independent State.¹

It has recently been announced that the Supreme Naval Prize Court at St. Petersburg has upheld the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court in the case of the *Cheltenham*. This decision is best summarized by saying that it involves the condemnation of both ship and cargo for conveying conditional contraband to a port which cannot fairly be considered belligerent. The cargo consisted of 67,500 sleepers and logs for the Fusen-Seoul Railway, and 375 cases of beer. It therefore now appears that Russia considers she is at war with Korea, a conclusion strangely inconsistent with Count Lamsdorff's own language in the Russian protest of March, 1904, against Japanese action in Korea. In this protest, as has been seen, Count Lamsdorff stated that Russia, in view of the Japanese landing in Korea on the eve of the battle of Chemulpho, did not consider herself at war with Korea. Further, the Korean Minister remained at St. Petersburg, and was stated to have been present at the reception of Admiral Alexeieff on his return from the Far East. Again, assuming that Korea has become a protectorate of Japan, it does not follow, from the view of international law taken by Dr. Stephen Lushington, in the case of the Ionian ships, that she is therefore at war with Russia. On this view, while it is in Japan's power as suzerain state to declare war for her protected mi-souverain state, Korea, the latter remains at peace unless she declares war for her, and it does not appear that she has done so. The *Cheltenham*, therefore, cannot fairly be considered to have had a belligerent destination, and her cargo was only conditionally contraband. The Russian regulations declaring contraband, March 1st, 1904, explicitly state

¹ Since these words were written the *Calchas* was released on bail, and the Supreme Prize Court at St. Petersburg has upheld the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court, but has stated additionally that the cotton and timber were condemned because they were destined for warlike purposes. It is very difficult to regard this as any real concession by Russia of the principle of conditional contraband especially in view of the fact that since this decision (June 14, 1905) Russia has sunk three neutral vessels at sea. The question inevitably arises what use cotton and timber can be to an army in the field. According to information at present available, the wholly indefensible contention that the *Calchas* was carrying despatches does not seem to have been even discussed by the Supreme Court at St. Petersburg. It is worth while to add that the crew of the *Calchas* complained of harsh treatment at the hands of the Russian officers and reckless navigation (*Times*, Feb. 28, 1905). But for both such acts captors are responsible (*Vrou Johanna*, 4 C. Rob. 348; *St. Juan*, etc., 5 C. Rob. 33).

that the ship conveying contraband is only liable to be confiscated in cases of an aggravated nature. But this is inconsistent with the final decision of the Supreme Naval Court at St. Petersburg in the case of the *Cheltenham*. What Historicus considered the two indissoluble tests of contraband, hostile quality and hostile destination, seem alike absent in the case of the *Cheltenham*. How the conveyance of conditional contraband only can be an aggravated offence when the destination is dubiously hostile, is very hard to see.¹

¹ Cf. *Times*, November 28, 1904.

APPENDIX F.

The Case of the "Allanton."

It is stated in the *Times*, October 24, 1904, that the Admiralty Council, under the following circumstances, have reversed the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court with regard to the *Allanton*. The Admiralty Council consisted of Admiral Avellan, President; four admirals; Professor de Martens representing the Foreign Office; Senators Tiesenhausen and Grave; and Mr. Wardrop, the British Consul. After putting some questions as to the ownership of the cargo, Admiral Avellan announced his decision to release the ship. The question of damages was not raised, it being intended, however, to raise a claim on this point through the proper channels later. It is impossible to regard this decision of the Admiralty Court, being clearly contradictory according to English notions of prize law, as entirely satisfactory. The court having held that the circumstances justified the arrest of the ship, it would appear that the captors should be entitled to their expenses. This result is unsatisfactory, and is contradictory to the practice of Lord Stowell. No decision of that great Admiralty lawyer ever decided that a vessel which, like the *Allanton*, had genuine papers disclosing a neutral destination, and which was exactly in its proper course, could be confiscated. But it is astonishing to observe, from the argument of M. Sheftel, of the Russian bar, that this conclusion can be supported by the principles of modern continental maritime law, and, in great part, from the Russian naval regulations. The arguments of M. Sheftel, the claimant's counsel, in the case of the *Allanton*, are as follows. There were two principal considerations on which the judgment of the Vladivostock Prize Court was based. First, the *Allanton* on her first voyage conveyed, with the knowledge of the owner, to an enemy's port, Sasebo, during war, a full cargo conveying contraband. Secondly, the vessel was seized carrying coal from Muroran to Singapore under circumstances inducing the belief that that was not her real destination.

M. Sheftel then proceeded to argue that the first consideration was in no wise acceptable as constituting a sound plea for confiscating a ship as a lawful prize. It may be observed that even the Russian regulations declaring contraband merely contend that the ship ought to be confiscated in an aggravated case of the conveyance of contraband. But the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court in the case of the *Allanton* involves the contention that Russia confiscates the ship in every case of the conveyance of contraband, as she did during the Crimean War, in spite of the fact that, according to the declaration of 1904, she has ostensibly abated her claim. The *Allanton*, as appears from the argument of M. Sheftel, could not, on any fair construction, be considered as engaged in a contraband transaction, either when proceeding to Muroran or when leaving that port. M. Sheftel proceeded to observe that the majority of the authorities on international law held that a vessel which succeeded in conveying contraband to a hostile port and was captured, not while it was engaged in doing so, but subsequently on the return voyage, could not be held liable to confiscation. Such was the principle enunciated by Prof. Franz Despagnet Prof. Franz von Liszt, and Prof. De Martens. Prof. De Martens, in his work, "International Law among Civilized Nations," positively asserted, that "In order that the seizure of a neutral vessel for conveying contraband should be lawful, it is necessary that the neutral vessel in question should be caught in *flagrante delicto*. Capture subsequent to the discharge of the unlawful cargo is not justifiable in law." In an even more striking sentence M. Sheftel observed that, according to Russian naval regulations in force, it was not permissible to seize a vessel for conveying contraband after she had discharged her cargo at the hostile port. The Russian regulations of March 27, 1900, regarding maritime prizes declared: "Mercantile vessels of neutral nations are liable to be confiscated as prizes when captured in the act of conveying contraband to the enemy or to an enemy port." This clearly implies that, according to regulations, a vessel is not liable to be seized after discharge of her cargo at the hostile port. In the case of the *Imina*, Sir W. Scott said—

"Taking it, however, that they (the goods conveyed, ship timber) are of such a nature as to be liable to be considered contraband on a hostile destination, I cannot fix that character on them in the present voyage. The rule respecting contraband, as I have always understood it, is, that the articles must be taken *in delicto*, in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy's port. Under the present understanding of the law of nations you cannot take the proceeds in the return voyage. . . . If the goods

are not taken *in delicto*, and in the actual prosecution of such a voyage, the penalty is not generally held to attach."¹

It therefore follows that the Vladivostock Prize Court, in proceeding on the principle that a vessel is liable to be confiscated after she has conveyed contraband to a hostile port, decided contrary both to modern continental maritime law as enunciated by its greatest living exponent, to maritime law as enunciated a hundred years ago by Lord Stowell, and to Russian naval regulations of the present day.

As to the second consideration on which the decision of the Vladivostock Prize Court proceeded, M. Sheftel observed that the charter-party was concluded a month before the outbreak of the war. He called the attention of the Admiralty Council of St. Petersburg to the fact that the Institut du Droit International at Venice, in 1896, laid down the principle that the carriage of contraband, commenced before the declaration of war and without necessary knowledge of its imminence, was not punishable. The ship-building sections of our English Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, only apply to a state of war actually existing; and there is clear analogy between conveying and supplying a contraband article. The loading and sailing of the *Allanton*, M. Sheftel observed, was completed before the publication of the Russian rules according to which coal was declared contraband. These regulations appeared in the *Times*, March 1, 1904. The owner had even conveyed coal to Vladivostock on another occasion. The mere suspicion of false destination is not ground for confiscation. The ship's papers had the authority of perfectly genuine proofs regarding destination of ship to which they belonged. The owner of the ship was the owner of the cargo, and therefore the latter was neutral property. In any case, it should be borne in mind that in virtue of the Declaration of Paris, April 27, 1856, and Article II. of the Marine Prize Regulations sanctioned by the Tzar, March, 27, 1895, a neutral flag covers an enemy's cargo provided it is not contraband. Therefore, even if the cargo of coal was Japanese property, it ought not to be confiscated, even though the Russian regulations regarding contraband declared coal contraband. Hostile destination, no less than hostile quality, constitutes a necessary element in determining whether or not a cargo falls under the category of contraband. In face of this contention it seems impossible to understand how the Admiralty Court of St. Petersburg, while releasing both vessel and cargo, could have held that the circumstances justified the captors in arresting the vessel. On the contrary, it appears that such an arrest conflicts with maritime prize

¹ The *Imina*, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 167, 168.

law as it has been understood both in England or Russia for more than a century. But since the Admiralty Prize Court did arrive at this paradoxical conclusion, it is as difficult to understand how any question of costs and damages remains open. Dr. Lushington observed that Lord Stowell only awarded costs and damages where the captors had been guilty of wilful misconduct or vexation. The St. Petersburg Prize Court, while it ought to have held that the captors of the *Allanton* were guilty of vexatious conduct, expressly decided that, in view of the circumstances, they were justified in arresting the vessel. Therefore the Admiralty Court of St. Petersburg seems to have stopped itself from awarding the owner of the *Allanton* the costs and damages at the hands of the captors which are due to him.

APPENDIX G.

The Question whether Provisions are Contraband, and the Evidence and Memoranda of Professor T. E. Holland, K.C., and Dr. J. Westlake, K.C., at the Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War (Parliamentary Papers, 1905).

SIR H. S. MAINE, in 1888, quoted Sir James Caird as saying, in a paper published in the previous year, that the food imported into Great Britain during that year would probably reach £140,000,000 in value. The gravity of the situation thus created in the event of the outbreak of war between this country and any maritime power could only be removed, in Sir H. S. Maine's opinion, by Great Britain offering to the United States to concede the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, except contraband of war, in return for the latter State consenting to abolish privateering.¹ The unfailing record of statistics shows that the situation, considered by Sir H. S. Maine to be one of "unexampled danger," has become accentuated. In 1899, the value of the imports into this country under the head of food, drink, and tobacco was £210,341,368; in 1900, £219,969,854; in 1901, £224,761,875; in 1902, £224,403,658; in 1903, £232,285,146. The reference to the Royal Commission of 1905 was therefore both imminent and essential. The Parliamentary Papers published in connection with it,² indicate in every line that the Commission appreciated the dignity and gravity of the occasion. The last two volumes contain, in the evidence and memoranda of Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. J. Westlake, a repertory of international law such as has not been met in a Blue Book since the Conference of Geneva, and possibly, since the English reply to the Prussian Exposition des Motifs in the eighteenth century. The memoranda, in particular, deserve all the commendation that a Vattel, a Montesquieu, or an

¹ Lectures, "International Law," vi. p. 120.

² Parl. Pap., 1905, Nos. 2643, 2644, 2645.

Historicus could bestow on Lord Mansfield's famous document. They are truly "une réponse sans réplique"—"un excellent morceau du droit des gens." Sir R. Phillimore observes that, till the Declaration of Paris, 1856, England, in her treaties of peace, appears to have been silent upon disputed questions of maritime international law.¹ One reason for this, clearly, is that this country has been scrupulous in fulfilling her international engagements, and has therefore hesitated to declare, in time of peace, a construction of maritime law that it might be impracticable to adopt in the event of becoming a belligerent. This traditional tendency of English jurisprudence is reflected in the memoranda of both Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. J. Westlake. In the direction of declaring maritime law, Professor T. E. Holland, while he admitted the significance of the entire isolation of England on the subject, merely made a very tentative recommendation that this country should join in excepting convoyed vessels from visitation and search by the cruisers of a belligerent. Again, while Dr. J. Westlake was prepared to adopt Sir H. S. Maine's suggestion that this country should concede the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, with the exception of contraband, he considered that the concession ought only to be made if it could be established that the crews of enemy merchantmen would not be useful in furthering the project of invasion. It is quite beyond the scope of this note to do more than draw attention to the invaluable repertory of the maritime law of belligerency recently furnished by Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. J. Westlake. The evidence and memoranda of both authorities were delivered before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Professor T. E. Holland considered that it was a great question whether the rules of international law would stand a great stress. Mr. Hall, it may be remembered, anticipated, in the Introduction to the last edition of his "International Law," that the next great war would be unscrupulously waged. It is at least possible to regard the Russo-Japanese War as fulfilling either presage, and to cite Professor F. De Martens as a witness to the fact.² In that war, neutral waters were made the basis of belligerent operations on a scale that transcended anything that occurred in those events of the American Civil War, on which the Geneva Conference adjudicated. Even a perverse construction of the much-vexed passage of Bynkershoek could not justify incidents like the first torpedo-boat attack on Port Arthur, or the Chemulpho or Chifu incidents. According to Professor F. De Martens, never before has such a war been waged; the greatest battles of modern times

¹ "International Law," vol. iii. s. 532.

² *North American Review*, November, 1905.

have been waged on neutral territory. It is necessary to revert at least ninety years to find a conscientious parallel to the Treaty of Portsmouth, in so far as it was a treaty concluded without the previous declaration of an armistice. Further, what is possibly even of more moment, the naval regulations of a belligerent, and not international law, have exclusively determined the decisions of Prize Courts. Professor T. E. Holland, in giving his evidence before the Royal Commission about three months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, considered that Prize Courts would be likely to uphold international law to some extent in the teeth of national opinion. Yet during the Russo-Japanese War, he admitted, speaking as a witness to fact, that the decisions of Russian Prize Courts were perversely wrong; a conclusion that no euphemism can render consistent with their having observed the slightest regard for international law. The Russo-Japanese War has further had the effect of entirely refuting the view that a restricted category of contraband is adopted on the Continent. On the contrary, as a witness to fact, Professor T. E. Holland observed that Russia classed articles as absolute contraband that had previously not even been considered conditional contraband on the Continent. While it must be admitted that the Russo-Japanese War is exceptional, the question is whether it will remain so. Professor F. De Martens, who exhausts both eloquence and learning in insisting on the exceptional character of the Russo-Japanese War, does not once suggest that such irregularities will never occur again, a fact of some significance. Dr. J. Westlake, in giving his evidence before the Royal Commission, considered that reliance on international law would have to be a very qualified one in any war in which this country was engaged. If any inference can be drawn from the Russo-Japanese War, this conclusion is indubitable. The occasion of the recent contest was diplomatic failure and augmentation of military and naval forces. It was considered before the Royal Commission that the probable causes of war in our times are diplomatic failures, not acts of aggression. But diplomatic failures arising from requisitions for an explanation as to increased armaments were the exciting causes of the Great War at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1793, M. Chauvelin, the French ambassador, required explanations from the British Government as to the reason for the augmentation of its military and naval forces, and this led to the great struggle of the wars of the French Republic and the French Empire.¹ Dr. J. Westlake, in giving his evidence before the Royal Commission, gave a very learned opinion that induces the essential conclusion that virtually the political environment of 1793 may reproduce

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. i. s. 212, p. 226.

itself, since he considered that England would only be involved in war if there were a great political convulsion; and in that event more than one of the bigger States would be allied against us. It is doubtless necessary, in construing these conclusions of Dr. Westlake, to take into consideration the military lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. It is further a question of public policy, not of public international law. It is more certain that future wars will be unscrupulously waged than that they will occur at all. The undue growth of armaments may be hoped to be corrected at the approaching convention of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. "Cedit quæstio," apparently, in view of the memorandum of Professor T. E. Holland, written in 1903 for the Royal Commission that privateering will not be revived. It is, however, very difficult to derive much consolation from this fact, assuming that the first article of the Declaration of Paris, though not infringed, was certainly evaded by Russia in 1904-5. It appears, as Professor T. E. Holland observed during the sitting of the Royal Commission, that the Confederacy did issue some letters of marque in the American Civil War.¹ But these privateers were all fitted out in the ports of Confederacy, and therefore none of the vessels whose operations engaged the attention of the Geneva Conference were privateers.² Professor T. E. Holland considers that vessels are not privateers when their officers are naval officers antecedently. The classical instance of the *Alabama* shows that a commissioned commerce destroyer is as efficient as a privateer could possibly be. It is of some interest to observe that the Royal Commission declined to consider that the successful depredations of the Confederate cruisers constituted any exception to the rule that command of the sea is a condition precedent to a successful attack on commerce. Their reasons appear to be that the success of the *Alabama* was popularly exaggerated, and that the moral effect she produced could not be repeated under the modern conditions of steamer merchant vessels. It is of some interest to note that this view is directly opposed to a dictum of Lord Clarendon, the statesman of the second decade to the Queen's reign who declared that steam terribly enhanced the dangers of commerce destroying. Assuming the figures of the Royal Commission as to the number of ocean-going steamers which virtually compose the British mercantile marine at the present day, and as to the number of seizures made by the *Alabama*, it must be admitted that a future enemy of this country, who possessed forty such vessels as the *Alabama*, could literally annihilate our mercantile

¹ Cf. "Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington," vol. i., "Geneva Arbitration," Com. State Papers, p. 215.

²-Ibid., *supra*, p. 84, where it is expressly stated that the commissions went out from England—from a branch of the insurgent Navy Department.

marine.¹ The Royal Commission further assumed that the Federal navy entirely devoted its attention to the blockade of the southern States, and did not devote any attention to the *Alabama*. According to a statement in the *Times* in 1863, the Federal Navy Department at that date had detailed sixteen vessels to destroy the *Alabama*, and it was claimed in addition that they all equalled the *Alabama* in speed and armament, though perhaps allowance was to be made for the exceptional sailing qualities of that vessel. This statement seemed to have been made on some authority, and derives strange confirmation in the fact that the list given in 1863 of the Federal war vessels detailed to destroy the *Alabama* included the *Kearsage*, by which she was destroyed in June, 1864.

A comparison of the memoranda of Professor T. E. Holland and Dr. J. Westlake reveals the interesting fact that while the former, on the whole, is inclined to think that this country should assert the rights of a maritime belligerent, the latter, like Historicus, believes that it should adopt the policy of asserting the rights of maritime neutrals. Thus Professor T. E. Holland entirely declined to consider the immunity of private property at sea as a practical proposal. Dr. J. Westlake, on the other hand, is inclined to adopt it, though great weight is, no doubt, to be attributed to his reservations. In view of the fact that little more than two months after he gave his evidence before the Royal Commission a war broke out in which provisions were declared absolute contraband by one belligerent, and conditional contraband by the other, a very significant incident occurred when Dr. Westlake was giving evidence. He mentioned, as a circumstance carrying great weight with him, that Professor Brusa, at the meeting of the Institute of International Law at Venice in 1896, "a very competent international lawyer" held that in treating rice as contraband, the French, in 1885, might perhaps be justified. In principle, Dr. Westlake considered that the extent to which we are dependent on oversea supplies radically differentiates the actual situation from that which existed in the times when our historic demeanour on the questions of international law connected with naval war was adopted. Therefore the policy of this country with regard to international law should in future be directed rather towards the maintenance and reasonable enlargements of natural rights than towards the maintenance and enlargement of belligerent rights. It is difficult to refrain from observing that the right of blockade, which Dr. Westlake regards as the bulwark of our maritime ascendancy, and as even necessary for our national existence, has always

¹ For the purposes of the Commission the British mercantile marine consists of 2000 ocean-going steamers, only vessels of over 1500 tons being included. The *Alabama* kept the sea for twenty-one months, and her captures averaged over three a month.

been regarded, from Lord Stowell's time, as involving the greatest encroachment on neutral rights allowed by international law. A nation which insisted on a large construction of the right of blockade, and yet claimed to enlarge the sphere of neutral right, would clearly render itself liable to the charge of inconsistency, if not to that of insincerity. Again, since the incidence of the penalty for breach of blockade falls on all articles, whether *bellici usus* or *pacifici usus*, whether they are exported or imported, the exercise of the right of blockade is totally destructive of any admission of the immunity of private property at sea in time of war. The acceptance of both principles would, of course, leave unimpaired the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband *in transitu* to his enemy. This consequence does not appear to have been contemplated by Dr. Westlake, who seems to advocate the abolition of the law of contraband. Neither the evidence taken before the Commission nor his memorandum affords the slightest ground for the supposition that, like Hübner and Dr. J. Westlake, Professor T. E. Holland is prepared to advocate the abolition of the law of contraband. With Hübner the abolition of contraband was rather an involuntary consequence of his theory than an express renunciation. The fact that the historic champion of neutrality implicitly abolished the doctrine of contraband has interest in connection with the recently expressed views of Dr. Westlake.

In the view of Dr. Westlake, this country cannot logically repudiate the Declaration of Paris, because by her adherence to the Declaration she has admitted that the law was uncertain. This, clearly, was not the view in the eighteenth century, as expressed in the Duke of Newcastle's answer to the Prussian memorial concerning neutral ships, which is admittedly one of the most admirable repertories of international law. In this reply Lord Mansfield considered that the contrary of the doctrine free ships free goods "was too clear to admit of being disputed."¹ Sir R. Phillimore considered the Declaration of Paris an anomalous declaration which had no natural connection with the Treaty of Paris. This writer indubitably disagrees with Dr. Westlake's view that maritime law, before the Declaration, was uncertain. Sir R. Phillimore expressly says that at the Declaration of Paris, Great Britain abandoned one of the most certain and highly valued of belligerent rights, namely, the right of confiscating enemies' goods found on board neutral vessels.² Sir R. Phillimore seems to consider that the Declaration is not a treaty.³ The silence so

¹ "Collectanea Juridica," vol. i. p. 145.

² Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii., preface x., s. 10; and *ibid.*, *infra*, p. 294.

³ *Supra*, 667.

studiously preserved by England in all her treaties declaring war upon the disputed questions of maritime law does not seem to justify the conclusion that it was regarded as uncertain in this country. According to the analogies of municipal law, the conviction of the uncertainty of the law is always followed by an attempt to declare it. But this country never attempted to declare maritime international law till 1856.

APPENDIX H.

The Changed Attitude of Russia on Absolute and Conditional Contraband.

THE following appeared in the *Times*, November 28, 1904:-

"At a recent meeting of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Mr. F. E. Smith delivered an address on 'Contraband of War.' A resolution was adopted on the subject, and representations were made to Lord Lansdowne, from whom the secretary to the Chamber has received the following reply:"—

"Foreign Office, November 25, 1904.

"Sir,—I have laid before the Marquis of Lansdowne your letter of the 19th inst., in which, by direction of the Council of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, you ask for a more definite statement as to the position which his Majesty's Government has taken up with the Russian Government with respect to contraband of war, and in particular as to what articles besides food stuffs are to be conditionally contraband, and whether coal, cotton, and machinery come under this category.

"Communications on this subject are still passing between the two Governments, and Lord Lansdowne is not at present in a position to add materially to the statement which has already been made public. His Majesty's Government have, as you are aware, from the first objected to the extension of the doctrine of contraband of war under which such articles as coal, cotton, and machinery have been classed as unconditionally contraband, and they adhere to the opinion which they have expressed on this point. The Russian Government have, however, not as yet shown any disposition to regard coal otherwise than as absolute contraband, or to yield to the representations which his Majesty's ambassador has, as you are aware, addressed to them on the subject of raw cotton. With regard to machinery, the wording of the decision of the prize court in regard to certain machinery on board the *Calchas* confirms the view that it will be liable to condemnation if any is proved to be intended for warlike use.

"His Majesty's Government have, as already indicated on more than one occasion, stated that they would not consider themselves bound to recognize as valid any decision confirmed by the prize

courts of last resort which might be inconsistent with well-established principles of international law, and they will strenuously support claims for compensation put forward by British subjects whose interests have suffered in consequence of any such decisions. It is proper to bear in mind that since the date, in September last, when the Russian Government issued supplementary instructions to their naval officers, the right of visit and search has not been exercised in a manner to which his Majesty's Government could reasonably take exception. A Parliamentary paper comprising the correspondence which has taken place in regard to these questions will be issued at an early date.

"I am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

"F. H. CAMPBELL."

It has been endeavoured to show, in a previous portion of this work, that the effect of the Russian declarations regarding contraband, is to annul the second article of the Declaration of Paris, and that perfect liberty of neutral nations to trade in ordinary goods which have no relation to war, any attempt to interrupt which Vattel denounces as "a flagrant injury."¹ Russia has attempted nothing less, since her regulations declaring contraband pronounced certain commodities to be absolute contraband which, by continental maritime jurisprudence, have not even been considered conditionally contraband.

The best comment on the foregoing communication from the Foreign Office is the letter of Professor T. E. Holland, in which, after discussing Russian Prize Law and the destruction of neutral vessels without the adjudication of a prize court, he observed (*Times*, August 6, 1904)—

"A far more important question is, I venture to think, raised by the Russian list of contraband, sweeping, as it does, into the category of 'absolutely contraband articles,' things such as provisions and coal, to which a contraband character, in any sense of the term, has usually been denied on the continent, while Great Britain and the United States have admitted them into the category of conditional contraband only when shown to be suitable and destined for the armed forces of the enemy or for the relief of a place besieged. Still more unwarrantable is the Russian claim to interfere with the trade in raw cotton. Her prohibition of this trade is wholly unprecedented, for the treatment of cotton during the American Civil War will be found on examination to have no bearing on the question under consideration. I touch to-day upon this large subject only to express the hope that our Government, in concert, if possible, with other neutral governments, has communicated to that of Russia, with reference to its list of prohibited articles, a protest in language as unmistakable as that employed by our Foreign Office in 1885. 'I regret to have to inform you, M. l'Ambassadeur,' wrote Lord Granville,

¹ "Droit des Gens," I. iii. c. vii. s. 112.

'that her Majesty's Government feel compelled to take exception to the proposed measure, as they cannot admit that, consistently with the law and practice of nations, and with the rights of neutrals, provisions in general can be treated as contraband of war.' A timely warning that a claim is inadmissible is surely preferable to waiting till bad feeling has been aroused by the concrete application of an objectionable doctrine."

The only result of the protest seems to be that Russia took provisions and perhaps machinery out of her category of absolute contraband. Coal and raw cotton remained, as before, absolute contraband under the Russian regulations declaring contraband. Yet, as has been seen, Russia, during the West African Conference of 1884—

"Took occasion to dissent vigorously from the inclusion of coal among the articles contraband of war, and declared that she would categorically refuse her consent to any articles in any treaty, convocation, or instrument whatever which would imply its recognition as such."¹

With regard to Professor T. E. Holland's observation that the treatment of cotton during the American Civil War has no bearing on the action of Russia during the late war declaring cotton absolute contraband, it may be recalled that the view on which the Federal Government declared cotton contraband was that it took the place of money. The Confederate Government expressly prohibited the sale of cotton during the Civil War, except to furnish the sinews of war.²

It is clear, therefore, that it is impossible to institute any comparison between the two cases. During the Civil War the Federals declared raw cotton exported from the Confederate States contraband when it had been appropriated as the property of the other belligerent Government. During the late Russo-Japanese War, Russia has declared imported raw cotton contraband. As imports have to be paid for, the practical consequence of the Russian prize regulations appears to be to maintain rather than to reduce the pecuniary resources of Japan. Lord Granville's protest, to which Professor T. E. Holland referred in the above letter, was made to the French Ambassador when France sought, during her hostilities in 1885 with China, to declare rice contraband.³ It is there stated that shipments of rice were entirely stopped by fear of capture.

¹ Hall's "International Law," pt. iv. c. v. p. 686, referring to Parl. Papers, "Africa," No. iv. 1885, 132.

² *Ibid.*, 4th ed., pt. iv. c. v. p. 690.

³ *Ibid.*, 4th ed., pt. v. c. v. p. 688.

APPENDIX I.

The authors are indebted to the editor of the *Times* for the following text, translation, and comparative analysis of the Report of the North Sea Commission:—¹

TEXT OF THE REPORT.

After announcing that the sitting had begun, Admiral Fournier, the presiding Commissioner, proceeded without further preface to read the report. It ran thus:—

RAPPORT DES COMMISSAIRES ÉTABLI CONFORMÉMENT À L'ARTICLE 6 DE LA DÉCLARATION DE SAINT-PÉTERSBOURG DU 12 (25) NOVEMBRE, 1904.

1er. Les Commissaires, après un examen minutieux et prolongé de l'ensemble des faits parvenus à leur connaissance sur l'incident soumis à leur enquête par la Déclaration de Saint-Pétersbourg du 12 (25) Novembre, 1904, ont procédé dans ce rapport à un exposé analytique de ces faits suivant leur enchaînement rationnel.

En faisant connaître les appréciations dominantes de la Commission en chaque point important ou décisif de cet exposé sommaire, ils pensent avoir mis suffisamment en lumière les causes et les conséquences de l'incident en question en même temps que les responsabilités qui s'en dégagent.

2. La seconde escadre Russe de la flotte du Pacifique, sous le commandement en chef du Vice-Amiral Aide-de-camp Général Rojdestvensky, mouillait le 7 (20) Octobre, 1904, auprès du Cap Skagen avec l'intention de faire du charbon avant de continuer sa route pour l'Extrême-Orient.

Il paraît, d'après les dépositions acquises, que, dès le départ de l'escadre de la rade de Réval, l'Amiral Rojdestvensky avait fait prendre des précautions minutieuses par les bâtiments placés sous ses ordres afin de les mettre pleinement en état de repousser pendant la nuit une attaque de torpilleurs, soit à la mer soit au mouillage.

¹ *Times*, February 27, 1905.

Ces précautions semblaient justifiées par les nombreuses informations des Agents du Gouvernement Impérial au sujet de tentatives hostiles à redouter, et qui, selon toutes vraisemblances, devaient se produire sous la forme d'attaques de torpilleurs.

En outre, pendant son séjour à Skagen l'Amiral Rojdestvensky avait été averti de la présence de bâtiments suspects sur la côte de Norvège. Il avait appris, de plus, par le Commandant du transport *Bakan*, arrivant du nord, que celui-ci avait aperçu la nuit précédente quatre torpilleurs ne portant qu'un seul feu et en tête de mât.

Ces nouvelles décidèrent l'Amiral à avancer son départ de vingt-quatre heures.

3. En conséquence, chacun des six échelons distincts de l'escadre appareilla séparément à son tour et gagna la Mer du Nord, indépendamment, dans l'ordre indiqué par le rapport de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky; cet officier général commandant en personne le dernier échelon formé par les quatre nouveaux cuirassés *Prince Souvoroff*, *Empereur Alexandre III*, *Borodino*, *Orel*, et le transport *Anadyr*.

Cet échelon quitta Skagen le 7 (20) Octobre à 10 heures du soir.

La vitesse de 12 nœuds fut prescrite aux deux premiers échelons, et celle de 10 nœuds aux échelons suivants.

4. Entre 1 heure 30 et 4 heures 15 de l'après-midi du lendemain, 8 (21) Octobre, tous les échelons de l'escadre furent croisés successivement par le vapeur Anglais *Zéro*, dont le Capitaine examina avec assez d'attention les différentes unités pour permettre de les reconnaître d'après la description qu'il en fit.

Les résultats de ses observations sont conformes d'ailleurs en général aux indications du rapport de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky.

5. Le dernier navire croisé par le *Zéro* était le *Kamchatka*, d'après la description qu'il en donna.

Ce transport, qui formait primitivement groupe avec le *Dmitri Donskoi* et le *l'Aurora*, se trouvait donc alors attardé et isolé à une dizaine de milles environ en arrière de l'escadre; il avait été obligé de diminuer de vitesse à la suite d'une avarie de machine.

Ce retard accidentel fût peut-être la cause incidente des événements qui suivirent.

6. Vers 8 heures du soir, en effet, ce transport rencontra le bâtiment Suédois *Aldebaran* et d'autres navires inconnus, qu'il canonna sans doute par suite des préoccupations que lui causaient dans les circonstances du moment son isolement, ses avaries de machine et son peu de valeur militaire.

Quoiqu'il en soit, le Commandant du *Kamchatka*, transmit à 8 heures 45 à son Commandant-en-chef par la télégraphie sans fil, au sujet de cette rencontre, l'information qu'il était "attaqué de tous côtés par des torpilleurs."

7. Pour se rendre compte de la part que cette nouvelle put prendre dans les déterminations ultérieures de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky, il faut considérer que dans ses prévisions les torpilleurs assaillants, dont la présence lui était ainsi signalée, à tort ou à raison, à une cinquantaine de milles en arrière de l'échelon des vaisseaux qu'il commandait, pouvaient le rejoindre pour l'attaquer à son tour vers 1 heure du matin.

Cette information décida l'Amiral Rojdestvensky à signaler à ses bâtiments vers 10 heures du soir de redoubler de vigilance et de s'attendre à une attaque de torpilleurs.

8. A bord du *Souvoroff* l'Amiral avait jugé indispensable que l'un des deux officiers supérieurs de son état-major fût de quart sur la passerelle de commandement pendant la nuit afin de surveiller, à sa place, la marche de l'escadre et de le prévenir immédiatement s'il se produisait quelqu'incident.

A bord de tous les bâtiments, d'ailleurs, les ordres permanents de l'Amiral prescrivaient que l'officier chef de quart était autorisé à ouvrir le feu dans le cas d'une attaque évidente et imminente de torpilleurs.

Si l'attaque venait de l'avant il devait le faire de sa propre initiative, et, dans le cas contraire, beaucoup moins pressant, il devait en référer à son Commandant.

Au sujet de ces ordres la majorité des Commissaires estime qu'ils n'avaient rien d'excessif en temps de guerre, et particulièrement dans les circonstances, que l'Amiral Rojdestvensky avait tout lieu de considérer comme très alarmantes, dans l'impossibilité où il se trouvait, de contrôler l'exactitude des avertissements qu'il avait reçus des Agents de son Gouvernement.

9. Vers 1 heure du matin le 9 (22) Octobre, 1904, la nuit était à demi obscure, un peu voilée par une brume légère et basse. La lune ne se montrait que par intermittences entre les nuages. Le vent soufflait modérément du sud-est, en soulevant une longue houle qui imprimait aux vaisseaux des roulis de 5 degrés de chaque bord.

La route suivie par l'escadre vers le sudouest devait conduire les deux derniers échelons, ainsi que la suite des événements l'a prouvé, à passer à proximité du lieu de pêche habituel de la flottille des chalutiers de Hull, composée d'une trentaine de ces petits bâtiments à vapeur et couvrant une étendue de quelques milles.

Il résulte des dépositions concordantes des témoins Britanniques que tous ces bateaux portaient leurs feux réglementaires et chalutaien conformément à leurs règles usuelles, sous la conduite de leur maître de pêche, suivant les indications de fusées conventionnelles.

10. D'après les communications reçues par la télégraphie sans

fil, rien d'anormal n'avait été signalé par les échelons qui précédaient celui de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky en franchissant ces parages.

On a su depuis, notamment, que l'Amiral Fölkersam, ayant été conduit à contourner la flottille dans le nord, éclaira de très près avec ses projecteurs électriques les chalutiers les plus voisins et, les ayant reconnus ainsi pour des bâtiments inoffensifs, continua tranquillement sa route.

11. C'est peu de temps après qu'arrivai là son tour, à proximité du lieu de pêche des chalutiers, le dernier échelon de l'escadre conduit par le *Souvoroff*, battant pavillon de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky.

La route de cet échelon le conduisait à peu près sur le gros de la flottille des chalutiers, qu'il allait donc être obligé de contourner, mais dans le sud, quand l'attention des officiers de service sur les passerelles du *Souvoroff* fut attirée par une fusée verte qui les mit en défiance.

Cette fusée, lancée par le maître de pêche, indiquait en réalité, suivant leurs conventions, que les chalutiers devaient draguer le côté tribord au vent.

Presque immédiatement après cette première alerte et en se rapportant aux dépositions, les observateurs, qui des passerelles du *Souvoroff* fouillaient l'horizon avec des jumelles de nuit, découvrirent "sur la crête des lames dans la direction du bossoir de tribord et à une distance approximative de 18 à 20 encablures," un bâtiment qui leur parut suspect parce qu'ils ne lui voyaient aucun feu et que ce bâtiment leur semblait se diriger vers eux à contre bord.

Lorsque le navire suspect fut éclairé par un projecteur, les observateurs crurent reconnaître un torpilleur à grande allure.

C'est d'après ces apparences que l'Amiral Rojdestvensky fit ouvrir le feu sur ce navire inconnu.

La majorité des Commissaires exprime à ce sujet l'opinion que la responsabilité de cet acte et les résultats de la canonnade essuyée par la flottille de pêche incombent à l'Amiral Rojdestvensky.

12. Presque aussitôt après l'ouverture de feu par tribord, le *Souvoroff* aperçut sur son avant un petit bateau lui barrant la route et fut obligé de lancer sur la gauche pour éviter de l'aborder. Mais ce bateau, éclairé par un projecteur, fut reconnu être un chalutier.

Pour empêcher que le tir des vaisseaux fût dirigé sur ce bâtiment inoffensif, l'axe du projecteur aussitôt relevé à 45° vers le ciel.

Ensuite, l'Amiral fit adresser par signal à l'escadre l'ordre "de ne pas tirer sur les chalutiers."

Mais en même temps que le projecteur avait éclairé ce bateau de pêche, d'après le dépositions des témoins, les observateurs du *Souvoroff* aperçurent à bâbord un autre bâtiment qui leur parut

suspect, à cause de ses apparences de même nature que celles de l'objectif du tir par tribord.

Le feu fut aussitôt ouvert sur ce deuxième but et se trouva ainsi engagé des deux bords, la file des vaisseaux étant revenue par un mouvement de contre-marche à sa route primitive sans avoir changé de vitesse.

13. D'après les ordres permanents de l'escadre, l'Amiral indiquait les buts sur lesquels devait être dirigé le tir des vaisseaux en fixant sur eux ses projecteurs. Mais comme chaque vaisseau balayait l'horizon en tout sens autour de lui avec ses propres projecteurs pour se garer d'une surprise, il était difficile qu'il ne se produisit pas de confusion.

Ce tir, d'une durée de dix à douze minutes, causa de graves dommages dans la flottille des chalutiers. C'est ainsi que deux hommes furent tués et six autres blessés; que le *Crane* sombra; que le *Snipe*, le *Mino*, le *Moulmein*, le *Gull*, et le *Majestic* reçurent des avaries plus ou moins importantes.

D'autre part, le croiseur *Aurora* fut atteint par plusieurs projectiles.

La majorité des Commissaires constate qu'elle manque d'éléments précis pour reconnaître sur quel but ont tiré les vaisseaux, mais les Commissaires reconnaissent unanimement que les bateaux de la flottille n'ont commis aucun acte hostile; et la majorité des Commissaires étant d'opinion qu'il n'y avait, ni parmi les chalutiers, ni sur les lieux, aucun torpilleur, l'ouverture du feu par l'Amiral Rojestvensky n'était pas justifiable.

Le Commissaire Russe, ne se croyant pas fondé à partager cette opinion, énonce la conviction que ce sont précisément les bâtiments suspects s'approchant de l'escadre dans un but hostile qui ont provoqué le feu.

14. Au sujet des buts réels de ce tir nocturne le fait que l'*Aurora* a reçu quelques projectiles de 47 millim. et de 75 millim. serait de nature à faire supposer que ce croiseur, et peut-être même d'autres bâtiments Russes, attardé sur la route du *Souvorov* à l'insu de ce vaisseau, ait pu provoquer et attirer les premiers feux.

Cette erreur pouvait être motivée par le fait que ce navire, vu de l'arrière, ne montrait aucune lumière apparente, et par une illusion d'optique nocturne dont les observateurs du vaisseau-amiral auraient été l'objet.

A ce propos les Commissaires constatent qu'il leur manque des renseignements importants leur permettant de connaître les raisons qui ont provoqué la continuation du tir à bâbord.

Dans cette conjecture certains chalutiers éloignés auraient pu être confondus avec les buts primitifs et ainsi canonnés directement. D'autres, au contraire, ont pu être atteints par un tir dirigé sur des buts plus éloignés.

Ces considérations ne sont pas d'ailleurs en contradiction avec les impressions de certains chalutiers qui, en se voyant atteints par des projectiles et restant éclairés dans le pinceau des projecteurs, pouvaient se croire l'objet de tir direct.

15. La durée du tir sur tribord, même en se plaçant au point de vue la version Russe, a semblé à la majorité des Commissaires avoir été plus longue qu'elle ne paraissait nécessaire.

Mais cette majorité estime qu'elle n'est pas suffisamment renseignée, ainsi qu'il vient d'être dit, au sujet de la continuation du tir par bâbord.

En tout cas, les Commissaires se plaisent à reconnaître à l'unanimité que l'Amiral Rojdestvensky a fait personnellement tout ce qu'il pouvait, du commencement à la fin, pour empêcher que les chalutiers, reconnus comme tels, fussent l'objet du tir de l'escadre.

16. Quoiqu'il en soit, le *Dmitri Donskoi*, ayant fini par signaler son numéro, l'Amiral se décidé à faire le signal général de "cesser le feu;" la file de ses vaisseaux continua alors sa route et disparut dans le sud-ouest sans avoir stoppé.

A cet égard les Commissaires sont unanimes à reconnaître, qu'aprè sles circonstances qui ont précédé l'incident et celles qui l'ont produit, il y avait à la fin du tir assez d'incertitudes au sujet du danger que courrait l'échelon des vaisseaux pour décider l'Amiral à continuer sa route.

Toutefois, la majorité des Commissaires regrette que l'Amiral Rojdestvensky n'ait pas eu la préoccupation, en franchissant le Pas de Calais, d'informer les autorités des Puissances maritimes voisines qu'ayant été amené à ouvrir le feu près d'ue groupe de chalutiers, ces bateaux, de nationalité inconnue, avaient besoin de secours.

17. Les Commissaires, en mettant fin à ce rapport, déclarent que leurs appréciations, qui s'y trouvent formulées, ne sont pas dans leur esprit de nature à jeter aucune déconsidération sur la valeur militaire ni sur les sentiments d'humanité de l'Amiral Rojdestvensky et du personnel de son escadre.

SPAUN,
FOURNIER,
DOUBASSOW,
LEWIS BEAUMONT,
CHARLES HENRY DAVIS.

TRANSLATION.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED IN CONFORMITY WITH
ARTICLE 6 OF THE ST. PETERSBURG DECLARATION OF THE 12TH
(25TH) NOVEMBER, 1904.

1. The Commissioners after minute and prolonged examination of the *ensemble* of the facts that have come to their knowledge concerning the incidents submitted to them for investigation by the St. Petersburg declaration of the 12th (25th) November, 1904, have in this report proceeded to give an analytic statement of those facts in their logical order.

In communicating the principal opinions of the Commission on each important or decisive point of this summary *exposé*, they believe that they have thrown sufficient light upon the causes and the consequences of the incident in question, and at the same time upon the responsibilities resulting therefrom.

2. On the 7th (20th) October, 1904, the second Russian squadron of the Pacific Fleet, under the chief command of Vice-Admiral Aide-de-Camp General Rohzdestvensky, anchored near Cape Skagen with the intention of taking in coal before continuing its voyage to the Far East.

It appears, according to the deposition made, that from the time when the squadron left the roadstead of Reval, Admiral Rohzdestvensky had caused the vessels under his command to adopt minute precautions with the object of placing them fully in a position to repel an attack by torpedo-boats during the night, either at sea or when anchored.

These precautions seemed to be justified by the information frequently sent by the Agents of the Imperial Government respecting hostile attempts that were to be apprehended, and which in all probability would take the form of attacks by torpedo-boats.

Furthermore, during his stay at Skagen, Admiral Rohzdestvensky had been informed of the presence of suspicious vessels off the Norwegian coast. Besides, he had learned from the captain of the transport *Bakan*, who had come from the north, that on the night before he had seen four torpedo-boats, which had only a single light at the masthead.

This news caused the Admiral to leave twenty-four hours earlier than he had intended.

3. Consequently each of the six distinct sections of the squadron steamed off separately in turn, and reached the North Sea independently of each other in the order mentioned in Admiral Rohzdestvensky's report; this general officer commanding in

person the last section, composed of the four new battleships *Prince Suvaroff*, *Emperor Alexander III.*, *Borodino*, *Orel*, and the transport *Anadyr*.

This section left Skagen at 10 p.m. on the 7th (20th) October.

The first two sections were ordered to proceed at a speed of twelve knots, and the following sections at ten knots.

4. Between 1.30 and 4.15 on the following afternoon, the 8th (21st) October, all the sections of the squadron were passed in succession by the English steamer *Zero*, the captain of which vessel examined the different units closely enough for them to be recognized from his description of them. Moreover, the results of his observations are in general agreement with the indications given in Admiral Rohzdestvensky's report.

5. The last vessel passed by the *Zero* was the *Kamchatka*, according to the description which he (the captain of the *Zero*) gave of her.

This transport, which at first formed part of the same group as the *Dmitri Donskoi* and the *Aurora*, was, therefore, at the time alone and about ten miles behind the squadron, having been obliged to slacken speed owing to a damaged engine.

This accidental delay was perhaps incidentally the cause of the subsequent events.

6. As a matter of fact, towards eight o'clock in the evening this transport met the Swedish vessel *Aldebaran* and other unknown ships, which she fired upon, doubtless owing to the apprehensions aroused in the momentary circumstances by her isolation, the damages to her engines, and her slight fighting value.

However this may be, at 8.45 p.m. the captain of the *Kamchatka* despatched to his commander-in-chief by wireless telegraphy the statement respecting this meeting that he was "attacked on all sides by torpedo-boats."

7. In order to understand the influence which this news might have had upon the subsequent decisions of Admiral Rohzdestvensky it must be remembered that in his anticipations the attacking torpedo-boats whose presence had thus been announced to him, rightly or wrongly, as being some fifty miles behind the section of the ships under his command, might overtake him towards one o'clock in the morning in order to attack him in his turn.

This information decided Admiral Rohzdestvensky to signal to his ships towards ten o'clock at night to redouble their vigilance and to expect an attack from torpedo-boats.

8. On board the *Suvaroff* the Admiral had deemed it indispensable that one of the two superior officers of his staff should be on duty on the Commander's bridge during the night, in order to superintend in his stead the progress of the squadron and let him know immediately should any incident occur.

Moreover, on board all the ships the permanent orders of the Admiral prescribed that the chief officer on duty was authorized to open fire in case of a manifest and imminent attack of torpedo-boats.

If the attack were made from ahead he was to do so on his own initiative, and in the contrary case, much less pressing, he was to refer to his commanding officer.

With regard to these orders, the majority of the Commissioners considered that they involved nothing excessive in time of war and particularly in the circumstances which Admiral Rozhdestvensky had every reason to consider very alarming in view of the impossibility in which he found himself of verifying the accuracy of the warnings that he had received from the agents of his Government.

9. Towards one o'clock in the morning on the 9th (22nd) October, 1904, the night was semi-obscure, somewhat overshadowed by a slight and low mist. The moon only showed itself at intervals through the clouds. The wind blew moderately from the south-east, raising a long swell, which made the vessels roll 5 degrees on either side.

The course followed by the squadron towards the south-west necessarily led the last two sections, as was eventually proved, to pass in the neighbourhood of the habitual fishing-ground of the flotilla of the Hull fishing-boats, consisting of some thirty of these small steamers and covering an area of some miles.

It results from the consistent depositions of the British witnesses that all these boats carried their regulation lights and trawled according to their customary rules under the lead of their "admiral" and pursuant to the indications conveyed by conventional rockets.

10. According to communications received by wireless telegraphy nothing unusual had been signalled by the sections which preceded that of Admiral Rozhdestvensky in traversing these regions.

It subsequently transpired that, notably, Admiral Fölkersam, having been led to skirt the flotilla of the north, very closely examined the nearest trawlers with his electric searchlights, and having thus recognized them as inoffensive, quietly proceeded on his way.

11. It was shortly afterwards that the last section of the fleet, led by the *Svarooff* flying Admiral Rozhdestvensky's flag, arrived in its turn near the trawlers' fishing-ground. The course taken by this section carried it nearly into the midst of the flotilla of trawlers, which it would have been obliged to skirt, but to the southward, when the attention of the officers of the watch on the bridge of the *Svarooff* was attracted by a green rocket, which put them on their guard.

This rocket, fired by the "admiral," indicated in reality, according to their conventions, that the trawlers were to trawl on the starboard side to windward.

Almost immediately after this first alarm, according to the depositions, the observers on the bridge of the *Suvaroff*, who were scanning the horizon with night-glasses, discovered "on the crest of the waves in the direction of the starboard cathead and at an approximate distance of eighteen or twenty cables," a vessel which appeared to them suspicious, because they saw no light, and the vessel seemed to be coming straight towards them.

When the suspicious vessel was lighted up by a searchlight, the men of the watch believed they detected a torpedo-boat going at high speed.

It was for these reasons that Admiral Rohzdestvensky opened fire on the unknown vessel.

The majority of the Commissioners express on this point the opinion that the responsibility for this act and the results of the cannonade sustained by the fishing flotilla rests with Admiral Rohzdestvensky.

12. Almost immediately after opening fire on the starboard side the *Suvaroff* perceived ahead of it a small boat barring its course, and was obliged to turn to port in order to avoid colliding with it. But this boat, lighted up by a searchlight, was recognized as a trawler.

In order to prevent the firing of the vessels from being directed against this inoffensive boat, the axis of the searchlight was immediately raised 45 degrees.

Thereupon the Admiral signalled to the squadron the order "Not to fire on the trawlers."

But while the searchlight illuminated this fishing-boat, according to the depositions of the witnesses, the observers on the *Suvaroff* perceived on the port side another vessel which appeared to them suspicious because of its resemblance to that which they were firing on upon the starboard side.

Fire was at once opened on the second object, and was thus carried on from both sides, the line of ships having by a retrograde movement returned to its original course without having modified its speed.

13. In accordance with the permanent orders of the squadron the Admiral indicated the object on which the fire of the ships was to be directed by fixing the searchlights upon them, but as each ship swept the horizon in every direction around it with its own searchlights in order to guard against a surprise it was difficult to avoid confusion.

This firing, which lasted from ten to twelve minutes, caused serious damage to the trawler's flotilla. It was thus that two

men were killed, six others wounded, that the *Crane* sank, and that the *Snipe*, the *Mino*, the *Moulmein*, the *Gull*, and the *Majestic* suffered more or less serious damage.

On the other hand, the cruiser *Aurora* was hit by several projectiles.

The majority of the Commissioners declare that they lack precise elements to identify on what object the ships fired, but the Commissioners unanimously recognized that the boats of the flotilla committed no hostile act, and the majority of the Commissioners, being of opinion that there was no torpedo-boat either among the trawlers or on the spot, the fire opened by Admiral Robzdestvensky was not justifiable.

The Russian Commissioner, not believing himself warranted in concurring in this opinion, stated his conviction that it is precisely the suspicious vessels that approached the Russian squadron for a hostile purpose that provoked the firing.

14. Respecting the real objects of this nocturnal firing, the fact that the *Aurora* was hit by a few projectiles of 47 millimetres and 75 millimetres would seem to be of a nature to give rise to the supposition that this cruiser, and perhaps even other Russian vessels, delayed on the track of the *Savaroff* without that vessel being aware of it, may have provoked and attracted the first firing.

This error may have been caused by the fact that this ship seen from behind showed no visible light, and owing to a nocturnal optical illusion experienced by the observers on the flagship.

In this connection the Commissioners declared that they lack important information enabling them to ascertain the reasons which brought about the continuation of the firing on the port side. In presence of this conjecture certain distant trawlers might have been confounded with the original objects, and thus cannonaded direct. Others, on the contrary, may have been hit by a fire directed on objects further off.

These considerations, moreover, are not in contradiction with the impression of certain trawlers who, finding themselves hit by projectiles and remaining lit up in the radius of the searchlights, might have believed themselves to be the object of direct aim.

15. The duration of the firing on the starboard side, even from the standpoint of the Russian version, seemed to the majority of the Commissioners to have been longer than appeared necessary.

But this majority considered that it is not sufficiently informed, as has just been said, with regard to the continuation of the firing on the port side.

In any case, the Commissioners willingly acknowledge unanimously that Admiral Rohzdestvensky personally did all he could from beginning to end to prevent the trawlers, recognized as such, from being the objects of the fire of the squadron.

16. However that may be, the *Dmitri Donskoi* having eventually intimated her number, the Admiral decided to give the "stop fire" signal. The line of his ships then continued its route to the south-west without having stopped.

In this connection the Commissioners are unanimous in recognizing that, after the circumstances which preceded the incident and those which gave rise thereto, there was at the closing of the firing sufficient uncertainty as to the danger incurred by the section of the ships to decide the Admiral to proceed on his way.

At the same time the majority of the Commissioners regret that it did not occur to Admiral Rohzdestvensky, while going through the Straits of Dover, to inform the authorities of the neighbouring maritime Powers that, having been led into open fire in the vicinity of a group of trawlers, those boats of unknown nationality required assistance.

17. The Commissioners, in closing this report, declare that their appreciations formulated therein are not in their spirit of a nature to cast any discredit either on the military value or the sentiments of humanity of Admiral Rohzdestvensky and of the *personnel* of his squadron.

THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN CONTENTIONS.

The following table gives the contentions of the British and Russian Governments, as set forth in the cases presented to the Commission by the British and Russian Agents on February 13, and the corresponding findings of the Commission:—

BRITISH CONTENTIONS.

I. That on the night of the 21st-22nd (8th-9th) October, 1904, there was in fact no torpedo-boat or destroyer present among the British trawlers or in the neighbourhood of the Russian fleet, and that the Russian officers were mistaken in their belief that such vessels were present, or in, the neighbourhood, or attacked, or intended to attack, the Russian fleet.

II. (a) That there was no sufficient justification for opening fire at all.

(b) When opened, there was a failure to direct and control the fire, so as to avoid injury to the fishing fleet.

(c) The firing upon the fishing fleet was continued for an unreasonable time.

FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

I. Upheld by the majority of the Commissioners.

II. (a) Upheld by the majority of the Commissioners.

(b) The Commissioners acknowledge unanimously that Admiral Rohzdestvensky personally did all he could to prevent the trawlers, recognized as such, from being the objects of fire of the squadron.

(c) The majority considered that firing was continued on the starboard side longer than was necessary, but that it was not sufficiently informed as to the duration of the fire on the port side.

III. That those on board the Russian fleet ought to have rendered assistance to the injured men and damaged vessels.

IV. That there was no fault of any kind in the conduct of those on the British trawlers or those connected with their management.

RUSSIAN CONTENTIONS.

I. That the cannonade was caused exclusively by the approach of two torpedo-boats, proceeding without lights, and at full speed, towards the squadron.

II. That the fire of the squadron was directed exclusively against the two suspicious vessels, and that the trawlers were only hit in consequence of unavoidable accidents.

III. That the squadron did everything in its power to diminish the risks incurred by the fishermen through the cannonade necessitated by the approach of the two torpedo-boats.

The Russian Government drew the following conclusions from the evidence submitted to the Commission :—

A. That the cannonade of the Russian squadron on the night of October 21–22, 1904, was ordered and executed in the legitimate accomplishment of the military duties of the chief of a squadron.

B. That consequently no responsibility can possibly rest upon Admiral Rohzdestvensky or any of his subordinates.

III. The Commissioners are unanimous in recognizing that there was at the close of firing sufficient uncertainty as to the danger incurred by the section of ships concerned to decide the Admiral to proceed on his way. The majority of the Commissioners regret that it did not occur to Admiral Rohzdestvensky while going through the Straits of Dover to inform the authorities of the neighbouring maritime Powers that the trawlers required assistance.

IV. The Commissioners unanimously recognized that the boats of the flotilla committed no hostile act.

FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

I. The majority of the Commissioners are of opinion that there was no torpedo-boat among the trawlers. They consider that the *Aurora*, and perhaps other Russian vessels, delayed on the track on the *Suvorov*, without that vessel being aware of it, may have provoked and attracted the first firing.

II. The majority of the Commissioners declare that they lack precise evidence as to the object on which the ships fired.

III. See reply to British contention II. (b).

A. The Commissioners find that the precautions taken by Admiral Rohzdestvensky to repel a torpedo attack were justified, but the majority hold that the fire opened by Admiral Rohzdestvensky was not justifiable.

B. The majority of the Commission are of opinion that the responsibility for the cannonade and its results rests with Admiral Rohzdestvensky.

APPENDIX J.

On the use of French Waters by the Russian Fleet.

THE question of the reception of belligerent vessels in neutral ports has already been discussed, and it has been seen that in principle, and, so late as 1861, in practice, there was no limit to the time during which a warship might remain in a neutral port when not actually receiving repairs. But the blockade of the *Nashville* by the *Tuscarora* in 1861, in Southampton Water, led to the adoption by the British Government of a rule that any vessel of war of either belligerent entering an English port should "be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions, or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs;" in either of which cases the authorities of the port were ordered "to require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours." Mr. W. E. Hall anticipated that the twenty-four hours' rule was not unlikely to become more general, but that it could never be a rule of international law, because there was no indication of a correlative duty to enforce it incumbent upon the neutral.¹ But in view of the express language of the Geneva arbitrators, this does not seem so clear as regards the stay of the *Shenandoah* at Melbourne, which has, indeed, been greatly exceeded by that of Admiral Rohzdestvensky at Madagascar.² In 1865 the *Shenandoah*, a Confederate cruiser, entered Melbourne in need of repairs, provisions, and coal, and with a crew insufficient for purposes of war. She was refitted and provisioned, and obtained a supply of coal, which seems to have enabled her to commit depredations in the neighbourhood of Cape Horn on whalers belonging to the United States; her crew having been surreptitiously recruited at the moment of her departure from Port Philip. It was urged on the part of the

¹ "International Law," 4th ed., pp. 652, 653, and note.

² December 30, 1904—March 16, 1905.

Government of that country that "the main operation of the naval warfare" of the *Shenandoah* having been accomplished by means of the coaling "and other refitment," Melbourne had been converted into her base of operations. The protest of the United States was upheld by the Conference of Geneva, where it was declared that, "by a majority of three to two voices, the Tribunal decides that Great Britain has failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed by the second and third of the rules aforesaid, in the case of this same vessel, from and after her entry into Hobson's Bay, and is, therefore, responsible for all acts committed by that vessel after her departure from Melbourne, on the 18th day of February, 1865."¹ The Tribunal therefore held that the *Shenandoah* had used Melbourne as a base of naval operations, and that Great Britain had not used due diligence to prevent such use. Professor T. E. Holland appears to differ from Mr. W. E. Hall on the question whether the twenty-four hours' rule can become a rule of international law. While Mr. W. E. Hall criticized Bluntschli for considering that any rule of international law could ever oust the right of the neutral to vary his own port regulations, Professor T. E. Holland, though admitting that the twenty-four hours' rule is not yet a rule of international law, seems equally to consider that it is capable of becoming such, and that it is desirable that it should.² The rule is, no doubt, tending to become as general as Mr. W. E. Hall anticipated, whether it be regarded as a rule of purely municipal or of international law. Professor T. E. Holland pointed out that the twenty-four hours' rule is to be found in the neutrality proclamations issued in 1904 by the United States, Egypt, China, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Again, in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the rule was adopted by both the belligerents of 1904. But the proclamations of most of the Continental Powers do not commit their respective Governments during the Russo-Japanese War to any period limiting the stay of a belligerent cruiser in their ports. The squadron of Admiral Rohzdestvensky has availed itself of this circumstance, not only as regards French ports, but as regards German ports in West Africa.³

¹ Cf. text of the award made on September 14, 1872, by the Tribunal of Arbitration held at Geneva, in Halleck's "International Law," vol. ii. p. 156.

² *Times*, April 21, 1905.

³ Cf. *Times*, January 31, 1905, where a complete account of the itinerary of Admiral Rohzdestvensky's is given. The Baltic fleet arrived outside Gabon, in the French Congo, on November 26, 1904. It effected some coaling operations there for four days, but apparently outside territorial waters. But from December 11 to 17 the Baltic fleet lay at Angra Pequena engaged in coaling operations, and while there was visited by the German official in charge on shore. The fleet then sailed direct for Madagascar, where it arrived on December 30.

In the letter above referred to, Professor T. E. Holland called attention to the material clauses of the French circular, which runs as follows:—

“(1) En aucun cas, un belligérant ne peut faire usage d’un port Français, ou appartenant à un Etat protégé, dans un but de guerre, etc. (2) La durée du séjour dans nos ports de belligérants, non accompagnés d’une prise, n’a été limitée par aucune disposition spéciale, mais pour être autorisés à y sejourner, ils sont tenus de se conformer aux conditions ordinaires de la neutralité, qui peuvent se resumer ainsi qu’il suit:—(a) . . . (b) Les dits navires ne peuvent, à l'aide de ressources puisées à terre, augmenter leur matériel de guerre, renforcer leurs équipages, ni faire “des enrôlements volontaires, même parmi leurs nationaux.” (c) Ils doivent s’abstenir de toute enquête sur les forces, l’emplacement ou les ressources de leurs ennemis, ne pas appareiller brusquement pour poursuivre ceux qui leur seraient signalés; en un mot, s’abstenir de faire du lieu de leur résidence la base d'une opération quelconque contre l'ennemi. (3) Il ne peut être fourni à un belligérant que les vivres, denrées, et moyens de réparations nécessaires à la subsistance de son équipage ou à la sécurité de sa navigation.”

Under these regulations, Professor T. E. Holland observes, “All must evidently turn upon the wisdom and *bonne volonté* of the officials on the spot, and of the Home Government, so far as it is in touch with them.” Mr. W. E. Hall observes that in France “all persons exposing the State to reprisals or to a declaration of war are liable to punishment under the Penal Code, which leaves the State to accommodate its rules to international law for the time being; and in 1861, on the outbreak of the American Civil War, a Proclamation of Neutrality was issued, referring to the appropriate articles of the Code, and prohibiting all French subjects from ‘assisting in any way the equipment or armament of a vessel of war or privateer of either of the two parties.’ Under this proclamation six vessels which were in course of construction in French ports for the Confederate States were arrested.”¹ During the American Civil War, therefore, France succeeded in maintaining a more correct attitude of neutrality than this country. But the question of the reception and stay of a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port presents many difficulties from the point of view of international law; and Professor T. E. Holland has lately observed that it must prominently engage the attention of that Conference on the rights and duties of neutrals, the convening of which was among the *vœux* of the Hague Conference.

In view of the stay of Russian vessels at Djibouti on three occasions during the late war, and of the prolonged nature of

¹ Hall’s “International Law,” 4th ed., p. 638.

their visit to Madagascar and French Cochin-China, it seems very difficult to deny that some infraction of neutrality has occurred. The first visit of Russian war vessels to Djibutil may be put out of the question. The stay of Admiral Rohzdestvensky at Madagascar greatly exceeds in duration the stay of the *Shenandoah* at Melbourne in 1865. Negrin, who is cited by Mr. W. E. Hall as adequately stating the conditions upon which belligerent vessels are admitted into neutral ports, imposes no less than seven distinct restraints upon a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port. It is noticeable that he forbids the augmentation of armament. But this would not seem, in principle, a different act from using territorial waters for a training-ground. Again, Negrin forbids the use of territorial waters by a belligerent in order to watch his enemy or obtain information about his future movements.¹ Further, this is forbidden, as has been seen, by the "French circular." Even if Admiral Rohzdestvensky did not use the marginal waters of Madagascar for this purpose, it is very difficult to draw the same conclusion as regards his prolonged stay at Kamranh Bay from April 12 to 29. Professor T. E. Holland appears to take this view, evidently regarding the latter incident as of more importance than the former.² It is highly unsatisfactory that there should be an entire absence of reliable information as to what occurred in Cochin-China waters.

In discussing the *Shenandoah* incident, Mr. W. E. Hall objects to the Geneva award on this head, because there was no continued use of the neutral base in that case; and "continued use is, above all things, the crucial test of a base." During the late war there has certainly been a continued use of Djibutil by whole squadrons of Russian war vessels, though possibly not by the same squadrons. On one occasion Admiral Folkersahm, with the cruiser squadron of the Baltic fleet, spent a whole week at Djibutil, December, 1904. It is, however, material to observe that, in Mr. W. E. Hall's opinion, there may be a continued use, not merely by visiting repeatedly the same neutral port, but by frequenting other ports of the same neutral, equally calculated to facilitate the purposes of the belligerent.³ But if this principle be merely applied with *prima facie* consistency, it has an obvious relevance to incidents like the successive sojourns of the Baltic fleet, during the late war, at Madagascar and Kamranh Bay.

The situation has become considerably aggravated by the fact that Admiral Rohzdestvensky, after leaving Kamranh Bay, merely proceeded some fifty miles up the coast of French Indo-China to

¹ Hall's "International Law," 4th ed., p. 654, referring to Negrin, p. 180.

² Cf. *Times*, April 21, 1905.

³ "International Law," 4th ed., p. 629.

Hon-kohe Bay, north of Nhatrang. It is stated that Hon-kohe Bay is a harbour within territorial limits offering the advantages of very deep water.¹ There is also a telegraph station at Hon-kohe Bay. The stay of the Russian fleet in the French waters of Cochin China and Indo-China is therefore nearly of a month's duration.

¹ *Times*, May 6, 1905.

APPENDIX K.

EXTRACT FROM *TIMES*, AUGUST 29, 1904, p. 10.

List of Russian Acts of Interference with Neutral Shipping since the outbreak of War in the Far East.

I.—INCIDENTS AT PORT ARTHUR.

British Steamship *Foxton Hall*.—Seized in Port Arthur harbour after outbreak of hostilities. (She had arrived on February 4—*i.e.* four days before hostilities began—from Cardiff with cargo of coal for Russian navy.)

British Steamship *Wenchow*.—Detained under circumstances of great hardship at Port Arthur, February 8–14, with Japanese refugees from Ching-wan-tao on board.

British Steamship *Hsiping*.—Fired upon from Port Arthur on her way from Ching-wan-tao; ordered to Dalny, and detained there four days (February 18).

British Steamship *Hipsang*.—Fired upon July 16 by Russian destroyer and sunk; according to the finding of the Naval Court held at Shanghai, August 23, “without any just cause or reason.”

II.—OPERATIONS OF ADMIRAL WIRENIN'S SQUADRON IN RED SEA AND MEDITERRANEAN.

British Steamship *Mongolia* (London to Sydney).—Stopped, February 20 in Red Sea, but allowed to proceed.

British Steamship *Mombasa* (London to Calcutta).—Stopped about same date in Red Sea, but allowed to proceed.

British Steamship *Etrickdale*.—Seized and brought into Suez, February 27; released February 29.

British Steamship *Frankley*.—Seized and brought into Suez, February 27; released February 29.

British Steamship *Paiawan*.—Stopped in Red Sea, but allowed to proceed.

British Steamship *Ben Alder*.—Stopped in Red Sea, but allowed to proceed.

(The Egyptian Government repeatedly protested against the Russian ships overstaying their time limits in Egyptian waters, and especially

against the prolonged stay of the *Dmitri Donskoi* at Suez under pretext of repairs.)

British Steamship *Mortlake*, German Steamship *Stuttgart*, Norwegian Steamer *Standart*.—Stopped off Port Said, March 13–16, by *Dmitri Donskoi*.

British Steamship *Osiris* (Brindisi to Port Said).—Stopped May 4 by Russian cruiser *Khrabry*, demanding surrender of Japanese mails; delayed for two hours.

III.—OPERATIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOCK SQUADRON.

British Steamship *Allanton*.—Seized June 16 (first raid) on homeward voyage; taken to Vladivostock and condemned by Prize Court, June 27, mainly on the ground, not that she was actually carrying contraband, but that she had carried contraband on her outward voyage.

German Steamship *Arabai*.—Seized July 22 (second raid), taken to Vladivostock; released about August 5, the cargo for Japan alone being confiscated.

British Steamship *Knight Commander*.—Sunk July 24 by Russian cruisers and subsequently adjudged a lawful prize by the Vladivostock Prize Court. No compensation.

German Steamship *Thea* (chartered by Japanese firm).—Sunk July 24 by Russian cruisers, and adjudged a lawful prize on the ground that she had lost her status as neutral ship. Compensation, nevertheless, granted to German owners.

British Steamship *Calchas*.—Seized on or about July 25, taken to Vladivostock; case still pending.

IV.—OPERATIONS OF THE "PETERBURG" AND "SMOLENSK" IN THE RED SEA.

British Steamship *Crewe Hall*, British Steamship *Menelaus*.—Stopped July 12 by the *Peterburg* off Jiddah, and detained for four hours for examination.

British Steamship *Malacca* (P. and O.).—Seized July 13 by the *Peterburg*; brought into Suez July 19 in charge of a prize crew; passed through the canal, and left Port Said July 21; released at Algiers, July 27.

British Steamship *Dragoman*.—Stopped July 15, but allowed to proceed; she was bound from the Russian port of Batum, in China.

German Steamship *Prinz Heinrich*.—Stopped July 15 or 16 by the *Smolensk*, and mail bags for Japan taken out of her; mail bags surrendered a couple of days later and sent on by British steamship *Persia*, which was stopped by the *Smolensk* for the purpose.

British Steamship *Dalmatia*.—Stopped July 17, but allowed to proceed.

British Steamship *Ceylon*.—Challenged July 18 by *Peterburg*, but allowed to proceed; she was homeward bound.

German Steamship *Scandia*.—Seized in the Red Sea, and brought back to Suez, July 24, in charge of a prize crew, but released same day, though she was stated to have 400 tons of rails for Japan on board.

British Steamship *Ardova*.—Seized by the *Smolensk* and brought back to Suez, July 25, in charge of a prize crew, but released same day.

British Steamship *Formosa*.—Seized and brought into Suez in charge of a prize crew, July 26; released July 27.

German Steamship *Holsteinia*.—Seized and brought into Suez in charge of a prize crew, July 27; released at once.

British Steamship *City of Agra* and *Massilia*.—Stopped by Russian cruisers (exact date not stated), but allowed after examination to proceed.

British Steamship *Comedian*.—Stopped and papers examined by *Smolensk* (August 22) in South African waters, eighty miles from East London.

V.—OPERATIONS OF NEW CRUISERS (TRANSFORMED GERMAN LINERS).

British Steamship *Manora*.—Challenged, August 6, twenty-five miles south of Finisterre.

British Steamship *Ronda*.—Stopped on voyage from Hull to Naples August 13, off Spanish coast.

British Steamship *Scotian*.—Stopped and examined, August 17, by *Ural* (ex *Maria Theresia*) off Straits of Gibraltar.

VI.—OPERATIONS OF THE BALTIC FLEET.

British Steamship *Oldhamia*.—Seized by the Baltic Fleet on May 18, 1905. The officers were put on board the *Oleg*, driven to Manila after the battle in the Sea of Japan, May 28, 29. The crew were transferred to the *Dnieper* (ex *Peterburg*), and an entirely Russian prize crew took over the *Oldhamia*, which was ordered to Vladivostock, escorted by the converted cruisers *Kuban* and *Terek*. It is difficult to conceive a more improper exercise of the right of visitation and search than this case. Modern usage only allows the master of the merchantman to be summoned with his papers on board the belligerent cruiser.¹ The Prize Code of the Institute of International Law prohibits a belligerent from requiring any person whatever to be summoned on board the belligerent vessel which intercepts the neutral. Both usage and authority, therefore, are entirely opposed to such an act as that of the Baltic Fleet, in requiring the entire crew and officers of the neutral merchantman to leave their vessel to embark on the belligerent warships. This vessel reported sunk.

British Steamship *Cilurnum*.—Stopped June 2, 1905, by Russian cruiser *Rion* (ex *Smolensk*); bags of beans, cotton, and boxes of antimony thrown overboard. Russians left suddenly, stating vessel was released.

¹ The *Eleanour*, 2 Wheaton, 262.

British Steamship *St. Kilda*.—Stopped and searched by Russian cruiser *Dnieper* (ex *Peterburg*) on June 4, 1905, 60 miles north of Hong Kong while on voyage to Japan. Cargo consisted of jute, rice, and cotton, and therefore was only conditionally contraband. Sunk on June 5. Eleven Europeans, including the captain, detained on board the *Dnieper*.

A question was addressed to Lord Lansdowne, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as to the probability of an early settlement of the claims of the captains, officers, and crews of merchant vessels, for personal suffering and loss¹ incurred by the action of Russian cruisers during the Russo-Japanese War. In reply, Lord Lansdowne stated that in the case of the *Ettrickdale* there had been payment in full, and the case was closed. But this was the only case in which a completely satisfactory result had been arrived at. In the case of the *Frankby*, the owners had received the greater part of their claim. In the case of the *Foxton Hall*, eighty per cent. of the amount claimed had been paid. In the case of the *Calchas*, the Russian Government had already paid the value of the flour on board. In the case of the *Hipsang*, *Ardova*, and *Knight Commander*, claims had been made for the loss of the effects of the captain, officers, and crew, and for compensation. There was not the slightest evidence that any of these claims would be even considered at the date of Lord Lansdowne's statement, and it is clear that they must be definitely abandoned, in the light of the decision of the St. Petersburg Prize Court in the case of the *Knight Commander*. The Russian Prize Courts have set a seal upon their "perversely wrong decisions," to use the language of Professor Holland, by an infraction of the rule of international law that "severe damages ought to be inflicted upon those captors who have behaved with cruelty towards the captured crew."² In two of the above cases, the liability of captors for embezzling property was a principle announced by Lord Stowell, who observed, in another case, that where it could be proved that the captors had any such malignant motive as that of inflicting pain or personal indignity, he would inflict exemplary damages. In this case, twenty-two of the crew of a Spanish vessel were put in irons; but the captor was a British privateer, and not a cruiser of his Majesty's Navy. Lord Nelson observed that privateers were very irregular. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian vessels

¹ *Times*, July 14, 1905.

² Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 333; referring to the *Maria* and the *Vrouw Johanna*, 4 Rob. p. 348; the *Concordia*, 2 Rob., p. 102; the *St. Juan Bautista* and *La Purissima Concepcion*, 5 Rob. p. 33; the *Eleanor*, 2 Wheaton's (Amer.) Rep. p. 359.

who have committed irregularities, or who have been guilty of wilful misconduct and vexation, have been Imperial cruisers. "Cadit quæstio" apparently that several authentic cases of wilful misconduct and vexation have occurred during the Russo-Japanese War. The crew of the *Knight Commander* were compelled to jump into the sea on their vessel being sunk. During the Great War, where an act of cruelty was proved against a privateer, it was a cause of forfeiture by the British Prize Act¹ of the vessel's letters of marque.

¹ *The Marianne*, (1803) 5 C. Rob. 9.

APPENDIX M.

The Portsmouth Treaty.

TEXT OF THE ARTICLES.

The full text of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Portsmouth (N. H.) between Russia and Japan is issued by Reuter's Agency as follows :—

“ His Majesty the Emperor of Japan on the one part, and his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias on the other part, animated by the desire to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and peoples, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace, and have, for this purpose, named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :—

“ His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: His Excellency Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency M. Takahira Kogoro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

“ And his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias: his Excellency M. Serge Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia and his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

“ Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following articles :—

“ ARTICLE I.—There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and between their respective States and subjects.

“ ARTICLE II.—The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea.

“ It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other

foreign Powers—that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

“ It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russo-Korean frontier from taking any military measures which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

“ ARTICLE III.—Japan and Russia mutually engage:—

“(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liau-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Article I. annexed to this treaty, and

“(2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

“ The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

“ ARTICLE IV.—Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

“ ARTICLE V.—The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and adjacent territory and territorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.

“ The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

“ ARTICLE VI.—The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kwang-cheng-tsze) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region, belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

“ The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

“ ARTICLE VII.—Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes, and in nowise for strategic purposes.

“ It is understood that this restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liau-tung Peninsula.

"ARTICLE VIII.—The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with a view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.

"ARTICLE IX.—The Imperial Russian Government cede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and all islands adjacent thereto and public works and properties thereon.

"The 50th degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of additional Article II. annexed to this treaty.

"Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin or the adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tartary.

"ARTICLE X.—It is reserved to the Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country; but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to Japanese laws and jurisdiction.

"Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence or to deport from such territory any inhabitants who labour under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

"ARTICLE XI.—Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Behring Seas.

"It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

"ARTICLE XII.—The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as the basis of their commercial relations, pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation on the basis of the treaty which was in force before the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, Customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, and the admission and treatment of the agents, subjects, and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

"ARTICLE XIII.—As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored.

"The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of prisoners.

"All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such

delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.

"The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present to each other, as soon as possible after the delivery of prisoners has been completed, a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of prisoners from the date of capture or surrender up to the time of death or delivery.

"Russia engages to repay to Japan, as soon as possible after the exchange of the statements as above provided, the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

"ARTICLE XIV.—The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias.

"Such ratification shall with as little delay as possible, and in any case not later than 50 days from the date of the signature of the treaty, be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister in Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States in St. Petersburg, and from the date of the later of such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full force.

"The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place in Washington as soon as possible.

"ARTICLE XV.—The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages.

"The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of discrepancy in interpretation the French text shall prevail.

"In conformity with the provisions of Articles III. and IX. of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional Articles:—

"I. TO ARTICLE III.

"The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the Treaty of Peace comes into operation; and within a period of 18 months from that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Lian-tung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall be first withdrawn.

"The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed 15 per kilomètre, and within that *maximum* number, the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible having in view the actual requirements.

"The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles, and shall take by common accord the

measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of 18 months.

"II. TO ARTICLE IX.

"As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, a commission of delimitation, composed of an equal number of members to be appointed respectively by the two high contracting parties, shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Sakhalin. The commission shall be bound, so far as topographical considerations permit, to follow the 50th parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

"The foregoing additional Articles are to be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to which they are annexed.

"Portsmouth, the 5th day, 9th month, 38th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 23rd August (5th September), 1905.

"In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed their seals to the present Treaty of Peace.

"Done at Portsmouth (New Hampshire), this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August (fifth September), one thousand nine hundred and five."

APPENDIX Q.

The New Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

THE following "Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, forwarding a copy of the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, signed at London, August 12, 1905," was issued yesterday as a Parliamentary paper [Cd.2690]:—

"*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.*

Foreign Office, September 6, 1905.

"Sir,—I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a new Agreement concluded between His Majesty's Government and that of Japan in substitution for that of the 30th January, 1902. You will take an early opportunity of communicating the new Agreement to the Russian Government.

"It was signed on the 12th August, and you will explain that it would have been immediately made public but for the fact that negotiations had at that time already commenced between Russia and Japan, and that the publication of such a document whilst those negotiations were still in progress would obviously have been improper and inopportune.

"The Russian Government will, I trust, recognize that the new Agreement is an international instrument to which no exception can be taken by any of the Powers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You should call special attention to the objects mentioned in the preamble as those by which the policy of the Contracting Parties is inspired. His Majesty's Government believe that they may count upon the good will and support of all the Powers in endeavouring to maintain peace in Eastern Asia, and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country.

"On the other hand, the special interests of the Contracting Parties are of a kind upon which they are fully entitled to insist, and the announcement that those interests must be safeguarded is one which can create no surprise, and need give rise to no misgivings.

"I call your especial attention to the wording of Article II., which lays down distinctly that it is only in the case of an

unprovoked attack made on one of the Contracting Parties by another Power or Powers, and when that Party is defending its territorial rights and special interests from aggressive action, that the other Party is bound to come to its assistance.

"Article III., dealing with the question of Corea, is deserving of especial attention. It recognizes in the clearest terms the paramount position which Japan at this moment occupies and must henceforth occupy in Corea, and her right to take any measures which she may find necessary for the protection of her political, military, and economic interests in that country. It is, however, expressly provided that such measures must not be contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of other nations. The new Treaty no doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.

"His Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that this point was readily conceded by Russia in the Treaty of Peace recently concluded with Japan, and they have every reason to believe that similar views are held by other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and Corea.

"His Majesty's Government venture to anticipate that the alliance thus concluded, designed as it is with objects which are purely peaceful and for the protection of rights and interests the validity of which cannot be contested, will be regarded with approval by the Government to which you are accredited. They are justified in believing that its conclusion may not have been without effect in facilitating the settlement by which the war has been so happily brought to an end, and they earnestly trust that it may, for many years to come, be instrumental in securing the peace of the world in those regions which come within its scope.

"I am, &c.,

"(Signed)

LANSDOWNE."

Inlosure.

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT
LONDON, AUGUST 12, 1905.

"PREAMBLE.

"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:—

"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions :—

"ARTICLE I.

"It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

"ARTICLE II.

"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

"ARTICLE III.

"Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

"ARTICLE IV.

"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

"ARTICLE V.

"The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

"ARTICLE VI.

"As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

“ARTICLE VII.

“The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

“ARTICLE VIII.

“The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI., come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

“In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

“In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

“Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

“(L.S.) LANSDOWNE,

“His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

“(L.S.) TADASU HAYASHI,

“Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of Japan at the Court of St. James.”

There can be no doubt that, *inter alia*, the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1905 is an instance of what Sir R. Phillimore calls “the doctrine and practice of guaranteeship, in its proper sense,” *i.e.* against third powers, and not against domestic or internal attacks upon a State.¹ It is therefore not open to the objections advanced against guaranteeship involving the right of intervention. This latter kind of guaranteeship is objected to by Vattel on the ground that it renders an ally a judge. An ally ought to remain an ally, in spite of changes that happen in the internal government of the State to which he is bound.² The treaty between Korea and Japan, however, is a treaty of guarantee

¹ Sir R. Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. ii. s. 62.

² Vattel’s “Droit des Gens,” I. ii. c. xii. s. 197; and Sir R. Phillimore’s “International Law,” vol. ii. s. 57 *et seq.*

involving intervention in the domestic affairs of another country. Treaties of guaranty involving a guarantee to defend the particular constitution of a State have not only been the most numerous but even the most important; since they include the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, and the numerous treaties that renewed or confirmed it, and the Treaty of Vicuna, 1725; guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction, confirmed by France in 1738, and Prussia under Frederic William. The British, the Austrian, the Spanish Empires, as well as the States of Poland, Geneva, and of minor German principalities, have all afforded examples of the application of the principle of guaranty.¹

The doctrine and practice of guaranteeship in its proper sense against third powers was applied at the Treaty of Vienna, 1815; by the Treaty of 1832 between France, Great Britain, Russia, and Bavaria, guaranteeing the independence of Greece; and the Treaty of 1839 between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Holland, and Belgium, guaranteeing the independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium.² The Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1905 rather implicitly than explicitly guarantees independence, as the word does not occur in it. But by Article II. it is clear that it is a guarantee of territorial integrity. The Agreement is an equal treaty, there being not merely an equality, but even an identity in the promises.³ A guarantee may apply to a treaty of peace, or any other treaty.⁴ The Anglo-Japanese Agreement cannot be called a guarantee of a treaty of peace, for by Article VI. it expressly contemplates a state of war. But it is, none the less, a treaty of guarantee.

It is, however, much more than a treaty of guarantee.⁵ It introduces a public written law for the East, contemplates a more or less permanent arrangement of national and international rights, and may almost be considered as establishing the assertion of a principle like the balance of power in the Far East.

The first commencement of international relations between Britain and Japan is alluded to by Sir R. Phillimore.⁶ A Convention was concluded at Nagasaki in 1855, by which certain ports were opened for certain purposes to British ships, and the jurisdiction of British authorities over British subjects in Japanese ports was retained. British ships of war, in the necessary performance of their duties, had a general right to enter all the ports of Japan; but, unless compelled by necessity, they were confined like merchantmen to certain ports named in the Convention.

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. ii. s. 56.

² *Ibid.*, s. 62.

³ Vattel's "Droit des Gens," I. ii. c. xii. s. 174.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *supra*, c. xvi. s. 235.

⁵ Cf. Hall's "International Law," 5th ed., pt. ii. c. x. p. 341.

⁶ "International Law," vol. iii., preface to, p. x.

APPENDIX R.

Treaty between Japan and Korea, November 17, 1905.

REUTER'S Agency is informed that the following is the text of the treaty between Japan and Korea, which was signed at Seoul on November 17:—

“The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two empires, have, with that object in view, agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations, to serve until the moment arises when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength:

“ARTICLE 1.—The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs in Tokio, will hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea, and the diplomatic and Consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.

“ARTICLE 2.—The Government of Japan undertakes to see to the execution of the treaties actually existing between Korea and other Powers, and the Government of Korea engages not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

“ARTICLE 3.—The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of his Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, who shall reside at Seoul, primarily for the purpose of taking charge of, and directing, matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal audience of his Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station Residents at the several open ports and such other places in Korea as it may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the direction of the Resident-General designate, exercise the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this agreement.

“ARTICLE 4.—The stipulation of all treaties and agreements existing between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement shall continue in force.

"ARTICLE 5.—The Government of Japan undertakes to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea.

"In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

"HAYASHI GONSUKE,

"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
"Plenipotentiary;

"PAK CHE SOON,

"Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"November 17."

The Treaty between Japan and Korea is an instance of a guarantee "to defend the particular constitution of a State generally against all attacks which may assail it, whether Foreign and External or Domestic and Internal."¹ The fifth article, by which the Governments of Japan and Korea undertake to maintain the dignity and welfare of the Imperial House of Korea, renders it possible to compare it in principle to the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI. In spite of the circumstance that, by the first article of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea was recognized as an independent sovereign State by Japan, Korea must now be considered a mi-souverain State, possessing less treaty-making power than the South African Republic under the Convention of London, 1884. By article 4 of the Convention of London, the South African Republic had an unrestricted right to conclude treaties with the Orange Free State and certain native tribes. Under the Treaty between Japan and Korea, the treaty-making power of the latter country is entirely abrogated. The first two articles of the treaty exhibit a close parallel to the fourth clause of the eighteenth article of the Convention of Pretoria, 1881, by which it was provided that the Transvaal Government, in regard to communications with foreign powers, should correspond with her Majesty's Government through the British Resident and the High Commissioner. The internal sovereignty of Korea was preserved under the Treaty of 1905 more completely than that of the Transvaal Republic under the Conventions of Pretoria and London. By these latter the Transvaal Government submitted to limitations of its internal sovereignty as regards the natives. The British Resident, under these conventions with the late South African Republic, had more extensive duties than the Japanese Resident-General under the Treaty of 1905, who merely directs external relations.

The fifth article of the Treaty between Japan and Korea, leaving unimpaired all treaties between the two States not inconsistent

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. ii. s. 56.

with the treaty itself, recalls the fact that the loss of personality and independence leaves unimpaired what are called transitory treaties—that is to say, treaties relating to cessions of territory or demarcations of boundary.¹ It would not be competent for either party to a treaty like that between Korea and Japan to annul treaties between other States that pre-existed before Korea's abandonment of the rights of legation.

¹ Sir R. Phillimore's "International Law," vol. iii. s. 529.

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
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